Card Key Implementation Plan

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Prepared by

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CARD KEY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

1	Introduction	1
2	Identification of Room Security Levels	5
3	Identification of Facility Areas and Required Security Level	7
4	Keying Hierarchy - Grand Master Plan	8
5	Access Provisions to Outside Agencies	9
6	Transition of Keying Hardware Between Facility Construction, Equipment Installation, and System Operational Phases	10
7	Analysis of Card Key Failure Mode: Locked versus Unlocked	13
8	Costs of Locking Scheme	14
9	Recommended Locking Scheme	15
10	Design Implementation Actions	16
Figure	LIST OF FIGURES	
Figure 1	LIST OF FIGURES Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent Structure Rooms	18
	Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent	18 19
1	Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent Structure Rooms	
1 2	Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent Structure Rooms Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - I	19
1 2 3	Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent Structure Rooms Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - I Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - II	19 20
1 2 3 4	Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent Structure Rooms Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - I Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - II Keying Hierarchy	19 20 21
1 2 3 4	Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent Structure Rooms Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - I Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - II Keying Hierarchy Intrusion Alarm Conduit Termination	19 20 21
1 2 3 4 5	Security Levels of Station and Mid-line Vent Structure Rooms Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - I Security Level of Yard and Shops Facilities - II Keying Hierarchy Intrusion Alarm Conduit Termination LIST OF ATTACHMENTS	19 20 21 22

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1. Introduction

This plan recommends a lock and keying system for the Los Angeles Metro Rail Subway Project. The keying plan is based on the <u>Security Access Control Report</u> (January 1985) prepared by MRTC which identified the minimum number of doors requiring card access control, and subsequently led to the issuance and approval of Change Request 4-088. Change Request 4-088 required that critical access areas of Metro Rail have electronic card access control which can be monitored from a central point. Non-critical access rooms need only have a hard key (cylinder) lock.

Four keying plan working sessions were held with District representatives from operations, maintenance, security, systems design, fire/life safety, and facility design, to reach agreement on the proper application of a card access control system for the Metro Rail Project. The recommendation of a mixed hard key-card key system is based on general concurrence of the group during the Third Keying Plan Working Session that the basis of Change Request 4-088 is still applicable and necessary.

All MOS-1 stations, the Main Shop, and the Maintenance-of-Way Building are included in the keying plan. An area control principle is used as the guideline for determining which doors require card access control. Simply stated, corridor doors leading to critical access rooms (herein identified) are card access controlled instead of the doors on these individual rooms. This normally minimizes the number of card readers required on the Metro Rail System. However, in cases where card keying corridor doors actually requires more card readers than card keying individual critical access rooms (due to station corridor configuration), the individual doors are card keyed. In some cases,

no corridor door exists and so there is no alternative but to card key the individual critical access rooms.

All intrusion alarms associated with the card access control system will be sent to the Transit Police headquarters at Imperial for monitoring. A dedicated console and printer will be provided there. Monitoring capability will also be provided at the Rail Control Center in the Main Shop, where a multi-function terminal and printer will be incorporated into the communications console. Validation/invalidation of card keys will be performed at the Maintenanceof-Way building, by the Facilities Maintenance Department, via a terminal. Software programming will provide this capability also to the Transit Police headquarters and Rail Control Center, if required.

The use of a card access control system on critical access areas improves security compared to a conventional hard key locking system. The primary benefits of a card control access system are effective security of property, monitoring of individual employee activity, automatic validation of door alarms, multiple access levels with a single card, and flexibility in changing and controlling access. A computer printout is available showing door usage as an added security measure. Unlike a hard key system, a card access control system can be used to secure areas from any persons by time of day, and can accommodate changes in unauthorized persons to any area almost immediately without having to replace door locks or issue keys simply by making an entry change on a video display terminal. The system can be used to unlock (or lock) a series of doors at any time of the day. Compared with a conventional hard key system with intrusion alarms, the card access control system will indicate fewer (if any) false alarms. All authorized entries

into rooms do not activate alarms. (The <u>Security Access</u> <u>Control Report</u> discusses this system in more detail.) Finally, innumerable keying hierarchies are available through a card access control system at all times.

Rooms are classified into three security levels: Critical - requiring card access control and intrusion alarm either directly on the room's door or the corridor door leading to the room; Sensitive - requiring hard key lock and intrusion alarm; and Moderate - requiring a hard key lock. A limited number of doors such as those leading to the emergency stairs at each station platform end will be intrusion alarmed and equipped with panic hardware on the public side. Most hard keyed doors without card access control will not have an intrusion alarm, eliminating the common-place problem of responding to numerous false alarms.

A master keying hierarchy is required to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to specifically designated areas. The fare collection equipment is not included in this proposed master keying system since access to this equipment and fare media/cash will be subject to a separate security system. Removable core locks are recommended for all Metro Rail facility doors during construction and system operation due to the ease of removal and replacement when a change of locks is required.

The card access control system will include card readers, card keys, and a local controller. Specifications for this system are contained in the A640 Communications Contract.

The proposed transition of room locks between the construction phase, equipment installation phase, and system operational phase is described in Section 6 of this plan to show when locks are replaced and who performs the replacement.

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Construction and annual O&M costs are provided in Section 8 for the mixed hard key-card key and all card key alternatives.

