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

April 1, 2003

Honorable Donald T. Bliss, Jr., Esq.
O' Melveny & Myers LLP
555 13th St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1109

Dear Special Master Bliss:

Due to technical problems in the printing process, some of the fonts in the copy of the BRU's *Consent Decree Load Factor Service Plan* sent to you yesterday may be hard to read. Please find enclosed a newly printed copy with fixed fonts. This newly printed copy has absolutely no change in content. Please accept this as the final version.

Sorry for the inconvenience.

Sincerely,

Ted Robertson
Bus Riders Union

Enclosures (not enclosed by fax)
c: Betty Hung
Rod Goldman, DEO, MTA
Caroline H. Mankey and James S. Schreier

BUS RIDERS UNION

CONSENT DECREE
LOAD FACTOR
SERVICE PLAN

MARCH 31, 2003

Contents

Overview

Overview

The Consent Decree voluntarily agreed to by MTA in 1996 requires MTA to meet mathematically precise overcrowding (i.e., load factor) reduction performance standards on all MTA bus lines. On August 6, 2002, the Special Master found that MTA had not complied with the second load factor standard of 1.25—*on 75 bus lines for more than two years*. Further, on November 12, 2002 the BRU-MTA Joint Working Group (JWG) found that MTA also had not complied with the next lower load factor standard of 1.2 *on 72 bus lines*. These non-compliance levels represent a particularly severe and persisting amount of overcrowding given that these bus lines carry approximately one million daily passengers—88% of MTA's predominantly low-income, minority, and transit-dependent ridership—and given that the load factor is calculated as average bus loads and not individual bus loads.

Based on the above findings, the Special Master began remedy proceedings. On December 9, 2002 the Special Master defined a methodology to narrowly tailor remedies to the nature and scope of load factor violations. The Special Master ordered the JWG to use this methodology to develop a remedy plan for load factor violations attributable to "missing bus trips" and load factor violations attributable to "a combined lack of schedule adherence and lack of capacity"—in short, to fix the problem of the still undersized and unreliable bus fleet and correspondingly poor bus service. As a first step in applying the Special Master's remedy methodology, the JWG agreed in January 2003 that 331 expansion service units (ESUs)—i.e., bus trips—are required in the AM peak hours and 453 ESUs are required in the PM peak hours.

Unfortunately, MTA then set about producing a service plan with serious problems. Not only does MTA's service plan significantly contradict the Special Master and Consent Decree's guidelines regarding these ESU and "missing bus trip" remedies, but it also would create new violations of the Consent Decree. The core of MTA's proposal is non-implementation. MTA *denies* that 87 AM and 117 PM ESUs are required, proposes to severely cut and diminish the quality of existing service in order to *simply shift resources within the bus system instead of reallocating funds from outside the bus system*, and *does not propose any remedies at all* for "missing bus trip" violations. Further, unmentioned in the MTA's plan is its proposal for a large fare increase at end of this year. MTA makes these proposals even as it sends discretionary bus-eligible funds to municipal operators and other projects such as the new Pasadena Gold Light Rail Line (scheduled to start in three months).

It is in this context that the BRU is submitting this alternative service plan. The BRU's plan has three core structural differences from MTA's proposal. First, the BRU's plan is rooted in the Special Master's directive that the total required ESUs "establish[] a floor, not a ceiling, for determining the amount of service capacity that must be added," and that other remedies for non-missed trip violations would supplement these narrowly tailored remedies. Second, the BRU's plan is rooted in the Consent Decree agreement that if MTA fails to meet a load factor standard, MTA *must reallocate sufficient funds from outside the bus system to meet the load factor standard*, and not just shift funds within the bus system. Third, the BRU's plan is rooted in the improvement in service while doing no harm principle of the Consent Decree. Applying these principles, the BRU has designed an effective set of service actions tailored to the specific violations that occurred over the last two years, and that continue to occur—no more and no less.

Summary of Bus Riders Union Load Factor Service Plan

Summary of Bus Riders Union
Load Factor Service Plan

Expand Service:

- **Add <u>all</u> 331 AM and 453 PM expansion service units agreed to by MTA and BRU into service in June 2003**

- **Add <u>at least</u> 185 buses and 425,500 revenue hours in June 2003 in order to implement all of these 331 AM and 453 PM expansion service units (it may still be determined that more buses and revenue hours are required)**

- **Hire drivers, mechanics, and service attendants to maintain existing personnel-to-assignment/bus ratios as service expands**

- **Fund load factor expansion service by reallocating resources from outside of the bus system, not by shifting resources around within it**

- **Restore 87 buses and 92,900 annual revenue hours already cut from service (add in addition to ESU expansion service)**

- **Establish a three-year procurement plan, starting with immediate purchase of 380 buses, to replace the "inactive" contingency fleet buses which will be used temporarily to fulfill the above expansion service, and to retire coming-of-retirement age buses**

Improve On-street Operations:

