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APPEARANCES:

- GEORGE GRAINGER, UMTA, REGION 9
- ALEX E. LUTKUS, CALIFORNIA PUC
- ERNIE VON IBSCH, CPUC
- JOEL SANDBERG, SCR TD
- JOE REYES, SCR TD
- W. C. LEBECK, LAFD
- GARY J. SALYER, LAFD
- RALPH S. WEULE, BARTD
- EDWARD FARRELLY, PATH
- GEORGE DONATO, MUCTC
- WILLIAM RHINE, SCR TD
- RUDD MC FARLAND, SCR TD
- JOHN THOMPSON, WMATA
- AL LOCK, MARTA
- PAUL GOTTFRIED, BOOZ, ALLEN
- RAMESH THAKARAR, SCR TD
- DOUGLAS LOW, SCR TD
- NEAL RICHARDS, SCR TD
- DICK GALLAGHER, SCR TD

1 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1981

2 8:30 A.M.

3 --000--

4  
5 MR. MC FARLAND: WE HAVE A DIFFERENT FORMAT THIS  
6 MORNING. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS ISSUES THIS MORNING IN OPEN  
7 FORUM AND IN PARTICULAR VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS, EMERGENCY  
8 VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS, EMERGENCY EVACUATION, EMERGENCY  
9 COMMUNICATIONS, FIRE MANAGEMENT, AND PUNCTUAL REQUIREMENTS  
10 OF CENTRAL CONTROL DURING EMERGENCIES. IF WE COULD GET SOME  
11 FEEL OF YOUR DIRECTION ON THAT, I THINK THOSE ISSUES -- IF  
12 SOMEONE WOULD LIKE TO KICK AROUND WITH YOU ON THE VENTILATION,  
13 I AM PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE NEED FOR MIDLINE SHAFTS.

14 IN THE PRESENTATIONS YESTERDAY I NOTICED THE  
15 MAJORITY OF THE SYSTEMS THAT WERE DISCUSSED INCORPORATED  
16 MIDLINE SHAFTS. WE ARE LOOKING AT SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE  
17 MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE TRACK ENERGY REQUIREMENTS  
18 DURING OPERATION. ONE OF WHICH IS VERTICAL PROFILING DROPPING  
19 OUT, CLIMBING IN.

20 ONE OF THE INCREMENTAL CAPITAL COSTS THAT WOULD  
21 BE INCURRED WOULD BE THE DEEPER MIDLINE SHAFTS. IT WOULD BE  
22 REQUIRED WITH VERTICAL PROFILING AS OPPOSED TO THE SHAFT WITH  
23 NON-VERTICAL PROFILING AT THE TIME THE RUNNING TUNNEL WOULD BE  
24 SHOWERED. WE HAVE ON THIS PROFILE, ON THE WALL -- THE DOTTED  
25 LINES REPRESENT ONE DRAFTSMAN'S CONCEPT OF WHAT A VERTICAL  
26 PROFILING SYSTEM WOULD LOOK LIKE WITH AN R-18 MILE STARTER  
27 LINE UTILIZING, I THINK, A 6 PERCENT GRADE AND GOING DOWN  
28 NO MORE THAN, I THINK, IT'S A HUNDRED FEET.

1 THE GRADES -- I AM CURIOUS. RALPH'S EYES JUST  
2 WENT UP. IT'S BEEN FASCINATING LOOKING AT THE STUDIES ON  
3 GRADES. WE HAVE PEOPLE LIKE CLOUDER NOW COMING BACK TO US  
4 SAYING, "WHAT IS WRONG WITH 6 PERCENT?" WHEREAS A YEAR AGO  
5 THEY WOULD GO, "HOW MUCH?" WE CAN PUSH OUT AN EMPTY TRAIN.  
6 WE CAN PUSH OUT A FULL TRAIN WITH AN EMPTY TRAIN ON 6 PERCENT  
7 GRADE. THAT WAS THE LIMITATION. THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE  
8 PUSH-OUT CAPABILITY AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE IT IN THE  
9 SHORTEST PERIOD OF TIME WHAT GRADE WE WOULD HAVE A HIGH  
10 PROBABILITY OF BEING ABLE TO PUSH OUT A LOADED TRAIN WITH AN  
11 EMPTY TRAIN, AND 6 PERCENT IS NOT AN EXTREME CASE. WE WANTED  
12 TO MINIMIZE ANY OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINT. IF FINE, WE BUY LOW  
13 OPERATION COSTS, BUT WE TOTALLY DESTROY MIDWAY, HEADWAY  
14 CAPABILITIES, THOUGH, THAT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. LOOKING AT  
15 THOSE TWO CONSTRAINTS, IT CONTRAINS AN UPPER LIMIT IN TERMS  
16 OF MOTOR CONTROL FAILURE ALSO.

17 WE ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF TAKING A HARD LOOK  
18 AT VERTICAL PROFILING, AT REGENERATION, AT COSTING, AT OTHER  
19 CONTROL LOGICS THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO REDUCE THE TRACK  
20 ENERGY REQUIREMENTS. WE CAN KEEP ASKING BILL FOR A LITTLE  
21 DEVICE ON THE SIDE THAT WILL ABSORBE ALL THAT ENERGY. BUT  
22 IF WE, IN THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION, HAVE A DEFINITE NEED  
23 FOR MIDLINE SHAFTS, IT PUTS A WHOLE DIFFERENT PROSPECTIVE  
24 ON US. AND AGAIN, WHAT I HEAR IS I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY  
25 OPTION OTHER THAN THE 14,000 FOOT TUNNEL. WE HAVE TO DRILL,  
26 I WOULD GUESS, FOUR OR FIVE HUNDRED FEET. WE WOULD HAVE TO  
27 LOOK AT THE ALTERNATIVE ENGINEERING COST, AT THE OTHER  
28 OPTIONS TO A MIDLINE SHAFT, SUCH AS TRAIN DOORS AS SOME SORT

1 OF AN EMERGENCY ESCAPE FOR PASSENGERS IN THE TUNNEL. YOU  
2 CAN GO INTO A CHAMBER, WHICH I TOTALLY REJECTED UNTIL SOMEONE  
3 YESTERDAY MENTIONED THIS IS A CONCEPT THAT IS NOT OUT OF THE  
4 QUESTION.

5 THE GEOLOGY IN GENERAL IS GOOD. IT APPEARS THAT  
6 WE ARE AT NO BIG ADVANTAGE IN A SINGLE TRACK VERSUS A DOUBLE  
7 TRACK. FROM A VENTILATION STANDPOINT, THEN, I THINK WE GO  
8 TO A SINGLE-TRACK TUNNEL, TWO SINGLE-TRACK TUNNELS. THAT,  
9 PLUS THERE ARE AREAS IN THE BASIN WHERE WE ARE GOING TO HAVE  
10 METHANE GAS PROBLEMS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DEPLETED OIL  
11 SHALE AREAS. YOU DIG INTO THEM AND THE CREW WILL STILL SEE  
12 THE SHALE AND A LOT OF METHANE GAS. AND I THINK THAT IS  
13 SOMETHING WE ARE GOING TO BE FACED WITH.

14 I BELIEVE THAT YOU MENTIONED MONTREAL HAD A  
15 SECTION OF TUNNEL -- WAS IT MONTREAL? AM I WRONG, GEORGE --  
16 OF METHANE GAS?

17 MR. DONATO: METHANE GAS. NO. WE DIDN'T HAVE METHANE  
18 GAS. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE HAD -- WE HAD INFILTRATION OF  
19 GASOLINE IN THE SUBWAY.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: FROM LEAKY TANKS?

21 MR. DONATO: WE HAD THIS PROBLEM AND WE DEALT WITH IT  
22 BY PASSING A BYLAW WHEREBY SOME OF THE TANKS TOLD US THAT IT  
23 WOULD BE REMOVED. OTHER THAN THE TANKS THAT WERE MORE UNDER,  
24 FOR INSTANCE, 500 FEET, THE SUBWAY WOULD BE TESTED ONE YEAR  
25 WITH A HYDROSTATIC METHOD TO MAKE SURE THEY WERE NOT LEAKING.  
26 AND THIS DOES REDUCE A LOT OF LEAKS, PLUS WE STILL HAVE SOME,  
27 BECAUSE OUR SUBWAY IS VERY DEEP, AND IT'S NOT REALLY SEALED  
28 TIGHT. WE PUMP A LOT OF WATER. WE HAVE A LOT OF

1 INFILTRATION OF WATER. SO IF A TANK IS LEAKING, WE ARE BOUND  
2 TO GET GASOLINE IN OUR SUBWAY.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: WHAT PRECAUTIONS DO YOU TAKE?

4 MR. DONATO: WELL, THE FIRE MARSHAL HAS THE ALTERNATIVE  
5 TO IMPOSE THIS BYLAW AND INSPECT ALL THE STATIONS, THE GAS  
6 STATIONS BELOW THE SUBWAY. THIS IS DONE BY THEM. WE HAVE AN  
7 INSPECTOR. THERE IS AN INSPECTOR THAT DOES THE TESTING ONCE  
8 A YEAR. IF EVER WE HAVE A PROBLEM, YOU SMELL IT PRETTY FAST,  
9 YOU KNOW. AND IT'S REPORTED TO YOU. WE CALL THE FIREMEN.  
10 WE GET THEM ON THE SCENE. AND WE GO WITH THEM TO THE STATION  
11 WHERE WE FEEL THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM. AND WE USUALLY GET  
12 IT BACK THERE WITHIN A DAY TO GET A TANK OUT TO PUMP. THE  
13 FIREMEN HAVE FULL AUTHORITY TO CLOSE THE PLACE COMPLETELY AND  
14 TO GET EQUIPMENT ON THE SITE IF THERE IS A LEAKY TANK TO  
15 REMOVE THE TANK.

16 MR. SALYER: GARY J. SALYER, L.A. FIRE DEPARTMENT.

17 WE HAVE HAD A RASH OF UNDERGROUND TANK LEAKAGE  
18 PROBLEMS. IT SEEMS LIKE THE ONES THAT WERE INSTALLED A LONG  
19 TIME AGO ARE STARTING TO GO NOW. AND IT MIGHT BE A  
20 CONSIDERATION, JUST IN THE FUTURE, THAT THIS IS HAPPENING MORE  
21 THAN I EVER THOUGHT IT WOULD.

22 MR. DONATO: WE COULD, IF YOU WANT, COPY THE BYLAWS WE  
23 HAVE. IT MIGHT BE OF SOME INTEREST TO YOU.

24 MR. MC FARLAND: YES.

25 MR. DONATO: AND HOW WE DEAL WITH THAT PROBLEM. IT IS  
26 A MAJOR PROBLEM, MORE SO IF YOU HAVE A SUBWAY, BECAUSE A  
27 SUBWAY WILL GENERATE STRAY CURRENTS IN THE SOIL. ONE THING  
28 YOU HAVE GOT TO MAKE SURE IS THAT YOU GENERATE AS LITTLE AS

1 POSSIBLE STRAY CURRENTS FROM YOUR TRACKS SO THAT YOU DON'T  
2 CREATE PROBLEMS THAT YOU WOULD BE A VICTIM OF.

3 MR. THOMPSON: JOHN THOMPSON, WMATA.

4 WE HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH TWO DIESEL TANKS. ONE OF  
5 THEM HAPPENED TO COME TO BE ONE OF OUR BUS GARAGES, SO WE HAVE  
6 HAD SOME PROBLEMS IN THAT AREA ALSO.

7 MR. MC FARLAND: WMATA MADE A SHAFT ON THE EAST SIDE  
8 OF THE RIVER CROSSING RIGHT BY THE WATER GATE, AND IT WAS ON  
9 A SIDE OF A VERY LARGE DIESEL FUEL OIL TANK. IT WAS THERE  
10 FOR YEARS AND YEARS. THEY WENT DOWN A GOOD 150 FEET, AND THE  
11 GROUND WAS PERMEATED DOWN TO 150 FEET TOTAL. THE HEATING  
12 OIL WAS OOZING OUT OF THE ROCK. THEY COULDN'T HAVE PICKED  
13 A BETTER SPOT.

14 MR. THOMPSON: WE HAVE JUST HAD THREE INCIDENTS. I  
15 DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT THAT.

16 MR. MC FARLAND: AS I SAID, AGAIN, WE HAVE DONE VERY  
17 MUCH THINKING ABOUT THE PROBLEM, BUT THERE WILL BE SHALE  
18 AREAS IN THE BASIN THAT HAVE ACTIVE METHANE. AND WE ARE GOING  
19 TO HAVE TO DO SOMETHING. I DON'T KNOW OF ANY OTHER SYSTEM IN  
20 THE COUNTRY THAT HAS HAD TO FACE THE PROBLEM. THERE IS NO  
21 SUCH THING AS WATERTIGHT TUNNELS. THE GERMANS HAVE TAKEN UPON  
22 THEMSELVES FOR YEARS TO HAVE WATERTIGHT TUNNELS, AND THE  
23 COST IS ASTRONOMICAL. AND THEY STILL HAVE LEAKS. IF THEY  
24 CAN'T KEEP WATER, WE CERTAINLY CAN'T.

25 DO YOU ALL RECALL THE CASTAIC TUNNEL IN THE  
26 EARLY 50'S WHERE 25 MINERS WERE KILLED IN THE WATER TUNNEL  
27 COMING IN THE VALLEY. THEY WERE IN A SHALE. I DON'T THINK IT  
28 WAS METHANE. IT WAS PETROLEUM GAS. THE DIFFERENCE WAS THAT

1 IT WAS LIGHTER THAN AIR. THE BUREAU OF MINE SAFETY WAS THERE  
2 AND THEY HAD THEIR SNIFFERS UP. AND THEY HAD AN EXPLOSION.

3 MR. DONATO: ONE THING WE DO IS AS SOON AS WE HEAR  
4 ABOUT THE TROUBLE, WE HAVE THE INSPECTOR THERE TO  
5 EXPOSE THE METER, AND THEY MAKE READINGS. AND LATER ON THE  
6 FIREMEN CAN COME ALSO AND THEY MAKE READINGS. IF WE FIND ANY  
7 EXPLOSIVE LEVEL IN THE SUBWAY, WE SHUT DOWN OUR ENTIRE  
8 OPERATION. BUT USUALLY, UNTIL NOW, WE DIDN'T HAVE GASES. WE  
9 HAD GASOLINE.

10 MR. MC FARLAND: YOU SHUT DOWN OPERATIONS?

11 MR. DONATO: WE SHUT DOWN. WE DIDN'T SHUT IT DOWN YET  
12 AT THE TRACK LEVEL. IT WAS NEVER EXPLOSIVE. THERE COULD BE  
13 A LEAK COMING IN WHERE YOU HAVE GASOLINE FOR INSTANCE. WE  
14 USE DETERGENTS IN THE WATER. AND IN SOME CASES WE HAVE SHUT  
15 DOWN OPERATIONS.

16 I REMEMBER WE HAVE SHUT DOWN OPERATIONS IN SOME  
17 CASES. YEAH. BECAUSE OF GASOLINE.

18 MR. RICHARDS: IN CONNECTION WITH THIS SYLMAR  
19 EXPLOSION, THAT WAS IN '71.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: '71.

21 MR. RICHARDS: AND THE GAS THAT CAUSED THE EXPLOSION  
22 THERE HAS BEEN FOUND AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS.

23 MR. MC FARLAND: IT IS A PETROLEUM BY-PRODUCT GAS  
24 LIGHTER THAN AIR.

25 MR. RICHARDS: THIS IS THE GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATION  
26 IN THAT WE ARE REVIEWING THE REPORT NOW. SO WE HAVE TO HAVE  
27 THE IDENTICAL CONDITIONS THAT CAUSED THE SYLMAR EXPLOSION  
28 ALONG WITH OUR ASSIGNMENT.

1 MR. MC FARLAND: THE CONSTRUCTION WILL BE HANDLED, I AM  
2 SURE, BY THE BUREAU OF MINE SAFETY WHICH WAS THE GROUP THAT  
3 WAS BROKEN OFF FROM THE BUREAU OF MINES IN 1970.

4 THEY ARE A VERY ACTIVE SAFETY ORGANIZATION  
5 INVOLVED IN ANY UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION WHERE THERE ARE  
6 GASES. THEY HAVE PROCEDURES, MAINTAIN AIR FLOW, REBREATHERS.  
7 EVERYBODY IN THE TUNNEL HAS A REBREATHER AND INSPECTORS  
8 AROUND SNIFFING.

9 I AM NOT WORRIED ABOUT CONSTRUCTION, BUT  
10 OPERATIONS. I DON'T THINK ANYBODY HAS HAD TO FACE THIS  
11 OPERATION. AND WE HAVE A DOOZY OF A PROBLEM.

12 MR. RICHARDS: IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MINE SAFETY,  
13 THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA HAS BEEN IN CONTROL OF THIS FOR A  
14 NUMBER OF YEARS. AND THEIR REGULATION, RELATIVE TO CENTRAL  
15 VENTILATION MINES, HAS VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY  
16 OF ADDITIONAL EXPLOSIONS PROVIDING THE REGULATIONS ARE  
17 FOLLOWED, BEING ABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE GAS LEVEL WHEN IT  
18 BECOMES DANGEROUS, AND PROVIDING ADEQUATE VENTILATION SO THEY  
19 DON'T REACH THESE EXPLOSIVE LEVELS.

20 MR. REYES: I WAS BASICALLY GOING TO SAY THE SAME THING.  
21 THE HEALTH CARE IN CALIFORNIA PRETTY MUCH REGULATES THAT  
22 AREA. THEY TOOK A LOT OF THE STUFF AND INCORPORATED IT IN THE  
23 MINE SAFETY.

24 MR. MC FARLAND: DURING CONSTRUCTION?

25 MR. REYES: YES.

26 MR. MC FARLAND: WHAT ABOUT OPERATIONS?

27 MR. REYES: WELL, I THINK RALPH IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS  
28 SOME OF THE THINGS THAT ARE COMING. THE WAY WE SEE IT IS THAT



1 IT IS NOT TOO FAR OFF. AND SURELY BY THE TIME THIS PROJECT  
2 GOES INTO THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE, WE CAN BE CONSIDERING THE  
3 USE OF THAT PHASE, BECAUSE I AM SURE THAT WILL PROBABLY BE  
4 INVOLVED IN THAT.

5 MR. MC FARLAND: I HAVE NO CONCERN DURING CONSTRUCTION.  
6 I THINK WE ARE VERY, VERY CLEARLY REGULATED. BUT ONCE  
7 CONSTRUCTION IS COMPLETED --

8 MR. WEULE: YOU WILL FIND, DURING YOUR OPERATION, ONCE  
9 YOUR CONSTRUCTION IS COMPLETED, THAT THEY HAVE NO  
10 JURISDICTION. AND OTHER THAN WORKERS' SAFETY THAT MAY BE  
11 INVOLVED, SUCH AS TYPES OF FUELS THAT YOU WOULD USE IN  
12 EQUIPMENT UNDERGROUND, THEY HAVE REGULATIONS OVER THAT PUT  
13 ON YOUR OPERATIONS. YOU ARE OPERATING TRAINS. WHERE YOU  
14 WILL RUN INTO PROBLEMS IS ANY RECONSTRUCTION THAT YOU DO,  
15 IMPROVEMENTS, ADDITIONS. THEN YOU WILL FIND THAT THEY HAVE  
16 YOU MEET ALL THOSE.

17 MR. MC FARLAND: I THINK WE HAVE A PROBLEM THAT SURELY  
18 THERE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE A MONITORING PROCEDURE IN  
19 THE AREAS WHERE WE HAVE HIGH CONCENTRATION DURING  
20 CONSTRUCTION. THOSE GASES ARE GOING TO GET INTO THE TUNNEL.

21 MR. REYES: I HAVE A QUESTION. WHAT IS DONE IN THAT  
22 TYPE OF SITUATION? ARE THERE TUNNELS WHERE THERE ARE  
23 CONTINUING ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SYSTEMS?

24 MR. MC FARLAND: I DON'T KNOW OF ANY IN THE CONTINENTAL  
25 UNITED STATES. I THOUGHT THERE WAS ONE IN MONTREAL. IT MAY  
26 HAVE BEEN IN TORONTO WHERE THERE WAS ONE STRETCH OF TUNNEL  
27 THAT DID GO THROUGH.

28 MR. DONATO: WE DON'T HAVE ANY. WE HAD THINGS LIKE

1 INFILTRATION OF SULFURIC ACID, YOU KNOW. IT WAS A SOURCE OF  
2 WATER, SPRING WATER WITH SULFUR IN IT. AND IT SMELLED AN  
3 AWFUL LOT IN THE SUBWAY. IT WAS NOT DANGEROUS, BUT IT WAS  
4 AN INCONVENIENCE. WE CHANALIZED THAT TO THE PUMPING STATION  
5 TO GET RID OF IT. THEY WERE NOT DANGEROUS.

6 MR. FARRELLY: IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THIS PROPOSED  
7 130 STANDARD, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF TALK ABOUT THE  
8 INTRUSION OF LIQUID IN THE TUNNELS, AND THIS ENTIRE SECTION  
9 OF THE STANDARD, AND THE REST OF THAT. BUT THAT IS NOT THE  
10 ISSUE IN WHICH YOU ARE RAISING ABOUT METHANE GAS DURING A  
11 CONSTRUCTION PHASE OTHER THAN VEHICULAR TUNNELS WHICH  
12 MONITOR FOR CERTAIN PRODUCTS. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY TRANSIT  
13 TUNNEL THAT HAS A CONTINUING MONITORING SYSTEM.

14 MR. THOMPSON: IN THREE LOCATIONS IN WMATA'S SYSTEM WE  
15 HAVE A FLAME DETECTOR IN THE SHAFT WHICH OCCURS IN THE  
16 INTERSECTION OF THE STREET, SO IF THERE WAS A FAILURE WITHIN  
17 THE GRADE OF THE VENT SHAFT STRUCTURE, IT WOULD DEACTIVATE.  
18 AND IT COMES THROUGH THE AUTOMATIC FIRE ALARM STRUCTURE.

19 MR. MC FARLAND: IS ANYONE ELSE FAMILIAR WITH A SENSOR  
20 OF ANY KIND, EXPLOSIVE?

21 MR. SALYER: THE PROBLEM I CAN SEE WITHOUT NOT HAVING  
22 A CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM IS THAT VERY LIKELY IN THE  
23 TUNNELS, THE FIRST NOTIFICATION YOU WOULD HAVE WOULD BE THE  
24 EXPLOSION OR THE PROBLEM.

25 MR. MC FARLAND: VERY HIGH ACCELERATION RATE.

26 MR. THOMPSON: INCIDENTALLY, THE TWO TO THREE FUEL  
27 LEAKS THAT WE HAD, ONE OF THOSE DID RESULT IN A FIRE IN THE  
28 FUEL IN THE TUNNEL WHICH OCCURRED ON THE BLUE LINE WHEN THE

1 TRAINS WENT THROUGH A GAP. THAT CREATED AN ARC AND SET THE  
2 FUEL ON FIRE.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: WHAT IS YOUR PROCEDURE?

4 MR. THOMPSON: THE TRAIN OPERATOR GOT OFF THE TRAIN AND  
5 EXTINGUISHED THE FIRE.

6 MR. MC FARLAND: IF YOUR SENSOR DETECTOR --

7 MR. THOMPSON: THIS WAS NOT DETECTED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT  
8 A COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID AND NOT A FLAMMABLE ONE, SO IT WOULDN'T  
9 HAVE BEEN DETECTED BY THE SENSOR IN THE FIRST PLACE. BUT  
10 THIS HAD MIGRATED OVER SOME DISTANCE INTO ANOTHER TUNNEL.

11 MR. REYES: I JUST HAD ONE MORE THING. ONE OF THE  
12 PROBLEMS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPMENT IS THAT, YOU KNOW, WE  
13 ARE TALKING ABOUT TWO OR THREE OR A HALF A DOZEN DIFFERENT  
14 GASES THAT HAPPEN TO GET INTO THE SYSTEM. AND THE  
15 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORS ARE GENERALLY ONLY SET UP TO MONITOR  
16 SPECIFICALLY ONE OR TWO OF THESE. SO YOU ADD ANOTHER LAYER  
17 ON THERE. IF YOU HAVE TWO OR THREE COMBINATIONS, YOU MAY END  
18 UP WITH TWO OR THREE SEPARATE SYSTEMS. BUT I BELIEVE IT IS  
19 SOMETHING YOU SURELY WILL LOOK AT AS YOU GO THROUGH AND GET  
20 A BETTER FEELING. I KNOW YOU HAVE ALREADY DONE SOME OF YOUR  
21 BARRING AND WHATNOT. THERE MAY BE SECTIONS IN FACT WHERE IT  
22 COMES ALMOST REQUIRED TO DO THAT.

23 MR. RICHARDS: IN CONNECTION WITH THIS TECHNIQUE, IT  
24 HAS BEEN COMPLETE. I DON'T BELIEVE THEY HAVE FOUND TWO  
25 DIFFERENT GASES AT ONE GIVEN LOCATION. ALTHOUGH, THEY HAVE  
26 FOUND DIFFERENT GASES AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE,  
27 THERE IS ANOTHER GAS THAT WAS JUST MENTIONED HERE, H<sub>2</sub>S. THEY  
28 FOUND THAT IN QUANTITIES IN ONE AREA. SO WE KNOW WE HAVE THE

1 PROBLEM.

2 MR. LOCK: AL LOCK FROM MARTA.

3 DURING REVENUE SERVICE, DURING OPERATIONS YOU HAVE  
4 PISTON ACTION OF A TRAIN FORCING AIR WITHIN THE TUNNEL  
5 IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT OTHER VENTILATION YOU HAVE. AND  
6 CONSIDERING THAT REVENUE SERVICE ON MOST SYSTEMS, IT IS EITHER  
7 24 HOURS A DAY OR CLOSE TO 24 HOURS A DAY.

8 DO YOU THINK YOU COULD HAVE AN ACCUMULATION IN A  
9 SHORT PERIOD OF TIME THAT WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND  
10 COMBUSTIBLE ITSELF?

11 MR. MC FARLAND: I DON'T KNOW. I THINK IT IS AN  
12 INTERESTING POINT. SUCH LOGIC MIGHT PUSH US TO A HIGHER  
13 BLOCKAGE RATE. I AM SURE A HIGHER FLOW RATE.

14 MR. RICHARDS: THE AREA TO WHICH THESE HYDROCARBON  
15 GASES EXPLODE IS IN THE ORDER OF 5 PERCENT. AND THAT IS A  
16 PRETTY LOW RATIO TO BE HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE.

17 SUPPOSING YOUR SYSTEM IS ONLY DOWN FOR, SAY, SIX  
18 HOURS; YOU SEND THE FIRST TRAIN OUT; IT RUNS INTO A POCKET OF  
19 GAS. THERE YOU ARE.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: WE COULD DEVELOP A STRATEGY, SAY, WHEN  
21 THE SYSTEM IS DOWN, WE HAVE NO MORE VENTILATION IN THESE  
22 AREAS THAT WOULD MAINTAIN SOME FLOW RATE, AIR FLOW RATE.

23 I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE A QUESTION. WE HAVE A  
24 GREAT VARIATION IN LINE LENGTHS BETWEEN STATIONS. WE GO TO  
25 THE SHORTAGE VENT ABOUT 2,640, I BELIEVE. THE LONGEST VENT IS  
26 14,000 FEET.

27 AT WHAT LENGTH IN REDUCING LINE LENGTH WOULD YOU  
28 NOT USE MIDLINE SHAFT, UTILIZE BLAST SHAFT AT YOUR STATIONS

1 FOR YOUR EMERGENCY VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS AS OPPOSED TO A  
2 MIDLINE SHAFT?

3 MR. THOMPSON: WE HAVE A SHAFT BETWEEN EVERY STATION.  
4 IN SOME CASES AS MANY AS TWO. IN ONE CASE WE HAVE 33. IN  
5 BETWEEN THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN TWO STATIONS IS IN THE  
6 ORDER OF 200 FEET WITH THE SHAFT IN THE MIDDLE, WITH VENT  
7 STRUCTURES TO HOLD IT TIGHT TOGETHER.

8 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU HAVE A WRITTEN CRITERIA ON THE  
9 USE OF THESE SHAFTS OR WHY YOU USE THE MIDLINE SHAFT IN SUCH  
10 SHORT SPACES?

11 MR. RICHARDS: I BELIEVE THAT IS JUST PART OF THE  
12 OPERATION. PART OF THE SCENARIO THAT WAS DEVELOPED EARLY ON  
13 WAS TO PROVIDE FOR EVALUATION OF HEAT FROM THE TUNNELS  
14 INCIDENTAL TO TRAIN OPERATION. AND THEY FELT IT WAS NECESSARY  
15 TO INSTALL THEM THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM.

16 MR. DONATO: WE HAVE 50 STATIONS AND ABOUT 50  
17 KILOMETERS OF SUBWAYS. AND THE DISTANCE BETWEEN SOME STATIONS  
18 IS BELOW A KILOMETER, SO IT COULD BE A THOUSAND FEET. WE HAVE  
19 MIDLINE SPAN SHAFTS IN ALL CASES.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: IN ALL CASES?

21 MR. DONATO: I SHOULD SAY ONE CASE WHERE THEY COULDN'T  
22 BUILD IT, BUT WE ARE VERY UNFORTUNATE ABOUT THAT. THERE  
23 SHOULD BE ONE IN BETWEEN EACH STATION. THERE SHOULD BE ONE  
24 IN EVERY ENTIRE TRACK. IF YOU WANT TO BE IN CONTROL, YOU  
25 SHOULD HAVE THAT. YOU SHOULD HAVE THAT ALSO, I THINK, FOR  
26 CONTROLLING YOUR TEMPERATURE IN YOUR SUBWAY.

27 WHAT WE HAVE IS A SYSTEM WHICH IS NOT REALLY VERY  
28 COMPLICATED. WE HAVE A FAN SHAFT IN BETWEEN THE TWO STATIONS.

1 AND THE THIRD -- WE TRY TO PUT IT IN THE THIRD DISTANCE,  
2 DIVIDE THAT INTO THREE PARTS AND IN THE THIRD. AND WE HAVE A  
3 VENT SHAFT IN THE STATION, IN THE LARGER AREA OF THE STATION.  
4 AND THE SIZE OF THAT VENT SHAFT IN THE STATION -- AND IT IS  
5 INCORPORATED IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE STATION -- YOU DON'T  
6 SEE IT. NORMALLY IT IS 300 SQUARE FEET. AND THIS IS THE FREE  
7 AREA. SO IF THERE ARE SOME LOUVERS INSTALLED BY THE  
8 ARCHITECT, HE HAS TO PROVIDE FOR A LARGER AREA. IT HAS TO BE  
9 300 SQUARE FEET.

10 NOW, THIS HAS BEEN VERIFIED WITH THE COMPUTER  
11 PROGRAM. SO IF WE COULD REDUCE THIS 300 SQUARE FEET --  
12 BECAUSE IT WAS COSTLY TO BUILD -- IT WAS FOUND BY THE COMPUTER  
13 PROGRAM THAT WE COULD NOT REDUCE IT. IF YOU REDUCE IT BELOW  
14 THAT, YOU HAVE A VERY BIG REDUCTION AS TO THE EFFICIENCY OF  
15 THAT SHAFT. WHY AT 300 FEET -- IT COMES TO 300 FEET -- IS  
16 THE SIZE OF OUR TUNNEL. OUR TUNNELS ARE ABOUT 300 FEET.  
17 THERE MUST BE SOME RELATION BETWEEN THE TWO. WE USED 300 FEET  
18 BY RULE OF THUMB. AND THE COMPUTER CONFIRMED IT WAS 300 FEET.  
19 AND WHAT WE DO -- WE GO TO MONTREAL -- IN THE SUMMER THE  
20 TEMPERATURES ARE PRETTY HIGH. WE CAN GO UP TO 90, 95 DEGREES.  
21 AND WE KEEP THOSE FAN SHAFTS OPERATING DURING THE NIGHT.  
22 ESPECIALLY DURING THE DAY, ALWAYS LETTING THE AIR COME INTO  
23 THE STATION. AND THE NIGHTS AT MONTREAL ARE VERY COOL. WE  
24 COOL THE MASS OF CONCRETE WE HAVE IN THE STATION. AND DURING  
25 THE DAY, WE SLOW DOWN VENTILATION, AND THE AIR COMING IN THE  
26 STATION AGAIN IS COOL BY THE CONCRETE. SO WE HAVE AN  
27 AIR-CONDITIONING EFFECT TO A CERTAIN EXTENT.

28 THIS WORKS PRETTY WELL. AND MANY, MANY

1 OCCASIONS IT IS COOLER IN THE SUBWAY THAN IT IS OUTSIDE.

2 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU REVERSE THAT IN THE WINTERTIME?

3 MR. DONATO: WE GET INTO A PROBLEM, FOR INSTANCE, IF IT  
4 IS HOT FOR ABOUT THREE OR FOUR DAYS. IT BECOMES COOL. YOU  
5 KNOW, BY THE TIME THE CONCRÉTÉ INCRÉASÉS IN TEMPERATURE, IT  
6 IS VERY HOT IN THE SUBWAY. IT TAKES ABOUT TWO DAYS -- I COULD  
7 SEND YOU SOME OF THE FIGURES I HAVE ON THAT. IT MIGHT BE  
8 INTERESTING TO LOOK AT.

9 FOR THE WINTER, WE GO EASY TO 20 BELOW ZERO. THEN  
10 WE SHUT DOWN THE FANS COMPLETELY. ACTUALLY, WE HAVE A CHART  
11 WHICH WAS GIVEN TO THE OPERATOR OF THE FAN. AND DEPENDING  
12 UPON THE TEMPERATURE ON HIS DESK -- AND IT IS THE CONTROL  
13 CENTER -- IT IS SHUT DOWN, CERTAIN FANS. HE SHUTS DOWN  
14 CERTAIN SHAFTS. AND THIS GOES ON ACCORDING TO THE  
15 TEMPERATURE.

16 FOR INSTANCE, IF WE HAVE A BIG DO AT THE CONCERT  
17 HALL AND PEOPLE ARE GETTING IN AT 7 O'CLOCK, HE OPENS THE VENT  
18 SHAFT FROM 7:00 TO 7:15 TO MAKE SURE THERE WON'T BE DRAFTS  
19 IN THE CORRIDOR.

20 WE TRY TO KEEP OUR HEAT IN THE SUBWAY IN THE  
21 WINTERTIME, BECAUSE IF WE DON'T SAVE IT, THE TEMPERATURE  
22 WOULD GO DOWN BELOW FREEZING AND WE WOULD GET INTO TROUBLE.

23 MR. MC FARLAND: INTRIGUING.

24 OF COURSE, OUR PROBLEM IS NOT QUITE THAT EXTREME.  
25 BUT IT IS VERY INTERESTING.

26 MR. DONATO: IF YOU ARE NOT CAREFUL, THE AXILLARY  
27 ACCESSES IN THE TUNNEL FOR THE PUMPING STATION -- IF YOU LET  
28 THE COLD AIR GET IN -- WHEN THE WATER INFILTRATES, THESE

1 THINGS WILL GET FULL OF ICE IN THE WINTERTIME AND THE ICE  
2 WILL GET CLOSE TO THE TRAIN, AND YOU WILL HAVE TO CHOP THE ICE  
3 TO MAKE SURE A TRAIN CAN PASS. IT WOULD BE JUST LIKE A  
4 GLACIER.

5 MR. MC FARLAND: ALL OF YOUR RUNNING TUNNEL IS DOUBLE  
6 TRACK?

7 MR. DONATO: YEAH.

8 MR. MC FARLAND: YOU AT WMATA HAVE SINGLE TRACK TUNNEL?

9 MR. THOMPSON: YES.

10 MR. MC FARLAND: ON YOUR MIDLINE SHAFT, DO YOU HAVE TWO  
11 SHAFTS? DO YOU HAVE A SINGLE SHAFT WITH DAMPERS?

12 MR. THOMPSON: WE HAVE A SINGLE SHAFT COMING INTO THE  
13 CENTER SECTION OF THE TRACK.

14 MR. MC FARLAND: THEN YOU CAN'T ISOLATE?

15 MR. THOMPSON: WE CAN'T ISOLATE ONE TRACK FROM THE  
16 OTHER.

17 MR. MC FARLAND: IF YOU HAD AN EMERGENCY ON ONE TRACK  
18 AND YOU WANTED TO EXHAUST THROUGH THAT MIDLINE SHAFT, YOU  
19 WOULD BE EXHAUSTING BOTH TRACKS?