Recommendations are made to ensure successful implementation of a lock and key system. Minimal changes are required for facility contracts. The recommendations are as follows:

- Ensure facility contract drawings contain provision of required intrusion alarm conduit, junction boxes, and other required electrical items.
- o Initiate change request to obtain District approval to revise Volume III, Section 18.9, and Table III-13-1 of Volume III, Section 13.4.4.C, of System Design Criteria and Standards to eliminate requirement of intrusion alarm to protect all ancillary (non-public) station areas. Also, revise criteria to allow train control, traction power, and elevator keys to be included in master keying.
- Ensure Communications Contract A640 provides for master keyed locks on Emergency Management Panel, Auxiliary Emergency Management Panel, and Command Post.
- Provide card readers and door hardware at locations shown in Attachment 3 drawings, and verify inclusion in Contract A640.
- At the Main Shop, provide means to notify Division Dispatcher of desired entry into Transportation section of building during off-hours. A telephone is acceptable. Remote door unlatching from Division Dispatcher's office is recommended.

- o At the Main Shop, provide means to notify Yard Dispatcher of desired entry into Yard Tower during offhours. A telephone is acceptable. Remote unlatching of ground floor entrance door from the Yard Tower is recommended.
- Provide terminal at Maintenance-of-Way Building to permit Facilities Maintenance staff to validate/invalidate card keys.
- Provide a coverplate on card access controlled doors that swing outward from the secured side, in order to protect the electric strike.

2. Identification of Room Security Levels

Three security levels are identified for Metro Rail facilities as described in the <u>Security Access Control Report</u>. Each level indicates the extent of security required to protect a room or space in a facility, dependent on the nature of equipment or material inside the area. The three levels of security are: critical, sensitive, and moderate. These levels are defined as follows:

A. Critical Access

Critical access areas are those that can be extremely hazardous, essential to the system's safe operation, or require restricted access due to the nature of the equipment or value of the product in the area. These areas shall have a card access control system including an intrusion alarm, either on an access corridor door or on the individual room doors.

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B. Sensitive Access

Sensitive access areas need to be secured to maintain the integrity of the equipment located therein. These areas shall have a hard key locking system with each discipline keyed differently, unless shared use of areas requires otherwise. These areas shall have an intrusion alarm, either on an access corridor door or on their own doors. The number of locations in this category is minimal. Included here are street level emergency exit hatches which accommodate a key wrench to open.

C. Moderate Access

Moderate access areas are used by various employees. A hard key locking system shall be provided giving access to employees of several disciplines. No intrusion alarm is planned for these areas.

Section 18.9 of Volume III of the Metro Rail System Design Criteria and Standards requires intrusion alarm protection on all ancillary station areas, or on common corridor doors leading to these areas. Such a requirement imposes an operational problem as alarms are likely to be activated frequently, many being false. The use of a card access control system on critical access areas and elimination of this requirement on the remaining areas would solve this problem. Consequently, a change request should be initiated to delete the requirement for intrusion alarms on all ancillary station areas. Other non-station areas should be examined for intrusion alarm requirements on an individual basis.

3. Identification of Facility Areas and Required Security Level

This section lists the various rooms in Metro Rail facilities and identifies an appropriate security level for each one. Metro Rail facilities are classified into two groups for this report: stations/mid-line vent structures and Yard/Shops buildings. All public and non-public rooms which require locks are listed. Proposed security levels of the station and mid-line vent structure rooms, Main Shop rooms, and Maintenance-of-Way and Yard Substation Building rooms are shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Some doors are not included because they do not require any lock.

Tunnel cross-passage doors require a latch but shall not have a lock. This also applies to cross-passages contain ing a sump pump. Thus, they are not included in the room security designations. Similarly, various rooms in the yard shop buildings, such as locker rooms and washrooms which do not require a lock are not included.

The end-of-platform gates at stations will have a thumbturn latch without any intrusion alarm. A closer and a self-latching mechanism is recommended to be added to these gates. Gate swing should be only towards the platform. Table III-13-1 of Volume III, Section 13.4.4.C of Design Criteria requires an intrusion alarm without a lock for these gates. Revision to this criterion is recommended to delete the intrusion alarm requirement, so that the potential problem of excessive false alarms can be avoided.

The Incoming Electrical Service Room at each station will be secured by the Department of Water and Power (DWP), and

thus are not included in the room security designations of Figure 1.

4. Keying Hierarchy - Grand Master Plan

A proposed keying hierarchy is shown in Figure 4 which in cludes stations, mid-line vent structures, Main Shop, Maintenance-of-Way Building, Yard Traction Power Substation, and ATC bungalows. Although MOS-1 does not contain any mid-line vent structures, they are included here for future reference.

The station Emergency Management Panel (EMP), Auxiliary Emergency Management Panel (AEMP), and Command Post (CP) are included in the master keying system. The EMP has two front panels, one for emergency ventilation controls and fire telephone among other items, and another for P.A., telephone and alarm panel. The former will have a lockset that will be masterkeyed to a more secure level than the latter. Both panels will be a part of the masterkeying system. The CP will have the fire telephone masterkeyed at a more secure level than the remainder of the panel. The AEMP only has one panel and it will be masterkeyed. Fire Department personnel will have access to the EMP, AEMP, and CP.

