

COMPARISON OF ASSOCIATED PRESS ARTICLE ISSUES – 7-27-2010

NO.	ISSUE	PRE-ACCIDENT Washington APPROACH	LACMTA APPROACH
1	Known Faulty circuits	Deemed a minor nuisance	No known history of faulty track circuits. Metro has modified the software system to detect “parasitic oscillations” (the condition that led to the WMATA accident) in track circuits on all rail lines which, when they occur, will generate an alarm at Rail Operations Center.
2	Older cars – susceptible to collapsing (crashworthiness)	Not replaced	The specification of the Red Line cars required conducting stress analyses, using guidelines issued by FTA, including crash worthiness analyses, to verify the structural integrity of the vehicles. The requirement that one vehicle not telescope into another at impact speeds up to 20mph was specifically written into the specification.
3	MTA’s signal system on part of the Red Line (approx 3.5 miles) is same as Washington’s (made by ALSTOM)	N/A	Metro is replacing its ALSTOM system. Expected schedule for replacement is 12 months. An interim solution has already been implemented that counts on the alarm to controllers as well as slower speed on the 3.5 miles.
4	On-board event recorders	No event recorders	The Breda cars (and all future cars) have event recorders installed and we plan on adding them to our Mid-Life Overhauls as they occur for the other fleets, including Red Line.
5	Involvement of Board of Directors	Failed to actively monitor safety issues	Our Board has consistently approved significant funds for safety improvements. Staff will continue regular reporting on safety matters through Operations Comm.
6	Testing of track circuits	Old test procedures had not been updated	Two independent tests of Metro’s track circuits were conducted after the Washington accident – one by Metro staff and another by ALSTOM. Both tests confirmed proper detection by track circuits. Metro also has a Signal Maintenance plan which includes testing of track circuits on a 2 year cycle. Additionally, the algorithms added

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			to our central control monitoring system check the track circuits on a continuous basis to alert Rail Operations if there are anomalies in train detection.
7	Mixing of train control components from different manufacturers	This practice was permitted	While the practice of mixing manufacturers is not banned per se, the practice of mixing manufacturers has not been one that Metro has encouraged or implemented to date. Specifically, were we to consider doing so (for example during phased replacement of obsolete equipment) we would do so under the approval and concurrence of equipment manufacturers and designers and in such a way as to minimize the connectivity of new and old equipment. Regarding the testing of track circuits on Red Line, Metro uses the manufacturer's recommended operating procedures.
8	Automatic Train Operation (ATO)/Manual Operation	ATO operation	Normal ATO operation. The mode of operation has no relation to the primary cause of the Washington accident. This is recognized in the NTSB synopsis of the accident.