- **Implement daily on-time street supervision on all lines systemwide in June 2003 and continue indefinitely if improvements occur**

Increase Mechanical Reliability:

- **Develop a specific action plan within one month to improve mechanical reliability**

Service Plan to Expand Service

I. Add all 331 AM and 453 PM expansion service units agreed to by MTA and BRU into service in June 2003

After months of briefings and hearings, in his December 9, 2002 *Memorandum Decision and Order on Remedial Methodology*, hereinafter the *Order*, the Special Master established a compromise methodology using the line-by-line mapping of load factor violations to calculate the precise amount of expansion service that must be added to the bus system in June 2003. As requested by MTA (though not quite to the extent it requested) this newly refined methodology consists of a four-step process that exempts from remedy numerous violations from the already small sample of total violations. After these exemptions, the resulting number of narrowly tailored ESUs—with each generally defined as a 40-seat bus but also allowed to be a larger bus—is the *minimum* expansion service required to be added:[1]

> The methodology establishes a *floor*, not a ceiling, for determining the amount of service capacity that must be added to various lines in order to achieve the 1.25 and 1.20 load factor targets. (December 9, 2002 *Order* at 54)

Accordingly, the implementation of the ESUs is neither optional nor conditional, and all 331 AM and 453 PM ESUs agreed to by the BRU and MTA after applying the Special Master's refined methodology must be put into service with their matching amount of buses and revenue hours in June 2003.[2]

Instead of developing a service plan with the requisite number of bus trips, buses, and revenue hours to implement these ESUs, as MTA was directed to do by the Special Master, MTA has chosen to try to further limit its obligations by proposing five sets of actions to exempt 86 AM and 117 PM ESUs from implementation:[3]

MTA's Proposed ESU Exemption Categories	AM	PM
On-street supervision	30	40
Change rule 2B of Special Master's ESU methodology	7	25
Traffic loaders and passbys	5	3
New Rapid Bus implementations	34	33
New Limited Service implementations	10	16
TOTAL	86	117

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1 This is true not just as a matter of law but also as a matter of necessity because ongoing overcrowding data will result in some additional required ESUs.

2 For the times and locations of the current ESUs agreed to by MTA and the BRU, see the line-by-line ESU spreadsheet submitted to the Special Master on March 3, 2003 by MTA. For a discussion of the bus trips, buses, and revenue hours to implement these ESUs, see section II on page 13.

3 MTA's designation of its substitution proposals as "Narrowly Tailored Remedies" is a misnomer because the Special Master's ESUs are already narrowly tailored remedies.

In each, the core proposal is to treat ESU implementation as optional and/or conditional upon failure of these alternative actions. Since they directly contradict the Special Master's directive to implement ESUs as a minimum remedy, MTA's exemption proposals should be rejected.

However, the Special Master did allow for consideration of further remedy actions in addition to the implementation of the ESUs. On-time street supervision is the main type of action in MTA's alternative proposals that merits any attention in this regard. Accordingly, the BRU is proposing on-time street supervision as such an additional remedy, though in a more effective manner than MTA. Implementation of Rapid Bus and Limited service has no impact on the requirement for the additional service capacity in the ESUs. However, as Rapid Bus and Limited service implementation involve significant cuts to existing service, they will be part of discussion in later sections of this plan. Finally, traffic loaders to forcibly keep load levels down by refusing passenger boardings are simply euphemisms for passbys—and as such, are prohibited by the Consent Decree.

Each section below is a concise discussion of how each of MTA's proposals undermines the ESU methodology and explains whether such a remedy action could be effective as an addition to ESU implementation.

A. MTA should implement on-street supervision only in addition to the ESUs

MTA's proposal not to implement 30 AM and 40 PM ESUs and instead only to institute on-time street supervision at a particular line/location/direction contradicts the Special Master's December 9, 2002 *Order* in two substantive ways. First, MTA is re-introducing its exclusive definition of schedule adherence in defiance of the Special Master's treatment of *all* non-missed trip violations as one group "attributable to a combination of lack of schedule adherence and lack of capacity." Second, MTA is then using this incorrect causal analysis to supplant the Special Master's methodology by transforming on-street supervision from an additional background systemwide remedy to being the sole remedy on particular lines that require ESUs. If accepted, MTA's proposal would undermine the causal analysis and remedy methodology specified in the Special Master's *Order* that defines the number of ESUs as the *minimum* expansion service required and that requires any increased on-time street supervision or other management actions to be implemented as additional background remedies to this expansion service, not in lieu of it.

On page 42 of his *Order*, the Special Master resolved the parties' dispute regarding schedule adherence and lack of capacity by rejecting mutually exclusive causation categories:[4]

> I conclude that it is not necessary or desirable to allocate a specific causal percentage to either lack of schedule adherence or insufficient capacity. The interrelatedness of the two causal factors warrants a nuanced, sophisticated joint examination of their role in causing overcrowding exceedences. Accordingly, the

[4] For this reason, the causal analysis on MTA's line-by-line mapping of load factor violations should not have MTA's exclusive categories either, but should be separated into violations caused by missed trips and those not caused by missed trips (and, of course, a third minor category for those "violations" caused by data problems).