Elevator, escalator, Traction Power, and Train Control keys are included in the master key system. This permits equipment control by authorized staff without having to issue additional keys. The Metro Rail Design Criteria (Volume I, Section 4.9.2 and Volume III, Section 18.9c) which currently prohibit elevator, Traction Power, and Train Control keys from being a part of the master key system, need to be revised via a change request. Security of the facilities

will be ensured by permitting only authorized personnel entry into non-public areas of stations.

The keying hierarchy (Figure 4) identifies rooms that will have a card access control system in addition to a hard key lock. These critical access areas will normally be entered using the card readers. The hard key lock can serve as a backup security mechanism in the event of a card key system failure. The hard keys to these rooms will not be circulated. Transit Police will control all hard and card keys.

The keying hierarchy is organized by discipline, with similarly designated keys being interchangeable. Thus, Key J can be used to access janitorial rooms at stations, Main Shop, and Maintenance-of-Way Building.

5. Access Provisions to Outside Agencies

It is the responsibility of the managers of the individual disciplines to determine the appropriate employees requiring room keys. The keying hierarchy shown in Section 4 classifies facility rooms according to each discipline. Outside agencies will have different procedures to enter Metro Rail facilities but most will be required to be accompanied by Metro Rail personnel for appropriate access.

The Fire Department and Transit Police will access the stations through the main entrances. During non-revenue hours, a card key will be required to raise the station entrance rolling grille. A master hard key will also be required to provide access to hard-keyed ancillary rooms (without card readers), and the Emergency Management Panel (EMP), auxiliary EMP (AEMP), and Command Post (CP).

The city and county police personnel will have un-escorted access into the system.

The Department of Water and Power (DWP) personnel will enter stations through a street level access hatch nearest the Incoming Electrical Service Room. An L.A. Fire Department wrench will be required to open the intrusion alarmed hatch. Since DWP personnel require unescorted access into Metro Rail facilities, they will be required to use the telephone near the hatch to call into the Rail Control Center (RCC) to notify of their presence and respond to the alarm.

Pacific Bill telephone maintenance personnel may access stations during revenue hours through the public entrances. They do not require station keys since the public telephone switchboard panels are typically located in the free area of the station. Union Station has a telephone room in a non-public area which will require escorted access (by station agent or other authorized persons) to provide the telephone repair person access to this room.

6. <u>Transition of Keying Hardware Between Facility Construc-</u> tion, Equipment Installation and System Operational Phases

Hard Key Locksets

The facility construction, equipment installation, and system operational phases should have removable core locks to control access during the various phases of construction. This ensures that lost or misplaced keys from one phase are not used illegally to enter rooms during a later phase. Key cores can be removed and new ones installed without requiring cylinder removal. (Cylinder houses removable core.) It is advantageous to have interchangeable cores for all Metro Rail facilities. This will permit any core to fit every lock cylinder and also enable any control key to replace every core. Baseline facility specifications currently provide for removable core locks, but do not currently provide for interchangeability throughout the system.

The Stage II station contractor is responsible for installing the doors and preparing the equipment rooms for beneficial occupancy by installation contractors. As such, no door hardware is usually required in the Stage I construction phase. Once a room is approaching Stage II completion, the door and door hardware (hard key lockset) are then installed. The District takes acceptance of the facility upon satisfactory completion of the contract.

The equipment installation contractor(s) will then take possession of the room for the installation period. If any Stage II work remains to be performed within a room, it would have to be done in coordination and under authorization of the equipment installation contractor. The equipment contractor would be responsible for control of keys and thus reasonable security of the room containing his equipment.

Typically, the equipment contractor retains occupancy of the room through pre-revenue testing. General provisions of all specifications allow the District to take possession or to use any completed or partially completed part of the contract work. When this occurs, the equipment contractor is relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to that part of the work. Station non-equipment rooms will be made available to the District by the Stage II contractor

for acceptance, without any equipment contractor involved thereafter.

Card Access Control System

Rooms designated as "critical access" areas shall require a card reader equipped with an intrusion alarm. The procedure to install these items is dependent upon the type of wall housing the doorway. In either case, the Stage I contractor provides conduit from the nearest Communications Interface Cabinet (CIC) or Train Control and Communications (TC & C) Room to the frame of the doorway, and the Stage II contractor provides the door frame and door hardware. Architectural Directive Drawing AD-023 shows guidelines for terminating conduit to door locations, and is included in Figure 5.

Cast-in-place concrete walls are built by the Stage I contractor and therefore, the conduit leading from the frame of the doorway to the intrusion alarm and card reader locations is also provided by the Stage I contractor.

In the typical case of a Concrete Masonry Unit (CMU) wall housing the doorway, the Stage II contractor who builds the wall also provides the conduit leading from the base of the doorway up around the door frame to connect to the intrusion alarm and card reader locations.

The card control access system including the contact switch intrusion alarm is provided in the Communications A640 Contract. On card access controlled doors that swing outward from the protected side, a coverplate is needed to secure the electric strike. This will be installed by the Stage II contractor. The card readers must be the same brand and model from station to station. It will be powered from the 48 V dc Communications Battery System. This battery system has an eight-hour rating.