20 MR. THOMPSON: RIGHT. THERE ISN'T ANY REAL SEPARATION  
21 BETWEEN THE TUNNELS.

22 MR. MC FARLAND: YOUR EMERGENCY EGRESS IN ALL CASES  
23 IS VERTICAL?

24 MR. THOMPSON: YES.

25 MR. MC FARLAND: YOU HAVE NO LATERAL EMERGENCY EGRESS?

26 MR. THOMPSON: NO. ANOTHER THING ABOUT OUR EMERGENCY  
27 EGRESS IS, IN MOST CASES, THE FAN EXHAUST AREA IN THE EXIT  
28 PATHS ARE NOT THE COMMON SHAFTS. SO IF THE FAN EXHAUST WAS



1 EXHAUSTING SMOKE, THAT EMERGENCY EXIT WOULD BE USELESS TO THE  
2 PUBLIC.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: OF COURSE, YOUR LOGIC WOULD SAY, IF YOU  
4 ARE EXITING, YOU ARE PULLING SMOKE IN. YOU WOULD WANT YOUR  
5 PASSENGERS TO GO TO THE STATION. YOU COULDN'T BE EXHAUSTING  
6 IN THAT SHAFT.

7 MR. THOMPSON: NOT IF IT WAS AN EXIT. IT WOULD COMPOUND  
8 THE PROBLEM.

9 MR. MC FARLAND: IF THERE WAS AN IMPACT IN THAT SHAFT,  
10 YOU WOULD BE DIRECTING PEOPLE TO IT?

11 MR. THOMPSON: IT DEPENDS. NOW, IN SOME OF THE NEWER  
12 DESIGNS THEY HAVE SEPARATED THE FAN EXHAUST AREA FROM THE EXIT  
13 PATH SO THAT IT IS A COMMON SHAFT WITH A SEPARATION BETWEEN  
14 THE TWO, SO THAT PROBLEM DOESN'T EXIST.

15 MR. MC FARLAND: MR. WEULE, DO YOU HAVE ANY SINGLE-TRACK  
16 TUNNEL IN ATLANTA?

17 MR. WEULE: IN ATLANTA, I DON'T BELIEVE WE DO.

18 MR. MC FARLAND: HOW DO YOU HANDLE VENTILATION SHAFTS?

19 MR. WEULE: WE HAVE VENTILATION FOR THE BULK OF OUR  
20 OPERATION. I BELIEVE THERE MAY BE EXCEPTIONS WHERE YOU DON'T  
21 HAVE MIDLINE SHAFTS. AND THOSE ARE IN STATIONS THAT ARE  
22 ESSENTIALLY IN THE DOWNTOWN AREAS VERY CLOSE TOGETHER. WE  
23 HAVE BOTH THE STATION VENTILATION SHAFTS AS WELL AS THE LINE  
24 SHAFTS.

25 MR. MC FARLAND: DOES YOUR MIDLINE -- CAN YOU ISOLATE  
26 FROM TUNNEL TO TUNNEL IN AN EMERGENCY?

27 MR. WEULE: YES.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU HAVE AN EMERGENCY EGRESS

1 LATERAL?

2 MR. WEULE: LATERAL NOT VERTICAL.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: NOT VERTICAL?

4 MR. WEULE: THAT IS CORRECT.

5 MR. DONATO: YOU TALKED ABOUT VENTILATING SHAFTS. IT IS  
6 A SHAFT WITHOUT A FAN OR A FAN SHAFT IS A SHAFT WITH A FAN.

7 MR. WEULE: WE HAVE BOTH RELEASE SHAFTS, VENT SHAFTS,  
8 AND RELEASE AND FAN SHAFTS, AS WELL. THE MIDLINE SHAFTS --  
9 I AM DESCRIBING FAN SHAFTS FOR VENTILATION.

10 MR. MC FARLAND: WHAT MAXIMUM LENGTH WOULD YOU HAVE  
11 BEFORE YOU PUT IN MORE THAN ONE MIDLINE SHAFT? THIS, OF  
12 COURSE, WE LOOKED AT FROM THE COMPUTER, BUT IN YOUR  
13 EXPERIENCE, YOUR JUDGMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE GOING FROM  
14 STUDIO CITY TO NORTH HOLLYWOOD. WE HAVE A 12,000-FOOT RUN.  
15 WOULD WE CONSIDER A SINGLE MIDLINE SHAFT THERE, SEVERAL  
16 MIDLINE SHAFTS?

17 MR. WEULE: I WOULD HAVE TO GUESS. BUT I THINK WE WOULD  
18 BE LOOKING ON THE ORDER OF TWO TO THREE THOUSAND FEET.

19 MR. MC FARLAND: PER SHAFT?

20 MR. WEULE: YES.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: AND THIS WOULD BE PREDOMINANT FROM  
22 YOUR EMERGENCY VENTILATION REQUIREMENT, NOT YOUR NORMAL . . .

23 MR. WEULE: THAT IS CORRECT. AND IN BARTD'S CASE,  
24 ALL OF THE LINE-FORCED VENTILATION IS TRULY EMERGENCY, WHILE  
25 STATION VENTILATION WAS SET UP TO MAINTAIN MAXIMUM COMFORT,  
26 COOLING THEIR EQUIPMENT, AND SO ON. THAT REALLY WASN'T  
27 NECESSARY. THE PISTON ACTION OF THE TRAIN, THE NATURAL  
28 VENTILATION, IN MOST CASES, WASN'T NECESSARY. SO WE DON'T USE

1 THE STATION VENTILATION EXCEPT FOR CLEARING SMOKE FROM THE  
2 DOWNTOWN AREA. IT GETS A LOT OF EXHAUST GASES.

3 MR. DONATO: I THINK YOU SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION  
4 THE CAPACITY OF THE FAN SHAFT. I THINK YOU COULD GO -- WELL,  
5 THIS IS GUESSING -- YOU COULD GO MORE THAN A MILE, IF YOU HAVE  
6 ONLY AN HOUR WITH ONLY ONE SHAFT, PROVIDING YOU INCREASE  
7 CAPACITY.

8 MR. MC FARLAND: YES.

9 MR. DONATO: ONE THING THAT WAS NOT DISCUSSED IS THE  
10 RELIABILITY OF THE INSTALLATION, AS FAR AS FAILURE.

11 IN OUR CASE WE FIND IT WAS NOT A LOT MORE  
12 EXPENSIVE. IT WAS LESS EXPENSIVE. INSTEAD OF GOING TO ONE  
13 LARGE FAN, WE PUT TWO FANS. YOU SEE, WHEN YOU PUT ONE LARGE  
14 FAN, YOU NEED ADDITIONAL PROTECTION, LIKE, VIBRATOR DETECTORS.  
15 AND THAT FAN, WHEN YOU HAVE TO REPAIR IT, IT IS DOWN FOR A  
16 LONGER PERIOD OF TIME. WE PREFER TO USE TWO FANS, GIVING THE  
17 SAME CAPACITY.

18 MR. MC FARLAND: IN A SERIES?

19 MR. DONATO: NO. IN PARALLEL AND PUSHING AIR IN THE  
20 SAME SHAFT WITH EACH DIFFERENT FEED COMING FROM DIFFERENT  
21 SOURCES. SO YOU HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF REDUNDANCY. IF YOU  
22 LOSE THE FAN, YOU DON'T LOSE IT, IF YOU HAVE A SMALLER FAN.  
23 IF IT IS DEFECTIVE, YOU CAN REPAIR THEM FASTER. IT IS MORE  
24 RELIABLE IN THE STATION. AND I THINK YOU COULD GO FOR EVEN  
25 PROBABLY A MILE, PROVIDING YOU PUT ENOUGH CAPACITY. BUT IF  
26 YOU PUT TOO MANY FANS, SOME BETWEEN STATIONS, YOU CAN  
27 COMPLICATE YOUR WHOLE SYSTEM. AND YOU SHOULD TRY TO KEEP IT  
28 SIMPLE.

1 MR. LUTKUS: RUSS, HAVE YOU GIVEN THOUGHT TO THE --  
2 LET'S TALK ABOUT THAT 14,000-FOOT DISTANCE TO HAVING VENT  
3 SHAFTS AT THE END WITH A PLENUM BETWEEN THE VENT SHAFTS  
4 RUNNING ABOUT 14,000 FEET WITH DAMPERS IN THE PLENUM.

5 MR. MC FARLAND: WITH AN ENGINEERING STANDPOINT,  
6 PROBABLY THE MINIMUM SIZE WE COULD BORE -- THE SMALLEST  
7 BORING MACHINE YOU CAN BUY IN ROCK IS 12 FOOT. ROBIN OR  
8 JARVEL WILL NOT BUILD SMALLER THAN 12 FOOT. IF YOU HAVE A  
9 SMALLER TUNNEL, THEY BACKFILL IT WITH CONCRETE. IF YOU HAVE  
10 TOO SMALL A DAMPER, YOU CAN'T WORK WITH IT. ASSUMING A  
11 ROCK-BOTTOM PRICE OF 3,000 A FOOT, I HAVE A LOT OF OPENINGS  
12 TO LOOK AT BEFORE I WOULD CONSIDER A THIRD TOO. THE MONEY  
13 IS ASTRONOMICAL, TWO TO THREE THOUSAND A FOOT. THAT WOULD  
14 SIMPLIFY THE VENTILATION IMMENSELY. THE TRADE-OFFS, OF  
15 COURSE, WOULD BE MUCH LARGER VENT STRUCTURES WITH THE TWO  
16 BORES.

17 MR. DONATO: ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT REDUCING THE SIZE OF  
18 THE TUNNEL TO INCREASE THE PISTON EFFECT?

19 MR. MC FARLAND: NO. TO HAVE A THIRD BORE THROUGH THE  
20 MOUNTAINS OR A VERTICAL SHAFT. WE HAVE HAD GREAT PROGRESS  
21 MADE OVER THE LAST DECADE IN RAISE BORING. IT MIGHT NOT BE  
22 OUT OF THE QUESTION. RAISE BORING IS GOING THROUGH THE TOP  
23 AND DRILLING DOWN WITH A SMALL DIAMETER AND INTERSECTING YOUR  
24 TUNNEL, AND DROPPING A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A HUGH KELLY BAR,  
25 PICKING UP YOUR BORING MACHINE AND PULLING IT UP WITH  
26 HYDRAULICS. IT IS VERY, VERY EFFECTIVE IN MINE DEVELOPMENT,  
27 TO DRILL DOWN, GRAB YOUR BORING MACHINE, AND PULL IT UP.

28 IT MIGHT NOT BE OUT OF THE QUESTION. IT IS

1 SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE EXAMINED, BUT EVEN IN THE BEST  
2 CASE, IT IS EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE. YOU HAVE A TRADE-OFF OF  
3 THAT COST AGAINST MUCH, MUCH MORE ADEQUATE PORTAL SHAFTS IN  
4 LONGITUDINAL VENTILATION PORTAL TO PORTAL. IT IS DIFFICULT  
5 GOING TO AN ENGINEERING TRADE-OFF BASED ON COST.

6 MR. RICHARDS: HAS ANYBODY HAD ANY EXPERIENCE IN USING  
7 IMPACT FANS TO STIMULATE THE VENTILATION IN THE TUNNEL?

8 MR. MC FARLAND: WHAT KIND OF FANS?

9 MR. RICHARDS: IMPACT.

10 MR. DONATO: THEY USE THAT IN EUROPE ALOT IN THE TUNNELS  
11 FOR PRIVATE CARS. I HAVEN'T SEEN IT USED --

12 MR. MC FARLAND: EXCUSE ME, PLEASE, GEORGE. I DON'T  
13 UNDERSTAND THE TERMINOLOGY OF AN "IMPACT FAN." AXIAL-FLOW  
14 FAN?

15 MR. DONATO: IT IS USED IN ALL THE TUNNELS.

16 MR. MC FARLAND: AXIAL FLOW, THEY USE IN THE SALZBURG  
17 TUNNEL, THE NEW ALPS TUNNEL. IT ASSISTS YOU IN LONGITUDINAL  
18 FLOW.

19 MR. RICHARDS: I NOTICED THEY ARE ALSO USING THEM IN THE  
20 HONG KONG SYSTEM. THEY USE THIS IN LIEU OF SOME OF THE VENTS.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: IT PROVIDES YOU WITH A BOOST IN  
22 LONGITUDINAL FLOW.

23 MR. DONATO: THAT'S RIGHT.

24 MR. RICHARDS: THERE ISN'T ANY EXPERIENCE IN USING THAT  
25 IN YOUR SYSTEM?

26 MR. DONATO: NO. WE DON'T USE THAT. THE PISTON EFFECT  
27 IS MUCH MORE EFFICIENT. EVEN IF YOU HAVE A BLOCKAGE RATIO  
28 WHICH IS NOT REALLY HIGH, YOU CAN HAVE A VERY BIG VENTILATION

1 WITH A PISTON EFFECT. IN MONTREAL THE FRONTAGE OF A TRAIN IS  
2 100 SQUARE FEET. THE TUNNEL IS 300.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: ONE-THIRD.

4 MR. DONATO: AND THE PISTON EFFECT IS VERY IMPORTANT.

5 MR. MC FARLAND: THIS IS A DOUBLE-TRACK TUNNEL?

6 MR. DONATO: YES. AND THE PISTON EFFECT OF THE DOORS --  
7 BECAUSE OF THE CLIMATE, WE NEED DOORS IN OUR STATION. THE  
8 PISTON EFFECT IS VERY, VERY LARGE. WE HAVE PRESSURE  
9 REGULARLY UP TO FIVE POUNDS PER SQUARE FEET. IT IS THE  
10 REASON WHY THE GLASS, IN SOME CASES, WILL LOSE THE WINDOW  
11 PANES, YOU KNOW. SO WE HAVE A STANDARD, I THINK, THAT IS NO  
12 MORE THAN 20 SQUARE FEET FOR GLASS OF MORE THAN THAT.

13 WE ASK FOR PRESSURE, I THINK, OF 30 POUNDS. THEY  
14 CAN SUSTAIN A PRESSURE OF 20 POUNDS PER SQUARE FOOT TO RESIST  
15 THE PISTON EFFECT, ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU HAVE THE TRAINS  
16 LEAVING THE STATION AT THE SAME TIME. YOU COULD HAVE UP TO  
17 SEVEN POUNDS PER SQUARE FOOT. YOU CAN'T OPEN THE DOOR. THE  
18 PISTON EFFECT IS A VERY EFFICIENT WAY TO VENTILATE YOUR  
19 TUNNEL. BUT WHEN YOU HAVE A PROBLEM AND YOU STOP THE TRAINS,  
20 YOU HAVE NO MORE VENTILATION, SO YOU CAN'T RELY ON THAT.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: YOU HAVE A VERY GOOD BLOCKAGE WHEN YOU  
22 STOP THE TRAIN ALSO.

23 MR. DONATO: YES.

24 MR. MC FARLAND: IT WAS MENTIONED YESTERDAY BY ONE OF  
25 THE SPEAKERS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT CENTRAL SHOULD HAVE A  
26 CLEAR INDICATION POSITION OF DAMPERS AND A SITUATION OF FANS.

27 MR. THOMPSON: AT WMATA THE FAN SYSTEM IS COMMUNICATED  
28 TO BY THE DATA TRANSMISSION SYSTEM. AND THAT SYSTEM

1 ACKNOWLEDGES THE RECEIPT OF A COMMAND FROM CENTRAL BASICALLY  
2 AT THE RELAYS THAT ARE IN THE PANEL. BUT ONE OF THE FLAWS TO  
3 THIS IS, IT DOESN'T TELL YOU IF YOU HAVE FAN OPERATION. AND  
4 IT DOESN'T INDICATE THAT YOU HAVE ANY AIRFLOW ACROSS THERE.  
5 IN KEEPING WITH THIS, THERE IS ALSO AN INDICATOR SYSTEM  
6 ATTACHED TO THE DAMPERS, THAT IS, A RELAY CLAMP SWITCH THAT  
7 OPERATES A LOUVER MOVEMENT OR MERCURY SWITCH ATTACHED TO  
8 THE LOUVER BLADES. AND YOUR MERCURY SWITCH IS MUCH BETTER,  
9 BECAUSE IT IS MORE ACCURATE.

10 ONE THING BEING DISCUSSED NOW IS THE ADDITION OF  
11 AN AIR VENT SWITCH IN THE PATH OF THE DISCHARGE FAN THAT  
12 WOULD INDICATE, SWINGING ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, THAT THE FAN  
13 WAS ACTUALLY IN OPERATION EQUIPPED WITH THE RECEIPT IN THE  
14 RETURN OF AN OPERATOR COMMAND. BUT PRESENTLY, RIGHT NOW, WE  
15 CAN ONLY TAKE ITS WORD FOR IT THAT IT IS IN OPERATION. WHAT  
16 THE PROBLEM HERE IS THAT THE FAN ITSELF COULD ACTUALLY BE  
17 SHUT DOWN, NOT HAVE ANY POWER ON IT, BUT THE COMMAND WOULD BE  
18 RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AND YOU WOULD RESULT IN A FALSE  
19 SENSE OF SECURITY.

20 MR. DONATO: AT MONTREAL WE HAVE A COMPUTER TO CONTROL  
21 THE FANS. AND AS I MENTIONED YESTERDAY, WE IMPOSE A CRITERIA  
22 THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO POSITION MANY FANS, UP TO 20 FANS,  
23 IN A MATTER OF TWO MINUTES. THIS IS NOT YET POSSIBLE. THEY  
24 HAVE ON THE COMPUTER TO DO THAT. AND THEY SAY THEY WILL BE  
25 ABLE TO GIVE US THAT.

26 THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM GOES TO THE FAN AND  
27 CLOSES THE CIRCUIT. AND THEIR FEEDBACK OF THE FAN IS  
28 ACTIVATED, COMING BACK TO CONTROL CENTER TO TELL THEM THAT

1 REALLY THE FAN IS ACTIVATED.

2 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU HAVE A SENSOR?

3 MR. DONATO: NO. WE DON'T HAVE DAMPERS.

4 MR. MC FARLAND: JUST THAT THE SWITCH HAS BEEN CLOSED?

5 MR. DONATO: THE SWITCH HAS BEEN CLOSED. AND I AM NOT  
6 SURE, BUT PROBABLY THAT THE CURRENT IS FLOWING.

7 MR. RHINE: THAT IS PROBABLY BETTER INSTRUMENTATION.

8 MR. THOMPSON: I AGREE WITH THAT. FOR SOME REASON  
9 THEIR PARTICULAR LEANING IS TOWARD A VENT SWITCH.

10 MR. DONATO: ONE PROBLEM YOU COULD HAVE WITH THE VENT  
11 IS THAT IT TAKES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME TO ACT. AND IF YOU  
12 WANT TO OPERATE THE FAN, YOU HAVE TO STOP IT FIRST. AND TO  
13 STOP, IF YOU WANT TO KNOW IF IT IS STOPPED, YOU HAVE TO WAIT  
14 UNTIL IT IS STOPPED COMPLETELY OR THE VENT WILL TELL YOU IT  
15 IS STILL OPERATING. AND YOU WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO COME IN  
16 WITH THE OTHER OPERATION.

17 ONE IMPORTANT THING, WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT  
18 RELIABILITY, IS THE MOTOR FAN SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED BY  
19 TERMINAL RELAYS. THIS IS SOMETIMES OVERLOOKED. AND YOU HAVE  
20 EXHAUST, HOT AIR. AND THE HOT AIR HEATS THE MOTOR AND STOPS  
21 THE FAN.

22 MR. MC FARLAND: IF THERE IS A THERMAL OVERLOAD SWITCH,  
23 IT SHOULD BE THERMALLY LINED.

24 MR. THOMPSON: ONE THING ABOUT THE WMATA SYSTEM IS,  
25 FIRST OFF, IT IS TEMPERATURE CONTROLLED. AND IT IS DESIGNED  
26 TO GO AS 90 DEGREES AND SHUT DOWN AFTER IT HAS REDUCED THE  
27 TEMPERATURE IN THE TUNNEL. ONE OF THE PROJECTED MODIFICATIONS  
28 TO THIS SYSTEM IS THE REMOVAL OF ALL THIS TEMPERATURE CONTROL



1 EQUIPMENT AND TO DEPEND COMPLETELY ON REMOTE ACTIVATION OR  
2 LOCAL SWITCH AND NOT HAVE THE TEMPERATURE-INDUCED OPERATION  
3 AT ALL. MAINLY BECAUSE OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE  
4 BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH IT AND THE FACT THAT IT IS BECOMING VERY  
5 COMPLEX.

6 AND ANOTHER THING ABOUT THIS IS, IF WE HAVE A  
7 SHAFT WITH SIX FANS IN IT, THIS SYSTEM WILL SEQUENTIALLY  
8 FIRE EACH FAN IN RESPONSE TO A LACK OF DECREASE IN TEMPERATURE.  
9 IF THE TEMPERATURE REMAINS AT 90 DEGREES, IT WILL FIRE THE  
10 NO. 2 FAN. AND ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THIS IS, IF ONE OF  
11 THESE FANS FAILS TO OPERATE, THERE IS NOT A SYSTEM WHEREIN  
12 THE DAMPERS ON THAT WOULD CLOSE, SO YOU WOULD HAVE A  
13 SHORT-CIRCUITING EFFECT BACK TO THE FAN THAT FAILED TO OPERATE  
14 AND REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VENTILATION SYSTEM. SO  
15 THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING REMOVAL OF A LOT OF THIS TEMPERATURE  
16 CONTROL EQUIPMENT.

17 MR. MC FARLAND: MR. WEULE, DO YOU HAVE A SIMILAR  
18 SYSTEM IN YOUR UNDERGROUND TUNNEL?

19 MR. WEULE: ESSENTIALLY YOU ARE LOOKING AT A FEEDBACK  
20 MECHANISM TO INFORM YOUR CENTRAL CONTROL THAT HE DOES HAVE  
21 OPERATION. AND I THINK THAT IS SOMETHING THAT IS CRITICAL.  
22 YOU CAN'T JUST RECEIVE THE COMMAND. FOR INSTANCE, THERE ARE  
23 FOUR EXHAUST FANS THAT I DESCRIBED PLUS FOUR LINE FANS THAT  
24 FEED INTO THE BORES. THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY EIGHT SEPARATE  
25 COMMANDS THAT THE CONTROLLER HAD TO MAKE. YOU ALWAYS HAVE  
26 THAT FOUR IN THAT CONFIGURATION, SO WE REPROGRAMED TO ALLOW  
27 ONE COMMAND TO OPERATE ALL FOUR. AND THEREBY IT CUTS HIS TIME  
28 AND ALSO THE ABILITY FOR MISTAKES, WE FOUND. WE ARE LOOKING

1 AT OTHER AREAS OF THE SYSTEM TO DO THE SAME THING.

2 THERE ARE AS MANY AS 19 FANS THAT WOULD HAVE TO  
3 BE OPENED SHOULD THERE BE A FIRE CONDITION IN THAT AREA. SO  
4 YOU CAN SEE THAT 19 INDIVIDUAL COMMANDS WOULD TAKE A  
5 CONTROLLER QUITE A BIT OF TIME TO EXECUTE. SO WE ARE  
6 AUTOMATING THOSE. WE ARE NOT LOOKING AT COMPLETE AUTOMATION.  
7 WE STILL WANT TO MAINTAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THERE, BUT WANT  
8 TO SIMPLIFY IT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

9 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU HAVE ZONE CONTROL BY YOUR  
10 OPERATORS IN THE VENTILATION, OR DO YOU HAVE ONE GROUP OF  
11 OPERATORS CONTROLLING YOUR ENTIRE SYSTEM?

12 MR. WEULE: WE HAVE ONE GROUP OF OPERATORS CONTROLLING  
13 A SYSTEM. WE HAVE A TRUE CENTRAL CONTROL. THAT IS ONE  
14 PHYSICAL LOCATION.

15 MR. DONATO: SAME THING IN MONTREAL.

16 MR. WEULE: THE CONTROLLERS THAT OCCUPY THAT ONE SPOT,  
17 ONE ROOM CONTROL TOWER, CONTROL OUR ACCELERATING EQUIPMENT,  
18 MOSTLY EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS COMMAND CONTROL, AND  
19 A LOT OF THE SUPPORT ACTIVITY POWER DISPATCHING, MAIN LINE  
20 TROUBLE-SHOOTING -- ALL THAT IS DETONATED FROM THAT ONE  
21 CENTRAL SYSTEM.

22 MR. MC FARLAND: MR. LOCK, YOU MENTIONED YESTERDAY  
23 YOUR ZONE SECURITY.

24 MR. LOCK: YES.

25 MR. MC FARLAND: HOW MANY STATIONS DO YOU HAVE IN A  
26 ZONE?

27 MR. LOCK: WE UTILIZED THE ZONE CENTER CONCEPT FOR  
28 SECURITY. WE HAVE A CENTRAL CONTROL THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR

1 TRAIN CONTROL, ELECTRIFICATION, SUPERVISOR CONTROL FUNCTIONS  
2 AND COMMUNICATIONS. IN OUR ZONE CENTER THE RESPONSIBILITY  
3 OF THE ZONE CENTER IS ASSOCIATED WITH SECURITY.

4 WE HAVE CC-2 MONITORS, VIDEOTAPING EQUIPMENT.  
5 WE HAVE A COMMUNICATIONS CONSOLE THERE WHICH PROVIDES FOR  
6 PASSENGER ASSISTANCE VIA THE PAY TRAIN ASSIST PHONES. WE HAVE  
7 THE SAME COMMUNICATION CONSOLE PROVIDED FOR POLICE ASSISTANCE  
8 VIA THE SECURITY FENCES THAT ARE LOCATED IN THE STATIONS.  
9 AND THE ZONE CENTER ALSO SERVES AS A PRECINCT HEADQUARTERS FOR  
10 THAT GROUP OF OFFICERS THAT ARE ASSIGNED TO THE REGION. THAT  
11 BASICALLY IS THE FUNCTION OF THE ZONE CENTER.

12 WITH RESPECT TO OUR CENTRAL CONTROL CONCEPT,  
13 OUR CENTRAL CONTROL CONCEPT, AS I SAID, PROVIDES FOR TRAIN  
14 CONTROL. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT HAVE AN AUTOMATED LINE  
15 SUPERVISION FUNCTION WITH RESPECT TO TRAIN CONTROL. SO  
16 ALTHOUGH WE PERFORM LINE SUPERVISION OUT OF CENTRAL, IT IS  
17 NOT NECESSARY INSOFAR AS THE OPERATION OF OUR SYSTEM IS  
18 CONCERNED. IN A SIMILAR SENSE, ALTHOUGH WE PERFORM, YOU  
19 KNOW, CONTROL OF ELECTRIFICATION OUT OF CENTRAL, WE STILL,  
20 AT THE INDIVIDUAL SUBSTATIONS, OF COURSE, HAVE ACCESS TO THE  
21 BREAKERS. AND WE CAN PERFORM THE SAME FUNCTION ON SITE  
22 RATHER THAN REMOTELY. AND THIS IS ALSO TRUE WITH FAN CONTROLS  
23 AND SO FAR AS OUR VENTILATIONS FANS ARE CONCERNED, THEY ARE  
24 NORMALLY OPERATED REMOTELY AT CENTRAL CONTROL. MANY OTHER  
25 SUPERVISORY CONTROL SYSTEMS HAVE REMOTE TERMINAL UNITS THAT  
26 ARE LOCATED AT EACH TRAIN CONTROL SWITCH WHICH IS ASSOCIATED  
27 WITH EACH STATION IN OUR SYSTEM. THERE IS ONE IN EACH  
28 SUBSTATION AS WELL.

1           AND VIA THESE REMOTE TERMINAL UNITS, WE EXIT  
2 THE DIFFERENT PIECES OF EQUIPMENT. WE ALSO HAVE INDIVIDUAL  
3 MANUAL CONTROLLERS AT THE FANS SO THAT THEY CAN BE OPERATED  
4 MANUALLY. WE HAVE HAD SIMILAR EXPERIENCE WITH WHAT JOHN  
5 STATED INSOFAR AS THE RELIABILITY OF OUR VENTILATION SYSTEM  
6 COMPONENTS AS WELL AS CENTRAL CONTROL BRINGING UP A  
7 VENTILATION SCENARIO THAT HAS BEEN REQUESTED INSOFAR AS AN  
8 EMERGENCY IS CONCERNED.

9           I THINK THE FIRST EXERCISE THAT WE RAN PRIOR TO  
10 THE OPENING OF THE EAST LINE TOOK SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF  
11 10 TO 15 MINUTES FOR THE CONSOLE OPERATOR IN CENTRAL TO BRING  
12 THE FANS UP AT THE PARTICULAR SITE THAT A SIMULATION WAS  
13 BEING HELD AT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE ADOPTED THE PROCEDURE OF  
14 HAVING AT LEAST ONE EMERGENCY VENTILATION SIMULATION PER WEEK.  
15 BY THAT I MEAN WE HAD ENGINEERS RIDING OUR TRAIN DURING  
16 PREREVENUE SERVICE ALONG WITH OPERATORS, AND WE WOULD AGREE  
17 BEFOREHAND WHAT TRACK AND WHAT SECTION OF LINE WE WOULD ASK  
18 FOR EMERGENCY VENTILATION. THIS CALL WOULD BE REFERRED TO  
19 CENTRAL FROM THE TRAIN INDICATING THE TRAIN IS STOPPING AT  
20 THIS POINT, THE TRAIN IS SMOKING, THERE IS A NEED FOR  
21 EMERGENCY VENTILATION. THIS IS THE PUSH-PULL SEQUENCE WE ARE  
22 ASKING FOR. WE WOULD LIKE THE DURATION, HOW LONG IT WOULD  
23 TAKE THEM TO RESPOND TO THIS CHALLENGE.

24           VIA THESE EXERCISES, THEY BECAME MORE PROFICIENT  
25 INSOFAR AS UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATION OF THE CONSOLE,  
26 BRINGING UP THAT PARTICULAR LINE SECTION ON THE CRT THAT IS  
27 LOCATED AT THE CONSOLE IN OPERATING THE VENTILATION SYSTEM  
28 PROPERLY.

1 WE ALSO HAD TROUBLES WITH RESPECT TO DAMPER  
2 OPERATION AND WITH RESPECT TO MOTORS. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW,  
3 VENTILATION SYSTEMS ARE RATHER COMPLICATED. AND I DON'T KNOW  
4 THAT IT HAS EVER BEEN MODELED FROM A RELIABILITY POINT OF VIEW  
5 WITH ESTIMATES BEING MADE INSOFAR AS WHAT ITS RELIABILITY  
6 WOULD BE. BUT I HAVE THOUGHT IN THE PAST THAT WOULD BE A  
7 RATHER CHALLENGING EXERCISE, TO MODEL THE VENTILATION SYSTEM  
8 AND TO PREDICT WHAT ITS MEANTIME FIGURE WOULD BE. CONTROLLING  
9 THE MULTITUDE OF FANS THAT THE SYSTEM POSSESSES, I THINK THAT  
10 THE DOWN TIME WOULD BE RATHER SHOCKING. TO PREDICT DOWN TIME  
11 WOULD BE --

12 MR. FARRELLY: MR. LOCK, DO YOU RECEIVE VERIFICATION  
13 BACK AT YOUR CENTRAL CONTROL THAT THE FANS ARE ACTUALLY IN  
14 OPERATION?

15 MR. LOCK: I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE DO. I THINK THAT  
16 WE VERIFIED THAT WE HAVE AIR FLOW INSOFAR AS THE DAMPERS ARE  
17 CONCERNED. BUT INSOFAR AS ACTUAL FAN OPERATION IS CONCERNED,  
18 I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SENSE ACTUAL FAN OPERATION.

19 WE HAVE A REQUIREMENT INSOFAR AS OUR FANS ARE  
20 CONCERNED THAT THEY OPERATE AT HIGH TEMPERATURE BECAUSE OF  
21 THE ENVIRONMENT AND EMERGENCY POSITIONS. AND SO I THINK IT  
22 IS A 300-DEGREE-FAHRENHEIT OPERATION FOR ONE HOUR THAT THE  
23 SYSTEM AND ITS COMPONENTS ARE RATED AT. AND FOR NORMAL  
24 VENTILATION, AS GEORGE WAS SAYING, WE DO USE MULTIPLES OF  
25 SMALL FANS AT THE END OF THE PLATFORMS FOR NORMAL VENTILATION.  
26 WE DO NOT HAVE MIDTUNNEL FANS UNLESS TUNNEL LENGTH EXTENDS  
27 APPROXIMATELY IN THE VICINITY OF 25 FEET. WE WILL NOT HAVE  
28 EMERGENCY FANS UNLESS TUNNEL LENGTH IS IN EXCESS OF 1200 FEET.

1 IF WE HAVE PORTALS OR STATION-TO-STATION SPACING THAT IS  
2 LESS THAN THAT DISTANCE, WE WILL NOT PROVIDE FOR EMERGENCY  
3 VENTILATION.

4 MR. MC FARLAND: AL, YOU SAID 1200 FOOT PORTAL TO  
5 PORTAL.

6 MR. LOCK: THAT IS OUR CRITERION THAT WE WILL PROVIDE  
7 EMERGENCY VENTILATION IF THE TUNNEL EXCEEDS 1200 FEET  
8 PORTAL TO PORTAL, OTHERWISE WE WILL NOT.

9 I WANT TO REMARK THAT, OF COURSE, OUR SYSTEM IS  
10 AT GRADES ELEVATED AND SUBWAY. AND THAT WE HAVE A NUMBER OF  
11 SUBWAY SECTIONS THAT ARE PORTAL TO PORTAL. THERE IS NO  
12 STATION IN THE TUNNEL, AND SO A NUMBER OF THOSE SECTIONS HAVE  
13 NO STAND PIPE EITHER. WE HAVE CRITERION INSOFAR AS PLACING  
14 STAND PIPE IN THE TUNNELS. AND SOME OF THE PORTALS ARE SO  
15 SHORT, LESS THAN 600 FEET, WHERE WE WILL NOT PLACE A STAND  
16 PIPE IN THE PORTAL. WE WILL NOT PROVIDE FOR NORMAL  
17 VENTILATION IN THE TUNNEL AT SHORT SECTIONS OF SUBWAY.

18 MR. MC FARLAND: WOULD YOU CALL IT AN UNDERPASS?

19 MR. LOCK: UNDERPASS, RIGHT.

20 MR. WEULE: WE HAVE SIMILAR DIVISIONS.

21 MR. THOMPSON: OUR PLACEMENT OF FANS IS CLOSELY  
22 RELATED TO PLACEMENT OF EMERGENCY EXITS. A SECTION OF THE  
23 TUNNEL THAT COMES TO MIND IS ONE THAT HAS TWO FAN SHAFTS  
24 BETWEEN STATIONS WITH A VENT SHAFT IN BETWEEN THE FAN SHAFT,  
25 AND ALL THREE OF THESE STRUCTURES, EMERGENCY EXITS ENCOUPLED  
26 WITH THEM, ARE HANSEN VENT SHAFT STRUCTURES.

27 MR. MC FARLAND: IF YOU HAVE A POSSIBLE EMERGENCY  
28 EGRESS, BEING LATERAL, WOULD THAT FAN SHAFT BE THERE?

1 MR. THOMPSON: PROBABLY NOT.

2 MR. FARRELLY: MAY I ASK A QUESTION OF THE OTHER  
3 TRANSIT OPERATOR?

4 IN ADDITION TO THE CENTRAL SUPERVISOR CONTROL OF  
5 VENTILATION FANS AND THE ABILITY TO CONTROL THE FANS LOCALLY,  
6 RIGHT AT THE FAN, DO ANY OF YOU HAVE PROVISIONS FOR CONTROL OF  
7 THE FAN, SUCH AS AT A FIRE EMERGENCY PANEL AT A PARTICULAR  
8 PASSENGER STATION?