7. Analyses of Card Key Failure Mode: Locked vs. Unlocked

In the event of a card key system failure, the card key lock can be designated either to fail locked or unlocked. A failure in the unlocked position permits entry and exit through the doorway. This may lead to unauthorized entry during such periods. A failure in the locked position permits exit from inside the room (simply by turning the interior doorknob or pushing the panic bar handle) and precludes entry from outside unless a master hard key (when provided) is used to open the door. The advantage of the latter method is that secured access is maintained at all times. Each card reader except at rolling grilles, will be equipped with a switch to set the failure mode, either locked or unlocked, which can be set or changed at any time.

The station entrance rolling grille which is controlled by a card access control system, is currently planned to unlock (deadbolt retracted) in the event of a card system This method is acceptable since it does not imfailure. pact station operations and passenger evacuation procedures. A card system failure during non-revenue hours when the rolling grille is in the down position permits District personnel to manually raise the grille to open the station to the public in the morning. A failure during revenue hours will not impact station operations since the rolling grille will be in the up position permitting entry and exit. Therefore, it is recommended that the currently planned rolling grille failure mode (unlocked) remains intact. A switch to permit the failure mode to revert back to locked will not be provided.

8. Costs of Locking Scheme

This section presents construction and annual O&M costs for the mixed hard key-card key system. Vendors of hard key and card key systems were contacted to obtain the cost estimates. A cost comparison of three alternative locking schemes considered in the keying plan working sessions is shown in Attachment 1.

Change Request 4-088 which was approved listed a cost of \$263,400 for a limited application of the card access control system. The current estimate is \$569,000 for the 18station alignment, of which \$48,750 is associated with the LA-Long Beach LRT System. Table 1 shows the construction and annual O&M costs of the card access control system, as configured as part of an overall mixed hard key-card key system. Backup cost data are contained in Attachment 2.

The recommendation listed in Section 1 to delete the intrusion alarm requirement on ancillary station areas would result in a cost savings of approximately \$250 per door. This would occur with hard keyed doors only, as card keyed doors require intrusion alarms.

Table 1

Construction and Annual O&M Costs of Card Key System

		MOS-1	18-Station
1. 2.	Construction Costs Annual O&M Costs	\$266,300 19,400 ^A	\$569,000 47,100 ^A
	Mhogo gooto remain the		

A - These costs remain the same from previous estimates.

9. Recommended Locking Scheme

The keying plan working group representing operations, maintenance, security, systems design, fire/life safety, and facilities design, recommends a mixed hard key-card key system. This is consistent with the intent of approved Change Request 4-008 stating a minimum requirement for card access control on critical access areas of the Metro Rail System.

A total application of the card access control system was considered and would cost \$1,330,100 for the 18-station alignment. The working group found this to be unjustifiably expensive relative to current project funding constraints. However, such an extensive system would provide improved security and keying convenience when compared with the mixed system.

The proposed card keying of rooms in MOS-1 stations and the Main Shop is shown in Attachment 3. The locking scheme reflects the use of area control principle. Rather than card keying individual critical access rooms, the number of readers can be reduced and/or greater area can be protected with the same number of readers if common corridor doors leading to these critical access areas are card keyed. In a few cases where card keying corridor doors require a greater number of readers compared with card keying individual rooms, the latter is chosen. The main intent is to minimize the number of required card readers and still adequately protect critical access areas.

Some doors are listed in Attachment 3 drawings as "exit only" with an arrow. This means that no locking hardware is recommended except to allow exiting in the direction shown by the arrow. Entry shall not be permitted. Other

doors are marked "IA" which means that an intrusion alarm is required (no card key). Card readers are listed with the prefix "CR" followed by the number associated with that particular location (e.g., CR5). Some card readers at 7th/ Flower Station are noted with "LCR," meaning that they are associated with the LRT portion of the station.

10. Design Implementation Actions

The following actions must be completed to ensure successful implementation of the card access control system:

- Conduct contract review to ensure intrusion alarm conduit is provided to all card keyed door locations in facility contract drawings.
- o Initiate change request to seek District approval to revise Volume III, Section 18.9, of System Design Criteria and Standards and eliminate requirement of intrusion alarm on all ancillary station areas. Revise this section to allow train control and traction power substations to be part of the master keying system. Also seek District approval to change Volume I, Section 4.9.2 to enable elevator keys to be included in master keying system.
- Add closer and self-latching provisions to end-ofplatform gates. Provide only one-way swing towards platform.
- Ensure Communications Contract A640 provides for masterkeyed locksets on EMP, AEMP, and CP.

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- Provide card readers and door hardware at locations shown on Attachment 3 drawings and verify inclusion in Contract A640.
- o At the Main Shop, provide means to notify Division Dispatcher of desired entry into Transportation section of building during off-hours. A telephone is acceptable. A remote door unlatching capability is recommended from the Division Dispatcher's office.
- At the Main Shop, provide means to notify Yard Dispatcher of desired entry into Tower during off-hours. A telephone is acceptable.
- Provide terminal at Maintenance-of-Way Building to permit Facilities Maintenance staff to validate/invalidate card keys.
- Provide coverplate on card access controlled doors that swing outward from the secured side, in order to protect the electric strike.

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Discipline/Room or Door	Security
Stations	
Automatic Train Control and	
Communications (TC & C)	
TC & C and Battery Room	Critical
Janitorial	
Custodial Room (Platform Level)	Moderate
Custodial Closet (Mezzanine Level)	Moderate
Trash Room	Moderate
Mechanical and Electrical	
Emergency Fan Room	Moderate
Fan Room	Moderate
Air Supply Room	Moderate
Smoke Exhaust Room UPE Room	Moderate Moderate
Chiller Room	Moderate
Ejector Room	Moderate
Sump Pump Room	Moderate
Sprinkler Valve Room	Critical
Mechanical Room	Moderate
Storage	Moderate
Traction Power Fan Room	Moderate
Blast Relief Shaft	Moderate
Emergency Vent Shaft	Moderate
Fire Pump Room (Union Station)	Moderate
Elevator Equipment Room Electrical Room (Cable Room)	Moderate Critical
Electrical Equipment	Critical
Operations	
Emergency Equipment Room	Moderate
Staff/Security Room	Moderate (provision to upgrade)
Lunch Room (Union Station)	Moderate
Supervisor's Booth (Union Station)	Moderate
Station Entrance Rolling Grille	Critical
Telephone	
Telephone Room (Union Station)	Moderate
Power	
Auxiliary Power Room	Critical
Traction Power Substation and Battery	
Room (TPSS)	Critical
Auxiliary Power Substation	Critical
Other	
Mezzanine Level Toilet Room	Moderate
Platform Level Toilet Room (Union Station)	Moderate
Emergency Exit Hatch End-of-Platform Gate	Sensitive (intrusion alarm w/o lock) Moderate (latch only)
End-of-Platform Emergency Exits	Sensitive
THE OF FIREFORM THOUS PARADA	
Mid-line Vent Structures	
Automatic Train Control and	

Automatic Train Control and	
Communications (TC & C) TC & C and Battery Room	Critical
Mechanical and Electrical Fan Rooms Electrical Room (Cable Room)	Moderate Critical
Power Traction Power Substation Auxiliary Power Room	Critical Critical

Note: No mid-line vent structures in MOS-1

FIGURE 2 - SECURITY LEVEL OF YARD AND SHOPS FAC	CILITIES -
Discipline/Room	Security
Main Shop	
Automatic Train Control and Communications (TC & C) Telecommunication Maintenance and Parts	
Storage Room	Moderate
Janitorial Janitor Room	Moderate
Janitor Closet	Moderate
Maintenance	
Managerial Offices Air Brake Shop	Moderate Moderate
Air Conditioning Shop	Moderate
Electrical Repair Shop	Moderate
Tool Room	Moderate
Storage	Moderate
Copier/Supply Room	Moderate
Electric Equipment Equipment Room	Moderate Moderate
Conference Room	Moderate
Battery Shop	Moderate
Welding Shop	Moderate
Metal Shop	Moderate
Parts Cleaning	Moderate
Mechanical/Electrical	Modemeter
Electric Closet Elevator Machine	Moderate Moderate
_	noderace
Power Traction Power Substation	Moderate
Stores & Secured Storage	
Security Storage	Moderate
Stores Issue	Moderate
System Stores Shipping and Receiving	Moderate Moderate
Telephone	
Telephone Closet	Moderate
Rail Control Center	Critical
Communications Equipment Data Processing	Critical
Operations Control Room	Critical
CCTV	Critical
Administration	Moderate
Transportation Operations Computer Room	Omitical
Crew Reporting	Critical Moderate
Manager	Moderate
Assistant Manager	Moderate
Copier/Supplies	Moderate
Dispatcher	Moderate
Dispatch Storage	Moderate
Janitor Training/Meeting	Moderate Moderate
Instruction	Moderate
T.V. Room	Moderate
Lunchroom	Moderate
Yard Control Tower	
Yard Control Tower Room	Critical
Train Control Room	Critical
Communications Room	Critical
(All three rooms protected on stairway entrance door.)	

Note:

Rooms designated as Moderate are equipped with hard key locks which normally are left unlocked.

(All three rooms protected on stairway entrance door.)

Discipline/Room	Security
Maintenance-of Way Shop	
Automatic Train Control and Communication	M. da wa ka
Telecommunications Room	Moderate
<u>Maintenance</u> Managerial Offices Copier/Supplies Electrical Room Secured Tool Room Tool Room Storage Lunch/Training Room	Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Janitorial Janitor Room	Moderate
Mechanical/Electrical Mechanical Room Compressor Room Elevator Equipment Room	Moderate Moderate Moderate

Yard Traction Power Substation

Traction Power Substation

Moderate (additional security by surrounding fence)