9 MR. LOCK: LET ME RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTION, BECAUSE THAT  
10 MATTER WAS DEBATED QUITE EXTENSIVELY AT ONE TIME ON OUR SYSTEM.  
11 THERE WAS A PROPOSAL THAT WAS PUT FORTH, AND IT WAS CONSIDERED  
12 VERY SERIOUSLY TO HAVE A CONTROL CENTER AT EACH TRAIN CONTROL  
13 ROOM FOR THE FOUR FANS SUCH THAT IF CENTRAL WAS EVER SABOTAGED  
14 OR FOR ANY REASON OR ANOTHER IT BECAME INOPERABLE, WE WOULD  
15 STILL HAVE REMOTE VENTILATION CONTROL CAPABILITY IN ADDITION  
16 TO THE LOCAL CONTROLS. BECAUSE OF COST EFFECTIVENESS, LET ME  
17 SAY, THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT ACCEPTED. IT WOULD BE A THIRD  
18 LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL IF WE ALREADY AGREED TO, AND WE  
19 FELT THAT IT REALLY WAS NOT NECESSARY. BUT THE ADVOCATES OF  
20 THIS PROPOSAL WERE VERY SERIOUS WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDING FOR  
21 SYSTEM OPERATION WITHOUT A CENTRAL CONTROL FACILITY, SO TO  
22 SPEAK. AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT MARTA TODAY WHO  
23 VERY SERIOUSLY WANT US TO CONSIDER DISMANTLING THE  
24 VENTILATION OPERATION, SO TO SPEAK, AS A COST-EFFECTIVE  
25 MEASURE.

26 MR. FARRELLY: MY QUESTION WAS ALSO PARTIALLY ADDRESSED  
27 TO THE ISSUE OF A FIRE MANAGEMENT PANEL AT PASSENGER STATIONS  
28 WHERE A COMMAND POST OR FIRE HEADQUARTER MIGHT BE SET UP IN AN

1 EVENT OF AN INCIDENT.

2 MR. LOCK: WHAT WE USED WAS THE FIRE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT  
3 INSOFAR AS EMERGENCIES ARE CONCERNED. BUT WE DO NOT PROVIDE  
4 FOR FAN CONTROL AT THAT PANEL. WE DO NOT PROVIDE, YOU KNOW,  
5 FOR COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY BETWEEN THAT FIRE MANAGEMENT  
6 PANEL WHICH BECOMES THE COMMAND POST VIA THE MAINTENANCE PHONE  
7 JACKS TO OTHER PARTS OF THE STATION AND THE ASSOCIATE LINE  
8 SECTIONS.

9 MR. FARRELLY: I SEE.

10 MR. REYES: WHEN WOULD THE LOCAL SYSTEM, THEN, BE  
11 UTILIZED AND BY WHOM?

12 MR. LOCK: THE LOCAL SYSTEMS ARE UTILIZED IN SEVERAL  
13 WAYS. ONE, THEY ARE UTILIZED BY MAINTENANCE IN THE  
14 EXERCISING AND THE PERFORMANCE OF ROUTINE MAINTENANCE ON  
15 THOSE FANS.

16 TWO, THEY HAVE BEEN UTILIZED IN SIMULATIONS BY  
17 MARTA PERSONNEL AND THE FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSUMING  
18 THAT, YOU KNOW, CENTRAL CONTROL IS INOPERABLE. AND WE STILL  
19 HAVE, THEN, A CAPABILITY TO OPERATE THE FANS MANUALLY ON  
20 SITE.

21 MR. REYES: BUT THEY WOULD DO THAT ONLY AFTER THEY  
22 HAD COMMUNICATED WITH CENTRAL. IN OTHER WORDS, CENTRAL IS  
23 AWARE THAT THESE CHANGES ARE TAKING PLACE ON THE SITE, THAT  
24 THE WHOLE VENTILATION IS BEING ACTIVATED THERE?

25 MR. LOCK: THERE IS A COMMUNICATION NET WHERE ALL THREE  
26 PARTIES ARE IN VOICE CONTACT, YES.

27 MR. REYES: ASSUMING THAT THE VENTILATION THERE IS  
28 CHANGED ON SITE, IS THERE SOME WAY FOR THE COMMAND CENTER TO



1 KNOW WITHOUT YOUR LINE COMMUNICATION THAT SOMETHING TOOK  
2 PLACE? DOES THE CONTROL BOARD INDICATE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A  
3 CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM?

4 MR. LOCK: AT CENTRAL THE CRT, THE CONTROL BOARD, WILL  
5 IDENTIFY VIA THE REMOTE TERMINAL UNIT ON SITE, WHAT STATE  
6 THOSE PARTICULAR TERMINALS ARE IN, WHAT SIGNAL IS THAT  
7 LOCATION. IT WILL IDENTIFY THE SIGNAL LEVEL AT THAT LOCATION.

8 MR. REYES: CENTRAL CANNOT OVERRIDE THE SYSTEM ONCE IT  
9 ACTIVATES LOCALLY?

10 MR. LOCK: CENTRAL CAN STOP IT. CENTRAL CAN REVERSE IT.

11 MR. FARRELLY: THE CENTRAL CONTROL CAN OVERRIDE THE  
12 LOCAL CONTROL?

13 MR. LOCK: OH, YES.

14 MR. MC FARLAND: ONCE YOU SWITCH FROM REMOTE TO LOCAL,  
15 CENTRAL CAN PUT THAT BACK TO REMOTE AGAIN?

16 MR. LOCK: CENTRAL CAN OVERRIDE IT, YES.

17 MR. FARRELLY: DOES THIS PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR PEOPLE  
18 MAINTAINING THE EQUIPMENT IF THEY THROW THE FAN CONTROL TO THE  
19 LOCAL POSITION?

20 MR. LOCK: I BELIEVE THEY HAVE A LOCK-OUT CAPABILITY  
21 SIMILAR TO THE LOCK-OUT CAPABILITY THAT WE HAVE ON OUR  
22 ELECTRIFICATION SYSTEM WHERE YOU CAN LOCK OUT A BREAKER AND  
23 CENTRAL CONTROL AND THEN IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT IT DOES, IT  
24 CANNOT FLIP THAT BREAKER.

25 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU HAVE A VERY CLEARLY DEFINED  
26 LOCK-OUT SYSTEM?

27 MR. LOCK: OH, YES, WE DO.

28 MR. FARRELLY: RUSS, THE REASON I ASKED AL LOCK THE

1 QUESTION, WAS THE PRESENT STATUS OF 130 CALLS FOR, IN ADDITION  
2 TO THE REMOTE SUPERVISING STATION REQUIREMENTS, REMOTE CONTROL  
3 TO BE LOCATED AT THE FIRE DEPARTMENT PANEL OF EACH STATION AT  
4 CLOSE PROXIMITY TO ABOVE-GROUND MAINTENANCE. SO THAT WOULD BE  
5 THE THIRD LEVEL OF CONTROL YOU ARE REFERRING TO. AND THAT  
6 IS WHAT IS PRESENTLY IN THIS STANDARD.

7 MR. MC FARLAND: THAT IS INTRIGUING.

8 MR. FARRELLY: AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT NONE OF THE  
9 PROPERTIES HERE HAVE THAT CAPABILITY.

10 MR. MC FARLAND: MR. DONATO, YOU DON'T HAVE THAT IN  
11 MONTREAL?

12 MR. DONATO: WE CANNOT OPERATE THE FANS LOCALLY, BUT  
13 CENTRAL CAN OVERRIDE THAT. THE PEOPLE MAINTAIN A SYSTEM WHERE  
14 THEY CAN LOCK IT WITH A PADLOCK, CAN SWITCH IT OFF COMPLETELY  
15 TO SECURE IT IF THEY WORK ON IT. BUT NORMALLY, IF THEY WANT  
16 TO ACTIVATE A FAN, THEY WOULDN'T ACTIVATE LOCALLY. THERE IS  
17 A PHONE THERE. IF THEY DO ACTIVATE THE FANS, CENTRAL CONTROL  
18 WILL RECEIVE A MESSAGE.

19 MR. RHINE: I MENTIONED THE QUESTION MR. REYES IS  
20 ASKING ABOUT AN AUTOMATIC NOTIFICATION AT CENTRAL WHEN  
21 WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF SOMEBODY IN THE FIELD SWITCHES ANYTHING  
22 FROM REMOTE TO LOCAL. IF CENTRAL IS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE  
23 FANS FOR WHATEVER REASON -- A MAJOR CATASTROPHE -- THEY MAY  
24 VERY LIKELY NOT GET ANY AUTOMATIC FEEDBACK EITHER. THEY ARE  
25 GOING TO BE DEPENDENT ON VOICE COMMUNICATION TO BE ADVISED  
26 OF THE STATUS OF THINGS AT THE INCIDENT SCENE.

27 IT IS GOING TO BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT, IF ALL  
28 ELSE FAILS, WIRES OR DAMAGE OR DTS DAMAGED, CONTROLS AND DATA

1 FEEDBACK, THEN THE VOICE COMMUNICATION IS ONE THING THAT  
2 REMAINS TO KEEP CENTRAL ADVISED.

3 AND IT WOULD SEEM THAT, FROM THAT SCENARIO, THEY  
4 ARE ONLY ONLOOKERS ANYWAY, BUT THEY ARE STILL AN OVERALL  
5 OBSERVATION POINT. BUT IF YOU HAVE A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM AT  
6 CENTRAL, YOU MAY NOT GET YOUR AUTOMATIC CENTRAL CHANGES IN  
7 THE VARIOUS CONTROLS IN THE REMOTE SIDE.

8 MR. THOMPSON: IN WMATA THE FANS CAN BE OPERATED FROM  
9 CENTRAL AUTOMATICALLY, BUT IF IT SWITCHES OVER TO MANUAL  
10 EMERGENCY OR IN ANOTHER CASE THERE IS AN OFF POSITION ALSO,  
11 THERE IS NO OVERRIDE CAPABILITY FROM DOWNTOWN AT ALL. I  
12 THINK ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THERE IS, THERE IS NOT AN EXCESS  
13 NUMBER OF CHANNELS AVAILABLE ON DTS TO GIVE THEM THAT  
14 CAPABILITY. I THINK THEY HAVE A LIMITED NUMBER OF CALLING  
15 BACK.

16 ANOTHER THING THAT MIGHT HEDGE UPON THIS IS,  
17 WHEN YOU GET IN THE AREA OF DESIGNING VENTILATION SYSTEMS,  
18 SOME THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DESIGNING A SYSTEM FOR USE  
19 THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PROJECT. WE HAVE NO LESS THAN SIX  
20 MAJOR MANUFACTURERS INVOLVED IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND THE  
21 PARTS PROCUREMENT FOR THE SYSTEMS. WE HAVE AT WMATA. AND IT  
22 IS COMPLICATED FROM A TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE POINT OF VIEW.  
23 AND YOU HAVE TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH ALL OF THEM.

24 MR. MC FARLAND: VERN GARRETT MENTIONED THAT YOU HAVE  
25 EVERY PUMP AND EVERY FAN MANUFACTURED IN THIS WORLD IN THAT  
26 SYSTEM.

27 MR. THOMPSON: I THINK WE ARE PROBABLY A TEST GROUND FOR  
28 A LOT OF THINGS, BUT IT CERTAINLY DOES CONTRIBUTE TO THE

1 PROBLEMS THAT WE HAVE HAD.

2 MR. MC FARLAND: HAS ANYONE USED SYSTEMWIDE PROCUREMENT IN  
3 FANS OR PUMPS? RALPH, DID BARTD LOOK INTO THAT?

4 MR. WEULE: I AM NOT SURE I CAN REALLY ANSWER THAT. I  
5 THINK SO, BUT I THINK AT LEAST THE RESULT HAS BEEN FAIRLY  
6 STANDARDIZED. HOW THAT WAS ACHIEVED, I AM NOT SURE. THEY  
7 WERE VERY ACTIVE IN A NUMBER OF SYSTEMWIDE THOUGHTS -- THE  
8 LINERS BEING ONE OF THE CLASSICS.

9 MR. LOCK: THE MARTA EXPERIENCE WAS THIS: FOR THE EAST  
10 LINE, FOR THE WEST LINE, AND FOR THE NORTH-SOUTH LINE, WHICH  
11 IS PHASE "A", WE HAD INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION CONTACT. WE HAD  
12 CT416, WHICH WAS THE SUPERVISOR IN A CONTROL SYSTEM THAT  
13 OPERATES IN THE AREA THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING. AND THEN WE HAD  
14 A CC2C, A CLOSE CIRCUIT CONTRACT, A RADIO COMMUNICATION  
15 CONTRACT. WE HAD TELEPHONE SYSTEM CONTRACTS.

16 FOR PHASE B, BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT WE  
17 ENCOUNTERED, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO SCHEDULING CONTRACTORS  
18 ONE AFTER THE OTHER AND THE DELAYS THAT OCCURRED AND THE  
19 CLAIMS THAT CONTRACTORS WOULD MAKE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT HAVE  
20 ACCESS TO THE SITE BECAUSE ONE MAN WAS PULLING CABLE AND  
21 THE OTHER MAN WAS DOING THIS AND THEY COULD NOT GET TO THE  
22 JUNCTION BOX AND MAKE THEIR CONNECTIONS, WE USED A SYSTEMWIDE  
23 PROCUREMENT. WE COMBINED ALL OF THIS INTO ONE BIG PACKAGE.  
24 AND CQ440 HAD THE CONTRACTOR BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS  
25 HEADACHE.

26 BUT INSOFAR AS THE FANS THEMSELVES ARE CONCERNED  
27 AND THE PUMPS, NO, WE HAVE NOT CONTINUED TO PROCURE THOSE IN THE  
28 SAME MANNER THAT WE DID IN PHASE A SEPARATELY. THERE ARE NOT

1 THAT MANY OF THEM. THAT'S RIGHT.

2 MR. DONATO: YOU HAD SEPARATE CONTRACTS FOR FAN  
3 INSTALLATION, BUT THEY WERE LARGE ORDERS. AS FAR AS THE  
4 CONTROLS OF THESE FANS, IT WAS A SEPARATE CONTRACT. SO WE  
5 DEAL WITH TWO CONTRACTORS. IT TURNS OUT THAT THE FANS WERE  
6 READY FOR OPERATION AND THE TELE-CONTROL WAS READY ABOUT A  
7 YEAR AFTER.

8 MR. MC FARLAND: HAS ANYONE HAD ANY EXPERIENCE IN  
9 PROJECTWIDE PROCUREMENTS WITH REGARD TO WARRANTIES IN THAT IF  
10 YOU TAKE DELIVERY AND STORE EQUIPMENT, DO YOUR WARRANTIES RUN  
11 OUT WHILE THEY ARE IN STORAGE?

12 MR. THOMPSON: THAT IS GENERALLY WHAT HAS HAPPENED.  
13 USUALLY THE PRODUCTS WE BUY ARE OUT OF THE WARRANTY LONG  
14 BEFORE THEY GO INTO USE AND OPERATION.

15 MR. RHINE: BUT THE REASON FOR THAT IS NOT NECESSARILY  
16 BECAUSE YOU COULD NOT GET A WARRANTY TO COVER THAT, BUT IT  
17 IS BECAUSE YOUR CONSTRUCTION IS DELAYED.

18 MR. LOCK: THE WARRANTY QUESTION IS A VERY INTRIGUING  
19 ONE. WE HAVE A VARIETY OF EXPERIENCE INSOFAR AS WARRANTIES  
20 ARE CONCERNED. ULTIMATELY THE PURCHASER PAYS FOR THE  
21 WARRANTY. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT WHATSOEVER. ON  
22 OUR VEHICLE CONTRACT WE HAVE A THREE-YEAR WARRANTY ON THOSE  
23 VEHICLES OR 150,000 MILES, WHICHEVER COMES FIRST AFTER  
24 ACCEPTANCE. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT VEHICLE ACCEPTANCE  
25 INITIALLY, EARLY IN TIME, WHEN WE WERE RATING OURSELVES TO  
26 OPEN THE FIRST PORTION OF OUR SYSTEM, OCCURRED VERY CLOSE TO  
27 REVENUE SERVICE. SO THERE WASN'T A PROBLEM WITH THE VEHICLE  
28 IN THIS REGARD. ITS WARRANTY BEGAN PRIOR TO ITS REVENUE

1 SERVICE USAGE.

2 ON STATION EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, THIS IS A BIG  
3 CONCERN. NOW, AGAIN, IT IS A MATTER FOR YOU TO CONSIDER IN  
4 THE PREPARATION OF YOUR SPECIFICATION. OUR FARE CONNECTION  
5 EQUIPMENT, THE EQUIPMENT INTENDED FOR THE NORTH-SOUTH LINE,  
6 WHICH IS THE LAST PORTION OF PHASE A, A GOOD DEAL OF THAT  
7 EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN MANUFACTURED PREVIOUSLY IN CONJUNCTION  
8 WITH THE PRODUCTION LINE THAT WAS MADE FOR THE EAST-WEST  
9 LINE. THIS EQUIPMENT IN TURN WAS PLACED IN STORAGE BY THE  
10 MANUFACTURER. IT WAS NEVER DELIVERED. IT WAS NOT PLACED ON  
11 THE SITE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, OUR WARRANTIES ARE AFTER  
12 ACCEPTANCE. SO THE WARRANTIES COMMENCE AFTER THAT EQUIPMENT  
13 IS PUT IN SERVICE AND ACCEPTED.

14 THERE CAN BE A BIG PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO  
15 ESCALATORS IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, WE HAVE MAINTENANCE  
16 CONTRACTS ON OUR ESCALATORS, SO WE DO NOT HAVE WARRANTY  
17 PROBLEMS IN THAT REGARD. WE HAVE MAINTENANCE WARRANTIES ON  
18 THE ESCALATORS AND ELEVATORS.

19 ANOTHER CONCERN OF OURS WITH RESPECT TO  
20 FIXATION EQUIPMENT IS PREMATURE INSTALLATION OF THIS  
21 EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL FINISHING OF THE STATION  
22 WHEREBY THE ACCUMULATION OF DUST AND GREASE AND DIRT AND  
23 DAMAGE THROUGH MISUSE OR HANDLING BY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL  
24 WILL CAUSE PROBLEMS INSOFAR AS THIS EQUIPMENT IS CONCERNED.  
25 AND OUR EXPERIENCE ON THE EAST-WEST LINE HAS RESULTED IN  
26 US DELAYING OR DEFERRING THE INSTALLATION OF HANDSETS, CCTV  
27 CAMERAS, AND OUR FIXED EQUIPMENT IN OUR STATION UNTIL WE ARE  
28 PRACTICALLY -- THE DAY BEFORE WE ARE READY FOR REVENUE

1 SERVICE. WE ARE SCHEDULING THE NORTH-SOUTH LINE FOR  
2 DECEMBER 1. IN EVERY STATION PRACTICALLY IN THE NORTH-SOUTH  
3 LINE WE HAVE NOT INSTALLED CCTV. WE HAVE NOT YET INSTALLED  
4 OUR HANDSETS. WE ARE WAITING PRACTICALLY UNTIL THE LAST  
5 MINUTE.

6 MR. FARRELLY: WE HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE WITH PROCUREMENTS  
7 OF MATERIALS FROM THE MANUFACTURER, THE MATERIALS BEING  
8 PLACED INTO WAREHOUSES AWAITING INSTALLATION AND THE  
9 WARRANTIES START AT SOME POINT AFTER THE INSTALLATION, SOME  
10 SORT OF UPSET LIMIT PERHAPS SO THAT THE MANUFACTURER KNOWS  
11 AT LEAST HOW FAR INTO THE FUTURE HE IS LIABLE TO LEAVE UP TO  
12 THE WARRANTY. I DON'T SEE THE WARRANTY PROBLEM. YOU PAY FOR  
13 IT, AS AL LOCK SAID, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. I WOULD ADVISE YOU  
14 TO HAVE IT.

15 MR. LOCK: MAY I MAKE ANOTHER COMMENT CONCERNING  
16 WARRANTIES? AND I THINK THIS IS RATHER PERTINENT. A WARRANTY  
17 PROVIDES YOU WITH A FORM OF INSURANCE POLICY, ESPECIALLY ON  
18 EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THE VEHICLE AND/OR TRAIN CONTROL EQUIPMENT,  
19 BECAUSE YOU INVARIABLY HAVE CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL ON SITE  
20 RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING THAT EQUIPMENT. AS A NEW EMERGING  
21 TRANSIT PROPERTY, YOU HAVE A PROBLEM OF ACQUIRING MAINTENANCE  
22 PERSONNEL AND HAVING THEM TRAINED AND CAPABLE ON SITE TO  
23 PERFORM ALL OF THESE FUNCTIONS. HAVING A CONTRACTOR PERFORM  
24 IN THIS AREA, HAVING A RESPONSIBILITY VIA THE WARRANTY TO  
25 MAINTAIN THIS EQUIPMENT, GIVES YOU A GREAT DEAL -- PROVIDES  
26 A GREAT DEAL OF ASSISTANCE RATHER THAN HAVING YOU AT DAY ONE  
27 TAKE COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE  
28 OF THE SYSTEM.

1 MR. MC FARLAND: ARE THERE OTHER ISSUES ON VENTILATION?

2 MR. DONATO: ONE COMMENT FOLLOWING WHAT AL HAS SAID.  
3 THIS MIGHT BE TRUE OF CAR EQUIPMENT. WE HAVE FOUND FOR  
4 EQUIPMENT GUARANTEE THE CONTRACTOR WILL DO THE MAINTENANCE  
5 ON THE EQUIPMENT FOR A YEAR OR TWO YEARS IS BEING USED BY  
6 MANY CONTRACTORS TO FINISH THEIR WORK. AND ACTUALLY YOU ARE  
7 IN OPERATION DURING THAT TIME PERIOD, AND THEY DON'T PROVIDE  
8 YOU SERVICE AT NIGHT. THEY DON'T GIVE YOU A SERVICE TO  
9 OPERATE A SUBWAY. CASES WE REFERRED TO TAKE OVER THE  
10 EQUIPMENT IMMEDIATELY ONCE IT IS COMPLETED WITHOUT ANY ONE-  
11 YEAR OR TWO-YEAR MAINTENANCE CONTRACT. WE WOULD RATHER TAKE  
12 IT IMMEDIATELY PROVIDING WE GET THE INFORMATION AHEAD OF  
13 TIME, WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO GET.

14 MR. MC FARLAND: THAT'S WITH A TRAINED MAINTENANCE  
15 AUTHORITY STAFF.

16 MR. DONATO: THAT'S RIGHT. WE FEEL THAT IF WE HAVE  
17 THE PROPER INFORMATION WE CAN TRAIN OUR PEOPLE AHEAD OF TIME.  
18 AND WHEN WE START TRAINING WE CAN MAINTAIN THE EQUIPMENT  
19 IMMEDIATELY. THEN WE PUT A MAN THAT WE NEED TO KEEP, FOR  
20 INSTANCE, THE ESCALATOR WORKING, AND WE DON'T WAIT FIVE  
21 HOURS FOR A SERVICEMAN. WE PUT THEM ON THE JOB, SO WE GET  
22 BETTER SERVICE THAN THE TRANSPORTATION PEOPLE.

23 MR. MC FARLAND: ARE THERE ANY OTHER AREAS OF  
24 VENTILATION, EMERGENCY VENTILATION, THAT ANYONE WOULD LIKE TO  
25 SPEAK ON?

26 MR. DONATO: I EXPLAINED YESTERDAY ABOUT OUR EMERGENCY  
27 PROCEDURE USING VENTILATION TO MASTER THE MOVEMENTS. I KNOW  
28 THAT MARTA IS DOING IT. HOW ABOUT MARTA? DO YOU HAVE A



1 STRATEGY OF HOW TO USE THE VENTILATOR IN CASE OF FIRE?

2 MR. THOMPSON: RIGHT NOW IT IS STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT.  
3 IT HASN'T BEEN APPROVED YET. IT IS ONLY RECENTLY THAT IT  
4 COMES UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY.

5 MR. MC FARLAND: CURRENTLY WMATA DOES NOT HAVE AN  
6 EMERGENCY VENTILATION PROCEDURE.

7 MR. THOMPSON: THAT IS CORRECT. WE OPERATE FANS BASED  
8 SOLELY ON THE JUDGMENT OF THE CENTRAL CONTROL STAFF. AND  
9 THEY ARE NOT REALLY TRAINED TO HANDLE THAT TYPE OF SITUATION,  
10 BECAUSE THEY ARE DOWNSTAIRS IN THE BASEMENT WATCHING THE  
11 CRT.

12 ONE OF THE MODIFICATIONS THAT IS GOING TO COME  
13 OUT OF THIS IS A PLACEMENT OF A TARGET ON THE CRT TO SHOW  
14 THEM WHERE THE FANS ARE.

15 MR. MC FARLAND: IS THERE MARKING IN THE TUNNEL TO  
16 GIVE THE OPERATOR THE TRAIN LOCATION?

17 MR. THOMPSON: YES. THERE ARE CHAIN MARKINGS IN THE  
18 TUNNEL. IT DEPENDS ON WHAT SECTION OF THE TUNNEL YOU ARE IN  
19 WHETHER THEY ARE EFFECTIVE OR NOT AND WHETHER THEY WILL BE  
20 ABLE TO SEE. WE HAVE THREE TYPES OF MARKERS. THE SMALLEST  
21 OF THESE MARKERS IS THREE BY SIX INCHES WHICH INDICATES  
22 MAYBE THIS BIG (INDICATING). THEN THERE ARE TWO OTHERS  
23 THAT ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER AND THEY ARE A LOT MORE VISIBLE,  
24 BUT THEN AGAIN, ONE IS FLUSH AGAINST THE WALL. AND IN NEW  
25 SECTIONS AND ALL FURTHER WILL HAVE THEM PERPENDICULAR TO THE  
26 WALL. BUT ASIDE FROM THOSE, THERE AREN'T ANY MARKINGS TO  
27 IDENTIFY ANY OTHER TUNNEL FEATURES.

28 THERE IS A LOT OF LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRAIN

1 OPERATORS AS TO WHERE THEY ARE IN THE TUNNEL. IF YOU TELL  
2 THEM TO STOP AT A FAN SHAFT, THEY MAY OR MAY NOT KNOW WHERE  
3 YOU ARE SPEAKING OF, SO THEY ARE NOT REALLY FAMILIAR WITH  
4 THEIR ENVIRONMENT EITHER.

5 MR. LOCK: WE HAVE GRAPHICS THAT ARE AT CENTRAL CONTROL  
6 WHICH WERE PREPARED BECAUSE OF THIS MATTER, RESULTED AS A  
7 CONSEQUENCE OF THE LENGTHY TIME TO BRING THE VENTILATION FANS  
8 INTO OPERATION WHEN WE FIRST STARTED EXERCISING THIS SYSTEM  
9 AND CONDUCTING OUR SIMULATIONS. ON POST BOARD, THREE BY FOUR,  
10 APPROXIMATELY, WE HAVE GRAPHICS FOR EACH LINE SECTION WHICH  
11 IDENTIFIES THE FANS AND THE FAN SETTINGS FOR PUSH-PULL OR  
12 REVERSE FLOW FOR PULL-PUSH IN EACH SECTION. THESE WERE  
13 PLACED ON A WALL NEXT TO THE ELECTRIFICATION CONSOLE WHERE  
14 THE REMOTE CONTROL WAS PERFORMED. AND VIA THESE GRAPHICAL  
15 AIDS THEN WHEN WE CONDUCT OUR WEEKLY TESTS, THE OPERATORS  
16 WERE ABLE TO MORE RAPIDLY BRING THE SYSTEM INTO OPERATION.

17 WE DO NOT HAVE, YOU KNOW, FORMAL COMPUTER CONTROL  
18 AT THIS TIME WHERE WE WOULD PUNCH IN MAYBE THE LINE SECTIONS  
19 AND THE DIRECTION OF FLOW AND THEN WE WOULD HAVE ALL FUNCTIONS  
20 ACTIVATED INsofar AS THEIR DIRECTION IS CONCERNED AND THE  
21 PLATFORM FAN AS WELL AS THE MIDLINE TUNNEL FAN. OUR  
22 MECHANICAL ENGINEER, MORRIS, HAS ASKED FOR THIS AND IT IS  
23 UNDER CONSIDERATION. BUT WE HAVE A VERY SMALL SYSTEM. WE  
24 ONLY HAVE ON THE EAST LINE TWO SECTIONS OF SUBWAY WHERE  
25 THERE ARE MIDLINE TUNNEL FANS. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE WEST LINE  
26 I THINK THERE IS ONLY ONE MIDLINE TUNNEL FAN. AND NOW THAT  
27 WE ARE BRINGING UP THE NORTH-SOUTH LINE, WHICH IS THE MAJOR  
28 UNDERGROUND TUNNEL PORTION OF OUR SYSTEM, WE WILL START TO

1 HAVE MORE AND MORE FAN CONTROLS THAT HAVE TO BE EXITED.

2 MR. THOMPSON: ONE THING ABOUT CENTRAL CONTROL STAFF IS  
3 THAT THERE ARE NO REGULAR DRILLS CONDUCTED ON THEIR PART IN  
4 THE OPERATION OF THE FAN EQUIPMENT. AND THERE FOR A PERIOD  
5 OF TIME THERE WAS AN ACTUAL LANGUAGE PROBLEM OF HOW TO  
6 IDENTIFY THE FAN SHAFT IN CALLING FOR ITS ACTIVATION. A  
7 TERM THAT MIGHT BE FAMILIAR TO OUR STAFF WHEN GIVEN TO THEM  
8 OVER THE PHONE OR THE RADIO WOULD BE COMPLETELY FOREIGN TO  
9 THEM, AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO SAY "WHAT STATIONS ARE YOU  
10 BETWEEN?" AND I WOULD SAY THAT PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED.  
11 AND WE ARE NOW SPEAKING IN A COMMON LANGUAGE, BUT THERE IS  
12 NO REGULAR EXERCISING OF THE FANS OR INSPECTION OF THE  
13 SYSTEMS. WE ARE STILL TRYING TO RECOVER FROM THE DAMAGE THAT  
14 HAS BEEN INCURRED.

15 MR. MC FARLAND: ANY OTHER VENTILATION COMMENTS? IF  
16 NOT, IT'S BEEN ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF, LET'S TAKE ABOUT A  
17 15-MINUTE BREAK.

18 (RECESS.)

19 MR. MC FARLAND: WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS A TOPIC VERY  
20 DEAR TO NFPA 130 -- "EMERGENCY EVACUATION REQUIREMENTS."

21 WE HAD A DISCUSSION YESTERDAY IN REGARD TO THE  
22 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 101 AND 130 -- "THE DYNAMIC VERSUS  
23 STATIC PLATFORM LOADING AND EXIT REQUIREMENTS." I THINK IT  
24 IS A SUBJECT THAT WE WANT TO PURSUE, PARTICULARLY IN  
25 CONJUNCTION WITH OUR FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND TAKE A HARD LOOK  
26 AT THE 130 IN THE DYNAMIC REGARD AS OPPOSED TO THE STATIC, IF  
27 I UNDERSTAND. AND I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO SEE YOUR  
28 EVALUATIONS. WE HAVE A PLATFORM LENGTH THAT IS DICTATED BY

1 CONCEPT SIZE, AND WE HAD A PLATFORM WIDTH THAT IS DICTATED BY  
2 PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS, AS A RULE, A MINIMUM SIZE THAT IS  
3 DICTATED BY RESTRAINTS. IT WILL HAVE NO LESS THAN, SAY, EIGHT  
4 FEET. WE HAVE A WIDTH OF ESCALATOR STAIRS IN OUR LOWEST  
5 VOLUME STATION WHERE WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A PLATFORM THAT  
6 WOULD BE IN VOLUME OR IN AREA MUCH GREATER THAN PATRONAGE  
7 REQUIREMENTS. YET IN THE STATISTIC EVACUATION CRITERIA WE WOULD  
8 HAVE TO ASSUME THAT ENTIRE PLATFORM WAS LOADED, AND WE WOULD  
9 HAVE TO PROVIDE EVACUATION FOR IT. THE OPPOSITE LOGIC BEING  
10 THE DYNAMIC OF A TIME ELEMENT IN UNLOADING TRAINS AND MOVING  
11 PEOPLE OUT IN A GIVEN TIME WITH NO REFERENCE TO A POSSIBLE  
12 SQUARE-FOOT CAPACITY.

13 AM I CORRECT ON THAT, DOUG?

14 MR. LOW: THAT'S BASICALLY IT.

15 MR. MC FARLAND: WELL, THAT'S SOMETHING THAT WE WANT  
16 TO SET SOME COMMON GROUND WITH OUR FIRE DEPARTMENT HERE ON  
17 HOW WE SHOULD BE APPROVING THIS.

18 MR. LOW: AS WE POINTED OUT YESTERDAY, I DON'T BELIEVE  
19 THERE IS ANY TRANSIT PROPERTY THAT HAS FOLLOWED NFPA 101  
20 REQUIREMENTS TO THE LETTER. THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN ADJUSTMENTS  
21 THAT HAVE BEEN MADE TO ACCOMMODATE EXACTLY WHAT YOU ARE  
22 TALKING ABOUT IN TERMS OF ELICITING THAT KIND OF SITUATION  
23 RATHER THAN A COMPLETELY RIGID, STATISTIC ONE. SO THAT NFPA 101  
24 HAS NOT BEEN FOLLOWED IN THOSE CASES AND THEY HAVE BEEN, IN  
25 FACT, FOLLOWING SOMETHING SIMILAR AS 130, IN FACT, NOT AS  
26 STRINGENT AS 130. IF YOU LOOK AT ALL THE OTHER PROPERTIES  
27 THERE EXISTING, IT IS NOT UP TO THE 130 IN MOST CASES.

28 I THINK MR. DONATO INDICATED THAT MONTREAL COULD

1 ACCOMMODATE THE 130.

2 MR. DONATO: IN MOST CASES, NOT IN ALL CASES.

3 MR. LOW: BUT YOU COULD MAKE THE NECESSARY CONVERSIONS  
4 IF REQUIRED?

5 MR. DONATO: IN MONTREAL, I TALKED YESTERDAY ABOUT  
6 HOW TO BOARD OUR STATIONS WHERE YOU HAD A CORRIDOR ABOUT  
7 1200 FEET TO GET TO THE PLATFORM. THIS WOULD NOT CONFORM  
8 WITH 130; OF COURSE NOT. SO WHAT WE HAVE DONE THERE IS WE  
9 BUILT ANOTHER ACCESS RIGHT ON TOP OF THE STATION. AND WE  
10 HAVE CUT THE DISTANCE. SO WE HAVE TWO ACCESSES AT THE  
11 STATION, ONE THAT IS RIGHT ON TOP OF THE STATION. SO THIS  
12 STATION CONFORMS WITH THE 130. I THINK EVENTUALLY -- THE  
13 STATIONS THAT WE HAVE THAT DO NOT CONFORM. WE WILL TRY --  
14 WHEN THE OCCASION COMES -- TO MODIFY THEM SO THAT THEY  
15 CONFORM WITH 130.

16 MR. LOW: IF I COULD FINISH UP WITH THE THOUGHT ON THIS:  
17 I WOULD HOPE THAT THE FIRE DEPARTMENT WOULD CONSIDER SOMETHING  
18 ALONG THE LINES OF 130 AS BEING THE DIRECTION TO GO FOR A  
19 TRANSIT SYSTEM, BECAUSE IN EFFECT IT HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE  
20 INDUSTRY, AND IT IS REALLY WHAT ALL THE OTHER PROPERTIES ARE  
21 USING, IN EFFECT. PERHAPS WHAT I SAID, NOT QUITE AS STRINGENT,  
22 SOMETHING ALONG THOSE LINES.

23 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU WANT TO REACT TO THAT STATEMENT,  
24 MR. LOCK?

25 MR. LOCK: I WAS, AND I BASICALLY AM, A PROPONENT OF  
26 NFPA 130. THE EFFORTS WITH RESPECT TO PREPARING A STANDARD  
27 BEGAN WHILE THE MARTA SYSTEM WAS UNDER DESIGN AND  
28 DEVELOPMENT. AND SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH

1 WORKING OUT A STANDARD WERE INVOLVED WITH THE MARTA PROGRAM  
2 AS WELL. AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, A NUMBER OF FEATURES IN THE  
3 STANDARD WERE MODELED AFTER THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS THAT  
4 WERE IMPOSED ON THE MARTA SYSTEM.

5 I THINK THAT, AS I REMARKED YESTERDAY, THAT NFPA  
6 101 STRETCHES SEMANTICS SOMEWHAT WHEN IT IS APPLIED TO A  
7 RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM, CONSIDERING STATIONS TO BE PLACED AND  
8 IMPOSING REQUIREMENTS ON THEIR DESIGN, ON THAT BASIS. OUR  
9 EXPERIENCE IN ATLANTA, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THAT OUR STATE FIRE  
10 MARSHAL WAS VERY RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT SOMETHING IN LIEU OF WHAT  
11 WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA AS LAW, AND THAT WAS  
12 THE 1967 EDITION OF NFPA 101. AND WE DID TRY AND WE TRIED  
13 VERY SERIOUSLY TO PREPARE A WHITE PAPER WHICH PROVIDED ALL OF  
14 OUR RATIONALE, PROVIDED A BACKGROUND TO THE DESIGN OF OUR  
15 SYSTEM HOPING THAT WE WOULD RECEIVE APPROVAL TO PROCEED IN A  
16 LIKE MANNER WITH SUBSEQUENT FASHION. WE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.  
17 AND WE HAD TO PROCEED ON A STATION-BY-STATION BASIS INSOFAR AS  
18 DESIGN APPROVALS WERE CONCERNED FOR THE FIRE MARSHAL.