Automatic Train Control Bungalows


ATC Bungalows

Moderate

FIGURE 4 - KEYING HIERARCHY

GRAND MASTER KEY AAA						
						-
STATION	MASTER AA	MAIN SI	HOP MASTER AB	MOW	BLDG	MASTER AC
*	TRAIN CONTROL & COMMUNICATION TC & C ROOM S1, S2		- TRAIN CONTROL & COMMUNICATION * COMMUNICATIONS ROOMS * TRAIN CONTROL ROOM AND BUNGALOWS	KEY		TRAIN CONTROL & COMMUNICATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS
KEY E -	ELEVATOR/ESCALATOR ELEVATOR EQUIPMENT ROOM	KEY E	- ELEVATOR/ESCALATOR * ELEVATOR EQUIPMENT ROOM			
			- MAINTENANCE * MANAGERIAL OFFICES * ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES * MAINTENANCE SHOPS	KEY	*	MAINTENANCE MANAGERIAL OFFICES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES MAINTENANCE SHOPS
*	JANITORIAL JANITORIAL ROOMS S1, S2	KEA 1	- JANITORIAL * JANITORIAL ROOMS	KEY		JANITORIAL JANITORIAL ROOM
*	MECHANICAL MECHANICAL ROOMS S1, S2	КЕУ М	- MECHANICAL * MECHANICAL ROOMS	KEY	M - *	MECHANICAL MECHANICAL ROOMS
KEY N -	ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL ROOM S1, S2	KEY N	- ELECTRICAL * ELECTRICAL ROOM			
KEY 0	STATION OPERATIONS STAFF/SECURITY ROOM TRASH LUNCHROOM (UNION STATION) SUPERVISOR'S BOOTH (UNION STATION) ALARM/PA/TELEPHONE/STORAGE PANEL OF EMP COVER PANEL OF COMMAND POST. EXCLUDES FIRE PHONE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT ROOM S1, S2					
• •	AUXILIARY POWER TRACTION POWER	KEY P	- POWER * TRACTION POWER			
	S1, S2	KEY S	- STORES & SECURED STORAGE * ALL STORES			
			- TRANSPORTATION * MANAGERIAL OFFICES * ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES * S1, S2	:	OTES	: S1=ELEVATORS, ESCALATORS S2=TOILET ROOM, CORRIDOR
└───KEY X - *	TELEPHONE TELEPHONE ROOM (UNION STATION)	KEY X	- TELEPHONE * TELEPHONE CLOSET			DOORS
		1	- RAIL CONTROL CENTER * OPERATIONS ROOM * CCTV ROOM * ADMINISTRATION ROOM	1	DIREC	CAL ACCESS ROOMS WHICH ARE TLY CARD KEYED WILL NOT BE DED IN THE MASTERKEYING M.

FIGURE 5 - INTRUSION ALARM CONDUIT TERMINATION



COST COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE

LOCKING SCHEMES

23

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: August 15, 1986

TO: Distribution

FROM: T. Eng TE

SUBJECT: Construction and O&M Costs of Lock and Keying Alternatives

FILE: S350X024 X045

Attached are construction and estimated annual O&M costs for an all hard key, mixed hard key-card key, and all card key system, for use in determining extent of an access control system on the Metro Rail Project. This is in response to Action Item #1 of Agenda Item #1 assigned to the author during the second Keying Plan Working Session on June 23, 1986. The Action Item stated the author is to "confirm construction costs of a card access control system, and perform cost trade-off with hard key system including O&M costs." The calculation of some O&M cost estimates reflect comments received from Art Peterson such as locksmith salary.

Change Request 4-088, which authorized card access to the project, identified an associated cost of \$263,400 for 17 stations. The updated cost is now \$466,400 for the same number of card readers per station for 18 stations. Additional cost figures are for the remainder of doors which require locks and intrusion alarm that will not have card access control. These costs were excluded in the Change Request.

In response to Action Item #2, "to obtain reliability figures of a card access control system from vendors," several vendors were contacted for information. Almost all did not publish such data, except that some did estimate that proximity card readers should last 3-5 years between failures. Users of card access systems have reported very few reliability problems, with proximity systems being significantly more reliable than other types of access systems. Schlage is the only known manufacturer that publishes reliability data. Considering that they have been in the card access business for 15 years, some of the data are perhaps theoretical and not based on experience, such as the card reader failure frequency. According to them, the following components fail as stated (mean time between failures): Memorandum Page 2 08/15/86

> Proximity Card Reader - 30 Years Microprocessor (local) - 5.6 Years Cards (warranty) - 5 Years

Action Item #3 of Agenda Item #6 assigned to the author "to prepare layout drawings of MOS-1 stations for use in keying doors" has been completed.

Please review the cost estimates to aid in deciding the extent of a card access control system on the Metro Rail Project. Interested individuals are requested to attend the next Keying Plan Working Session on August 20, 1986, at RTD (time and place to be announced) to reach a decision on this matter. Development of the Keying Plan cannot proceed until this issue is resolved.

TE:mc

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Attachments (8)

L. Elliott B. Blakesley M. Becher G. Schulman N. Brown R. Beuer T. Clawson L. Boyde MA. Dale H. Budds H. Chaliff* J. Burge K. Murthy* J. Crawl A. Peter W. Rhine J. Sandb	mann (LAFD) n D. Schiehl (LACOFD) ss ey* son
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H. Storey

DCC (2) Chron Subject (2) *w/o attachments



CONSTRUCTION AND O&M COSTS - HARD KEY VS. CARD KEY

 		10 S -1		18-STATION		
Item	All Hard Key (\$)	Mixed Hard Key-Card (\$)	All Card (\$)	All Hard Key (\$)	Mixed Hard Key-Card (\$)	All Card (\$)
Construction Costs				<u> </u>		
 All Hard Key System 30 Drs/Station, 12 Drs in Yard 	32,400			110,400		
2. Intrusion Alarm for #1	91,500			199,400		
3. Proximity System 8 Drs/Station		195,000			466,400	
4. Hard Key 22 Drs/Station		22,000			79,200	
5. Intrusion alarm for #4 22 Drs/Station	i	67,100		· · · · ·	146,200	
6. All Proximity Card 30 Drs/Station			420,200			1,281,300
7. Optional Hard Key w/#3		8,000			28,800	
8. TOTAL	\$123,900	\$294,500	\$420,200	\$309,800	\$723,000	\$1,281,300
9. Annual O&M Costs	\$ 15,800	\$ 19,400	\$ 12,600	\$ 39,200	\$ 47,100	\$ 38,400

Notes: Items #3 and #6 include an intrusion alarm.

See Attachments 1 thru 7 for explanation of assumptions used to derive the costs. Costs have been rounded off.

Construction Costs: All Hard Key

		Cost (\$)	Source ^A
MOS	<u>5-1</u>		
Item 1.	All Hard Key System ^B		
	<pre>\$200/lock x (30 locks/station x 5 stations + 12 locks/yard x 1 yard) = \$32,400</pre>	\$32,400	1.2
Item 2.	Intrusion Alarm for All Hard Key System		
	Software: \$50,000 Door Contact: \$62/dr x 30 dr/station x 5 stations = \$9,300 I/O Ports: \$60/port x 30 port/station x 5 stations ^C = \$9,000 Wire and Hook-up: \$23,200	\$91,500	9
Item 8.	Total	\$123,900	
	<u>Station</u> All Hard Key System ^B		
	<pre>\$200/lock x (30 locks/station x 18 stations + 12 locks/yard x 1 yard) = \$110,400</pre>	\$110,400	1,2
Item 2.	Intrusion Alarm for All Hard Key System		
	Software: \$50,000 Door Contact: \$62/dr x 30 dr/station x 18 stations = \$33,480 I/O Port: \$60/port x 30 port/station x 18 stations = \$32,400 Wire and Hook-up: \$83,520	\$199,400	9
Item 8.	Total	\$309,800	
B - Aver Exac	cés are listed in Attachment 7. age number of locks per station is 30 based upon typical station layouts. t number may vary slightly among individual stations. Excludes cost of mainten rface with SCADA.	ance equipm	rent.

Construction Costs: Mixed Hard Key-Card

MOS	-1	Cost (\$)	Source ^A
	Proximity system for 8 doors/station ^B		
	\$195,000 is estimate based on average of costs quoted by API Alarms Systems,		
	Card Key Systems, Honeywell, and Wells Fargo Alarm Services. Applied to 8 doors/station x 5 stations	¢105 000	
		\$195,000	3,4,5,6
Item 4.	Hard Key Lock for 22 doors/station		
	\$200/lock x (22 locks/station x 5 stations		
	+ 12 locks/yard x 1 yard) = \$24,400	\$24,400	1,2
Item 5.	Intrusion alarm for 22 Hard Keyed doors/station		
	73.3% (22 doors out of 30 doors) of intrusion alarm costs for		
	30 doors \$91,500 (listed in Item 2, all hard key for MOS-1) 0.733 x \$91,500 = \$67,070		
	103-17 0.755 x 331,500 = 307,070	\$67,100	9
Item 7.	Optional Hard Key on 8 proximity doors/station as		
	backup security.		
	\$200/lock x 8 locks/station x 5 stations = \$8,000	\$ 8,000	1,2
Item 8.	Total	\$294,500	
		¥294,000	
	Station Proximity System for 8 doors/station ^B		
rcem J.	\$466,400 is estimate based on average cost quoted by same firms listed		
	in Item 3 for MOS-1.	\$466,400	3 4 5 4
	•	9400 ₉ 400	3,4,5,6
Item 4.	Hard Key Lock for 22 doors/station		
	\$200/lock x (22 locks/station x 18 stations + 12 locks/yard x 1 yard) = \$81,600		
	$-12 \operatorname{locks/yatu} \times 1 \operatorname{yatu} = 301,000$	\$81,600	1,2
Itëm 5.	Intrusion Alarm for 22 Hard Keyed doors/station		
	73.3% x \$199,400 (Item 2 all Hard Key for 18-station) = \$146,160	\$146,200	6
Item 7.	Optional Hard Key on 8 proximity doors/station as backup security.	-	
	\$200/lock x 8 locks/station x 18 stations = \$28,800	¢ 10 0ÃA	1 0
.		\$ 28,800	1,2
Item 8.	Total	\$723,000	
A - Sour	ces are listed in Attachment 7	-	
	d on the following areas being access controlled. Tractice Deven Deven		

B - Based on the following areas being access controlled: Traction Power Room, Train Control and Communications Room, Auxiliary Power Room, Electrical (Cable) Room, and Station Entrances. Exact number of access controlled rooms may vary slightly among individual stations.
SNT11337

Construction Costs: All Card

		<u>Cost</u> (\$)	SourceA
MOS-1			
Item 6. All	Proximity Card		
Syst Farg		<u>\$420,200</u> \$420,200	3,4,5,6
Item 6. All	Proximity Card		
1n 1 18 s	81,300 is average of costs quoted by same firms listed tem 6 for MOS-1. Applied to 30 doors/station in all tations.		
		\$1,281,300	3,4,5,6
Item 8. Tota	1	\$1,281,300	

A - Sources are listed in Attachment 7.