19 NFPA 130, YOU KNOW, HOWEVER, GOES FAR BEYOND  
20 STATION DESIGN. AND IT IS IN THAT AREA THAT I SUSPECT -- I  
21 DON'T HAVE ANY REAL FEELING, BUT IT IS IN THAT AREA THAT I  
22 SUSPECT THAT AT MOST TRANSIT SYSTEMS, EITHER OLD OR NEW, THIS  
23 COUNTRY WILL HAVE A GREAT DIFFICULTY IN COMPLYING WITH NFPA  
24 130. BUT, NEVERTHELESS, IT IS FAR BETTER TO DESIGN IT ON A  
25 STANDARD THAN IT IS TO STRETCH A STANDARD AND SAY THAT IT IS  
26 APPLICABLE TO THIS FIELD OF ACTIVITY WHEN IT WAS REALLY NEVER  
27 INTENDED FOR USE IN THE DESIGN OF A TRANSIT SYSTEM. AND SO  
28 IT WAS ONE OF MARTA'S RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE TIME WE APPEARED

1 BEFORE THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD THAT A  
2 STANDARD SUCH AS NFPA 130 BE PURSUED AND BE ADOPTED FOR  
3 TRANSIT INDUSTRY. IT IS FAR BETTER TO HAVE SOMETHING AND TO  
4 DESIGN TO IT THAN TO BE IN THE DARK, SO TO SPEAK, IN THIS  
5 AREA.

6 MR. MC FARLAND: MR. LUTKUS, THERE IS A PUC POSITION ON  
7 THIS . . .

8 MR. LUTKUS: NO. THERE IS NOT A PUC POSITION ON NFPA  
9 130. ACTUALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO GET A COPY OF IT TO TAKE A  
10 LOOK AT IT. BUT THE POSITION OF THE PUC IN REGARDS TO  
11 STANDARDS, THE COMMISSION WOULD CONSIDER THAT THE STANDARDS  
12 ARE APPROPRIATE. WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IS THE PERFORMANCE  
13 STANDARD. AND, IN FACT, THE COMMISSION AT THIS TIME IS  
14 INVOLVED IN A FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF  
15 RAIL RAPID SAFETY STANDARDS FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. AND  
16 A FEASIBILITY PROJECT IS TO BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF MARCH.  
17 AND ALL THAT WILL DO AT THAT TIME WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT AS  
18 TO WHETHER IT IS FEASIBLE TO HAVE STANDARDS AND WHAT AREAS  
19 SHOULD THERE BE STANDARDS OR GUIDELINES OR RULES AND ALSO  
20 TO ASSESS WHAT IT WILL TAKE COMPLETELY, TIMEWISE, AND WHAT  
21 CATEGORIES. AND THAT WILL BE A SECONDARY PHASE.

22 MR. FARRELLY: I RECALL THERE WAS A PIECE OF  
23 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PUC AND THE NFPA. I AM NOT SURE  
24 WHETHER IT WAS ADDRESSED -- BUT IT WAS TRANSMITTING SOME  
25 COMMENTS, AT LEAST, EXPLORING AREAS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION  
26 AND POSSIBLE CHANGES OF 130 WHICH WAS RECEIVED EARLIER THIS  
27 YEAR. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT THAT ESTABLISHED A POSITION  
28 FOR THE PUC, BUT IT APPEARED THAT SOMEONE WITHIN THE PUC HAS

1 REVIEWED THESE DRAFTS. COULD YOU CLARIFY THAT?

2 MR. LUTKUS: THERE WAS A DRAFT, AND I THINK IT WAS OF  
3 CHAPTER TWO ONLY OF THE NFPA 130 STANDARD. AND OUR STAFF  
4 REVIEWED THAT, AND IT WAS THE STAFF'S OPINION THAT THAT  
5 DRAFT -- THE MATERIAL IN THERE -- WAS SO GENERALIZED THAT IT  
6 WAS THE STAFF'S OPINION THAT IT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A  
7 STANDARD. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE WHAT THE PRESENT STATE OF NFPA  
8 130 IS. THERE MAY BE SOME CHANGES.

9 MR. MC FARLAND: DID THEY HAVE ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA TO  
10 SET UP AS A STANDARD, OR WAS IT THEY JUST FELT THAT THE 130  
11 WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED?

12 MR. LUTKUS: THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE MATERIAL TO  
13 COMPARE. IT WAS JUST THAT THE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THIS  
14 PARTICULAR CHAPTER WAS CONSIDERED TO BE SO GENERALIZED AND --

15 MR. MC FARLAND: SITE SPECIFIC?

16 MR. LUTKUS: TERMINOLOGIES AS SUCH MAY BE REQUIRED OR  
17 AS APPROPRIATE -- ITEMS LIKE THAT WHICH -- SPECIFICALLY, LIKE,  
18 QUOTE, "AS APPROPRIATE." THAT IS NOT TERMINOLOGY THAT IS  
19 APPROPRIATE FOR A STANDARD. THAT TYPE OF THING IS TOO  
20 GENERALIZED.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: I WAS STRUCK BY THE DIFFICULTY OF THE  
22 ABSENCE OF ANY COMMENTS IN REGARD TO TUNNEL EVACUATION WHICH  
23 IS MUCH MORE A CONCERN TO ME THAN STATION EVACUATION. BUT  
24 IN LOOKING AT OUR SYSTEM AND THE FACT THAT ALL OF OUR RUNNING  
25 TUNNELS OR A GREAT MAJORITY OF OUR RUNNING TUNNELS WILL BE  
26 BORED AND WILL PROBABLY BE SINGLE-TRACK DOUBLE BORE, I HAVE  
27 A GREAT NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO EMERGENCY EGRESS,  
28 TO EMERGENCY VENTILATION. AND IN LOOKING AT 130, I WAS STRUCK



1 BY THE COMMENTS THAT EMERGENCY EGRESS COULD BE VERTICAL OR  
2 LATERAL INTO THE PARALLEL BORE. IN OUR CASE, THE LATERAL END  
3 OF THE PARALLEL BORE WOULD GIVE US A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY  
4 AND WOULD ALSO GIVE US A DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINT.

5 IT WAS RAISED YESTERDAY THAT THE THIRD RAIL IN  
6 THE PARELLEL BORE IS GOING TO BE HOT. YOU HAVE A TRAIN THAT  
7 YOU ARE EXITING THROUGH PARALLEL CONNECTIONS. YOU MAY HAVE  
8 UP TO EIGHT HUNDRED TO A THOUSAND PEOPLE GOING INTO THE  
9 PARALLEL BORE. YOU HAVE MERELY A CATWALK WITH A COVER  
10 BOARDED THIRD RAIL. IMMEDIATELY I CAN CONJURE UP SOME  
11 SITUATION. BUT THIS IS THE SITUATION THAT IS USED IN ATLANTA.

12 MR. RHINE: THE THIRD RAIL IS OUT-BOARDED CATWALK.

13 MR. MC FARLAND: IT IS STILL THERE.

14 MR. RHINE: YOU ARE PROBABLY IN MORE DANGER BEING DOWN  
15 ON THE TRACK WITH THE INCOMING TRAIN COMING ACROSS TO RESCUE  
16 YOU THAN YOU ARE WALKING ACROSS TO THE THIRD RAIL.

17 MR. MC FARLAND: WITH A THOUSAND PEOPLE, THERE IS A  
18 LAW THAT WILL BE BROUGHT INTO APPLICATION IMMEDIATELY CALLED  
19 PARKINSON'S. YOU PUT A NUMBER ON IT.

20 MR. LOCK, DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS? WAS THAT A  
21 CONCERN IN YOUR DELIBERATION WITH REGARD TO EMERGENCY EGRESS?

22 MR. LOCK: IT WAS A CONCERN. TECHNICALLY, WE CALL OUR  
23 DUCT BANK A SERVICE WALKWAY. PERSONALLY, WE FEEL IT IS A  
24 MEANS OF EMERGENCY EGRESS IN REFERENCE TO THE INVERT. THE  
25 DESIGN OF OUR CARS, BECAUSE WE HAVE AN END DOOR, WE HAVE  
26 ACCESS TO THE INVERT AS WELL AS TO THE SERVICE WALKWAY. SO  
27 WE CAN CONDUCT AN EVACUATION VIA BOTH LANES.

28 AGAIN, BECAUSE OF TRAIN CONTROL EQUIPMENT

1 IN PEDANT SPOTS, BECAUSE OF THE THIRD RAIL -- ALTHOUGH IT  
2 DOES HAVE A COVER BOARD -- AND YOU REALLY HAVE TO LOOK FOR  
3 TROUBLE WHEN YOU HAVE A COVER BOARD.-- WHEN IT EXTENDS  
4 APPROXIMATELY 300 FEET, IT ONLY GIVES YOU ABOUT 60 DEGREES  
5 ACCESS TO THE THIRD RAIL. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW, YOU HAVE  
6 TO LOOK FOR TROUBLE. AND WITH PARKINSON'S LAW, SOMEONE WILL  
7 FIND TROUBLE.

8 ALSO, BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT IN OUR TUNNELS  
9 WE HAVE A SLAB CONSTRUCTION INSOFAR AS VIBRATION AND NOISE  
10 IS CONCERNED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER THAT THE INVERT  
11 WOULD BE THE PREFERRED MEANS OF EGRESS. IT IS AVAILABLE,  
12 BUT THE SERVICE WALKWAY IS FAR MORE PREFERABLE. WE HAVE A  
13 HANDRAIL ON A SERVICE WALKWAY WHERE WE HAVE MIDTUNNEL  
14 EMERGENCY EXITS. WE PROVIDE FOR CROSSWALKS OVER THE RUNNING  
15 RAIL. WE PROVIDE FOR BREAKS IN THE THIRD RAIL. AND SO WE  
16 HAVE A DEFINED LANE OF EMERGENCY EVACUATION TO THE EMERGENCY  
17 EXIT AND THEN UP AND OUT OF THE SYSTEM. I THINK THAT IS  
18 PREFERABLE TO THE INVERT. AND THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS  
19 THAT ALTHOUGH WE DO HAVE EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND ALTHOUGH WE  
20 DO HAVE BATTERY SUPPLIES IN STATIONS, TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY  
21 LIGHTING IN THE SUBWAY AS IN THE STATION, AS WELL AS EXITING  
22 SIGNS, IT WAS SIMPLER TO CONDUCT THE EVACUATION ALONG THE  
23 SERVICE WALKWAY. AND THAT IS WHAT WE DO DURING OUR  
24 SIMULATIONS. WE HAVE NOT ENCOUNTERED ANY PROBLEMS IN OUR  
25 SIMULATIONS INSOFAR AS EVACUATIONS ARE CONCERNED.

26 BUT, AGAIN, LET ME SAY THIS, THAT A SIMULATION,  
27 A TEST, IS ONLY GOOD AS IT IS DESIGNED. AND TO MY KNOWLEDGE,  
28 WE HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO HAVE A CRUSH LOAD ON EIGHT CARS AND

1 TO EVACUATE A CRUSH LOAD TRAIN. OUR SIMULATIONS ARE NORMALLY  
2 CONDUCTED WITH FOUR CARS. WE HAVE CONDUCTED THEM WITH TWO  
3 AND, AGAIN, IT IS A TEST AND EVERYONE KNOWS IT IS A TEST. SO  
4 TO EVACUATE 400 OR 600 PEOPLE IN A SIMULATION IS ONE THING,  
5 AND TO BE FACED WITH A PEAK 15-MINUTE EIGHT-TRACK CRUSH LOAD  
6 OF UPWARDS OF 1500 PEOPLE IS SOMETHING ELSE AGAIN.

7 MR. RICHARDS: OF COURSE, WE KNOW YOU HAVE YOUR  
8 SIMULATIONS AND YOU HAVE HAD FIRE DRILLS WHERE PEOPLE WERE  
9 INVOLVED IN CHECKING OUT YOUR SIMULATION.

10 MR. LOCK: DO YOU MEAN USING PATRONS?

11 MR. RICHARDS: DID YOU HAVE FIRE DRILLS WHERE PEOPLE  
12 WERE USED TO CHECK YOUR VALIDITY OF YOUR SIMULATION?

13 MR. LOCK: OUR SIMULATION INVOLVES VOLUNTEERS WHO ARE  
14 RIDERS ON A TRAIN AND WHO DO NOT KNOW IF AND WHERE THE  
15 EMERGENCY EVACUATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE. SO THEY ARE THE  
16 GUINEA PIGS, SO TO SPEAK, IN THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION  
17 EXERCISES. WE USE EMPLOYEES. WE HAVE NOT CONDUCTED AN  
18 EXERCISE DURING REVENUE SERVICE WHERE WE SIMULATE AN  
19 EMERGENCY AND ASK THE PATRONS TO EVACUATE INTO THE TUNNEL.

20 MR. RICHARDS: YOU NEVER REALLY HAD A FIRE DRILL, THEN?

21 MR. LOCK: IT IS A MATTER OF SEMANTICS. WE HAVE HAD A  
22 FIRE DRILL USING OUR EMPLOYEES. WE DO NOT HAVE FIRE DRILLS  
23 USING PASSENGERS. THAT WOULD BE MY RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION.

24 MR. MC FARLAND: WHAT IS THE HEIGHT OF YOUR CATWALK?

25 MR. LOCK: OUR CATWALK IS APPROXIMATELY 31 INCHES ABOVE  
26 THE TOP OF THE RAIL, OUR SERVICE WALKWAY. THAT IS THE TOP OF  
27 THE DUCT BANK.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: YOUR PLATFORM HEIGHT IS WHAT, 42  
29 INCHES?

1 MR. LOCK: 44 INCHES.

2 MR. MC FARLAND: SO YOU ARE LESS. THE REASON THAT I  
3 RAISED THIS AT THE OBSERVATIONS PEER BOARD APPROXIMATELY A  
4 YEAR AGO IS, A VERY INTERESTING POINT WAS BROUGHT UP BY BOB  
5 JOHNSON FROM PATHCO THAT IT IS HIS FEELING THAT ANY SITUATION  
6 WHERE THERE IS AN EMERGENCY IN THE TUNNEL, THE OPERATOR HAS  
7 A SERIES OF INSTRUCTIONS TO FOLLOW. ONE IS TO RADIO HIS  
8 POSITION. TWO IS TO DO A WALK-AROUND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE,  
9 AND THEN TO GET BACK TO CENTRAL.

10 WE POINTED OUT THAT IN MOST TUNNELS TO WALK  
11 AROUND IS TOTALLY IMPOSSIBLE. AND THEN HE MENTIONED THAT IN  
12 MONTREAL THE CATWALK IS NOT 42 INCHES HIGH. IT IS DOWN ABOUT  
13 24 INCHES, WHICH WOULD GIVE YOU VISUAL ACCESS TO THE  
14 UNDERSIDE OF THE CAR. IT WOULD STILL GIVE YOU A WALKWAY.  
15 SOMEONE IN THE ORDER OF MY HEIGHT CAN'T WALK ON CATWALKS IN  
16 UMATA. HAD THOSE CATWALKS BEEN LOWER, THEY WOULD BE QUITE  
17 EASILY WALKED ON.

18 AND I WAS POINTED OUT BY JOHNSON THAT WALK-AROUND  
19 IS IMPORTANT. THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD BE LOOKING AT A  
20 CATWALK AT APPROXIMATELY HALF THE PLATFORM HEIGHT, GETTING  
21 THE EMERGENCY EGRESS ON THE CATWALK THAT IS MORE USABLE,  
22 PARTICULARLY WITH A HANDRAIL, WHICH IS ALSO NOT COMMON, AND  
23 GIVE THE OPERATOR ACCESS TO THE UNDERCARRIAGE IF HE CAN  
24 CONDUCT A WALK-AROUND.

25 MR. LOCK: THE DESIGN OF THE TUNNEL INSOFAR AS THE  
26 SERVICE WALKWAY IS CONCERNED, FROM MY POINT OF VIEW, BASICALLY  
27 IS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE ORIGINALLY  
28 OF THAT SERVICE WALKWAY WAS THE DUCT BANK, TO ENCAPSULATE OUR

1 CABLING RATHER THAN STRINGING IT IN THE TUNNEL AND EXPOSING  
2 IT IN A TUNNEL. AND THE TOP OF THE DUCT BANK SERVES VERY  
3 CONVENIENTLY AS A SERVICE WALKWAY.

4 NOW, MOST OF OUR SYSTEM, INsofar AS THE SUBWAY  
5 TUNNELS ARE CONCERNED, IS COVERED CONSTRUCTION WHERE YOU HAVE  
6 A BOX, A RECTANGLE. AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, YOUR HEADROOM,  
7 WHEN YOU ARE ON THE SERVICE WALKWAY, IS NO PROBLEM WHATSOEVER.  
8 THE PROBLEM OCCURS WITH RESPECT TO LIGHT FIXTURES, WHERE THEY  
9 ARE LOCATED, IF THEY ARE LOCATED ON THE SIDE. AND THAT WAS  
10 A MATTER OF MUCH DISCUSSION, WHETHER WE WOULD HAVE OVERHEAD  
11 LIGHT FIXTURES OR WHETHER WE WOULD HAVE SIDE LIGHT FIXTURES.  
12 AND, BASICALLY, MAINTENANCE WAS A STRONG ADVOCATE OF PLACING  
13 LIGHT FIXTURES ON THE SIDE WALL BECAUSE IT WOULD BE VERY  
14 DIFFICULT AND A TIME CONSUMING CHORE TO REMOVE HANGING LAMP  
15 FIXTURES THAT WERE HUNG IN THE CENTER OF THE TUNNEL.  
16 MAINTENANCE WAS ALSO AN ADVOCATE IN HAVING LIGHT FIXTURES  
17 ACCESSIBLE FROM THE SERVICE WALKWAY RATHER THAN HAVING TO  
18 HAVE A LADDER WITH RESPECT TO ACCESSING LIGHT FIXTURES. YOU  
19 GET INTO THESE OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE DISCUSSIONS WITH  
20 RESPECT TO DESIGN OF SYSTEM AND LIGHT FIXTURES. AND STANDPIPE  
21 DROPS ARE MORE OF A CONCERN INsofar AS THE SERVICE WALKWAY  
22 USE THAN ANYTHING ELSE.

23 NOW, BECAUSE OF THIS QUESTION THAT YOU RAISED  
24 WITH RESPECT TO BEING ABLE TO WALK AROUND A TRAIN, IN OUR  
25 SUBWAY STATIONS, NOW, AT THE END OF THE PLATFORM, WE HAVE  
26 APPROXIMATELY 150 FEET WHERE WE DO NOT HAVE THE SERVICE  
27 WALKWAY SO THAT WE ARE AT THE END OF THE INVERT LEVEL AND  
28 WE CAN INSPECT A MARIPARE (SIC) AND WALK AROUND A MARIPARE AT THAT

1 POINT. BUT WITH THE SERVICE WALKWAY, THERE IS REALLY NO  
2 MEANS OF BEING ABLE TO INSPECT THE UNDER-CAR EQUIPMENT  
3 BOXES.

4 MR. FARRELLY: MR. WEULE?

5 MR. WEULE: I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOUR OPERATING  
6 CRITERIA AND PHILOSOPHIES WILL DICTATE YOUR DESIGNS IN THE  
7 AREA. AND THIS IS WHAT HAS TO BE ESTABLISHED FIRST. FOR  
8 INSTANCE, WHAT GEORGE DESCRIBES IS BASED IN A LARGE PART IN  
9 THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE TWO OR A CREW OF TWO ON THE TRAIN.  
10 ONE TAKES CARE OF THE PASSENGERS WHILE ONE WORKS ON THE FIRE.  
11 IN THE CASE OF THE BART TRAIN, WE HAVE ONE TRAIN OPERATOR.  
12 HE IS NOT CONCERNED WITH FIGHTING THE FIRE AT ALL. HIS  
13 PRIMARY ROLE IS TO GET THE PATRONS OUT AND CLEAR IT FOR THE  
14 FIRE DEPARTMENT TO COME IN AND TAKE CARE OF THE FIRE.

15 TO SUPPORT THE TWO-MAN CREW AND THE FIRE  
16 FIGHTING CAPABILITY, HE HAS STANDPIPES AND HOSES AND NOZZELS  
17 LOCATED THROUGHOUT. AND ONE DICTATES THE OTHER. AND I WOULD  
18 SUGGEST A SET PHILOSOPHY THAT DICTATES THE DESIGN.

19 MR. DONATO: I WOULD LIKE TO BRING A CORRECTION ON THAT,  
20 RALPH. ACTUALLY, WE WANT TO GO TO A ONE-MAN OPERATION. AND  
21 THE REASON WHY WE DIDN'T DO THE ONE-MAN OPERATION YET IS  
22 BECAUSE OF A LABOR PROBLEM. ACTUALLY, THE SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED  
23 SO THAT WE WOULD GO EVENTUALLY TO A ONE-MAN OPERATION.

24 MR. WEULE: SO YOU WILL BE PLACED WITH DEALING WITH THE  
25 PASSENGERS' PROTECTION AND MOVEMENT VERSUS THE --

26 MR. DONATO: WE WILL HAVE TO CHANGE OUR PROCEDURE, THEN,  
27 WHEREVER WE GO TO A ONE-MAN OPERATION. WE ARE THINKING ABOUT  
28 THAT NOW. BUT THE WALKWAY ARRANGEMENT WAS DESIGNED AT THE

1 TIME WITH A COMPROMISE, THE HEIGHT, THE WIDTH. THERE WAS A  
2 COMPROMISE. WE WANTED TO HAVE IT LOW ENOUGH SO THAT WE COULD  
3 HAVE ACCESS TO THE UNDERCARRIAGE. WE WANTED TO HAVE IT LOW  
4 ENOUGH SO THAT WE COULD STEP FROM THE INVERT TO THE -- WE  
5 HAVE INSTALLED HANDRAILS SO THAT WE CAN GRAB AT THE PROPER  
6 HEIGHT. WE WANTED TO HAVE IT HIGH ENOUGH FOR PEOPLE TO WALK  
7 FROM THE CAR DOWN ON THIS. WE WANTED IT WIDE ENOUGH SO THAT  
8 PEOPLE WOULDN'T FALL. BUT THEN IT WAS A TRADE-OFF WITH THE  
9 WIDTH OF THE TUNNEL, BECAUSE IN OUR CASE, IF WE INCREASED THE  
10 TUNNEL BY ONE INCH, SO I AM TOLD, THE COST OF THE EXCAVATION  
11 IS MUCH HIGHER BECAUSE EVERYTHING IS ROCK IN MONTREAL. WE  
12 NEED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF STEEL ARCHES. IF WE WERE TO GO A  
13 LITTLE WIDER THAN THAT, WE MIGHT NEED A LOT MORE STEEL ARCHES.  
14 AND IT MIGHT DOUBLE THE COST OF TUNNELING. THERE IS AN AMOUNT  
15 OF TRADE-OFF THAT YOU HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION.

16 MR. MC FARLAND: MY CURIOSITY IS THAT, IN TALKING TO  
17 MANY SYSTEMS THAT HAVE WALKWAYS AND BORED TUNNELS, AS FAR AS  
18 I COULD ASCERTAIN, IT WAS A MATTER OF TRADITION, NOT  
19 FORETHOUGHT, THE SIZES AND WIDTH OF WALKWAYS.

20 WALTER DOCTORY (SIC) THAT WORKED FOR MCITA FOR 20-SOME  
21 YEARS -- HOW MANY DUCTS DOES T.A. HAVE IN THEIR DUCT BANK?  
22 SOME VERY LARGE NUMBER. AND HE HAS NEVER SEEN MORE THAN A  
23 SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEM OCCUPIED. AND THAT'S A HUNDRED-YEAR  
24 SYSTEM.

25 MR. WEULE: I WOULD DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT EVACUATION  
26 CAPABILITY WAS THE PRIME REQUISITE IN THE WALKWAYS IN THE  
27 BART SYSTEM. I AM SURE IT WAS THE MAINTENANCE.

28 MR. DONATO: WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT THE EVACUATION, THE

1 WALKWAY IS NOT THE PROPER WAY TO EVACUATE PEOPLE, BECAUSE IT  
2 IS TOO LONG. OF COURSE, WE HAVE A TUNNEL WITH DOUBLE TRACK.  
3 WHEN WE EVACUATE, TIME IS IMPORTANT. AND WE EVACUATE PEOPLE  
4 ON THE INVERT. THE INVERT IS DESIGNED SO IT IS AS CLEAR AS  
5 POSSIBLE. IT IS TRUE WE HAVE SOME IMPOTENT SPOTS, BUT THE  
6 TUNNEL IS WELL LIT. AND WE CAN EVACUATE PEOPLE VERY, VERY  
7 FAST. AND WHAT WE DO IS WE KILL THE POWER ON BOTH TRACKS.  
8 AND IT IS NOT VERY OFTEN THAT WE HAVE TO EVACUATE PEOPLE. IT  
9 IS VERY SELDOM. AND YOU CAN SHUT DOWN YOUR SYSTEM AT THAT  
10 TIME. IF YOU REALLY HAVE A SERIOUS INCIDENT, YOU COULD  
11 SHUT IT DOWN FOR TWO OR THREE HOURS. WHAT WE DO IS WE PUT  
12 BUSES ON SURFACE FOR THAT TIME.

13 MR. MC FARLAND: YOU COULD HAVE SIDE-TO-SIDE EVACUATION.  
14 YOU COULD PULL A TRAIN UP. DO YOU DO THAT?

15 MR. DONATO: WE DON'T DO THAT. WE DON'T HAVE THAT  
16 BECAUSE WE HAVE THE TRACK SIDE BY SIDE. AND ONCE YOU START  
17 EVACUATION, YOU ARE LIABLE TO HAVE PEOPLE ON THE TRACK. AND  
18 IF YOU HAVE PEOPLE ON THE TRACK, YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED TO PUT  
19 POWER ON. YOU COULD KILL PEOPLE VERY EASILY. ONCE THE  
20 OPERATOR KNOWS THAT ONE PASSENGER GOT DOWN ON THE TRACK, HE  
21 HAS TO ASK FOR US TO CUT THE POWER. THERE IS NO POWER ON  
22 THE TRACK.

23 MR. GRAINGER: YOU HAVE TWO THIRD RAILS; DON'T YOU?  
24 THEY HAVE A SPECIAL PROBLEM BECAUSE THEY HAVE FOURE THIRD  
25 RAILS.

26 MR. SANDBERG: AS YOU HAVE RELATIVELY POINTED OUT, YOU  
27 HAVE SHORT STATION SPACING.

28 MR. DONATO: THE WALKING DISTANCE IS NOT VERY LONG.



1 MR. LOW: GEORGE, HOW DO YOU TURN OFF YOUR THIRD RAIL  
2 POWER? FROM WHAT SOURCES CAN YOU DEACTIVATE?

3 MR. DONATO: YOU HAVE TRIP SWITCHES ALONG THE TUNNEL  
4 EVERY ABOUT 400 FEET THAT YOU COULD USE. THE OPERATOR  
5 USUALLY DOESN'T USE THAT. HE USES HIS PHONE AND ASKS THE  
6 CENTRAL CONTROL TO CUT THE POWER. AND THEY CUT POWER  
7 IMMEDIATELY.

8 MR. LOW: DO YOU ALSO HAVE THEM IN THE STATION?

9 MR. DONATO: YES. YOU HAVE THEM AT ALL THE STATIONS,  
10 AT TEN OF THE STATIONS. AND IN THE CENTER STATION YOU HAVE  
11 TRIP SWITCHES.

12 MR. MC FARLAND: DO YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH VANDALS  
13 OR TRIPPING --

14 MR. DONATO: IN THE STATIONS, WE PUT THE GLASS TUBE  
15 SO THAT PEOPLE TRIPPING THIS WILL BREAK THE TUBE. BUT  
16 ELSEWHERE WE DON'T HAVE ANY OF THESE GLASS TUBES. THERE IS A  
17 CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PEOPLE WHO MIGHT USE THEM, BUT VERY, VERY  
18 SMALL. IT IS NO PROBLEM AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED.

19 MR. WEULE: BART HAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME SETUP WITH  
20 SUBWAY TRIPS IN THE SUBWAY AND PLATFORM TRIPS. THERE WAS A  
21 GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN IN PREREVENUE THAT THERE WOULD BE A  
22 VANDAL PROBLEM. IT HAS NOT TURNED OUT TO BE THE CASE.

23 MR. DONATO: ONE THING WE HAVE IS THE MEANS AT CENTRAL  
24 CONTROL TO OVERRIDE ALL OF THESE TRIPS IF WE WANTED TO. BUT  
25 THEY ARE UNDER ORDER NOT TO USE IT EXCEPT IN VERY SPECIAL  
26 CASES.

27 MR. WEULE: OURS HAVE TO BE RESET. THE GLASS ACTUALLY  
28 HOLDS THE BUTTON, THAT TYPE OF THING.

1 MR. DONATO: ONE THING WHICH IS NOT DIRECTLY ON THIS  
2 LINE BUT RELATES TO THAT, TO EVACUATION, IS WHEN YOU HAVE THE  
3 PROBLEM SOMEWHERE, THE DANGER IS THAT THE TRAINS WOULD BUNCH  
4 TOGETHER.

5 ONE PROVISION THAT WE HAVE AND OTHER SUBWAYS HAVE  
6 IS WHAT WAS CALL A DEPARTURE ORDER. AND EVERY STATION HAS  
7 A SIGN AND CENTER CONTROL PUSHES A BUTTON AND IT STOPS ALL  
8 THE TRAINS AT THE STATION. IT IS AN INDICATION TO ALL THE  
9 OPERATORS NOT TO MOVE OUT OF THAT STATION WHERE THEY ARE.  
10 AND WHEN THEY GET IN THE STATION, THEY STAY THERE AND WAIT  
11 FOR HIS ORDER TO PROCEED. SO WE DON'T BUNCH THE TRAIN  
12 TOGETHER.

13 MR. WEULE: WE HAVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME TYPE OF  
14 AN OPERATION WHERE CENTRAL CONTROL ISSUES A PLATFORM HOLD  
15 WHICH WOULD HOLD AUTOMATICALLY THE TRAINS AT ALL THE STATIONS  
16 IN ADDITION TO TRAINS THAT ARE IN BETWEEN STATIONS  
17 IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM, THE VENT  
18 SEPARATION CONCEPT THAT I DESCRIBED YESTERDAY.

19 MR. MC FARLAND: TO STOP A VENT?

20 MR. WEULE: YOU CAN'T GET TWO TRAINS BETWEEN VENTS,  
21 SO THAT GIVES US AN ALARMING SITUATION. IF WE HAVE A FIRE, THE  
22 FIRST ACTION IS, YOU GET ALL THE REST OF THE TRAINS OUT OF  
23 THERE.

24 WE DO NOT DISCOURAGE PASSENGERS ONCE THEY ARE IN  
25 THE NON-INCIDENT BORE, CLEAR BORE, FROM GETTING ONTO THE  
26 TRACKWAY ITSELF. WE MAKE IT VERY VISIBLE TO THEM THAT THE  
27 THIRD RAIL IS HOT AND WILL REMAIN HOT. AND THAT IS PUBLISHED  
28 THROUGHOUT AND HIGHLY VISIBLE ON THE COVER BOARD.

1 MR. MC FARLAND: BUT YOUR LIGHTING IS SUFFICIENT, SO  
2 THERE IS MINIMAL TRIPPING HAZARD, OBSTRUCTIONS?

3 MR. WEULE: VERY LITTLE OBSTRUCTIONS REALLY. TYPE  
4 PLATES AND CROSS-BONDING, NOT VERY BAD. AND THE LIGHTING IS  
5 GOOD. EVERY 50 FEET, I BELIEVE, THERE IS A 12-FOOT  
6 FLORESCENT.

7 MR. MC FARLAND: HOW DO YOU OFF-LOAD ON THE FORE AND  
8 AFT? DO YOU HAVE A LADDER?

9 MR. WEULE: NO. WE DO NOT HAVE EVEN DOOR CAPABILITY.

10 MR. LOCK: INSOFAR AS OFF-LOADING IS CONCERNED, SIDE  
11 DOOR OFF-LOADING IS SIMPLE BECAUSE THERE IS NOT MUCH AGAINST  
12 THE CAR FLOOR AND THE SERVICE WALKWAY, SOMETHING IN THE ORDER  
13 OF 13, 16 INCHES, SOMETHING OF THAT SORT. AND THAT HAS NOT  
14 TO DATE CAUSED ANY PROBLEM. INSOFAR AS END-DOOR LOADING IS  
15 CONCERNED, WE HAVE NO SPECIAL EQUIPMENT THAT WE CARRY. WHAT  
16 HAS BEEN UTILIZED IS THE MECHANICAL UPPER, WHICH IS MIDWAY  
17 BETWEEN THE CAR FLOOR AND STEPPING DOWN TO THE MECHANICAL  
18 UPPER AND THEN DOWN TO THE INVERT. BUT AS I SAID BEFORE,  
19 THAT IS NOT THE PREFERABLE MEANS OF EVACUATION. SIDE DOOR  
20 EVACUATION FROM PATRONS IS IN OUR PROCEEDINGS AND IS WHAT  
21 WE FOLLOW.

22 I WANTED TO MAKE A REMARK CONCERNING EMERGENCY  
23 THROUGH STATIONS. OUR EMERGENCY TRIP STATIONS ARE BLUE-LIGHT  
24 STATIONS AND ARE OFF THE PLATFORM AT EACH END OF A SUBWAY  
25 PLATFORM. THEY ARE REALLY NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY THE PUBLIC.  
26 THERE IS NO VISUAL AID DIRECTING THE PUBLIC TO GO OUT TO THE  
27 PLATFORM AND TO OPERATE THE EMERGENCY TRIP STATION. THEY ARE  
28 NOT LOCKED. THEY ARE NOT BEHIND A GLASS THAT YOU HAVE TO

1 BREAK. THEY ARE IN A BOX. YOU OPEN THE BOX; THERE IS A PHONE  
2 THERE; THE TRIP STATION IS THERE THAT YOU CAN ACTIVATE MANUALLY  
3 AND AS I INDICATED, THERE IS A MAINTENANCE PHONE JACK FOR  
4 EMERGENCY WIRED COMMUNICATION IN THAT AREA. OUR BLUE-LIGHT  
5 STATIONS ARE ALSO LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF OUR  
6 SYSTEM. THEY ARE AT EVERY PORTAL TO A SUBWAY AS WELL AS AT  
7 THE END OF THE PLATFORM. THEY ARE AT MIDLINE TUNNEL EMERGENCY  
8 EXITS AND ENTRIES AS WELL. THEY ARE LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY  
9 EVERY QUARTER MILE ALONG THE GRADE SECTION OF OUR SYSTEM.  
10 AND THEY ARE LOCATED AT POINTS OF ACCESS OF OUR ELEVATED  
11 STRUCTURE. BY THAT I MEAN WE HAVE IDENTIFIED POINTS OF ACCESS  
12 TO THE ELEVATED STRUCTURE WHERE WE HAVE A STREET DOOR OR  
13 UNDERPASS OR MEANS OF GETTING FROM THE STREET TO THE ELEVATED  
14 STRUCTURE. AND THE BLUE-LIGHT STATION IS LOCATED TO THE  
15 OUTSIDE OF THE AERIAL STRUCTURE SO THAT THE FIRE DEPARTMENT  
16 WOULD HAVE USE OF IT BEFORE ENTERING THE TRACKWAY RATHER  
17 THAN HAVING TO CROSS THE TRACKWAY AND USE IT.