Annual O&M Costs

MOS-1: All Hard Key

5% of System Costs 0.05 x \$32,400 = \$1,620	\$ <u>1,620</u>
TOTAL	\$15,815
Round Off	\$15,800

Explanation/Source

- Item #1 Intrusion Alarm Maintenance based on in-house maintenance. Source: #4,7
- Item #2 Estimate of anticipated false alarms. Hourly wage of transit police officer obtained from "Operating and Maintenance Cost Estimate MOS-1," March, 1985 prepared by Booz-Allen & Hamilton. Inspection time includes access time and actual inspection.
- Item #3 Locksmith salary provided by Source #8. Excludes fringe benefits.
- Item #4 Spare Parts 5-10% guoted by locksmith. Author uses low figure. Source: #1

Annual O&M Costs

18-Station: All Hard Key

1.	Intrusion Alarm Maintenance (3% of System Costs)	
	$0.03 \times \$199,400 = \$5,982$	\$ 5,980
2.	False Alarm Inspection	
	35 false alarms/wk x 1/2 hr inspection/ alarm x \$12.35/yr. x 52 wk/yr = \$11,239	\$11,240
3.	Locksmith (half-time)	
	0.5 x \$33,000/yr = \$16,500	\$16,500
4.	Spare Parts	
	5% of System Costs 0.05 x \$110,400 = \$5,520	\$ 5,520
	TOTAL Round Off	\$39,240 \$39,200

Explanation/Source

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(See MOS-1 Estimates in Attachment 4)

Annual O&M Costs

Mixed Hard Key-Card and All Card

MOS-1

Item 9. Mixed Hard Key-Card

73.3% (22 doors out of 30 doors) of cost of all hard key O&M costs plus 3% of card system costs + 3% instrusion alarm costs. Source: #4,7 0.733 x \$15,800 + 0.03 x \$195,000 + 0.03 x \$67,100 = \$19,444 \$19,400

Item 9. All Card

3% of card system	costs.	Source:	#4,7	
$0.03 \times $420,200 =$	\$12,606			\$12,600

18-Station

Item 9. Mixed Hard Key-Card

Same as above.				
0.733 x \$39,200	+	0.03 x \$466,400) +	
0.03 x \$146,200	=	\$47,111		\$47,100

Item 9. All Card

Same as above. 0.03 x \$1,281,300 = \$38,439 \$38,400

List of Sources

- #1 Robert Skeels & Co. Compton, CA (213) 639-7240 Contact: Ed Jeffry
- #2 Specialty Installation Bell Gardens, CA (213) 928-2545 Contact: Larry Peterson
- #3 API Alarm Systems Long Beach, CA (714) 821-1325 Contact: Gil Gonzales
- #4 Card Key Systems Chatsworth, CA (818) 998-7560 Contact: Micky Mickens

- #5 Honeywell Los Angeles, CA (213) 934-8964 Contact: Troy Miller
- #6 Wells Fargo Alarm Services Los Angeles, CA (213) 758-3103 Contact: John Piccininni
- \$7 SensorNet
 Fullerton, CA
 (714) 738-4306
 Contact: Erwin Ackerman
- #8 RTD Los Angeles, CA (213) 237-2053 Contact: Art Peterson
- #9 MRTC Los Angeles, CA (213) 612-7153 Contact: Charlie Fisher

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Number of Card Readers			
Location	Former	Current	
Main Shop	12	3	
Union	8	11	
Civic	8	10	
5th/Hill	8	11	
7th/Flower	8	12 MR + 13 LRT	
Alvarado	8	11	
Total	52	58 MR + 13 LRT	

Number of Card Readers for MOS-1: Former and Current

Derivation of Construction Costs of Locking Schemes


Locking Scheme	Former Construction Cost	Current Construction Cost	
MOS-1, Mixed Hard Key-Card Key	\$195,000	MR: $\frac{58}{52} \times \$195,000 = \$217,500$ LRT: $\frac{13}{52} \times \$195,000 = \frac{\$48,750}{$266,250}$ Total: $\$266,250$	\$266,300 (MR + LRT)
18-Station, Mixed Hard Key-Card Key	\$466,400	$\frac{MOS-1}{18-Station} = \frac{(MOS-1 w/o LRT)}{(18-Station) current}$ $\frac{\$195,000}{\$466,400} = \frac{\$217,500}{x}$ $x = \$520,215$ $+ \frac{48,750}{\$568,965} (LRT)$ $\$568,965 (MR + LRT)$	→ \$569,000 (MR + LRT)
MOS-1 All Card Key	\$420,200	\$420,200 + \$48,750 (LRT) = \$468,950	→ \$469,000
18-Station, All Card Key	\$1,281,300	\$1,281,300 + \$48,750 (LRT) = \$1,330,050	→ \$1,330,100


Construction and Annual O&M Costs of Mixed Hard Key-Card Key and All Card Key Systems


	MOS-1		18-Station	
	ed Hard -Card Key	All Card	Mixed Hard Key-Card Key	All Card
1. Construction Cost \$20	66,300	\$469,000	\$569,000	\$1,330,100
2. Annual O&M Costs § :	19,400	\$ 12,600	\$ 47,100	\$ 38,400

ATTACHMENT 3

FACILITY DRAWINGS OF MOS-1 STATIONS AND MAIN SHOP SHOWING CARD READER LOCATIONS










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
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



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






























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
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
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



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
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





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
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
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





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










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
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





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
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






## METRO RAIL TRANSIT CONSULTANTS





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



































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















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
)<sup>1</sup> ∆-iR7 | ∆-i/05

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