18 MR. DONATO: WE HAVE LADDERS INSTALLED ON THE SIDE OF  
19 THE TUNNEL. WE HAVE THEM ABOUT EVERY 80 FEET TO THE WHOLE  
20 END OF THE SUBWAY. THERE ARE LADDERS. THEY ARE WOODEN  
21 LADDERS. THEY HAVE ONE SADDLE LADDER, WHICH IS LONGER THAN  
22 THE OTHER ONES. THEY ARE HOOKED INTO THE DOORSILLS AND CAN BE  
23 USED TO UNLOAD PEOPLE. IN EMERGENCIES THIS IS USED MAYBE FOR  
24 OLDER PEOPLE. BUT PEOPLE JUMP DOWN IF THERE IS EVER AN  
25 EMERGENCY, BECAUSE ON OUR SUBWAY THE PASSENGER CAN OPEN THE  
26 DOOR IF THEY WANT TO. SO YOUNGER PEOPLE WILL CHOOSE -- IF  
27 THERE IS NO DANGER -- THEY MIGHT CHOOSE TO JUMP DOWN WHEN THEY  
28 SEE THERE IS AN EVACUATION GOING ON. BY THAT TIME, THE POWER

1 IS CUT OFF.

2 OUR TRANSPORTATION PEOPLE LIKE TO USE THE WALKWAY.  
3 BUT IT IS A VERY LONG PROCESS TO EVACUATE IF YOU HAVE A  
4 THOUSAND PEOPLE ON A TRAIN TO USE A WALKWAY. IT'S A VERY LONG  
5 PROCESS, AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENFORCE THAT ON PASSENGERS  
6 WHO SEE A MUCH FASTER WAY TO EVACUATE. THOSE WHO TAKE THE  
7 WALKWAY, ONCE THEY REACH THE END OF THE TRAIN, BECAUSE THE  
8 WALKWAY IS VERY NARROW, GO DOWN THE WALKWAY AND WALK.

9 MR. WEULE: WE ARE DEVELOPING NEW CAR SPECIFICATIONS.  
10 I AM SURE YOU KNOW THAT THE C CAR (SIC) WILL HAVE END-DOOR  
11 CAPABILITIES.

12 MR. THOMPSON: WMATA CARS HAVE A LADDER CARRIED BEHIND  
13 THE OPERATOR'S CAB. THERE IS NO WAY TO ATTACH TO IT THE  
14 VEHICLE ITSELF. IT JUST LIES UP AGAINST THE CAR. PREVIOUS  
15 EVACUATIONS WERE DIRECTED TO GO THROUGH THE END DOOR OF THE  
16 CAR. BUT NOW THERE HAS BEEN SOME RETHINKING OF THIS AND  
17 SIDE-DOOR EVACUATIONS ARE UNDER REVIEW RIGHT NOW. AND THEY  
18 ARE ENTERTAINING THE THOUGHT OF A SIDE-DOOR EVACUATION. THAT  
19 CAN ONLY BE DONE BY THE OPERATOR, BECAUSE HE HAS CONTROL OF  
20 THE VEHICLE. THERE IS NO PASSENGER EVACUATION EFFORT AT ALL.  
21 THE OPERATOR UNLOCKS THE DOOR.

22 MR. MC FARLAND: IF VERN GARRETT CAN EXIT A VEHICLE  
23 FROM THAT CATWALK . . .

24 MR. THOMPSON: THE CATWALK VARIES IN INCHES FROM 13 TO  
25 24 INCHES, DEPENDING ON WHERE YOU ARE OUT IN THE SYSTEM.  
26 ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE MAJOR OBSTRUCTIONS ALONG THERE BECAUSE  
27 MANY OF THE ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS OR VENTILATING SYSTEMS ARE  
28 INSTALLED DIRECTLY IN THE PATH OF EGRESS.

1                   AND I WAS INTERESTED IN WHAT RALPH SAID YESTERDAY  
2 ABOUT REMOVING A LOT OF THESE OBSTRUCTIONS.

3                   WHERE DID YOU PUT THEM? YOU DIDN'T JUST TAKE THEM  
4 OUT, DID YOU?

5                   MR. WEULE: SOME COULD BE TAKEN OUT AND WERE TAKEN OUT.  
6 OTHERS, LIKE JUNCTION BOXES THAT WERE SMALL ENOUGH, COULD BE  
7 MOVED UP HIGH ENOUGH ALONG THE WALL WITHOUT INTERFERING  
8 CLEARANCE, OTHERWISE, PUT INTO CROSS PASSAGES.

9                   MR. THOMPSON: I KNOW THROUGHOUT OUR SYSTEM MANY, MANY  
10 JUNCTION BOXES, TRANSFORMERS, AND SOME TRAIN GRAPHICS, JUST  
11 TURN BACK SIGN, ET CETERA --

12                  MR. GRAINGER: I WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT I RECEIVED  
13 THE OTHER DAY THE PROCEEDINGS OF A SYSTEM SAFETY APPLICATION  
14 THROUGH SYSTEMWIDE SYMPOSIUM. I DON'T KNOW IF ANYBODY WAS  
15 THERE, BUT IT WAS HELD JULY 27, 1980. THERE IS A PAPER THAT  
16 I GOT, AND I THINK I WILL COPY IT FOR EVERYBODY. IT IS BY  
17 BILL GOSSARD OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD. AND  
18 HE TALKS ABOUT SYSTEM SAFETY AND SMALL RAPID TRANSIT FIRES.  
19 I BRING IT UP AT THIS POINT BECAUSE ONE OF HIS POINTS IS, AS  
20 WE ALL KNOW, YOU HAVE TO REALLY PLAN ON THE UNEXPECTED. HE  
21 HAS TWO PARAGRAPH BLURBS ON THE BART FIRE. HE HAS ABOUT A  
22 THREE PARAGRAPH ON THE SEPTA FIRE, JUST A FEW MONTHS BEFORE  
23 THE BART FIRE. AND THAT WAS REALLY A COMEDY OF ERRORS.

24                  THE MOTORMAN, HE OPENED HIS DOOR TO HELP THE  
25 PEOPLE WHO COULDN'T GET THE SIDE DOORS OPEN. SO THEY WERE  
26 KNOCKING OUT WINDOWS. AND WHEN HE OPENED HIS DOOR, THEY SAW  
27 THAT HE HAD AN OPEN WINDOW THAT DIDN'T HAVE TO BE OPENED, SO  
28 THEY JUST SORT OF PUSHED HIM RIGHT BACK INTO THAT CAB. AND

1 THE CONDUCTOR WAS FOUR CARS BACK, AND HE HAD TO FORCE HIMSELF  
2 THROUGH A CRUSH LOAD AND COME UP AND OPEN THE SIDE DOORS.

3 "YOU HAVE TO PLAN ON THE UNEXPECTED" WAS REALLY  
4 HIS MESSAGE. AND I THINK IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO --

5 MR. MC FARLAND: ADD A LITTLE PANIC.

6 MR. GRAINGER: YES.

7 MR. WEULE: I THINK THERE IS A LOT OF RESENTMENT WHETHER  
8 THE PASSENGER SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET OUT OF THE CARS ON THEIR  
9 OWN. AND THE BART SYSTEM HAS A CLEARLY MARKED PANEL THAT  
10 SAYS, "EMERGENCY DOOR HANDLE" THAT COULD EASILY BE PULLED UP  
11 AND THERE IS A HANDLE WITH AN ARROW. AND IT IS VERY CLEAR  
12 WHAT TO DO. AND WE PUBLISH IT.

13 AND, AGAIN, THERE WAS A LOT OF FEAR THAT THIS  
14 WOULD RESULT IN A LOT OF DISRUPTION -- SOMEBODY CRANKS THAT  
15 HANDLE BACK; THE TRAIN COMES TO A STOP -- IT HAS NOT PROVED  
16 TO BE THE CASE. WE HAVE HAD TRAINS STOPPED IN THE TRANSWAY  
17 TUBE FOR OTHER EMERGENCY REASONS. THERE WAS A LOT OF CONCERN  
18 AFTER THE TRANSWAY TUBE FIRE THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE PANIC  
19 THINKING THERE MIGHT BE A FIRE AND DASHING OUT ON THE TRACKWAY.  
20 IT DIDN'T PROVE TO BE A PROBLEM AT ALL.

21 MR. LOCK: LET ME ADD A REMARK IN THAT REGARD. INsofar  
22 AS THE CAR DOOR SUBSYSTEM IS CONCERNED, TWO HAZARDS THAT WE  
23 INVESTIGATED WERE THE SITUATION WHERE A DOOR OPENS  
24 INADVERTENTLY WHILE THE TRAIN IS IN MOTION AND THE DOOR NOT  
25 OPENING WHILE A TRAIN IS STOPPED VIA THE EMERGENCY. WE HAVE  
26 THE CAPABILITY OF HAVING EMERGENCY CONTROLS AT EACH DOOR SO  
27 THAT WHEN THE TRAIN IS OKAY, PATRONS CAN EXIT. WE ALSO, IN  
28 THE CAR, HAVE AN EMERGENCY STOP WHICH IS ACCESSIBLE TO A

1 PATRON. THERE IS A BIG, RED PUSH BUTTON, AND IT HAS BEEN  
2 USED INADVERTENTLY, ESPECIALLY AFTER FOOTBALL GAMES WHEN THE  
3 FALCONS LOSE AND WE HAVE FANS WHO ARE A BIT BEERED-UP AND A  
4 BIT DISGUSTED. AND WE HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF TRAINS STOPPED ON  
5 THE EAST LINE AFTER THE FOOTBALL GAMES.

6 NONETHELESS, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE VERY STRONG  
7 ADVOCATES ON THIS MATTER WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDING A MEANS OF  
8 EGRESS FOR A PATRON FROM A TRAIN, THAT HE HAS CAPABILITY OF  
9 STOPPING THE TRAIN AND HE HAS CAPABILITY OF EXITING THE TRAIN.  
10 THE CTA, FOR ONE, IS A STRONG ADVOCATE FOR PROVIDING THE  
11 PATRON WITH A MEANS OF STOPPING THE TRAIN, WITH A MEANS OF  
12 EXITING. BASICALLY, WE HAVE PROVIDED THAT SAME CAPABILITY,  
13 INSOFAR AS OUR CARS ARE CONCERNED.

14 MR. LOCK: FROM A HUMAN FACTORS POINT OF VIEW, IN AS  
15 FAR AS VEHICLE DESIGN IS CONCERNED, WE CONSIDERED THE MATTER  
16 AND WE DEBATED IT ALMOST EFFORTLESSLY WITH RESPECT TO YOUR  
17 OPERATION. THE TRAIN OPERATOR NORMALLY USES AUTOMATIC TRAIN  
18 STATIONS. WE PUT THE TRAIN IN ATO IN OUR SYSTEM. HE HAS TO  
19 PRESS THE TRAIN BUTTON. THE TRAIN ACCELERATES AND IS IN  
20 AUTOMATIC CONTROL. IT LEAVES THE STATION. THE TRAIN  
21 OPERATOR THEN HAS TO PRESS THE OPEN DOOR. HE THEN HAS TO  
22 PRESS CLOSE DOOR. AND THEN HE PRESSES THE PROCEED BUTTON,  
23 AND THE TRAIN CONTINUES IN OPERATION. THERE ARE TWO OPEN  
24 BUTTONS, ONE FOR THE LEFT SIDE AND ONE FOR THE RIGHT SIDE.  
25 THERE ARE ALSO DOOR OPEN BUTTONS AT EACH END OF A CAB, ONE ON  
26 THE CONSOLE AND ONE SPECIAL BUTTON ON THE LEFT-HAND SIDE OF  
27 THE CAB IN CASE WE HAVE A SIDE PLATFORM STATION, DEPENDING  
28 UPON WHETHER WE HAVE A CENTER PLATFORM STATION AND SIDE



1 PLATFORM STATION. THIS IS A STATION THAT CREATES A POTENTIAL  
2 HAZARD WITH RESPECT TO THE TRAIN OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY  
3 OPENING THE WRONG SIDE AND CAUSING A POTENTIAL PROBLEM. IN  
4 OUR STATIONS, FORTUNATELY, NOT THROUGH DESIGN, I DON'T BELIEVE  
5 BUT THROUGH ACCIDENT, WE REALLY REMEDIED THE PROBLEM, BECAUSE  
6 WE HAVE A RAIL IN OUR STATION BETWEEN FOUR SIDE-PLATFORM  
7 STATIONS RUNNING DOWN THE CENTER LINE OF THE TRACKWAY WHICH  
8 IS USED TO IDENTIFY THE STATION LOCATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS  
9 RAIL IS APPROXIMATELY WAIST HIGH, SO IF YOU WOULD OPEN THE  
10 DOOR IN THE WRONG SIDE OF THE CAR YOU WOULD SEE THIS RAIL  
11 RIGHT IN FRONT OF YOU. AND UNLESS YOU ARE BLIND, YOU ARE  
12 NOT LIABLE TO TAKE A STEP FORWARD AND FALL ON THE TRACKWAY.  
13 AGAIN, IT IS A QUESTION OF WHAT IS PREFERABLE.

14 MR. DONATO: CONCERNING THAT PROBLEM OF OPENING THE  
15 DOOR ON THE WRONG SIDE, WE HAD SOME OCCASION ON THAT IN  
16 MONTREAL, BUT WE HAVE MODIFIED THE LOGIC OF THE OPERATION OF  
17 THE CARS. WE HAVE A MESSAGE CONTROLLING FROM THE STATION  
18 TELLING ON WHAT SIDE THE PLATFORM IS AND THE OPERATOR CANNOT  
19 MAKE A PROBLEM ANYMORE.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: IT STILL IS THE OPERATOR'S PROBLEM.

21 MR. DONATO: BUT HE CAN'T OPEN THE DOOR ON THE WRONG  
22 SIDE, BECAUSE IN SOME CASES WE WANT TO OPEN ONE SIDE OR THE  
23 OTHER SIDE, BUT HE CAN'T MAKE A MISTAKE. IT IS ARRANGED WITH  
24 HIS LOGIC OF THE DOOR. AS FAR AS OPENING THE DOOR, AS I  
25 MENTIONED, THE PASSENGER CAN OPEN THE DOOR FROM INSIDE. THE  
26 OPERATOR OR THE PASSENGER CAN ALSO OPEN THE DOOR FROM THE  
27 OUTSIDE. THERE IS A PULL CORD ON SOME OF THE DOORS. ON  
28 BOTH SIDES AND ON THE PLATFORM SIDE IT IS ABOVE THE PLATFORM,

1 ON THE OTHER SIDE ALSO WHERE IT IS HIGH ENOUGH. THE OPERATOR,  
2 FOR INSTANCE, HE WANTS TO EVACUATE THE TRAIN AND THE PATRONS  
3 DON'T, HE CAN PULL THE CORDS AND UNLOCK ALL THE DOORS SO  
4 THEY CAN BE OPENED FROM INSIDE AND THEY CAN BE OPENED FROM  
5 THE OUTSIDE.

6 MR. LOW: GETTING BACK TO THE MATTER OF PATRONS OPENING  
7 THE DOORS, DO YOU HAVE SOME KIND OF OVERRIDE, EITHER WITH  
8 YOUR SYSTEM OR MARTA WHERE YOU COME TO A STOP AND YOU DON'T  
9 EVACUATE -- IT IS A STOP THAT IS NOT AN EMERGENCY SITUATION --  
10 DO YOU HAVE AN OVERRIDE THAT THE OPERATOR COULD KEEP THOSE  
11 DOORS CLOSED?

12 MR. DONATO: WE DON'T HAVE AN OVERRIDE, BUT WHAT WE  
13 TELL THE OPERATOR IS TO TALK TO THE PATRONS OVER HIS P.A.  
14 SYSTEM THAT "THERE IS NO EMERGENCY. IT HAS BEEN DELAYED."  
15 BUT IF THE PASSENGER WANTS TO OPEN THE DOOR, HE CAN ALWAYS  
16 OPEN THE DOOR.

17 MR. WEULE: THE ORIGINAL HAD THE ABILITY FOR PATRONS  
18 TO GET OUT, BUT IT DID NOT HAVE AN EMERGENCY EGRESS AS YOU  
19 DO. OUR NEW DESIGN DOES HAVE THAT. WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO  
20 KEEP DOORS CLOSED AT STATIONS. THE ONLY TIME WE DO THAT IS  
21 SOME KIND OF SECURITY OR POLICE.

22 MR. THOMPSON: ONCE THE EMERGENCY MECHANISM IS OPEN FOR  
23 THE DOORS, IS THE TRAIN THEN DISABLED FROM MOVEMENT? CAN YOU  
24 OVERRIDE AND CONTINUE TO MOVE?

25 MR. RHINE: IN THE CASE OF BART, IT BYPASSES ALL THE  
26 NORMAL PROTECTIVE DEVICES. BUT OTHER THAN THAT, YOU CAN'T  
27 MOVE THE TRAIN IN. AFTER THE TRAIN IS STOPPED, YOU COULD GO  
28 INTO ROAD MANUAL. YARD MANUAL IS AT VERY LOW SPEED.

1 MR. LOCK: I WANT TO MAKE A COMMENT CONCERNING DOUG'S  
2 INQUIRY WITH RESPECT TO ADDITIONAL CONTROLS OR DOORS.

3 BESIDES OUR NORMAL DOOR CONTROLS THAT THE  
4 OPERATOR ACCESSES IN THE COURSE OF REVENUE SERVICE, HE HAS  
5 ANOTHER CONTROL WHEREBY HE CAN LOOK OUT OR HE CAN PREVENT  
6 THE END DOOR, THE INSIDE DOOR, THE DOOR CLOSEST TO HIM FROM  
7 OPENING. OUR PLATFORM IS 600 FEET. THERE IS A TOLERANCE,  
8 INSOFAR AS STOPPING IS CONCERNED. AND ESPECIALLY BECAUSE  
9 OF GRADES, YOU SOMETIMES ENCOUNTER SITUATIONS WHERE YOU HAVE  
10 PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO STOPPING. AND THE END COULD  
11 CONCEIVABLY BE OFF THE PLATFORM. IN THAT CASE, THE  
12 RECOURSE THE OPERATOR HAS IS TO PROHIBIT IT FROM OPENING OR  
13 ELSE NOT TO DUMP HIS LOAD AND TO GO TO THE NEXT STATION,  
14 WHICH IS NOT DESIRABLE INSOFAR AS HAVING A HAPPY PUBLIC.

15 MR. LOW: YOU CAN'T BACK UP?

16 MR. LOCK: NO. YOU CAN NEVER BACK UP. SUSPENSION,  
17 SEVERE DISCIPLINE IF AN OPERATOR EVER ATTEMPTS TO BACK UP.  
18 HE DEFEATS THE SIGNALING SYSTEM, BASICALLY.

19 MR. WEULE: DOES HE HAVE THE ABILITY TO BACK A TRAIN?

20 MR. LOCK: YES. WE DID HAVE SUCH A SITUATION HAPPEN  
21 WHEN WE WERE VERY EARLY IN REVENUE SERVICE. AND UNDER THE  
22 CONDITIONS, IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE. THIS WAS THE LAST TRAIN  
23 IN OPERATION FOR THAT EVENING. IT WAS APPROXIMATELY 1:30 IN  
24 THE MORNING. AND THE OPERATOR CAME TO A FIVE POINTS STATION.  
25 AND A FIVE POINTS STATION IS ONE STATION IN OUR SYSTEM WHERE  
26 WE HAVE SIDE AND CENTER PLATFORMS SO THAT YOU CAN ACCESS OR  
27 EXIT A TRAIN FROM EITHER SIDE. THE OPERATOR HAS TO OPEN BOTH  
28 DOORS FOR PEOPLE TO ENTER AND TO LEAVE. AND EVIDENTLY HE DID

1 NOT DO THIS. AND EVIDENTLY THE PARTY OR PARTIES WHO WANTED  
2 TO EXIT DIDN'T EVEN BOTHER TO LOOK IN BACK OF THEM TO SEE  
3 THAT THE OTHER DOOR WAS OPEN. BUT HE CLOSED THE DOOR,  
4 SUPPOSEDLY, AND HE PROCEEDED TO THE NEXT STATION, WHICH IS A  
5 VERY SHORT SPACE, APPROXIMATELY 2,000 FEET, MAYBE A HALF A  
6 MILE, THE OMNI STATION.

7 HE THEN LEARNED, MUCH TO HIS DISMAY, THAT THERE  
8 WAS A GROUP IN THE CAR CLAMORING TO GET OFF AT THE FIVE POINTS  
9 STATION. THEY WANTED OUT BADLY. SO HE THEN BACKED THE TRAIN.  
10 HE WAS THE ONLY TRAIN IN OPERATION. HE THEN BACKED THE  
11 TRAIN TO FIVE POINTS AND LET THEM OFF. AND HE THEN PROCEEDED.  
12 THIS WAS LOGGED AS AN UNUSUAL OCCASION. THERE WAS A BIG  
13 HUMAN CRY ABOUT THIS OPERATION. AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT WAS  
14 MADE VERY CLEAR THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN YOU OPERATE  
15 A TRAIN IN A REVERSE DIRECTION.

16 MR. DONATO: WE WILL BACK UP A TRAIN IN CERTAIN CASES,  
17 BUT THE OPERATOR CALLS AND ASKS PERMISSION; CENTRAL CONTROL  
18 SEES WHERE ALL THE TRAINS ARE AND HE CAN GIVE PERMISSION.  
19 THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO DO IT BY THEMSELVES.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: ARE THERE ANY OTHER ISSUES ON EMERGENCY  
21 EVACUATION?

22 MR. VON IBSCH: DOES WMATA HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BACK A  
23 TRAIN?

24 MR. THOMPSON: YOU CAN BACK A TRAIN, IF THEY NEED TO  
25 REVERSE.

26 MR. VON IBSCH: YOU DO HAVE A CONTROL SWITCH?

27 MR. THOMPSON: YOU CAN PUT IT IN MANUAL AND REVERSE AND  
28 BACK THE TRAIN FROM THE IMMEDIATE OPERATING CAB, BUT THAT

1 PRACTICE IS NOT DONE.

2 MR. MC FARLAND: ARE THERE ANY OTHER ISSUES ON EMERGENCY  
3 EVACUATION?

4 MR. GRAINGER: WALT HAS DONE A LOT OF WORK ON THIS  
5 DYNAMIC EGRESS. AND IN OUR PAST PEER REVIEWS, HE HAS ALWAYS  
6 SERVED IT WELL, WAS A DEVIL'S ADVOCATE PUTTING ISSUES ON THE  
7 TABLE, NOT NECESSARILY SAYING HE BELIEVES IN IT, BUT JUST  
8 HE WOULD LIKE TO GET IT DISCUSSED. AND ONE THAT HE PASSED  
9 ON TO ME I THINK IS VERY IMPORTANT FROM A COST POINT OF VIEW,  
10 IF YOU LOOK AT THE NFPA 130 AND FOUR-MINUTE AND SIX-MINUTE  
11 KIND OF THINGS ON MOST NORTHERN STATIONS, THE RATES AND  
12 EVERYTHING, IF YOU DO A LITTLE ARITHMETIC, THE BOTTOM LINE IS  
13 THERE IS A VOLUME, THE SIZE AND THE STATION BECOMES HUGE AND  
14 THE CAPITAL COST IS PRETTY BAD.

15 MR. LOW: I HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THESE CALCULATIONS,  
16 WHICH I WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU SEPARATELY. THEY ARE NOT QUITE  
17 AS SIZEABLE AS THEY ANTICIPATE. SOME OF THEM GET LARGE,  
18 CERTAINLY, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE IT IS QUITE AS DRASTIC.

19 MR. MC FARLAND: GEORGE, I THINK ABOUT A YEAR FROM NOW,  
20 WHEN WE HAVE FORMULATED A POSITION FROM A PLACE BETWEEN 101  
21 AND 130, I THINK WE WILL PUT IT UP AND LET WALTER TAKE SOME  
22 SWINGS AT ALL OF IT.

23 MR. GRAINGER: WELL, I THINK THE POINT IS, IF PEOPLE  
24 ARE GOING TO RESPOND, TO AID BY COMMENTING BEFORE NOVEMBER 13,  
25 ONE FOOD FOR THOUGHT WOULD BE IS THE EMPANELING ON THAT  
26 TOTAL VOLUME. BECAUSE THAT REALLY HAS A STRONG IMPACT ON THE  
27 CAPITAL COSTS.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: OUR ARCHITECT IS VERY SENSITIVE ON THAT

1 ISSUE.

2 MR. LOW: WE HAVE RUN SOME SEPARATE CALCULATIONS BASED  
3 ON WHAT WE HAVE NOW, AND THEY ARE NOT QUITE AS DRASTIC AS IT  
4 WOULD APPEAR.

5 MR. GRAINGER: BUT THERE IS STILL AN IMPACT. IS THAT  
6 WHAT YOU ARE SAYING?

7 MR. LOW: WELL, OF COURSE, THERE IS. IT DOES REQUIRE  
8 EXTRA EXITS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.  
9 BUT IT IS NOT QUITE THE EXTENT AS WALTER ANTICIPATED. THE  
10 FORMULA THAT HE USED REALLY ALLOWED FOR THE LENGTH OF VOLUMES  
11 BETWEEN STATIONS THAT WOULD BE BASED ON PATRONAGE PROJECTION.  
12 HE HAD A VOLUME OF A FULLY-LOADED TRAIN. AND THEY ARE NOT  
13 MOSTLY FULLY LOADED IN TERMS OF LENGTH VOLUME THAT YOU HAVE  
14 IN A PARTICULAR STATION AREA.

15 MR. MC FARLAND: MR. DONATO?

16 MR. DONATO: I WOULD LIKE TO ADD JUST ONE COMMENT  
17 CONCERNING THIS TIME TO EXIT THE STATION, WHICH I THINK IS  
18 SIX MINUTES. AND THIS IS ONE COMMENT WE MADE WHEN WE ANSWERED  
19 THIS REGULATION. WE SAID THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THAT INTO  
20 CONSIDERATION. WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT TIME OF EXITING A STATION,  
21 IF YOU HAVE MEANS OF PASSING SMOKE, IF YOU HAVE NO MEANS OF  
22 CONTROLLING THE SMOKE MOVEMENT OR YOU HAVE MEANS OF  
23 CONTROLLING THE SMOKE MOVEMENT, IT SHOULD HAVE A BEARING ON  
24 THE TIME TO EVACUATE A STATION. SO MAYBE IT COULD BE ALLOWED  
25 A FEW MORE MINUTES IF YOU CAN CONTROL SMOKE.

26 MR. FARRELLY: AS OF NOW, THE STANDARD IS NOT WRITTEN.  
27 I WOULD ACCOMMODATE THAT MODIFICATION. AND THE COPY THAT IS  
28 BEING DISTRIBUTED IS VIRTUALLY THE FINAL DRAFT. BUT IT IS NOT

1 THE FINAL DRAFT WITHOUT THE PUBLIC'S COMMENTS.

2 MR. SANDBERG: IF I MIGHT COMMENT ON THAT. YOU WILL  
3 NOTICE THAT THIS COPY AT THE BACK HAS SOME PAGES THAT ARE OUT  
4 OF OTHER VERSIONS, BECAUSE THAT COPY DID NOT INCLUDE FIGURES  
5 AND THE SAME CALCULATIONS. SO THE LAST FOUR OR FIVE PAGES  
6 ARE OUT OF THERE. THEY ARE THERE TO SUPPLY THOSE MISSING  
7 ELEMENTS.

8 MR. FARRELLY: MAY I ASK YOU IF THOSE TYPED PAGES IN  
9 THERE REFLECT THE CHANGES THAT WERE MADE? I DON'T THINK THEY  
10 WOULD.

11 MR. SANDBERG: IN THE COMPARISONS I MADE I DIDN'T FIND  
12 ANY CHANGES IN TEXT. BUT I DIDN'T GO THROUGH MORE THAN A FEW  
13 PAGES.

14 MR. LOW: SPEAKING OF THAT 15 VOLUMES THAT THEY  
15 MENTIONED, I THINK THEY USED AS A GUIDE DIVIDING YOUR PEAK  
16 HOUR BY 4, MULTIPLYING BY 1.5. WE ACTUALLY FIND IN OUR  
17 SYSTEM THAT WE HAVE A RATHER FLAT PERIOD THROUGH THE PEAK TWO  
18 HOURS OR SO, SO THAT WE COULD POSSIBLY VARY THAT FORM.  
19 INSTEAD OF MULTIPLYING BY 1.5, IT COULD BE A LESSER AMOUNT.

20 RUSS, YOU POINTED THIS OUT BEFORE. I THINK IT  
21 IS A VALID OBSERVATION.

22 MR. DONATO: I WOULD LIKE TO ADD A FEW POINTS THAT I  
23 THINK ARE VERY IMPORANT CONCERNING EVACUATION. FOR INSTANCE,  
24 IF YOU HAVE AN EMERGENCY ON THE TRAIN AND YOU WANT TO  
25 EVACUATE YOUR STATION IN YOUR PROCEDURE, IF YOU SHOULD HAVE  
26 SUCH A THING AS PEOPLE IN THE STATION, PUT THE ESCALATOR ON  
27 THE WAY UP SO THAT PEOPLE CAN EVACUATE FASTER. OTHER PROBLEMS  
28 THAT WE HAVE FOUND IS THAT SEVERAL PEOPLE WILL EVACUATE UP TO

1 THE PLATFORM LEVEL OR UP TO THE MEZZANINE LEVEL AND THERE THEY  
2 FEEL SAFE ENOUGH, YOU KNOW. THEY ARE FAR ENOUGH FROM THE  
3 DANGER AND THEY BUNCH THERE. AND THEY WANT TO SEE THE SHOW.  
4 AND PEOPLE CAN'T EVACUATE ANY MORE. THEY NEED POLICE THERE  
5 FAST TO GET THESE PEOPLE MOVING OUT. OTHERWISE, YOU GET A  
6 CORK THERE, AND PEOPLE CAN'T EVACUATE. IT BECOMES VERY  
7 DANGEROUS, BECAUSE THE ESCALATORS ARE PUMPING PEOPLE UP.

8 MR. RHINE: YOU NEED A COPY OF NFPA 130 THERE TO SHOW  
9 THEM.

10 MR. DONATO: PEOPLE ARE GOING OUT EXITING THE STATION.  
11 THEY DON'T WANT TO LOSE THEIR FARE, SO THEY ARE WAITING TO  
12 GET THEIR TICKET BACK AND TRANSFER TO TAKE THE TRAIN.

13 MR. MC FARLAND: INSIDE THE GATE.

14 MR. DONATO: SO THEY DON'T MOVE OUT THERE, AND YOU CAN'T  
15 EXIT PEOPLE FROM THE STATION.

16 MR. THOMPSON: ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAYS WE HAVE  
17 FOUND TO MOVE PEOPLE OUT OF THE STATION WAS TO ANNOUNCE OVER  
18 THE ADDRESS SYSTEM THAT THERE WERE BUSES WAITING UPSTAIRS,  
19 WHETHER THERE WERE OR NOT. ANOTHER THING IS THAT, IN MOST  
20 CASES, PEOPLE STAY TO THE ADJACENT PLATFORM TO WATCH THE  
21 INCIDENT. WE HAVE NEVER HAD A TOTALLY EVACUATED STATION FOR  
22 ANY SINGLE FIRE EVER. THERE HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH PEOPLE TO  
23 CONTROL THE SITUATION. AND THEY WILL JUST GO TO A VANTAGE  
24 POINT WHERE THEY CAN OBSERVE AS LONG AS THEY DON'T FEEL  
25 PERSONALLY THREATENED THERE.

26 MR. MC FARLAND: IT MAKES ME THINK OF YOUR ZONE  
27 SECURITY. IT IS ALMOST A NECESSITY ON EMERGENCY EVACUATION  
28 TO HAVE THE POLICE READILY AT HAND.



1 MR. THOMPSON: THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS THAT ARE  
2 IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE ARE ONE OR TWO. IF THERE IS ANY TRAIN  
3 SUPERVISOR PERSONNEL, THEY ARE USUALLY THERE ACTING LIAISON  
4 TO THE FIRE OFFICIAL. AND GENERALLY SPEAKING, A FIRE OFFICER,  
5 IF THEY ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY IN THEIR AREA THAT THEY ARE  
6 WORKING IN AND THEY ARE NOT IN ANY DANGER, IMMINENT OR  
7 IMMEDIATELY, THESE PEOPLE ARE LEFT TO THEMSELVES, BECAUSE  
8 THERE ISN'T ANY RECOGNIZED IMMEDIATE DANGER THERE.

9 MR. LUTKUS: THAT PROBLEM ALSO EXISTS IN THE TUNNEL  
10 AREAS IF YOU ARE GOING FROM ONE TUNNEL TO ANOTHER. THERE ARE  
11 A LOT OF TRADE-OFFS INVOLVED, IF THE ATTEMPT IS TO KEEP THE  
12 PATRON ON THE CATWALK. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS TO KEEP THEM  
13 MOVING. YOU MAY GET THE FIRST PATRON TO MOVE, SAY, 200 FEET  
14 ALONG THE CATWALK AND THEN STOP, BECAUSE THEY DON'T KNOW WHERE  
15 TO GO. THEN EVERYONE ELSE TRYING TO EXIT THE ORIGINAL BORE  
16 GETS JAMMED UP.

17 ANOTHER ITEM IS YOU MAY GET OLDER PEOPLE OR  
18 CRIPPLED PEOPLE THAT WILL FORCE A LOT OF PEOPLE ONTO THE  
19 TRACKWAY AND THEN THEY ALSO ARE MOVING UP. AND THE SAME THING  
20 COULD HAPPEN THERE, AND THEN AT THE SAME TIME A RESCUE TRAIN  
21 COULD BE COMING DOWN. AND THERE MAY BE SMOKE IN THAT BORE,  
22 SO THERE ARE A LOT OF TRADE-OFFS, PEOPLE PUSHING, PEOPLE  
23 PUSHING OTHER PEOPLE INTO THE THIRD RAIL. SO THE APPROPRIATE  
24 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, BEFORE THE FACT, IS VERY IMPORTANT --  
25 TO EVALUATE ALL OF THE VARIOUS ISSUES.

26 MR. MC FARLAND: IT IS INDEED.

27 THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN. LET'S BREAK FOR AN HOUR OR  
28 THEREABOUTS.

29 (LUNCH RECESS.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

1:45 P.M.

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MR. MC FARLAND: WE HAVE DISCUSSED EACH OF THESE AREAS EARLIER ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION, ON FIRE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, AND CENTRAL CONTROL. AGAIN, WE HAVE DISCUSSED THESE IN OUR DELIBERATIONS YESTERDAY AND TODAY. BUT IN THE COMMUNICATION, I THINK, IF WE WERE TO GO TO THE TRANSCRIPTS AND GO THROUGH EVERYTHING SAID ON COMMUNICATION, WE WOULD HAVE A VERY GOOD AREA ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS. FROM WHAT I RECALL, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT EXISTED IN MARTA AND WHAT I THINK YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PUT IN THE BART; AM I WRONG?

MR. WEULE: WE HAVE THE RADIO CAPABILITIES. WE HAVE SEVERAL TIERS OF HARD WIRE CAPABILITY OF WHICH SEVERAL ARE DEDICATED TO FIRE SERVICES, ALL THAT BACKED UP BY OUR RADIO SYSTEM, PLUS THE MAIN TELEPHONE SYSTEM, WHICH IS NOT CONSIDERED DEDICATED EMERGENCY SYSTEM, AND OUR EMERGENCY PHONE SYSTEM. AND I AM REALLY CONCERNED THAT WE HAVE TOO MANY TIERS OF COMMUNICATION. AND THAT CAN LEAD TO MISUSE, MISCOMMUNICATIONS, AND A LOT OF MORE PROBLEMS DURING A TUNNEL EMERGENCY EVENT. MY POINT IS THAT YOU CAN GO OVERBOARD IN COMMUNICATIONS TOO.

MR. MC FARLAND: YOU HAVE, OR WAS IT AL WHO HAD THE CO-ACCESS?

MR. LOCK: OH, YES. WE DO.

MR. FARRELLY: THERE ARE VERY FEW SYSTEMS THAT RELY ON THIRD-RAIL COMMUNICATION.

1 MR. RHINE: GEORGE SAID THAT THEY DID AT ONE TIME.

2 MR. DONATO: THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM, THE RADIO SYSTEM,  
3 WAS PURCHASED IN EARLY '60 FOR THE SUBWAY. THE MESSAGE WAS  
4 PASSED BY THE THIRD RAIL. THIS WAS THE BEST EQUIPMENT AT THAT  
5 TIME AVAILABLE.

6 MR. FARRELLY: I THINK CHICAGO MAY HAVE HAD. I DON'T  
7 KNOW IF THEY STILL DO OR NOT.

8 MR. DONATO: THEY INVENTED THAT IN THE EARLY 70'S,  
9 AROUND '72 OR '73. BECAUSE WHAT HAPPENED IS, WHEN YOU HAD  
10 A SHORT CIRCUIT, YOU WOULD LOSE COMMUNICATION.

11 MR. THOMPSON: ONE THING ABOUT RADIO COMMUNICATION THAT  
12 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN BUYING A NEW SYSTEM IS THAT THERE ARE  
13 NEW SYSTEMS AVAILABLE WHERE THE PORTABLE, HAND-HELD RECEIVER  
14 CAN BE PLUGGED INTO A CONSOLE MOUNT UNIT AND BE USED AS BOTH  
15 A BASE AND PORTABLE STATION. AND I THINK IF WE HAD IT TO  
16 DO OVER AGAIN WE WOULD CERTAINLY LOOK AT SOMETHING LIKE THAT,  
17 BECAUSE WHEN AN OPERATOR LEAVES A CAB, YOU HAVE LOST TOUCH  
18 WITH HIM. INSTEAD, I NOTED IN BART THEY HAVE GIVEN ALL YOUR  
19 PERSONNEL PORTABLE RADIOS IN ADDITION TO THE CAB. YOU CAN  
20 AVOID THAT EXPENSE BY LOOKING AT THAT SORT OF EXISTENCE.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: WASN'T IT BOB JOHNSON THAT WAS  
22 EXPLORING THE VIRTUES OF THAT GRANDEUR?

23 MR. THOMPSON: I KNOW THAT PARTICULAR TYPE OF SYSTEM  
24 IS USED BY FIRE AND POLICE AGENTS, PLUGGING IT IN WHEN YOU  
25 GET IN AND YOU TAKE IT WITH YOU WHEN YOU GET OUT.

26 MR. FARRELLY: THE QUESTION ON THAT WOULD BE ABUSE.

27 MR. RHINE: THE OPERATOR SIGNS IN EVERY DAY, SO IF IT  
28 DOESN'T COME BACK IN IT COMES OUT OF THEIR PAYCHECK. IT HAS

1 AN OPERATING PROBLEM IN THAT YOU CAN'T COMMUNICATE TO CENTRAL  
2 EASILY THROUGH THE RADIO TO THE PASSENGERS, WHICH IS A DESIRED  
3 FEATURE FOR SOME PEOPLE. BUT YOU CAN'T EASILY WIRETAP INTO  
4 THE CENTRAL COMMUNICATION INTO THE PASSENGERS, WHICH IS A  
5 DESIRED FEATURE TO A LOT OF PEOPLE. AND THAT IS ONE DRAWBACK.

6 MR. MC FARLAND: WE WERE JUST DISCUSSING THE EMERGENCY  
7 COMMUNICATION AND WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE HAND-HELD  
8 COMMUNICATORS THAT PLUG INTO THE CAB. AND IF YOU WANT TO  
9 WALK AROUND OR SUCH, YOU HAVE COMMUNICATION WITH YOU.

10 DID SOMEONE ELSE MENTION THAT WE HAVE A DIFFERENT  
11 COMMUNICATION PRACTICE BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND THE CITY?

12 MR. SALYER: WE ARE ON DIFFERENT FREQUENCIES, DIFFERENT  
13 RADIO FREQUENCIES.

14 MR. MC FARLAND: WE HAVE ONE COUNTY STATION.

15 MR. SALYER: ONE COUNTY IN THE WHOLE GROUP?

16 MR. LOW: SO FAR.

17 MR. MC FARLAND: I THINK WE HAVE TOUCHED ON MOST OF THE  
18 FIRE EMERGENCY ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS. ARE THERE ANY  
19 ISSUES -- MR. DONATO?

20 MR. DONATO: WE HAVE RADIOS IN THE CARS, COMMUNICATORS  
21 TO CENTRAL CONTROL. AND WE ALSO HAVE THE PORTABLES. THE  
22 PORTABLES WERE PURCHASED ESPECIALLY WHEN WE GO TO ONE-MAN CAR,  
23 IF WE EVER GO TO ONE-MAN CAR. BECAUSE WHEN A RADIO OPERATOR  
24 LEAVES HIS POST, YOU NEVER KNOW IF HE IS EVER GOING TO COME  
25 BACK. SO IF YOU HAVE A ONE-MAN OPERATION, HE NEEDS PORTABLES  
26 WHEREVER HE GOES TO INSPECT A TRAIN, OTHERWISE, YOU LOSE TOUCH  
27 WITH HIM.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: I SEE.

1 MR. DONATO: WE HAVE A PRIVATE EXCHANGE WITH PRIORITY  
2 NUMBERS. WE HAVE USED THAT FOR MAINTENANCE, AND WE USE THAT  
3 ALSO FOR EMERGENCIES. SINCE THE FIREMAN, WHEN HE COMES ON THE  
4 SITE, AND THEY WANT TO CONTACT THEIR ALARM CENTRAL, THEY USE  
5 THAT PHONE; THEY HAVE A SPECIAL NUMBER; THEY HAVE PRIORITY;  
6 THEY OVERRIDE ALL THE OTHER COMMUNICATION. THEY CAN USE ANY  
7 PHONE IN OUR SUBWAY. I THINK THE NUMBER IS 4059. AND THEY  
8 GET DIRECTLY TO THEIR ALARM SYSTEM AND OVERRIDE ALL THE OTHER  
9 PHONES.

10 WE ALSO HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DIRECT LINES  
11 FOR TRANSPORTATION USE ON THE PLATFORM. IT CONNECTS  
12 DIRECTLY TO CENTRAL CONTROL.

13 MR. THOMPSON: ON WMATA, THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM HAS A  
14 DIRECT LINE CABLE WHERE THE PASSENGER CAN WALK UP TO ANY OF  
15 THE WAYSIDE TELEPHONES, HIT THE ASTERISK BUTTON AND GET A  
16 DIRECT LINE TO CENTRAL CONTROL. THE BAD FEATURE ABOUT THIS  
17 IS, IF YOU ARE THE FIRST PERSON TO HIT THE ASTERISK BUTTON,  
18 YOU WILL GET THE ONLY AVAILABLE EMERGENCY LINE. IF ANOTHER  
19 PERSON HAS AN EMERGENCY REMOTELY LOCATED TO THAT, HE WILL  
20 HAVE TO WAIT. AND HE WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO GAIN ACCESS AND  
21 MODIFICATION UNDER WAY TO EXPAND THAT, BECAUSE AS THE SYSTEM  
22 GROWS LARGER, WE CAN ANTICIPATE MORE THAN ONE INCIDENT AT ONE  
23 TIME IN THAT REGARD.

24 ALSO, OUR CENTRAL CONTROL AREA MAINTAINS DIRECT  
25 LINE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ALL THE NEIGHBORING FIRE AND POLICE,  
26 EMS JURISDICTION, AND SOME OF THE MORE UNUSUAL PLACES LIKE  
27 THE SECRET SERVICE.

28 MR. LOCK: AT MARTA WE DESIGNATE RADIO AS "SAFETY

1 CRITICAL." THAT MEANS, IF IT BECOMES UNOPERATIONAL, A TRAIN  
2 HAS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF THE REVENUE SERVICE AND CAN'T BE PUT  
3 INTO REVENUE SERVICE IF THE TRAIN IS NOT FUNCTIONING.

4 JUST LIKE GEORGE INDICATED, THE OPERATORS ARE ALSO  
5 ISSUED HANDSETS. SO IF THEY MUST LEAVE THE CAB, THEY CARRY  
6 THEIR HANDSETS AND IT IS AN ALTERNATE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.

7 INsofar AS COMMUNICATION WITH THE FIRE DEPARTMENT  
8 AND OUTSIDE, MARTA IS PRETTY HUMOROUS FROM MY POINT OF VIEW.  
9 INITIALLY, WHEN WE WERE TALKING ABOUT ALARMS AND HOW WE WOULD  
10 COMMUNICATE WITH THE FIRE DEPARTMENT, WE FIRST WERE  
11 CONSIDERING THAT WE WOULD HAVE OUR ALARMS GO DIRECTLY TO THE  
12 LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT, NOT PASS THROUGH MARTA CENTRAL CONTROL.  
13 WE WERE DISCHARGED FROM THAT APPROACH. THE FIRE DEPARTMENT  
14 INDICATED WHERE SUCH A SCHEME HAD BEEN TRIED PREVIOUSLY,  
15 THEIR FALSE ALARM RATE WAS JUST TOO HIGH AND THEY WERE  
16 RESPONDING TO MORE FALSE ALARMS THAN THEY COULD IMAGINE.  
17 WHEN WE BECAME OPERATIONAL WE APPROACHED THAT COMMENT BECAUSE  
18 THE FALSE ALARM RATE, ESPECIALLY ON SMALL DETECTORS IN OUR  
19 SYSTEM, LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED. WE ALWAYS HAVE FALSE  
20 ALARMS. AND IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO  
21 SCRUTINIZE VERY CAREFULLY THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF THE FIRE  
22 ALARMS WE INSTALL IN OUR SYSTEM NOW. IT IS JUST NOT WORTH THE  
23 EFFORT INsofar AS THE HIGH FALSE ALARM RATE IS CONCERNED.

24 AND THE OTHER THING IS THAT WE, IN OUR SYSTEM  
25 DESIGN, DID HAVE DIRECT LINES WITH THE FIRE DEPARTMENT FROM  
26 CENTRAL CONTROL. WE HAD DIRECT LINES WHERE WE WOULD ALSO  
27 BE ABLE TO REACH THE FIRE DEPARTMENT. AND IN OUR CASE IT  
28 DIDN'T WORK BECAUSE WE FOUND, THROUGH EXPERIENCE, THAT FIRE

1 JURISDICTIONS IN OUR AREA FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER DID NOT  
2 RESPOND TO DIRECT LINES IMMEDIATELY, AND IN SOME CASES WE  
3 HAD DIFFICULTY IN RAISING ANY RESPONSE AT ALL. WHEREAS IF  
4 YOU CALL IN ON A 911, THEY ARE WITH YOU LIKE THAT. AND AS  
5 A CONSEQUENCE, BECAUSE OF THIS DIFFICULTY IN EXERCISING THE  
6 SYSTEM REPEATEDLY AND HAVING PROBLEMS IN CONTACTING THE FIRE  
7 DEPARTMENT, WE DROPPED OUR DIRECT LINES AND WE NOW DIAL IN AS  
8 ANYONE DOES.

9 MR. MC FARLAND: AND IT WORKS MUCH BETTER?

10 MR. SALYER: IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES WE DON'T HAVE  
11 DIRECT LINES TO THE FIRE DEPARTMENT, SO THAT WOULDN'T BE A  
12 CONSIDERATION IN THE CITY.

13 MR. MC FARLAND: JUST DIAL IN?

14 MR. SALYER: RIGHT.

15 MR. WEULE: THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOU COULDN'T PUT THEM IN.

16 MR. SALYER: THAT'S CORRECT.

17 MR. FARRELLY: WE HAVE PRESENTLY TWO SYSTEMWIDE RANGE  
18 CHANNELS, ONE IS DEDICATED TO OPERATIONS AND THE OTHER POLICE.  
19 WE ARE CURRENTLY, IN LODGING THIS SYSTEM, TO HAVE A THIRD  
20 CHANNEL SO IN THE EVENT OF AN INCIDENT, THAT THIRD CHANNEL  
21 COULD BE DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO COMMUNICATION CONCERNING A  
22 PARTICULAR INCIDENT. ALSO, ALL OUR TELEPHONES ALONG THE  
23 WAYSIDE HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF BEING ATTACHED INTO THE RADIO  
24 SYSTEM. SO FROM ANY TELEPHONE, BY GOING THROUGH CONTROL  
25 CENTRAL, YOU CAN GET ONTO THE RADIO SYSTEM AS WELL AS MAKING  
26 A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF OUTGOING CALLS. WE FIND IT QUITE FLEXIBLE.

27 AND ANOTHER THING THAT WE HAVE GAINED IN THE AREA  
28 OF COMMUNICATION IS TO FURNISH THE FIRE SERVICES POWERED

1 EQUIPMENT BECAUSE OF INCOMPATIBILITY OF VARIOUS FIRE  
2 JUSTIDICTIONS. SO WE HAVE TRIED TO GET THEM STANDARDIZED  
3 PIECES OF EQUIPMENT SO THEY CAN COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER  
4 EASILY.

5 MR. MC FARLAND: BUT WITH THIS CAPABILITY OF ATTACHING  
6 CENTRAL, CENTRAL COULD BE AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN TWO  
7 DIFFERENT FIRE FREQUENCIES.

8 MR. FARRELLY: IT COULD, BUT IT IS NOT PART OF THE GAME  
9 PLAN BECAUSE I THINK THAT WOULD JUST ADD ANOTHER POTENTIAL  
10 FOR CONFUSION.

11 MR. DONATO: I SHOULD HAVE, IN OUR CASE, ALSO TWO MORE  
12 FREQUENCIES FOR RADIO, AND THIS IS ONE FOR MAINTENANCE, FOR  
13 SERVICE AND ONE FOR TRANSPORTATION ALSO. BECAUSE WE ARE PART  
14 OF THE BUS SYSTEM, SO WE HAVE TWO MORE FREQUENCIES FOR  
15 SERVICE.

16 MR. MC FARLAND: HOW MANY FREQUENCIES?

17 MR. RHINE: FOR THE METRO RAIL PROJECT YOU CAN LOOK FOR  
18 A TENTATIVELY GIVEN THREE FREQUENCIES, BUT WE FEEL THAT WE  
19 WILL PROBABLY NEED FIVE AND MAYBE EVEN SIX. WE ARE GOING TO  
20 REQUIRE THREE, AND THEY'RE IN, I BELIEVE, THE VHF BAND. WE WOULD  
21 LIKE TO HAVE THEM ALL IN ONE BAND, SO WE WILL RETAIN THESE.  
22 AND TO RETAIN THEM YOU HAVE TO KEEP THEM FOR ALL TESTS.  
23 WE WILL PROBABLY TRY FOR FIVE, MAYBE SIX, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE  
24 IN-YARD FREQUENCIES OR SOME MEANS OF RADIO FREQUENCY IN THE  
25 YARD SO YOU DON'T HAVE THE PROBLEM OF ONE PERSON, ONE YARD  
26 THINKING HE IS TALKING TO SOMEBODY IN THAT YARD AND IN  
27 REALITY TALKING TO SOMEBODY IN THE OTHER YARD AND SAY, "MOVE  
28 THAT TRAIN ON TRACK SO-AND-SO," AND SAY, "THERE IS NO TRACK



1 SO-AND-SO AND THERE IS NO TRAIN THERE." BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO  
2 USE THE SAME FREQUENCY WITH VERY LITTLE POWER.

3 MR. THOMPSON: WE HAVE FOUR OPERATING RAIL FREQUENCIES  
4 FOR THE MAIN LINES, ONE FOR POLICE AND ONE FOR MAINTENANCE.  
5 IN ADDITION, THE PHONE SYSTEM HAS MANY, MANY USES. THERE IS  
6 A PARTY LINE CAPABILITY WHERE UP TO FIVE PERSONS CAN COME  
7 OVER FROM EITHER WITHIN THE PHONE SYSTEM OR OUT. BY DIALING  
8 SPECIFIC NUMBERS, YOU CAN GAIN ACCESS TO THIS SYSTEM. THIS  
9 SYSTEM IS BROKEN DOWN TO AN APPLICATION SYSTEM WHERE THERE  
10 ARE TEN LINES PER NUMBER OR TEN PHONES THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM.  
11 AND THERE ARE CERTAIN INTERSTATION DIALING FEATURES. IT IS  
12 KIND OF -- AS YOU TELL MORE AND MORE PEOPLE ABOUT THE SYSTEM,  
13 IT JUST GENERALLY CONFUSES THEM, SO A LOT OF INFORMATION IS  
14 NOT GIVEN OUT TO THE FIRE AGENCIES, ET CETERA, BECAUSE IT  
15 COMPOUNDS THE ERROR PROBABILITY.

16 MR. MC FARLAND: ANY OTHER COMMENTS?

17 MR. LOCK: I WOULD JUST LIKE TO REEMPHASIZE OUR  
18 EXPERIENCE ONCE MORE. I AM CERTAIN I MENTIONED THIS  
19 YESTERDAY, BUT INsofar AS EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS ARE  
20 CONCERNED, INITIALLY OUR RADIO SPECIFICATIONS PROVIDED  
21 FOR MARTA COMMUNICATION. AND THE RADIOS WERE TO  
22 BE USED ROUTINELY DURING THE COURSE OF OPERATION AND IN  
23 EMERGENCIES. AS WE BEGAN TO DEVELOP A DIALOGUE WITH THE  
24 EMERGENCY SERVICES, AND AS WE BEGAN PLANNING FOR EMERGENCIES,  
25 WE FOUND OUT THAT WHAT WE SHOULD HAVE DONE IS PROVIDE FOR A  
26 CAPABILITY FOR ALL THE JURISDICTIONS TO COMMUNICATE SURFACE-  
27 TO-TUNNEL THROUGHOUT OUR SYSTEM. AND OUR EMERGENCY  
28 JURISDICTION IS ON DIFFERENT BANDS. SOME ARE ON UHF AND SOME

1 ARE ON VHF.

2 YOU SHOULD ADDRESS IT INITIALLY RATHER THAN OTHER  
3 FACTS AND RECONCILE TO THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE TO HAVE THEIR  
4 OWN COMMUNICATIONS. THEY REALLY DO NOT READILY ACCEPT THE  
5 CONCEPT OF CENTRAL ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY. THEY WANT TO  
6 USE THEIR FREQUENCY. THEY WANT TO KIND OF TALK TO THEIR  
7 PEOPLE IN THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES. IN OUR EXPERIENCE,  
8 THEY ARE EVEN MORE ADAMANT IN THAT REGARD. THEY WANT TO BE  
9 ABLE TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE HOSPITALS DIRECTLY. AS A  
10 CONSEQUENCE, IT IS JUST BEST TO CONSIDER THAT YOU ARE GOING TO  
11 PROVIDE A SURFACE-TO-TUNNEL COMMUNICATION ABILITY FOR ANY  
12 COMMUNICATION.

13 MR. DONATO: I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU CONTACT YOUR  
14 POLICE. WE HAVE A PROBLEM IN MONTREAL WHERE THE ROBBERS AND  
15 THIEVES, PEOPLE THAT STEAL FROM BANKS, AND THINGS LIKE THAT,  
16 THEY CURRENTLY USE THE SUBWAY TO ESCAPE BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT  
17 THE POLICE HAVE NO COMMUNICATION IN THE SUBWAY. AND IT IS  
18 A BIG PROBLEM FOR THE POLICE. AND THEY CAME TO SEE US MANY  
19 TIMES. HOW THEY COULD HAVE COMMUNICATION IN THE SUBWAY WAS  
20 A MULTI-MILLION-DOLLAR DEAL. IT COULD HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED  
21 RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING, BECAUSE RIGHT NOW THEY HARDLY HAVE  
22 ANY MEANS OF FINDING THESE THIEVES ONCE THEY GET IN THE  
23 SUBWAY.

24 MR. RHINE: THAT IS ONE OF THE EXTRA CHANNELS THAT WE  
25 DIDN'T CONSIDER. THEY WERE LOOKING FOR A SECURITY OR POLICE  
26 CHANNEL. WE HAVE OUR OWN POLICE FORCE HERE AND WE ALSO WANT  
27 TO MAKE SURE THAT THE CITY JURISDICTION POLICE FORCE HAS A  
28 CHANCE TO COMMUNICATE ALSO. THAT IS ONE OF THE REASONS WE

1 NEED ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES.

2 MR. THOMPSON: ONE MORE THING -- METRO IS ABOUT A YEAR  
3 AWAY FROM THE INSTALLATION OF A COMPLETE FIRE AND EMS ON  
4 JURISDICTIONAL FREQUENCY SYSTEMS FOR THEIR USE IN THE TUNNELS  
5 WITH SOME PARTICULAR DUPLEX ARRANGEMENTS FOR DUAL-CHANNEL  
6 BROADCASTING AND RECEPTION WHERE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES  
7 SERVE AS A RESPONSIBILITY TO DIFFERENT AGENCIES AND ESPECIALLY  
8 HARD-WIRE SYSTEMS UNDER THE RIVER.

9 MR. RHINE: THAT WAS AN OUTGROWTH OF BART.

10 MR. THOMPSON: THAT WAS A DIRECT OUTGROWTH FROM THE  
11 EXPERIENCE IN BART, AND IT WAS AGAIN REENFORCED BY THE SMALL  
12 FIRE WE HAD IN THE RIVER SECTION.

13 MR. MC FARLAND: ARE THERE ANY OTHER COMMENTS ON  
14 COMMUNICATIONS? I WAS INTERESTED IN THE PRIORITY MANAGEMENT  
15 OF JURISDICTIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND. ONCE THE FIRE DEPARTMENT  
16 IS ON THE SCENE, IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE, THE FIRE DEPARTMENT  
17 IS IN COMMAND. BUT IN READING THROUGH THE BART EXPERIENCE,  
18 THE QUESTION THERE IS, IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE JURISDICTION,  
19 HOW DO YOU ESTABLISH CHAIN OF COMMAND PRIORITIES? IS THERE  
20 ANY STANDARD PROCEDURE THAT IS FAIRLY COMMON AMONGST THE --

21 MR. LOCK: ON THE MARTA SYSTEM WE HAVE IN OUR EMERGENCY  
22 CLAIM EACH LINE SECTION SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED. WE IDENTIFY  
23 THE COMPANY THAT HAS RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BACKUP  
24 JURISDICTION THAT BACKS THEM UP. SO EACH PORTION OF OUR  
25 SYSTEM IS IDENTIFIED WITH RESPECT TO WHO SERVES INSOFAR AS  
26 EMERGENCIES AND WHO BACKS THEM UP. THAT IS THE PROCESS THAT  
27 WE FOLLOW.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: YOU WORKED OUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN

1 EACH OF THE AUTHORITIES, EACH OF THE JURISDICTIONS AND TO  
2 PROCEDURES, PRIORITIES, AND CHAIN OF COMMAND?

3 MR. LOCK: AND WE HAVE A DOCUMENT IN THE EMERGENCY  
4 PLAN. WE HAVE IT DOCUMENTED, SO THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT,  
5 IF WE HAVE AN EMERGENCY AT THIS LOCATION, THERE IS NO QUESTION  
6 AS TO WHO RESPONDS AND WHO BACKS THEM UP.

7 MR. WEULE: WE HAVE SEVERAL CASES WHERE SHOULD WE HAVE A  
8 FIRE RECORDED IN THE AREA WE CALL TWO FIRE DEPARTMENTS, SAN  
9 FRANCISCO AND OAKLAND, A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THAT. AND BY FORMER  
10 AGREEMENT THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR WORKING OUT AMONGST  
11 THEMSELVES WHO IS IN CHARGE. ESSENTIALLY, THAT RESTS WITH  
12 WHOSE JURISDICTION DOES IT HAPPEN TO BE IN. BUT IT REALLY  
13 DOESN'T PRESENT AN OPERATIONAL PROBLEM AT THE TIME. WE HAVE  
14 GIVEN THE CONTROL CENTER THE PRECISE LOCATION OF  
15 JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES.

16 PART OF THE AGREEMENT IS, IF IT IS CLOSE AND  
17 THEY ARE CALLED, IF IT IS NOT THEIR JURISDICTION, THEY DON'T  
18 GO HOME AND WAIT FOR SOMEBODY TO COME. BUT IT IS A MATTER OF  
19 A FORMAL AGREEMENT. AND I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THOSE  
20 BE DEFINED AND AGREED TO IN A MUTUAL EFFECT.

21 MR. THOMPSON: IN REGARD TO JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS,  
22 WE CONSULT WITH THE TWO FIRE DEPARTMENTS AND LET THEM DECIDE  
23 WHO IS GOING TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY IN CERTAIN AREAS. OF  
24 COURSE, IT IS IN THEIR PHYSICAL BOUNDARY, THE AGENCY THAT  
25 NORMALLY HAS OR IS IN CHARGE OF THAT AREA, TAKES  
26 RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT. BUT IN SOME CASES IT MAY BE CLOSER  
27 TO ANOTHER AGENCY AND THEY MAY REQUEST A FORMAL AGREEMENT  
28 BETWEEN THOSE AGENCIES ASSISTED IN THAT MATTER. BUT WE

1 REALLY DON'T HAVE THIS PROBLEM OCCURRING WITH US TOO MUCH,  
2 BECAUSE WE HAVEN'T CROSSED THAT MANY BOUNDARIES.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE A QUESTION. IN  
4 TALKING TO BALTIMORE AND LOOKING AT SOME OF OUR DOCUMENTS,  
5 THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DIFFERENT AUTHORITIES  
6 AND THEIR MANNER IN WHICH THEY HAVE SOUGHT COOPERATION WITH THE  
7 FIRE DEPARTMENT. POLICE DEPARTMENTS ARE A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT  
8 ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, SET UP A FIRE MARSHAL COMMITTEE. THEY  
9 HAVE A NUMBER OF COMMITTEES. AND TO A LARGE DEGREE, DELEGATED  
10 TO THAT COMMITTEE THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE AGREEMENTS. OTHER  
11 AUTHORITIES HAVE DONE SIMILARLY. I THINK A MAJORITY OF YOU  
12 HAVE NOT USED A COMMITTEE APPROACH IN DIRECT ONE-TO-ONE.  
13 I WONDER IF YOU WOULD SPEAK ON THAT.

14 MR. WEULE: DURING THE DESIGN PHASE -- AND IT WAS WELL  
15 INTO THE DESIGN PHASE, A COMMITTEE WAS APPOINTED BY THE  
16 VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS, AND IT WAS FOUR OR FIVE OF THE FOURTEEN  
17 THAT REPRESENTED THE FIRE DEPARTMENT. THE STATE FIRE MARSHAL  
18 WAS ALSO ASSIGNED TO JOIN THAT COMMITTEE, AND BART  
19 REPRESENTATIVES WERE ASSIGNED. IT WAS FORMAL MINUTES DECIDING  
20 THE VARIOUS ISSUES AS THEY WENT THROUGH. STATION EXITING IS  
21 PROBABLY AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF THAT. WE USED A DYNAMIC  
22 CONCEPT OF THAT, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT THE SAME ONES DESCRIBED  
23 NOW.

24 SO EACH CASE WAS TREATED IN THAT GROUP ONCE WE  
25 WERE IN OPERATION. THAT COMMITTEE STILL EXISTS, BUT NOT IN  
26 THAT FORM. NOW THERE ARE REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH OF THE 14  
27 FIRE DEPARTMENTS ON A COMMITTEE. THEY MEET MONTHLY, ADDRESS  
28 JOINT OPERATIONAL ISSUES.

1 MR. MC FARLAND: THEY MEET MONTHLY?

2 MR. WEULE: YES.

3 MR. SALYER: OURS WOULD BE VERY SIMILAR TO THAT. THE  
4 ONE FLY IN THE OINTMENT, IF YOU WOULD CALL IT, WOULD BE THE  
5 COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT. AND IT WOULD BE THE WEST HOLLYWOOD  
6 STATION. IF A FIRE OCCURRED IN THAT STATION, MOSTLY THEY  
7 WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF IT. THERE WE WOULD HAVE A MUTUAL AID  
8 AGREEMENT, AS WE WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THEM.

9 MR. LOCK: ANOTHER POINT, INsofar AS THIS MATTER IS  
10 CONCERNED, THAT WE FOUND TO BE OF GREAT CONCERN WAS THE FIRE  
11 PROTECTION IN THE AGREEMENT INsofar AS THE YARDS AND SHOPS  
12 ARE CONCERNED. THE YARD REPRESENTS A TREMENDOUS INVESTMENT  
13 INsofar AS VEHICLES. A CAR IS A MILLION DOLLARS. YOURS WILL  
14 BE IN EXCESS OF THAT. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT DESIGN  
15 CONCEPTS THAT THE INDUSTRY HAS USED INsofar AS PROTECTING  
16 YARDS. AND THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT MATTER WITH US. AND IT  
17 TOOK SOME TIME INsofar AS DIALOGUE WITH THE LOCAL FIRE  
18 JURISDICTIONS WAS CONCERNED TO INVOLVE A CONCEPT THAT WAS  
19 MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TO ALL PARTIES. AND YOU SHOULD CONSIDER  
20 YOUR YARD AND FIRE PROTECTION DESIGN AS CAREFULLY AS YOU DO  
21 YOUR MAINTENANCE DESIGN FROM MY POINT OF VIEW.

22 MR. DONATO: NOW THAT WE ARE EXTENDING THE SUBWAY, WE  
23 ARE GOING INTO A SMALL MUNICIPALITY. SOME OF THEM ARE FAIRLY  
24 WELL ORGANIZED AS FAR AS FIRE IS CONCERNED, OTHERS ARE SMALL.  
25 WE HAVE VOLUNTEER FIREMEN. WE HAVE SEEN THE CHIEF OF FIREMEN  
26 AND DISCUSSED THAT WITH THEM. WE DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH  
27 THAT LEVEL. THE PROBLEM IS AT A HIGHER LEVEL. A QUESTION OF  
28 JURISDICTION IS IMPORTANT.

1                   WHAT COMPLICATES THINGS IS THAT THE CITY OF  
2 MONTREAL LABOR AGREEMENT, IF THEY GO FIGHT A FIRE OUTSIDE THE  
3 CITY, THEY GET PAID DOUBLE TIME. SO THE SOLUTION WE HAVE  
4 FOUND SO FAR IS, IF WE HAVE A FIRE OUTSIDE THE CITY, WHICH  
5 NATURALLY WOULD BE CLOSEST TO MONTREAL, WE CALL BOTH  
6 AUTHORITIES AND WE ASK THEM BOTH TO RESPOND. WE ASK THEM AT  
7 THE CHIEF LEVEL TO DECIDE WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO DO.

8                   FIGHTING A FIRE IS A WORK OF A SPECIALIST. I  
9 DON'T THINK WE CAN DECIDE AHEAD OF TIME WHAT A SPECIALIST CAN  
10 DO. IT IS UP TO THEM AT THAT TIME TO KNOW WHO IS GOING TO DO  
11 WHAT. WE CALL BOTH. AND WE TOLD THE CITY OF MONTREAL IF  
12 THERE IS ANY BILL BECAUSE THEY GO OUTSIDE THE CITY, THEY SEND  
13 US THE BILL. WE WILL PAY FOR IT. BUT THIS IS A POSITIVE  
14 ACTION THAT WE TOOK. WE DON'T HAVE ANY WRITTEN AGREEMENT AT  
15 THE POLITICAL LEVEL, BUT THIS IS OUR ATTITUDE NOW.

16                  MR. GRAINGER: I WANT TO PASS ON A QUESTION. ARE THERE  
17 ANY PROBLEMS WITH CONTINUITY OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS?  
18 FOR EXAMPLE, YOU CAN MAKE AN AGREEMENT, WHETHER IT IS WRITTEN  
19 OR OTHERWISE, AND THEN FOUR MONTHS LATER COMES THE CHANGE,  
20 A YEAR LATER COMES ANOTHER CHANGE AND YOU HAVE DESIGNED TO  
21 THE ORIGINAL DECISION.

22                   HAS THERE BEEN ANY EXPERIENCE LIKE THAT?

23                  MR. MC FARLAND: WE WILL HAVE CRITERIA BEFORE WE DO ANY  
24 DESIGN. THIS IS A POLICY THAT HAS BEEN SENT DOWN HERE, AS  
25 HAS BEEN IN THE PAST. IT HAS BEEN A LUXURY. BUT I THINK WITH  
26 CRITERIA AND A BASE LINE ESTABLISHED WE WON'T HAVE THIS  
27 PROBLEM OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING AGREEMENT, AT LEAST WE HOPE.  
28 BUT WE ARE MAKING A CONCERTED EFFORT HERE TO DEVELOP CRITERIA,

1 DEVELOP CRITERIA DOCUMENTS, BASE LINE CONFIGURATIONS, AND  
2 THEN MAINTAIN THAT CONFIGURATION AND UPDATE IT OFFICIALLY, NOT  
3 VERBALLY OR BY AD HOC.

4 MR. GRAINGER: HAS THAT BEEN A PROBLEM AT ALL WITH  
5 OTHERS?

6 MR. WEULE: YES. IT HAS BEEN. AND THE BEST WAY TO  
7 HANDLE THAT TYPE OF THING IS BY INITIATING A CONFIGURATION OR  
8 DOCUMENTATION CONTROL AND ALSO ENCOURAGE THE FIRE DEPARTMENT  
9 THAT YOU ARE DEALING WITH THE SAME THING. WE HAVE FOUND,  
10 AFTER WE ASKED ALL THE FIRE JURISDICTION TO SHARE WITH US  
11 THEIR EMERGENCY PLANNING RELATED TO BART, DOCUMENTS THAT WERE  
12 OUT OF DATE BY TEN YEARS, EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE RECORDS  
13 INDICATING THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED -- OR AT LEAST UPDATES HAD  
14 BEEN SENT THAT PEOPLE THAT HAD BEEN ASSIGNED HAD RETIRED OR  
15 TRANSFERRED AND NOBODY KNEW WHAT TO DO WITH THIS SET OF  
16 DOCUMENTS.

17 BUT GETTING A JOINT CONTROL ON THE DOCUMENTATION  
18 AND A GOOD OPENING EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION SO WHEN YOU DO  
19 EXCHANGE A SYSTEM OR MODIFY OR DETERMINE THERE ARE BETTER  
20 WAYS TO APPROACH A PARTICULAR PROBLEM, THEY WILL DO THAT.  
21 YOU WILL NEVER START AND NOT MODIFY. AND THE BEST WAY IS A  
22 GOOD FORMALIZED SYSTEM CONTROL. AND I THINK THAT HAS BEEN  
23 DONE.

24 MR. THOMPSON: MANY OF THE QUESTIONS REGARDING  
25 JURISDICTION AND JUST GENERAL FIRE SERVICE ARE COORDINATED  
26 THROUGHOUT THE METRO LIAISON OFFICER'S SUBCOMMITTEE, WHICH IS  
27 CHAIRED THROUGH THE COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF  
28 GOVERNMENT THROUGH THEIR REGIONAL BASE. THEY PROVIDE THE



1 SUPPORT FOR THAT COMMITTEE IN RECORD KEEPING, IN RECORDING  
2 WHAT GOES ON.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: YOU HAVE A FORMAL AGREEMENT THROUGH  
4 COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS?

5 MR. THOMPSON: IT IS COORDINATED THROUGH THE COUNCIL  
6 OF GOVERNMENTS AND ITS SIGNATORIES WITH THE LOCAL POLITICAL  
7 JURISDICTIONS, AND THROUGH THEIR METRO LIAISON OFFICER THEY  
8 REPRESENT THE DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONAL PROPERTIES. AND IT IS  
9 THROUGH THESE MEN, THEN, THAT THE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES  
10 ARE SETTLED AND THEY SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THEIR FIRE CHIEF. SO  
11 THEY ARE IN POWER TO REACT TO ANY SITUATION THAT CAN COME UP.  
12 AND WE CERTAINLY PRESENTED THEM WITH A NUMBER IN THE PAST  
13 SEVERAL YEARS.

14 MR. MC FARLAND: THIS SEEMS TO BE THE DIRECTION --

15 MR. THOMPSON: GENERALLY SPEAKING, IF IT INVOLVES A  
16 FIRE SERVICE, WE TAKE IT TO THEM AND LET THEM WALK IN OUR  
17 SHOES, MORE OR LESS. AND THEY LEND THEIR WISDOM TO THE  
18 SITUATION, AND WE COME UP WITH AN ANSWER THAT IS ACCEPTABLE  
19 USUALLY TO BOTH PARTIES. NOT EVERYTHING THAT THE FIRE  
20 OFFICERS HAVE TOLD US TO DO HAS BEEN MET WITH PRAISE FROM THE  
21 AUTHORITIES. PARTICULARLY THE USE OF GASOLINE TUNNELS  
22 CREATED QUITE A STIR, BUT THEY WERE VERY ADAMANT. AND THEY  
23 TOLD US, "IF YOU USE IT WE WILL LOCK YOU UP AND LOCK THE NEXT  
24 GUY UP."

25 MR. MC FARLAND: I DON'T FOLLOW YOU -- GASOLINE?

26 MR. THOMPSON: YES. THERE WAS QUITE A BIT OF ACTIVITY  
27 THROUGH OUR TRUCK AND STRUCTURES DEPARTMENTS USING GASOLINE-  
28 POWERED EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS INSIDE THE TUNNELS FOR MAINTENANCE

1 ACTIVITIES. AND ONCE THE FIRE OFFICIALS HEARD OF THIS, THEY  
2 MORE OR LESS REACTED TO US VERY STRONGLY AND WANTED TO KNOW  
3 WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHY AND ET CETERA.

4 MR. MC FARLAND: IT WOULDN'T BE ALLOWED DURING  
5 CONSTRUCTION?

6 MR. THOMPSON: IT IS NOT ALLOWED "PERIOD" BEYOND ANY  
7 STRETCH OF IMAGINATION. AND ONCE THEY FOUND OUT ABOUT THIS  
8 THEY REACTED STRONGLY. AND THAT WAS NOT MET WITH A LOT OF  
9 PRAISE FROM THE AUTHORITIES, LIKE I SAID. THEY WEREN'T TO  
10 CONTINUE TO DO THIS IN CERTAIN CIRCLES, AND CONSEQUENTLY,  
11 YOU KNOW, THAT WAS ONE OF THE FIRMER ISSUES THEY PLANTED ON  
12 OUR DOORSTEP.

13 MR. MC FARLAND: THAT IS INTRIGUING.

14 MR. THOMPSON: AS I SAID, THEY WERE VERY ADAMANT.

15 MR. WEULE: YOU WILL FIND THAT IN CALIFORNIA FOR YOUR  
16 OPERATIONAL AREAS THAT THE MINES AND TUNNELS REALLY DON'T  
17 COVER THE USE OF IT. THEY CERTAINLY ARE NOT ENAMORED WITH  
18 THE USE OF GASOLINE OR PROPANE IN UNDERGROUND AREAS, BUT YOU  
19 ARE GOING TO FIND IN YOUR REAL WORLD THAT SMALL REQUIRED  
20 TOOLS ARE MADE WITH SMALL GASOLINE ENGINES.

21 WE HAVE TALKED TO MINE AND TUNNEL FOLKS IN THE  
22 BAY AREA. WE DON'T USE LARGE EQUIPMENT, GASOLINE-POWERED  
23 ALL RAIL EQUIPMENT FOR DETAILED USE UNDERGROUND. AND SO WE  
24 HAVE COME TO A REQUIRED AGREEMENT. BUT I THINK IT IS  
25 SOMETHING THAT HAS TO BE FACED RIGHT OUT FRONT SO THAT YOUR  
26 FIRE SERVICES AND MINES AND TUNNELS UNDERSTAND WHAT IS  
27 HAPPENING.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: THEIR JURISDICTION WOULD ONLY BE DURING

1 CONSTRUCTION?

2 MR. WEULE: WELL, THAT IS WHERE IT IS CLEAR.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: IN OPERATIONS?

4 MR. WEULE: THERE IS A LOT OF ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION.

5 MR. DONATO: WHEN WE OPENED THE SUBWAY IN THE MID '60'S,  
6 WE HAD SOME GANG CARS POWERED WITH GASOLINE, AND WE USED THAT  
7 FOR SEVERAL YEARS UNTIL THE FIREMEN TOLD US THAT THIS WAS NOT  
8 PROPER EQUIPMENT TO HAVE AND ALSO THE INSPECTOR FROM THE  
9 PROVINCE. SO WE CONVERTED THEM TO PROPANE. AND THEN THIS  
10 WENT ALONG FOR A FEW YEARS, AND AFTERWARD THEY TOLD US THAT  
11 PROPANE WAS NOT PROPER EQUIPMENT. SO WE ARE SCRAPPING THEM  
12 GRADUALLY. WE ARE USING DIESEL. WE DON'T KNOW IF THEY ARE  
13 GOING TO TELL US TO GET RID OF DIESEL. WE HAVE DIESEL WITH  
14 CATALYTIC SCRUBBERS.

15 MR. WEULE: CATALYTIC SEEMS TO BE IN AND WATER SCRUBBERS  
16 SEEM TO BE OUT.

17 MR. DONATO: WE HAVE THIS QUESTION OF STORING UNDER-  
18 GROUND PROPANE. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THAT WITH FRENCH  
19 AUTHORITIES AND WE HAVE -- I DON'T KNOW IF IT IS A WRITTEN  
20 AGREEMENT -- BUT WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT FOR VERY SMALL  
21 QUANTITIES, EXPLAINING THAT THEY ARE IN THE AREA SHORT OF  
22 WELL VENTILATED. BUT GRADUALLY WE ARE TRYING TO GET RID OF  
23 ALL PROPANE.

24 MR. THOMPSON: WITH USE OF GASOLINE, ONE OF THE MAIN  
25 THINGS THAT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO WAS THE USE OF THE  
26 EQUIPMENT IN REGARD TO REFUELING IT IN THE TUNNELS. THEY  
27 KNEW IT DIDN'T POSE AS MUCH AS A HAZARD AS THE REFUELING  
28 OPERATION DID, AND THEY USED THE BROAD POWERS THAT ARE GIVEN

1 THE FIRE CHIEF TO DISCHARGE ANY OF THE GENERALLY UNSAFE  
2 CONDITIONS.

3 IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS NOT SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED  
4 BY THE CODES, JUST ANYTHING UNSAFE BY THE FIRE CHIEF SHALL BE  
5 PROHIBITED. AND USING THAT VERY BROAD INTERPRETATION, THEY  
6 PUT A STOP TO IT. I THINK IT ALL CAME TO A HEAD WHEN THEY  
7 LEARNED THAT WE HAD BROUGHT IN A SWEDISH RAIL CAR THAT HAD A  
8 HUNDRED-GALLON TANK ON BOARD. AND THAT HAS NEVER GONE INTO  
9 THE TUNNEL YET EITHER. IT WAS A RAIL EXAMINATION VEHICLE.

10 MR. LOCK: I HAD A COMMENT TO MAKE CONCERNING SECURITY  
11 AGREEMENTS, AND OUR EXPERIENCE WAS WITH LOCAL POLICE  
12 JURISDICTIONS. IT TOOK A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TO ARRIVE AT A  
13 MASTER AGREEMENT INSOFAR AS OUR SECURITY FORCES WERE CONCERNED  
14 WITH RESPECT TO ARREST AND DETENTION AND WHO DID WHAT. AND  
15 THAT WAS MORE OF A PROBLEM THAN FIRE SERVICE WAS. WE REALLY  
16 DIDN'T HAVE A FORMAL AGREEMENT INSOFAR AS FIRE SERVICE WAS  
17 CONCERNED. THE LOCAL JURISDICTIONS SAID "WE ARE GOING TO  
18 SERVICE YOU IF YOU ARE IN OUR JURISDICTION." AND WE HAVE  
19 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND TO WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY AND  
20 WHO BACKS UP WHO. AND SO YOU DON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THAT.  
21 BUT INSOFAR AS SECURITY WAS CONCERNED, IT WAS A TOTALLY  
22 DIFFERENT STORY. AND THE ONE DIFFICULTY THAT WE ENCOUNTERED  
23 WAS WITH RESPECT TO THE CORONER'S OFFICE INSOFAR AS SECURITY  
24 IS CONCERNED.

25 WE HAD HEARD THE EXPERIENCES OF OLDER PROPERTIES  
26 LIKE NEW YORK CITY AND LIKE CHICAGO WHO HAD FREQUENT  
27 SUICIDES AND THE PROBLEMS THAT THE DEATH POSED INSOFAR AS  
28 OPERATIONS WERE CONCERNED. AND IN GEORGIA IT WAS REQUIRED

1 THAT A CORONER BE ON SITE AND CERTIFY THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS  
2 DECEASED BEFORE HE CAN BE MOVED, OTHERWISE OPERATIONS MUST  
3 BE DOWN. AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, OUR SECURITY OFFICERS -- WE  
4 ARRIVED AT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CORONER'S OFFICE WHERE THEY  
5 WOULD BE TRAINED FROM THE CORONER AND THEY WOULD BE DEPUTIES  
6 OR ASSISTANT CORONERS AND THEY COULD THEN UNDERTAKE THIS  
7 RESPONSIBILITY. AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE SYSTEM WOULD NOT  
8 REMAIN STAGNANT FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME LOOKING FOR A  
9 CORONER.

10 MR. WEULE: IT IS INTERESTING. BART WENT THROUGH MUCH  
11 THE SAME THING. IT WAS ASSUMED IN THE INITIAL PLANNING THAT  
12 THE LOCAL POLICE JURISDICTIONS WOULD HANDLE POLICE MATTERS ON  
13 BART, AND BART WOULD HAVE A REGULARLY SMALL FORCE. AS IT  
14 CAME CLOSE TO REVENUE SERVICE AND IT GOT ADDRESSED HEAD-ON  
15 WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES, THE PICTURE BECAME QUITE  
16 RADICAL BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN TAKING ONE IOTA  
17 OF RESPONSIBILITY.

18 BART HAS A FULL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WITH FULL  
19 POLICE POWERS IN THE STATE. I THINK IT IS UP TO 135 OFFICERS.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: AL, DOES MARTA HAVE ITS OWN POLICE?

21 MR. LOCK: MARTA HAS HIS OWN POLICE. THE SIZE OF THE  
22 POLICE FORCE I DON'T RECOLLECT. I THINK IT IS LESS THAN HALF  
23 THE SIZE OF YOURS, RALPH. WE HAVE ARREST AND DETENTION  
24 POWERS. HOWEVER, INSOFAR AS FORMAL ARREST IS CONCERNED, WE  
25 MUST TAKE THE INDIVIDUAL DOWN TO THE LOCAL POLICE STATION  
26 WHERE HE IS FORMALLY CHARGED.

27 MR. WEULE: THE ONLY THING THAT BART DOESN'T MAINTAIN IS  
28 FULL JAIL FACILITIES. WE HAVE BOOKING AND DETENTION.

1 WE ALSO HAVE THE CORONER PROBLEM. OBVIOUSLY YOU  
2 ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO DETERMINE IF HE IS DEAD. EVEN IF HE IS  
3 IN PIECES HE GOES TO THE HOSPITAL, WHICH IS HARDLY  
4 APPROPRIATE. SO WE WERE ABLE TO WORK OUT WITH EACH ONE OF  
5 THE COUNTY JURISDICTIONS THE ABILITY TO MOVE THE BODY FROM  
6 THE TRACK TO ANOTHER LOCATION UNTIL THE CORONER COULD ARRIVE,  
7 BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT AN IMMEDIATE-RESPONSE AGENCY.

8 MR. MC FARLAND: WE ARE NOT PRIMARILY DISCUSSING  
9 SECURITY OR SAFETY, BUT I WOULD APPRECIATE IT, IF YOU HAVE ANY  
10 DRAFT AGREEMENTS, LOOK AT THE FORM. BUT BOTH FOR THE FIRE  
11 COMMITTEES AND THE FIRE MARSHAL COMMITTEES OR YOUR SECURITY  
12 AGREEMENTS, THEY WOULD BE SOME INTERESTING GUIDELINES, I  
13 THINK.

14 MR. DONATO: WE HAD A VERBAL AGREEMENT WITH THE POLICE  
15 BEFORE WE OPENED REVENUE OPERATIONS AS TO WHO WOULD BE ALLOWED  
16 IN SECURITY TO REMOVE THE BODY. AND THIS IS WHAT WE ARE  
17 DOING AT THIS TIME. AND WE HAVE EACH STATION EQUIPPED TO TAKE  
18 THE BODIES AND WRAP THEM UP. AND THIS IS DONE BY OUR OWN  
19 MAN. THE POLICE COME AFTER THAT. THE CORONER COMES TO PICK  
20 THEM UP. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION BEFORE  
21 STARTING OPERATION.

22 MR. MC FARLAND: I DON'T KNOW HOW WE GOT ON THIS  
23 CORONER BUSINESS, BUT IT IS VERY MUCH AN ISSUE.

24 MR. DONATO: YOU HAVE GOT TO DECIDE WHO IS GOING TO PICK  
25 UP THE PIECES, HOW THEY ARE GOING TO HANDLE THEM.

26 MR. MC FARLAND: WE WILL LEAVE IT TO THE ARCHITECTS.

27 MR. FARRELLY: ONE OF THE QUESTIONS THAT WERE RAISED AND  
28 WERE ADVISED BY THE TRANSPORTATION TO HAVE INVOLVED WAS HOW MANY

1 BODY BAGS WE HAD TO HAVE. WE HAVE REFRIGERATION CAPABILITY  
2 FOR CORPSES AND A FEW OTHER THINGS. THIS CAN GO ON AND ON  
3 TO SOME DEPTHS.

4 MR. THOMPSON: WE HAVE A 200-MAN POLICE FORCE GROWING.  
5 IT HAS JURSDICTIONAL COMPLETE POWERS ON THE PROPERTY THERE  
6 NOT EMPOWERED IN MARYLAND, D.C., OR VIRGINIA OFF THE PROPERTY  
7 OR OFF DUTY. THEY DO OPERATE IN THE TRIJURSDICTIONAL AREA  
8 WHICH IS SIMILAR TO PATH, BUT THEY HAVE STATEWIDE AUTHORITY.

9 I BELIEVE IN THE EVENT, IF THERE IS A FATALITY,  
10 THE HOMICIDE AGENCIES OF THE LOCAL JURISDICTIONS ASSUME SOME  
11 RESPONSIBILITY IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA. AS FAR AS CORONERS  
12 ARE CONCERNED, I HAVE NO IDEA.

13 MR. FARRELLY: ONE THING ABOUT THE PATH POLICE, BECAUSE  
14 THEY ARE PART REALLY OF THE PORT AUTHORITY POLICE FORCE AND  
15 MAY BE SUBSEQUENTLY ASSIGNED TO PAIR UP AT PORTS AND WHAT  
16 HAVE YOU, THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN TRAINED AS FIRE FIGHTERS  
17 BECAUSE THEY COULD BE THE FIRST TO RESPOND. SO WHEN THEY ARE  
18 ASSIGNED TO PATH, THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY. BUT, AGAIN, IN  
19 TERMS OF RESPONSE, IT WOULD BE THE MUNICIPAL FIRE DEPARTMENT  
20 WHO WOULD BE RETAINED TO RESPOND TO A PARTICULAR FIRE  
21 INCIDENT.

22 MR. MC FARLAND: I HAVE AN ITEM OF DISCUSSION HERE. THE  
23 FUNCTIONS REQUIRE CENTRAL DURING FIRE EMERGENCY. I WOULD  
24 LIKE TO GO BACK TO MR. LOCK'S COMMENT THAT REACTED TO YOUR  
25 THINKING WITHIN MARTA OF THE NEED OF CENTRAL CONTROL. I WISH  
26 YOU WOULD PICK UP ON THAT AGAIN.

27 MR. LOCK: WE HAVE, AS YOU REMARKED EARLIER, QUITE A  
28 DIVERSE OPINION THROUGHOUT THE AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO THE

1 NEED FOR A CENTRAL CONTROL. WE DO HAVE A CENTRAL CONTROL  
2 FACILITY? IT'S VERY SIMILAR TO THE DESIGN OF OTHER CENTRAL  
3 CONTROL FACILITIES. IT PERFORMS AND TRAINS SUPERVISION  
4 FUNCTIONS. IT PERFORMS AN ELECTRIFICATION CONTROL FUNCTION.  
5 IT PERFORMS AN OVERALL SUPERVISORY FUNCTION FOR THE SYSTEM,  
6 AND IT IS THE CENTRAL AREA FOR COMMUNICATIONS.

7 BUT INsofar AS THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM IS  
8 CONCERNED, WE DO NOT HAVE AN AUTOMATED LINE SUPERVISION  
9 FUNCTION PERFORMED BY TRAIN CONTROL. IT IS NOT VITAL TO THE  
10 SAFETY OF THE SYSTEM. THE TRAIN CONTROL STANDPOINT WE CAN'T  
11 OPERATE. WE CAN OPERATE REVENUE SERVICE WITH CENTRAL BEING  
12 DOWN AND REMAINING SAFE. IN A SIMILAR SENSE, WITH RESPECT  
13 TO ELECTRIFICATION, WE CAN EXERCISE CIRCUIT BREAKER AT THE  
14 SUBSTATIONS MANUALLY WITHOUT HAVING THE ACCESS TO THE REMOTE  
15 FACILITY THAT CENTRAL CONTROL PROVIDES. THIS IS ALSO TRUE  
16 WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNICATIONS. THEORETICALLY, AT LEAST, IT  
17 IS POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THAT OUR SYSTEM CAN OPERATE WITHOUT  
18 A CENTRAL CONTROL. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, HOWEVER, WE HAVE  
19 NEVER REALLY SERIOUSLY ENTERTAINED THIS POSSIBILITY, BECAUSE  
20 SIMILAR TO THE FIRE DEPARTMENT'S DESIRE FOR A COMMAND POST  
21 WHEN THEY ARE HANDLING AN EMERGENCY, THE AUTHORITY WANTS A  
22 COMMAND POST INsofar AS ITS DAILY OPERATIONS ARE CONCERNED.  
23 AND IN OUR CENTRAL CONTROL FACILITIES, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH  
24 RESPECT TO, YOU KNOW, UTILITY POWER FOR KEEPING IT  
25 OPERATIONAL, WE HAVE DUAL FEEDERS FROM DIFFERENT SUBSTATIONS  
26 SUPPLYING US WITH POWER. WE HAVE ALL THE EQUIPMENT IN  
27 CENTRAL THAT IS PROTECTED BY A LIAISON SYSTEM WHICH ABOUT  
28 EVERYONE ELSE DOES.



1 WE ALSO HAVE A STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR IN CASE  
2 WE WOULD LOSE ALL UTILITY POWER. WE HAVE AN UP SYSTEM THAT  
3 COMES ON LINE FIRST AND THEN THE STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR WILL  
4 TAKE OVER. AND SO WE ARE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT THE OPERATION  
5 OF CENTRAL CONTROL. BUT, NEVERTHELESS, AS I SAID EARLIER,  
6 IT IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO SYSTEM OPERATIONS.

7 MR. RHINE: IT IS ESSENTIAL BECAUSE THE REALITY OF IT  
8 IS THAT EVERYTHING ELSE IS BACKED UP TO CENTRAL IN THE EVENT  
9 THAT YOUR ABILITY TO OVERSEE AND SUPERVISE THE SYSTEM BREAKS  
10 DOWN. YOU COULD NOT BEGIN TO DO THE AMOUNT OF COMMUNICATION  
11 NECESSARY FOR BART IN CONTROL ROOMS IF CENTRAL WAS WITHOUT  
12 SOME MANNER, YOU WOULD HAVE 26 PEOPLE IN EACH OF THE ROOMS.  
13 FIRST OF ALL, YOU HAVE TO KNOW THAT YOU HAVE TO GET THEM OUT.  
14 IF YOU WERE OUT AT CENTRAL, YOU WOULDN'T KNOW AND ESSENTIALLY  
15 YOU HAVE TO GET THEM THERE AND TAKE OVER LOCAL CONTROL. AND  
16 CERTAINLY IN VARIOUS CASES YOU WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DECISIONS  
17 EVEN THOUGH THE ROUTING IS AUTOMATIC AND THE TRAIN LOST IT'S  
18 I.D. THERE IS AN INTERSECTION IN EACH OF THESE. CENTRAL  
19 IS THE PRIMARY CONTROL OF THE SYSTEM. IF YOU DIDN'T HAVE  
20 CENTRAL, YOU WOULD HAVE SOMETHING CALLED "COMMUNICATION  
21 CENTRAL." IN A FAR-REACHING SENSE, IT IS LIKE NEW YORK CITY  
22 WITH ALL ITS LITTLE WATCHTOWERS AND PEOPLE THROWING  
23 MECHANICAL LEVERS AND SWITCHES. THEY HAVE A CHART WHEN TRAINS  
24 ARE GOING TO COME AND GO ALL DAY LONG. IF ANYTHING HAPPENS  
25 ANYWHERE IN THE SYSTEM THEY HAVE LITTLE IDEA OF WHAT HAPPENED;  
26 WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT; AND YOU SIMPLY COULD NOT RUN A SYSTEM --  
27 I GUESS WITH BART'S EMERGING SYSTEM -- WITHOUT SOMETHING THAT  
28 IS CENTRALIZED, A LOT OF INFORMATION.

1 I DON'T THINK ANYONE WOULD HAVE A SYSTEM OPERATE  
2 THAT WAY. YOU COULD DO WITHOUT THE LOCAL CONTROL BEFORE YOU  
3 COULD DO WITHOUT THE CENTRAL CONTROL.

4 MR. WEULE: ESSENTIALLY, I WAS GOING TO FILL IN WHAT  
5 RHINE JUST ELABORATED AND WHAT IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE AND  
6 TO ASSURE PROTECTION, I.E., REAREND PROTECTION BY THE LOCAL  
7 CONTROL FUNCTIONS. BUT THERE ARE SO MUCH OTHER THINGS THAT  
8 ARE CRITICAL TO THE OPERATION THAT THAT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. WE  
9 DO HAVE BACKUP SHOULD WE LOSE CENTRAL CONTROL FOR DISPATCHING  
10 PERSONNEL WITH COMMUNICATION TO THE VARIOUS LOCATIONS, BUT  
11 IT IS JUST A TREMENDOUS UNDERTAKING. IT IS POSSIBLE, BUT YOU  
12 ARE GOING TO DEGRADE THAT SYSTEM OPERATION.

13 MR. LOCK: LET ME MAKE A COMMENT INSOFAR AS OUR  
14 SYSTEM DESIGN IS CONCERNED WITH RESPECT TO TRAIN CONTROL. I  
15 APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT WITH RESPECT TO BART AND ITS DESIGN  
16 CONCEPT. AT MARTA THE TRAIN PERFORMS THE FUNCTION OF  
17 AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION. WE DID NOT REQUIRE CENTRAL  
18 CONTROL FOR THAT FUNCTION. WE DO NOT REQUIRE CENTRAL FOR  
19 AUTOMATIC TRAIN OPERATION. WE NEED CENTRAL ONLY FOR LINE  
20 SUPERVISION. AND LINE SUPERVISION REALLY IS NOT SAFETY  
21 CRITICAL ON OUR SYSTEM. IT IS NOT THE SAFETY CRITICAL  
22 FUNCTION, ALTHOUGH, WE DO REQUIRE LOCAL CONTROL. IF WE LOSE  
23 LOCAL CONTROL AT A TRAIN CONTROL ROOM, THAT SEGMENT OF THE  
24 SYSTEM THEN IS DOWN, AND WE HAVE TO OPERATE ROAD MANUAL  
25 THROUGH THAT SECTION.

26 MR. RHINE: BART AND MARTA ARE ALL THE SAME PRINCIPLE.  
27 THEY ALL WORK THE SAME WAY WITH DIFFERENT ELECTRONIC ACTION.  
28 IN A DISTRIBUTED CONTROL SYSTEM YOU HAVE ZONES OF CONTROL.

1 BUT WHAT I WAS GOING TO SAY WAS YOU COULDN'T TAKE OUT ONE  
2 SECTION AND RUN A MANUAL THROUGH THAT SECTION BECAUSE YOU  
3 ARE SWITCHING AND YOU ARE ROUTING AND EVERYTHING IS  
4 AUTOMATICALLY CONTROLLED, AS IS TRAIN PROTECTION AND SPEED  
5 CONTROL.

6 WHAT I AM SAYING IS FOR YOU TO DO AWAY WITH IT  
7 BECAUSE I DON'T THINK IT IS GOING IN THERE. BUT EACH OF THE  
8 26 TRAIN CONTROL RULES ACTUALLY CARRIES OUT TRAIN PROTECTION  
9 AND AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL FUNCTIONS. BUT THERE ARE A LOT  
10 OF SIGNALS TO CENTRAL ABOUT OTHER THINGS OF OPERATIONS. THERE  
11 IS NO WAY IN THE WORLD YOU CAN KEEP TWO SYSTEMS RUNNING  
12 SMOOTHLY WITHOUT ANY DISRUPTION WITHOUT A TRAIN CONTROL  
13 SYSTEM.

14 MR. MC FARLAND: NOW, WE ARE TALKING FIRE EMERGENCY.  
15 I THINK THIS BECOMES EVEN MORE PARAMOUNT.

16 MR. THOMPSON: WE OPERATED FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY  
17 TEN DAYS BLIND FROM CENTRAL CONTROL. THE COMPUTERS WERE DOWN  
18 AND THE SCREENS WERE BLANK. WE MADE SEVERAL CONTINGENCY  
19 PLANS WHICH INCLUDED DISTRIBUTION TIME. WE WORKED UP A  
20 SPECIAL PROCEDURE SPECIFICALLY FOR FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATION  
21 IN CONJUNCTION WITH FAN SHAFT OPERATIONS WHICH WE HAD LOST.  
22 THERE IS NO REMOTE CONTROL TO THESE FACILITIES OR ANYTHING  
23 LIKE THIS FOR THAT PERIOD OF TIME. WE DID NOT HAVE ANY  
24 INCIDENT DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME, BUT WE HAD TO DEVELOP  
25 A CONTINGENCY PLAN BASED UPON THE FACT THAT WE WOULD BE  
26 RUNNING BLIND FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME. AND IT WENT WITHOUT  
27 INCIDENT.

28 MR. DONATO: WE CAN BREAK WITHOUT CENTRAL CONTROL.

1 CORRECT ME IF I AM WRONG, BUT I THINK MONTANA HAS BEEN THE  
2 FIRST SUBWAY WITHOUT CENTRAL CONTROL AND EVEN IN EUROPE THAT  
3 DIDN'T HAVE CENTRAL CONTROL. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT NOW TO  
4 THINK TO OPEN WITHOUT CENTRAL CONTROL. WE HAVE IN OUR SYSTEM  
5 LOCAL CONTROL SO IF ACTUALLY THE OPERATION SIDE OF CENTRAL  
6 WOULD GO BLANK COMPLETELY THEY COULD OPERATE WITH LOCAL  
7 CONTROL. IF EVER WE LOSE THE POWER OF CENTRAL CONTROL IT IS  
8 VERY, VERY DIFFICULT TO OPERATE BECAUSE EVERYTHING IS THERE,  
9 ALL THE OTHER POWER STATIONS, FIELDING LINES, A WHOLE  
10 SATELLITE. THIS IS WHERE ALL THE SWITCHES ARE, AND YOU ALLOW,  
11 IF YOU USE POWER TO FEELER, YOU CHANGE FEELER AND THINGS LIKE  
12 THAT. IT IS ALL DONE AT CENTRAL CONTROL. YOU COULD, I AM  
13 SURE, OPERATE, BUT YOU WILL HAVE A LOT OF PROBLEMS IF YOU  
14 DON'T USE CENTRAL CONTROL.

15 BUT ONE THING I WOULD LIKE TO ADD IS, I THINK WE  
16 HAVE A TENDENCY TO CONCENTRATE TOO MANY THINGS OUT OF CENTRAL  
17 CONTROL, ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT FIRE DEFENSE. I  
18 THINK THEY ARE GOOD AT THE BEGINNING, YOU KNOW, TO RELAY THE  
19 INFORMATION, TO CALL THE FIREMEN TO SEND PEOPLE TO THE SITE,  
20 BUT THEY DON'T SEE VERY WELL WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE. THE  
21 INFORMATION THEY GET IS INFORMATION THEY GET THROUGH OUR  
22 INDIVIDUALS, AND THEY PASS THROUGH DIFFERENT PEOPLE. AND WHEN  
23 IT GETS TO THEM IT IS NOT VERY, VERY CORRECT.

24 WHAT WE HAVE IN THE VICINITY -- WE HAVE THE  
25 CHIEF OF INCIDENT. HE IS A TRANSPORTATION MAN. AND HE IS  
26 ON THE SITE. HE HAS A RADIO. WE GIVE HIM ALSO  
27 COMMUNICATION IF WE LOSE THE TELEPHONE. WE GIVE HIM REPORTS  
28 AND COMMUNICATIONS WE BRING TO THEM. AND HE CAN COMMUNICATE

1 WITH CENTRAL CONTROL. HE CAN COMMUNICATE WITH THE FIREMAN.  
2 AS SOON AS THE FIREMEN GET THERE, THEY TAKE OVER AND HE IS  
3 THERE TO HELP THE FIREMAN. CENTRAL CONTROL CAN'T BE OF MUCH  
4 HELP THEN BECAUSE THEY DON'T HAVE ANY EYES ON THE SITE.

5 MR. MC FARLAND: THE PREPARED RESPONSIBILITY, OF  
6 COURSE, IS ONCE THE FIRE DEPARTMENT IS ON THE SCENE IS TO  
7 TAKE CHARGE OF THE FIRE. THE HOME OF CENTRAL BECOMES ONE OF  
8 SECONDARY IN SUPPORT.

9 MR. DONATO: BECAUSE THEY ARE FAR FROM THE INCIDENT.  
10 THEY DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE, AND THIS  
11 HAS HAPPENED TO ME SEVERAL TIMES, YOU KNOW, WHERE I GET A  
12 CALL AT NIGHT OR DURING THE DAY AND CENTRAL CALLS AND THEY  
13 CALL ME IF THERE IS ANY PROBLEM WITH FIRES. AND I SAY, "AFTER  
14 ALL, WE HAVE A SMALL EMISSION OF SMOKE AT THAT STATION." AND  
15 WHAT I ASK IS, "HAVE THE FIREMEN BEEN CALLED?"

16 HE SAID, "YES." I SAY, "DOES IT LOOK WORSE?"  
17 THEY SAY, "NO."

18 AND I TAKE MY CAR AND I GO THERE. THEY DON'T  
19 KNOW. THEY DON'T KNOW HOW IMPORTANT IT IS. YOU HAVE TO GO  
20 THERE AND USUALLY LEARN MORE THINGS WHILE THERE.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: IF THEY SAY, "YES," YOU DON'T TAKE  
22 YOUR TIME.

23 MR. DONATO: THEY SHOULD HAVE A MINIMUM CLOSE CIRCUIT  
24 TV. THEY NEED CLOSE CIRCUIT TV THAT LOOKS AT TWO PLATFORMS.  
25 IT IS SOMETHING THEY SHOULD HAVE BECAUSE THEY GET MESSAGES  
26 OF THINGS THAT GO WRONG IN THE STATION AND THEY DON'T SEE IT.  
27 AND PEOPLE DON'T ALWAYS USE THE RIGHT WORDS WHEN THEY SPEAK.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: IS THIS CENTRAL NOW?

1 MR. DONATO: CENTRAL RECEIVES INFORMATION FROM A  
2 STATION AS TO IF SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH THE TRAIN. DEPENDING  
3 UPON THE MAN WHO CALLED, IT COULD BE IMPORTANT OR NOT  
4 IMPORTANT. HE COULD SAY IT IS NOT IMPORTANT. IT COULD BE  
5 VERY IMPORTANT. THERE COULD BE A LOT OF SMOKE COMING FROM THE  
6 TRAIN, AND HE COULD SAY IT IS JUST A LITTLE BIT OF SMOKE. I  
7 THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU WOULD SEE THE PLATFORM. MANY  
8 SUBWAYS HAVE IT. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU HAVE TO HAVE IT TO HAVE  
9 CLOSE CIRCUIT TV TO SEE THE PLATFORMS.

10 MR. WEULE: THAT BECAME A VERY HOT POLITICAL ISSUE  
11 INCLUDING UNION INVOLVEMENT, SO WE ARE NO LONGER USING THOSE.  
12 ALTHOUGH WE DO HAVE SOME INSTALLATION STILL IN PLACE.

13 MR. SALYER: THE FIRE DEPARTMENT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE  
14 SOMEBODY THAT KNOWS THE SYSTEM ON THE SCENE TO ASSIST THE  
15 INCIDENT COMMANDER THROUGHOUT THE EMERGENCY. AND OUR FIRE  
16 DEPARTMENT WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ENCOURAGE -- WE GET A CALL ON  
17 ANYTHING THAT HAPPENS, ANYTHING THAT APPEARS TO BE A FIRE.  
18 EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT SURE IT IS A FIRE, WE WANT TO BE CALLED  
19 ON IT. WE WOULD RATHER COME AND BE TURNED BACK WITHOUT  
20 NOTHING THAN BE DELAYED AND HAVE SOMETHING BUILD UP BEFORE  
21 WE GET THERE.

22 MR. THOMPSON: THIS IS A CONTINUING PROBLEM WITH WMATA.  
23 THE CONTROL STAFF IN MANY INSTANCES WILL RESPOND TO A FIRE  
24 ALARM IN LESS THAN APPROPRIATE MANNER IN THAT THEY WILL MAKE  
25 A DETERMINATION THAT "WELL, WE DON'T NEED TO CALL THE FIRE  
26 DEPARTMENT ON THIS." AND UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES THEY  
27 WILL CALL THE FIRE DEPARTMENT IN. THERE REALLY ISN'T A  
28 PATTERN IN IT EXCEPT IT APPEARS TO AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSIDERED

1 OPINION AT THAT TIME.

2 AS I WAS LEAVING TO COME OUT HERE I KNOW THERE  
3 WAS A MEMORANDUM GOING TO CENTRAL CONTROL ADVISING THEM THAT  
4 THERE WAS A LEGAL REQUIREMENT WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO  
5 THEIR ATTENTION MANY TIMES BEFORE THAT ALL FIRES HAD TO BE  
6 REPORTED TO THE FIRE DEPARTMENT AND THAT AT THE SAME TIME WE  
7 WERE ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE THROUGH THE LIAISON OFFICER'S  
8 COMMITTEE A REDUCED RESPONSE FOR THOSE TYPES OF INCIDENTS  
9 WHICH WERE CLEARLY NOT A FIRE BUT WERE WARNED IN SOME  
10 INVESTIGATION BY THE FIRE DEPARTMENT. I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT  
11 IS HEADING RIGHT NOW PRESENTLY BECAUSE OUR RESPONSES TO THE  
12 METRO STATION ARE BOX ALARM ORDER, WHICH IS A VERY  
13 SIGNIFICANT RESPONSE BY THE FIRE DEPARTMENT. SO THAT IS A  
14 CONTINUING PROBLEM. AND IT GOES RIGHT DOWN TO THE TRAINING  
15 THAT THE PEOPLE IN CENTRAL CONTROL HAVE OR DON'T HAVE, IN  
16 THIS CASE, AS FAR AS HOW TO DETERMINE WHAT IS AN EMERGENCY  
17 AND WHAT IS NOT.

18 WE FURNISHED TO THE LIAISON OFFICER'S COMMITTEE  
19 COPIES OF ALL REPORTS WHICH REFLECT ON FIRE, AND THEY TURNED  
20 AROUND TO USE THIS AS AMMUNITION TO FUEL THIS INCIDENT TO  
21 BRING IT TO HEAD. AND I SUPPOSE THAT IT WILL RESULT IN THE  
22 ADOPTION OF A LIMITED RESPONSE FOR SMOKE IN THE STATION  
23 VERSUS AN ACTUAL CAR FIRE OR SOMETHING ALONG THAT LINE FOR  
24 INVESTIGATION PURPOSES. BUT PRIMARILY THIS WHOLE THING IS  
25 BEING BROUGHT UP SO THAT CENTRAL CONTROL WORKS CLOSELY WITH  
26 THE FIRE DEPARTMENT AND CALLS UPON THEIR SERVICES EACH TIME.  
27 I THINK WHAT THEY ARE REACTING TO IS THAT, WHEN THE FIRE  
28 DEPARTMENT COMES TO THE SCENE, THEY GENERALLY INTERRUPT

1 REVENUE SERVICE FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER OR THEY HAVE TO  
2 HOLD A TRAIN THERE FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES BY THE  
3 DEPARTMENT. AND THEY ARE REACTING TO THAT BECAUSE THEIR  
4 PRIMARY MISSION, AS THEY SEE IT, IS TO RUN THE RAIL RECORD  
5 AND NOT RUN AN EMERGENCY.

6 MR. SALYER: THIS CAN BE COMPARED WITH OUR HISTORY OF  
7 REPORTING HOTEL FIRES. WE HAVE A VERY BAD HISTORY OF HOTEL  
8 FIRES NOT BEING REPORTED IN THEIR INCIPIENCY WITH THE HOPE  
9 THAT THE MANAGER CAN PUT THE FIRE OUT AND NOT HAVE THE  
10 TENANT SEE TEN FIRE TRUCKS PULL IN FRONT, WHICH IS BAD FOR  
11 BUSINESS. AND WE DO PROSECUTE THEM WHEN IT CAN BE PROVEN  
12 THAT THEY HAVE DONE THIS. IT IS IN THE MUNICIPAL CODE THAT  
13 THEY ARE OBLIGATED TO REPORT THE FIRES. AND I WOULD SORT OF  
14 COMPARE THAT WITH THIS CASE.

15 MR. WEULE: AND THE PEER FROM THE TRANSIT AUTHORITY'S  
16 VIEW POINT IS WE HAVE A FULL RESPONSE. IT'S HARD FOR THE  
17 FIRE DEPARTMENT TO APPRECIATE "WAIT A MINUTE. HOLDING THAT  
18 TRAIN IS HOLDING 10,000 PEOPLE RIGHT BEHIND IT." AND I THINK  
19 WE ARE GETTING OVER THAT HUMP NOW SIMPLY BY A LOT OF  
20 HEAD-TO-HEAD WORK WITH THE FIRE DEPARTMENT AND BART TO  
21 ESTABLISH WHAT OUR REASONABLE RESPONSE LEVEL IS AND REASONABLE  
22 RESPONSE REPORT CRITERIA. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THREE LEVELS  
23 OF RESPONSE. WE FEEL THAT THE FIRE DEPARTMENT SHOULD KNOW  
24 EVERYTHING THAT GOES ON IN REGARD TO, SAY, ANY SMOKE OR FIRE  
25 CONDITIONS. THERE WAS A FIRE IN THE TRASH CAN AND WE PUT IT  
26 OUT. AND IT IS LIKE, IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO COME OUT AND LOOK  
27 AT THE TRASH CAN, ALL RIGHT.

28 THE YELLOW ALERT IS THE SECOND LEVEL WHERE WE HAVE



1 A SMOKE CONDITION OR WHERE WE HAVE A BETTER KNOWLEDGE OF  
2 WHAT THAT SMOKE IS AND A LIMITED RESPONSE IS SENT.

3 AND THEN A RED ALERT IS WHERE WE HAVE A REPORT  
4 OF A PUBLIC FIRE. BUT YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO WORK VERY  
5 CLOSELY TOGETHER.

6 MR. SALYER: WHAT WOULD THAT BE UNDER, EMERGENCY OR  
7 NONEMERGENCY?

8 MR. WEULE: NONEMERGENCY. WE ARE STILL WORKING IT OUT.  
9 WE HAVE HAD IT IN THE LAST ABOUT NINE MONTHS NOW. BUT IT IS  
10 COMING TOGETHER. AND EACH TIME WE USE ONE OF THOSE, WE  
11 SHAKE IT OUT AND REVIEW THE TAPES BOTH ON OUR SIDE AND ON  
12 THEIR SIDE. WELL, YOU START HEAVY AND NOW YOU ARE BACKING OFF  
13 AFTER A FEW CLIPS OF EXPERIENCE, AS THAT IS PROBABLY HOW IT  
14 HAS TO BE.

15 IF THEY CAN OPENLY DISCUSS IT RATHER THAN  
16 TAKE THIS HARD-ROCK POSITION WHERE WE HAVE ONE SIDE AND  
17 "WE ARE NOT GOING TO TELL YOU ANYTHING BECAUSE YOU ARE GOING  
18 TO SCREW IT UP ON THE OTHER SIDE," YOU HAVE TO MAINTAIN OPEN  
19 LEVEL AND CONTINUE IT SO YOU CAN ADJUST IT WHERE THE RIGHT  
20 WAY IS.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: GENTLEMEN, IF YOU ALL WOULD LIKE A  
22 COLD DRINK . . .

23 (RECESS.)

24 MR. MC FARLAND: WE ARE IN THE VERY EARLY PHASES OF  
25 PRELIMINARY -- DOUG WOULD CALL IT CONCEPTUAL. THIS IS OUR  
26 FIRST REVIEW IN DISCUSSION OF FIRE SAFETY. I WOULD LIKE TO  
27 PUT ON THE TABLE THE QUESTION -- SEEK RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHAT  
28 SORT OF MEETINGS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND. WHAT SORT OF REVIEWS?

1 I WAS VERY MUCH INTRIGUED BY MR. LOCK'S COMMENTS YESTERDAY ON  
2 DESIGN ASSURANCE FOR FIRE SAFETY. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO  
3 SPEAK ON THAT ISSUE, IT WOULD BE VERY INFORMATIVE.

4 MR. LOCK: I MADE THAT COMMENT YESTERDAY IN DESCRIBING  
5 OUR SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM AS IT WAS CONDUCTED DURING THE  
6 COURSE OF ENGINEERING. AND IN PARTICULAR, WITH REFERENCE TO  
7 CRITERIA, EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE IN WHAT DOUG LOW WOULD CALL  
8 CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING, EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE STARTING ON YOUR  
9 DESIGNING OF FACILITIES AND STRUCTURES, IT WAS OUR EXPERIENCE  
10 TO TAKE -- WE TOOK -- LET ME PHRASE IT THAT WAY -- TO START  
11 IMMEDIATELY ON THE PREPARATION OF CRITERION. BECAUSE  
12 FOLLOWING CONCEPTUAL DESIGN, YOU WILL GET INTO PRELIMINARY  
13 DESIGN. YOU WILL THEN TURN THE WORK OVER TO A & E. THE  
14 WORK WILL COME BACK IN A PACKAGE. YOU HAVE TO HAVE A BASIS  
15 FOR THE REVIEW AND THE FINALIZATION OF IT. AND THIS BASIS IS  
16 YOUR CRITERIA. YOU THEN ALSO WILL BE IN THE PROCESS OF  
17 PREPARING PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATIONS. YOUR PROCUREMENT  
18 SPECIFICATIONS HAVE TO BE REVIEWED AND THEY HAVE TO BE  
19 CORRECTED PRIOR TO THE TIME THEY ARE ADVERTISED. THEN, AGAIN,  
20 YOU NEED YOUR CRITERIA AS A MEANS OF PERFORMING THIS FUNCTION.  
21 AND SO YOUR CRITERIA ARE ESSENTIAL INITIALLY.

22 WELL, YOU WILL DEVELOP GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FIRST  
23 AND FROM THIS YOU WILL HAVE CRITERIA. AND THEN YOU WILL  
24 EVOLVE SPECIFICATIONS AND YOU WILL PROCEED WITH THE DESIGN  
25 CONSTRUCTION OF YOUR SYSTEM. IN OUR CASE, INSOFAR AS I  
26 REPORTED YESTERDAY, WITH RESPECT TO OUR SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM,  
27 AFTER WE EVOLVED OUR CRITERIA, OUR MAJOR MILESTONE WAS THE  
28 DESIGN REVIEW FUNCTION WHERE WE REVIEWED DESIGNS FOR

1 PERFORMANCE TO CRITERIA FROM A SAFETY POINT OF VIEW, AND THEN  
2 WE PROVIDED FOR A PROVISION. AND THEN AS WE GOT INTO  
3 CONSTRUCTION, WE INSPECTED THE AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION FOR  
4 CONFORMANCE TO THE DESIGNS WHICH PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN DESIGNED  
5 TO CONFORM TO THE CRITERIA. AND THE SAD FACT OF THE MATTER  
6 IS, YOU DO NOT CATCH EVERYTHING.

7 AS A CONSEQUENCE -- ... ESPECIALLY AT POINTS OF  
8 INTERFACES WHERE YOU REALLY RUN INTO TROUBLE AND WHEN YOU  
9 INSPECT AS-BUILT CONFIGURATIONS, YOU WILL FIND THAT  
10 STANDPIPES ARE UNCONNECTED. AND YOU WILL FIND ALL SORTS OF  
11 DISCREPANCIES WHICH YOU THINK SHOULD BE CAUGHT AND PROBABLY  
12 SHOULD HAVE BEEN CAUGHT. BUT FOR SOME REASON OR ANOTHER THEY  
13 WEREN'T. AND THIS PROCESS GIVES YOU BETTER ASSURANCE THAT  
14 YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE FEW OF THESE OR, HOPEFULLY, NONE. BUT  
15 THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS, YOU WILL ALWAYS HAVE SOME. BUT,  
16 YET, I AM AN ADVOCATE FOR THIS PROCESS BECAUSE WE FOLLOW IT,  
17 AND I THINK IT HAS MERIT.

18 MR. MC FARLAND: THANK YOU.

19 MR. THOMPSON: I THINK ONE OF THE BEST THINGS YOU CAN  
20 DO IS TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN OBSERVING THE CONSTRUCTION  
21 EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN GOING ON. UNLIKE WMATA, WE HAVE  
22 LITTLE OPPORTUNITY OR JURISDICTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION AREAS  
23 EXCEPT FOR THE PRESUBSTANTIAL INSPECTION AND THE OTHER  
24 SCI'S THAT ARE CONDUCTED. BUT BY THE TIME THE EQUIPMENT IS  
25 INSTALLED AND THE BUILDINGS ARE BUILT, THE PROBLEMS WILL COME  
26 OUT BEYOND YOUR CONTROL AND YOU MORE OR LESS END UP BUYING  
27 THE SITUATION AS IT IS.

28 MR. MC FARLAND: IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS IN THE

1 PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING PHASES THAT WE ARE FACING RIGHT NOW,  
2 FREQUENCY OF REVIEW AND FROM A SAFETY STANDPOINT, HOW WOULD  
3 YOU RECOMMEND REVIEWING THE PRELIMINARY DESIGN THAT WE WILL  
4 START IN THE SECOND YEAR FROM A SAFETY ASSURANCE STANDPOINT?

5 MR. LOCK: WELL, OUR EXPERIENCE, AS I INDICATED  
6 YESTERDAY, WAS THAT AT THIS POINT IN TIME WHEN YOU ARE IN  
7 PRELIMINARY DESIGN, WHEN YOU ARE CONCEPTUALIZING YOUR SYSTEM,  
8 THIS IS WHERE YOU ARE AT THE POINT WHERE YOUR DECISIONS  
9 ARE EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT WITH RESPECT TO CONFIGURATION  
10 BECAUSE THIS IS WHERE THE BIG BUCKS ARE SPENT. AND AS A  
11 CONSEQUENCE, WE REVISED THE PROCESS OF CONCEPTUAL DESIGN  
12 BECAUSE OF THE CONCERN ON THE PART OF OUR MANAGEMENT THAT  
13 THIS WORK COULD BE DONE IN A MORE COST-EFFICIENT MANNER THAN  
14 HAD BEEN DONE PREVIOUSLY. I WISH DOUG WAS HERE, BECAUSE WE  
15 COULD HAVE A GOOD DIALOGUE WITH RESPECT TO AESTHETICS AND  
16 PATRON COMFORT AND FINANCIAL COST. WHAT FINANCIAL LINE DO  
17 YOU DRAW?

18 AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE NOW HAVE DESIGN TEAMS  
19 FOR CONCEPTUAL DESIGN WHERE THEY ARE ASSIGNED A LINE SEGMENT  
20 RESPONSIBILITY. PUT IT THIS WAY, THE RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM, TO  
21 MY WAY OF THINKING, IS, IN ITS DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION,  
22 SOMEWHAT LIKE AN AVOCADO. YOU KNOW YOU HAVE THIS SYSTEM YOU  
23 ARE GOING TO DESIGN AND THEN YOU TEAR IT APART AND YOU HAVE ALL THESE  
24 LITTLE LEAVES AND THEN YOU PUT IT BACK TOGETHER AGAIN. AND  
25 TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE COST CONTROLS AND TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE  
26 TECHNICAL CONTROLS, YOU CAN'T COMPARTMENTIZE IT INTO  
27 INDIVIDUAL LINES AND EXPECT IT TO BE DONE EFFICIENTLY AND  
28 PROPERLY.

1 THE CONCEPT THAT WE ARE FOLLOWING AT THE PRESENT  
2 TIME -- WE ARE DESIGNING ON THE BASIS OF LINE SEGMENTS WHERE  
3 WE HAVE NOW GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY TO AN INDIVIDUAL THAT WE  
4 DESIGNATE AS A PROGRAM MANAGER FOR A LINE SEGMENT. AND THAT  
5 IS A CONVENIENT DIVISION OF SYSTEM -- A NUMBER OF LINE  
6 SECTIONS AND STATIONS THAT BECOME A PACKAGE. AND HE IS  
7 RESPONSIBLE FOR WORRYING ABOUT THE INTERFACES. HE IS  
8 RESPONSIBLE FOR -- HE IS ALMOST THE LAST AUTHORITY, ALMOST BUT  
9 NOT QUITE THE LAST AUTHORITY FOR SIGNING OFF ON CHANGE  
10 ORDERS, BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN BITTEN QUITE SEVERELY INSOFAR AS  
11 CHANGE ORDERS ARE CONCERNED IN ESCALATING COSTS WITH  
12 RESPECT TO OUR STATIONS AND OUR LINE SECTIONS. AND THE  
13 SAFETY QUESTION ENTERS RIGHT AT THIS POINT AS WELL.

14 WHEN WE GET INTO GRADE CONSIDERATIONS, WHEN YOU  
15 GET INTO CROSSOVER, WHEN YOU GET INTO POCKET TRACKS, PLACES  
16 OF SAFE REFUGE, YOU SHOULD HAVE SAFETY INVOLVEMENT; FROM MY  
17 POINT OF VIEW, INITIALLY, BECAUSE THESE CONSIDERATIONS  
18 DEFINITELY IMPACT DESIGN AND CONSEQUENTLY THE IMPACT COST.  
19 AND THEY ARE A MAJOR CONCERN. SO I FEEL THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE  
20 A REVIEW PROCESS, WHICH NEED NOT BE AS FORMALIZED AS THIS  
21 INSOFAR AS MINUTES ARE CONCERNED, CERTAINLY, BUT THAT SAFETY  
22 SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN. AND YOU SHOULD HAVE A FORMAL SET OF  
23 CRITERIA AND FORMAL PROCESS INSOFAR AS REVIEW AND EVALUATIONS  
24 ARE CONCERNED.

25 MR. THOMPSON: JUST ONE OTHER THING IS, IF YOU BUY A  
26 SYSTEM, WHETHER IT BE FIRE ALARMS OR VENTILATION OR ANYTHING,  
27 BE SURE THAT YOU PURCHASE IT AND ACCEPT IT AS A SYSTEM AND NOT DO IT  
28 IN SEGMENTS, BECAUSE THAT HAS BEEN THE CRUX OF OUR PROBLEM,

1 BECAUSE WE HAVE ACCEPTED PIECES OF A PUZZLE AND WHEN WE GET  
2 THE WHOLE PICTURE WE FIND THAT IT IS NOT WHAT WE INTENDED OR  
3 WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE.

4 MR. DONATO: WE HAVE A DIVISION CALLED FIRE PREVENTION.  
5 THEY ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE. THEY DON'T HAVE RESPONSIBILITY AS  
6 WIDE AS MARTA WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AFTER A LOT OF THINGS IN  
7 THE CONCEPTION AND ENGINEER. THEY ARE ONLY LOOKING AFTER  
8 FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT. THAT IS ALL THEY DO. THE BALANCE,  
9 WE COULD SEE THE TECHNICAL COMPONENTS OF THE SUBWAY. AS  
10 FAR AS SAFETY IS CONCERNED, IT IS LOOKED AFTER BY THE THREE  
11 DEPARTMENTS. THE THREE DEPARTMENTS HAVE THE  
12 RESPONSIBILITY TO SET UP IN WRITING WHAT ARE THEIR CRITERION,  
13 IF YOU WANT, OR SAFETY TOUCHING THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS LIKE  
14 VENTILATION OR PUMPING SYSTEM. THE CITY WANTS SO MANY PUMPS.  
15 THEY WANT DIFFERENT FEET. THEY WILL GIVE THEM THEIR  
16 CRITERIA.

17 NOW, THE CONSTRUCTION GROUP STARTS WITH THAT AND  
18 THEY DESIGN -- THEY PREPARE SPECIFIC DRAFTS. THESE DRAFTS  
19 ARE SENT BACK TO US. WE READ THEM. WE LOOK AT THEM. AND  
20 WE REPORT BACK IN WRITING WHAT WE LIKE AND WHAT WE DON'T LIKE.  
21 THEN WE MEET AGAIN ANOTHER TIME. THEY TAKE ALL THIS  
22 MODIFICATION. WE MEET WITH THEM AND WE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO  
23 CHANGE MAJOR THINGS, BUT WE CAN CHANGE SMALL THINGS.

24 AFTER ONCE WE AGREE, THEN THESE SPECIFICATIONS  
25 ARE SENT FOR PROCUREMENT. NOW, THE CONTRACTS ARE GIVEN. WE  
26 HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO CONTRACTORS. THERE IS, BUT OUR  
27 MAINTENANCE MEN ARE CLOSE TO THE STATION, ESPECIALLY WHEN  
28 THEY GET TO THE END PHASE. AND USUALLY THEY WORK WITH THE

1 CONTRACTOR. EVEN IF THIS IS NOT ALWAYS, THE CONTRACTOR  
2 DOESN'T MIND, BECAUSE IF WE'RE HELPING SOMEHOW. THIS WAY WE  
3 CAN LEARN THE SYSTEM BECAUSE IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO GET  
4 DRAWINGS, GET THE INFORMATION. MANUALS FOR MAINTENANCE, YOU  
5 GET THEM AFTER YOU START OPERATION BECAUSE THE DATE YOU  
6 START OPERATION HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT IT WILL BE A WEEK  
7 BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. AND IT IS NOT VERY MUCH YOU CAN DO  
8 ABOUT THAT. SO YOU HAVE TO SOMEHOW FIND A WAY TO GO AROUND  
9 ALL THESE PROBLEMS AND GET THE SYSTEM GOING.

10 MR. GRAINGER: HOW ABOUT THE AREAS OF REVIEWS OF THE  
11 FIRE DEPARTMENT?

12 MR. MC FARLAND: AREAS OF REVIEW WITH THE FIRE  
13 DEPARTMENT?

14 MR. GRAINGER: YES.

15 MR. MC FARLAND: I THINK THAT GETS TO THE QUESTION OF  
16 WHAT SORT OF ORGANIZATION THEY SET UP TO INTERFACE WITH THE  
17 FIRE DEPARTMENT IN VIEW OF SOME SORT OF FIRE MARSHAL  
18 COMMITTEE. THAT WOULD BE A NATURAL OUTPUT AS A MECHANISM FOR  
19 REVIEW BOTH TO THE AUTHORITY AND FROM THE AUTHORITY TO THE  
20 FIRE DEPARTMENT. BUT WITH PRIMARILY ONE JURISDICTION HERE --  
21 WELL, TWO -- WE DON'T FACE THE SAME PROBLEM THE FIRST OTHERS  
22 HAVE FACED WITH MANY JURISDICTIONS WHERE YOU ARE FORCED TO  
23 GO TO SOME OVERSEEING GROUP.

24 MR. GRAINGER: BUT IT MAY BE THAT THE THINGS THAT LOCK  
25 TALKS ABOUT IS SOME PERIODIC SAFETY REVIEW AND PART OF THE TEAM  
26 MIGHT BE SOME FIRE PEOPLE.

27 MR. MC FARLAND: NO QUESTION. THIS WILL BE PART OF THE  
28 FUNCTION, SOME SORT OF FIRE SAFETY REVIEW. MY QUESTION IS

1 FREQUENCY.

2 MR. RHINE: I FEEL, AND I THINK, WE WILL FOLLOW A  
3 PRACTICE WHERE SAFETY IS NOT REVIEWED INTO THINGS. YOU DON'T  
4 ACHIEVE ANY SAFETY BY SITTING DOWN AND REVIEWING THE BEST  
5 EXPERTS OF THE WORLD AND FIND OUT WHAT IS NOT THERE. SO IT  
6 IS A DESIGN REQUIREMENT JUST AS STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS OR  
7 OPERATIONAL OR ANYTHING ELSE WITH THE PRESENCE OF LOS ANGELES  
8 FIRE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THE MEANS OF OUR CONTRACT WITH THE  
9 CITY. I FOR ONE, IN THE SUBSYSTEM AREA, AM LOOKING FORWARD,  
10 FROM THE BEGINNING, WORKING A LOT OF THE SAFETY THINGS IN  
11 AND WHEN THE SAFETY PEOPLE, WHO ARE NOT MY STAFF NECESSARILY,  
12 HELPING ME MAKE THE DECISIONS SO THAT WHEN THE REVIEW WILL BE  
13 MORE OF A FORMALITY THAN A FACT-FINDING SESSION, BECAUSE TO  
14 FIND OUT AFTER THE FACT, AFTER IT IS BUILT OR READY TO  
15 OPERATE, THE LEAST TO SAY IS BAD AND IT IS MOST LIKELY  
16 DEVASTATING, SO I THINK THE SPEAR OF EVERYTHING WE ARE DOING  
17 HERE AND THE WAY TO PREDESIGN TO CARRY OUT THAT SAFETY WILL  
18 BE FACTORED IN. IT SHOULD BE FACTORED INTO THE VERY  
19 BEGINNING AND ALL FACILITIES. AND WE WILL DO IT THAT WAY IN  
20 OUR DESIGN EFFORTS BETWEEN THE CRITERIA SYSTEM LEVEL, CRITERIA  
21 LEVEL BY RUSS AND THE OTHER PEOPLE.

22 MR. MC FARLAND: THE SYSTEM LEVEL, SAFETY LEVEL  
23 CRITERIA WILL BE THE KEY TO ASSURING THIS PROCESS. LET ME  
24 RAISE A POINT AGAIN. I SAID EARLIER THAT WHEN WE LOOKED BACK  
25 INTO THE RECORD AND GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT EARLIER IN THE  
26 '70'S, IN THE '60'S PERHAPS EVEN THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
27 CRITERIA IS A LUXURY THAT PEOPLE DIDN'T HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY  
28 TO UNDERTAKE OR TO DOCUMENT. WE CAN FIND ONE COMPLETE SET OF



1 CRITERIA AT ATLANTA. IF YOU LOOK AT THE OTHER SYSTEMS, WE  
2 HAVE ONE SYSTEM CRITERIA, ONE. IT IS THE MIAMI. I AM SURE  
3 THERE WERE OTHERS, BUT IT WAS NEVER PUT INTO PRINT. IT WAS  
4 NEVER BROUGHT INTO A DOCUMENT.

5 MR. RHINE: YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT GENERAL CRITERIA AND  
6 SO FORTH. YOU SAID A "SAFETY SYSTEM PLAN." THEY ONLY HAD  
7 IT AFTER CERTAIN PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT URGED THE INDUSTRY  
8 TO PUT DOWN ON PAPER WHAT THEIR GENERAL SAFETY CONCERNS AND  
9 METHODS WERE. ALTHOUGH, AGAIN, IT WAS DOCUMENTED TO SOME  
10 EXTENT AND PUT SOMETHING ON THE SHELF. IN THE LAST FIVE  
11 YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A LOT MORE PROGRESS TOWARD A MUCH MORE  
12 ORGANIZED DOCUMENT SAFETY PLAN.

13 MR. MC FARLAND: DO WE HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS, AREAS OF  
14 CONCERN OR DISCUSSION? AS I LOOK ABOUT THE ROOM I SEE THE  
15 NORMAL 3 O'CLOCK-SECOND-DAY REACTION.

16 MR. DONATO: ONE AREA WE DIDN'T DISCUSS IS THE GOOD  
17 HOUSEKEEPING FOR FIRES. CLEANING TRACK LEVEL IS VERY  
18 IMPORTANT. IN MONTREAL WE HAVE A VACUUM TRAIN -- SOME  
19 PROBABLY HAVE THEM, SOME DON'T. I THINK IT IS MORE TO KEEP  
20 THE TUNNELS IN GOOD CONDITION WITHOUT ANY TRASH. A FIRE COULD  
21 START VERY EASILY IN A TUNNEL BECAUSE YOU DO HAVE OIL OR  
22 INFILTRATION IF YOU HAVE TRASH ON TOP OF THAT. I THINK IT  
23 IS VERY IMPORTANT TO REMOVE THE DUST YOU HAVE ON THE SUBWAY  
24 TO PROTECT YOUR ROLLING STOCK, BECAUSE DUST CAN DAMAGE THE  
25 EQUIPMENT, ESPECIALLY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. I THINK VACUUM  
26 CLEANERS ARE VERY IMPORTANT CLEANING THE SUBWAY.

27 MR. MC FARLAND: A POINT WELL TAKEN.

28 MR. DONATO: ONE OTHER POINT, WHERE WE HAVE MOST OF OUR

1 FIRES IS IN THE TRASH CANS. I WISH SOMEBODY COULD GIVE US  
2 A TRASH CAN THAT THEY CAN EXTINGUISH FIRES AUTOMATICALLY. WE  
3 HAVE TRIED TO DESIGN SOMETHING, BUT WE DIDN'T SUCCEED YET. I  
4 WONDER IF ANYONE ELSE HAS FOUND ANYTHING.

5 MR. RHINE: WE WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WITH THE TUNNEL  
6 CLEANING THINGS. WHEN BART HAD THE TUNNEL WASHING CAR AND  
7 RAN IT THROUGH THE TUBE AND THEN SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE  
8 FAMOUS REPORTER RAN THROUGH THERE AND REPORTED HUNDREDS OF  
9 LEAKS AND DRIPPING WATER THROUGH THE TUNNEL. ONE MUST BE  
10 ALERT TO ADVERSE REACTIONS TO HOUSEKEEPING.

11 MR. MC FARLAND: ARE THERE ANY OTHER AREAS OF  
12 DISCUSSION?

13 MR. THOMPSON: YES. JUST ONE FINAL THING. AS FAR AS  
14 GOOD HOUSEKEEPING IS CONCERNED, ONE OF THE BEST THINGS TO  
15 FOLLOW IS THE NFPA CODES. ANYPLACE THAT IS AS CLEAN AS THAT  
16 CODE REQUIRES CAN'T BURN. AND THAT'S THE STANDARD FOR OUR  
17 INSPECTION, THE NFPA CODES. SO IF YOU FOLLOW THOSE, YOU WILL  
18 DO AWAY WITH ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF YOUR PROBLEM.

19 MR. GRAINGER: I WAS IN ANOTHER MEETING. I DON'T KNOW  
20 IF WE TALKED ABOUT THINGS OF FIRE EXTINGUISHERS.

21 MR. MC FARLAND: AT THIS POINT IN TIME WE FELT IT WAS  
22 NOT GERMANE TO ISSUES. A YEAR FROM NOW, A YEAR AND A HALF  
23 FROM NOW, BUT AT THIS POINT WE FELT IT WOULD BE DETAILED AND  
24 WOULD GO WAY BEYOND WHAT OUR NEEDS ARE.

25 GENTLEMEN, I SURE WANT TO THANK YOU ON BEHALF OF  
26 RTD FOR THE EFFORT, AND IT IS AN EFFORT. AS YOU KNOW, I  
27 SAY I LOOK AT THE FACES AND I THINK MOST OF THE GAS TANKS ARE  
28 ABOUT DRY. ENERGY LEVELS ARE WAY DOWN EVEN WITH A LARGE

1 LUNCH OR INSPITE OF THE LARGE LUNCH. I THINK THIS DAY AND THE  
2 TWO DAYS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY FRUITFUL FOR US AT RTD AND FOR  
3 MYSELF. AND I THINK THAT IT IS EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN GETTING  
4 US INSIDE DIRECTION, IN THE DIRECTION WE SHOULD BE GOING.

5 MR. GALLAGHER, WOULD YOU LIKE TO --

6 MR. GALLAGHER: WELL, YOU HAVE SPOKEN FOR RTD. I DON'T  
7 THINK I HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD.

8 MR. MC FARLAND: THANK YOU.

9 MR. GRAINGER: I WOULD LIKE TO SAY ONE LAST THING. I  
10 HAVE ATTENDED ALMOST EVERY PEER GROUP REVIEW, AND EACH ONE  
11 I THINK IS BETTER THAN THE LAST ONE. AND I THINK THIS ONE  
12 WAS PARTICULARLY GOOD. AND I THINK WE SHOULD GIVE RUSS  
13 A ROUND OF APPLAUSE. I THINK HE HAS DONE A GOOD JOB OF  
14 EMPLOYING THIS THING.

15 THE OTHER THING IS, HOW WOULD YOU LIKE TO GIVE  
16 YOUR IMPRESSIONS ON --

17 MR. MC FARLAND: WHAT WE ARE DOING, HOW WE ARE DOING, OR  
18 WHAT WE COULD DO BETTER.

19 MR. GRAINGER: WE OFTEN DO THAT OTHER THAN LETTING US.  
20 DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA OF HOW WE COULD IMPROVE OR --

21 MR. WEULE: I THINK THAT CERTAINLY IT IS COMMENDABLE  
22 THAT YOU CAN ASSEMBLE THIS KIND OF A GROUP TO DO JUST THIS.  
23 AND I CERTAINLY THINK IT IS FOR ALL TO BENEFIT, NOT JUST RTD.  
24 WE ARE SHARING INFORMATION AS WE ARE GOING THROUGH THIS. AND  
25 BY DOING THIS AND IN RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEMS THAT OTHERS  
26 HAVE, ONLY THEN CAN THOSE KINDS OF PROBLEMS BE PREVENTED,  
27 MAYBE NEW ONES PUT FORWARD. SO I AM IMPRESSED WITH THIS  
28 TYPE OF REVIEW.

1 MR. FARRELLY: I THINK THE INDUSTRY WILL GREATLY  
2 BENEFIT, PERHAPS MORE THAN RTD, FROM THE TRANSCRIPT WHEN THEY  
3 ARE FINALLY RELEASED IN THE TOTAL AND WE ALL CAN EXAMINE FROM  
4 MANY DIFFERENT PROSPECTIVES, FROM THE OLDER SYSTEMS TO THE  
5 NEW SYSTEMS, TO THOSE BEING PLANNED, TO THOSE JUST EMERGING.  
6 AND SHARE, AS RALPH HAS INDICATED, THE DIALOGUES THAT HAVE  
7 TAKEN PLACE IN THIS PEER REVIEW PANEL. I THINK IT IS A VERY,  
8 VERY WORTHWHILE ACTIVITY.

9 MR. LOCK: I WANT TO COMMENT THAT OUR EXPERIENCE,  
10 INsofar AS EMBARKING UPON A DESIGN OF OUR SYSTEM, WAS AS  
11 FOLLOWS: WE WENT TO OTHER TRANSIT AUTHORITIES. I PREPARED  
12 AN ITINERARY INsofar AS TRAVEL WAS CONCERNED, AND WE  
13 INVESTIGATED EXISTING PROPERTIES. WE VISITED THE NEW  
14 EMERGING PROPERTIES. WE ESTABLISHED DIALOGUE WITH BART. WE  
15 HAD A LENGTHY UNDERGOING DIALOGUE WITH WMATA, WITH LARRY  
16 ENGLEMAN. AND DOES MOHAMMED GO TO THE MOUNTAIN? DOES THE  
17 MOUNTAIN GO TO MOHAMMED? I THINK THIS SYSTEM IS FAR, FAR  
18 PREFERABLE THAN WHAT WE EMBARKED UPON. NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.  
19 I THINK IT IS A MUCH BETTER PROCESS, BECAUSE YOU ARE ABLE  
20 TO GATHER TOGETHER IN ONE ROOM AND DEVELOP A DIALOGUE AMONG  
21 DIFFERENT PROPERTIES WHO HAVE HAD THESE PROBLEMS. AND SO IT  
22 SHOULD BE SORT OF SYNERGISTIC. THE OUTCOME SHOULD BE A LOT  
23 BETTER THAN SEEING EACH ONE INDIVIDUALLY, AND HOPEFULLY THAT  
24 IS THE CASE. I ENDORSE THE PROCESS WHOLEHEARTEDLY.

25 THE OTHER COMMENT I WANTED TO MAKE WAS THIS: THE  
26 ONE BIG ACTIVITY THAT WE WERE INVOLVED IN EARLIER WAS  
27 ESTABLISHING THE ACTUAL DESIGN CONSTRAINTS OR SYSTEM  
28 CHARACTERISTICS WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL BE DOING AS WELL.

1 AND THIS QUESTION OF "DO WE DESIGN MANNED STATIONS OR  
2 UNMANNED STATIONS? DO WE HAVE BACKUP CAPABILITY? DO WE BRING  
3 IN THE CONDUIT STEPS AND PUT A KEY ON IT IN CASE WE ARE  
4 GOING TO HAVE ATTENDANTS OR NOT? ARE WE GOING TO GO TO FIXED  
5 FARES, ZONED FARES? AND WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY?"

6 AND IT HAS A TREMENDOUS IMPACT INSOFAR AS YOUR  
7 SYSTEM IS CONCERNED. EACH ONE OF THESE SUBSYSTEMS HAS TO BE  
8 CONSIDERED IN THAT LIGHT. AND THE DESIGN CONSTRAINTS YOU  
9 PLACE ON YOUR SYSTEM WILL THEN BE VERY IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY  
10 FROM A SAFETY POINT OF VIEW, BUT FROM EVERY OTHER SYSTEM AS  
11 WELL.

12 MR. DONATO: I LIKE VERY MUCH THE FORMAT YOU HAVE,  
13 BECAUSE IT HAS ALLOWED US TO LEARN ABOUT WHAT THE OTHER  
14 PEOPLE ARE DOING. WHEN PEOPLE COME TO SEE US IT IS ONLY IN  
15 EXCHANGE ONE WAY. HERE ONE CAN BENEFIT FROM THE COMMENTS OF  
16 OTHER PEOPLE AND WE CAN ASK QUESTIONS. I THINK WE NOT ONLY  
17 GIVE INFORMATION, WE RECEIVE INFORMATION.

18 MR. MC FARLAND: I THINK MR. LOCK'S COMMENT ON  
19 DISSYNERGISM IS THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF THE INTERACTION.  
20 WE WOULDN'T GET GOING TO EACH PROPERTY SEPARATELY.

21 MR. THOMPSON: I FEEL THAT I HAVE GAINED MORE FROM THIS  
22 THAN I HAVE GIVEN IN A LOT OF WAYS, BECAUSE THE INFORMATION  
23 I HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE OTHER AUTHORITIES CERTAINLY GIVES  
24 ME A MESSAGE TO TAKE BACK TO MY AUTHORITIES. AND I THINK I  
25 WILL HAVE A VERY INTERESTING DISCUSSION WITH SOME OF OUR  
26 OFFICIALS.

27 MR. SALYER: I WOULD JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT MY PARTNER  
28 BILL LUBBUCK, THAT COULDN'T BE HERE TODAY, GREATLY

1 APPRECIATES BEING INVITED. WE FEEL IT IS VERY PRODUCTIVE,  
2 AND WE HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO INVOLVE US FROM HERE ON.

3 MR. MC FARLAND: WE WILL, BY ALL MEANS. I THINK WE HAVE  
4 TO SIT DOWN AND FIGURE OUT HOW TO BRING THE COUNTY INTO IT.  
5 OUR CONTRACT IS WITH THE CITY AND IT IS THROUGH THE CITY TO  
6 YOU.

7 MR. SALYER: WELL, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WE CAN MAKE SURE  
8 THEY ARE INVOLVED.

9 MR. LUTKUS: I THINK THIS IS AN EXCELLENT PROCESS TO  
10 DEVELOP A NEW SYSTEM, BECAUSE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS  
11 IN SAFETY IS THE PLANNING STAGES. AND RIGHT HERE YOU ARE  
12 GETTING ALL THE ADVANTAGES OF THE EXPERTISE OF THE GOOD AND  
13 THE BAD OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS. SO I THINK RTD IS QUITE  
14 FORTUNATE THAT THIS TYPE OF ARRANGEMENT WAS MADE. AND I  
15 THINK YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE GREAT ADVANTAGE OF IT. AND WE  
16 ARE PLEASED THAT WE WERE INVITED HERE TO BE PART OF THIS.

17 MR. MC FARLAND: IT WAS MR. GALLAGHER'S FORESIGHT. IT  
18 WAS DICK; AM I CORRECT?

19 MR. GALLAGHER: I AM NOT GOING TO ARGUE WITH YOU.

20 MR. MC FARLAND: WELL, GENTLEMEN, WITH THAT, WE WILL  
21 ADJOURN THE MEETING. I, AGAIN, WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR  
22 TIME AND THE EFFORT AND THE ENERGY INVOLVED.

23 (THE PEER REVIEW MEETING WAS ADJOURNED  
24 AT 3:20 P.M.)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA     )  
                                  )  SS.  
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES  )

I, CYNTHIA R. SPERRY , THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICIAL  
REPORTER FOR THE WITHIN MATTER, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE  
FOREGOING PAGES, 4 THROUGH 120, INCLUSIVE, DO CONSTITUTE A  
FULL, TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS HELD  
BEFORE ME ON OCTOBER 15, 1981.

Cynthia R. Sperry