> JWG and the parties should separate exceedences into two categories: 1) exceedences attributable to "missed trips"; and 2) exceedences attributable to a combination of lack of schedule adherence and lack of capacity.

Based on this determination, the Special Master established the ESU methodology for calculating the precise amount of expansion service that would be applied to all non-missed trip violations as one group. As discussed previously, this ESU total is then the minimum expansion capacity required to be added to bus lines in June 2003, and is not optional (see page 54 in December 9, 2002 *Order*). The Special Master allowed for other systemwide remedies, such as on-time street supervision, but only as an addition to this expansion service. He specifically addressed the complementary nature of such a remedy in footnote 20 on page 41: any organizational changes, including on-time street supervision "should be implemented in concert with an expansion of service capacity in order to be effective in reducing load factor exceedences." Accordingly, the BRU proposes that MTA implement all 70 of MTA's so-called "schedule adherence" ESUs along with the rest of the required expansion service in June 2003 as the minimum required.

However, with that baseline established, on-time street supervision can and should be increased as a remedy in addition to ESUs.[5] When examined as an addition, the main strength of the operational content of MTA's on-time supervision plan is that it recognizes as a problem that the number of Transit Operations Supervisors has dropped from approximately 500 ten years ago to just under 200 today,[6] and proposes that additional on-street supervisors dedicated to on-time street performance be added. However, in MTA's proposed plan and the supporting detail provided later, MTA proposes only a very limited number of supervisors (13), on a limited set of lines, generally focused only on the peak hours, and at frequencies of, at most, every other day (sometimes just once a week or ten days). MTA told BRU at the JWG that this limited effort was for budget reasons. In any case, such a limited implementation would undermine these efforts—rendering them ineffective.

First, though the BRU and MTA have not agreed about on-time performance being a cause of overcrowding, we have agreed that on-time performance is a systemwide general operations issue, not a particular line issue. As such, focusing on only a few lines will not lead to systemic improvement that can be felt on all noncompliant lines. Second, if implemented just for the peak hours, again, it would not be effective because schedule adherence involves the general operating procedures and culture of the bus system. Such efforts need to be operating at all times of day to have a chance to actually work. Third, for the same reason, a supervisor will not be effective

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5 While the BRU remains unconvinced about the relevance of schedule adherence as a cause/remedy of overcrowding, the Special Master has ruled it to be a partial factor for the 80% of violations not due to missing bus trips. The BRU, therefore, proposes on-time street supervision in this context. Of course, any improvements achieved would certainly help MTA meet other obligations in the Consent Decree for better service to riders.

6 Based on conversations with Dana Woodbury and Rod Goldman at the JWG. This also corresponds to the "Metro Business Operation Plan," page 19: "Budget reductions have reduced the number of Transit Operations Supervisors for Metro Bus and Metro Rail from over 400 in Fiscal Year 1993, to 250 in Fiscal Year 1998."

showing up every other day at best, every other week at worst, but must have a daily presence on the line. Accordingly, the BRU proposes that in addition to the full implementation of ESUs, MTA:

- Implement on-time street supervision systemwide (i.e. for all lines);
- Implement on-time street supervision for each line daily;
- Have supervisors dedicated to on-time supervision at the ratio of one supervisor to 25 in-service buses during all peak times, midday off-peak times, Saturday, and Sunday (this allows MTA to tailor personnel appropriately to bigger and smaller lines, and to peak and off-peak times—i.e., to have more supervisors on the bigger lines or in busier times and fewer on the smaller lines or in non-peak times—while maintaining a pervasive presence on the streets);
- Have a supervisor manage the same line or lines (within above ratio);
- Have supervisors do location-based checking for all of the peak hours and half of the off-peak hours (they can and should be at more than one location on a line; in particular they should not just stay at the load factor data-collection point);
- Hire more supervisors to implement this on-street supervision and do not pull from existing supervisors;
- Implement this on-street supervision for two years and continue indefinitely if improvements occur.

While the impact of on-street supervision on load factor violations remains to be seen (and has had limited success historically), the impacts on the rest of service could be significant as any improved on-time performance is better for riders. Also, having more supervisors brings the added benefit of better passenger and driver support generally.

B. Step 2 of the Special Master's remedy methodology already specifically defines exemptions for "isolated" violations, and BRU and MTA agreed on the resulting ESUs; MTA cannot go back and try to re-litigate these definitions

In essence, MTA proposes to change the definition of the "isolated violation" remedy exemption—specifically Step 2B—in the Special Master's ESU methodology and to thereby exempt another 7 AM and 25 PM ESUs. The Special Master, however, already resolved the BRU-MTA dispute regarding the criteria to define a load factor violation as isolated and not requiring a remedy; he established that the ESUs determined *after* these exemptions would be narrowly tailored remedies and the minimum required expansion service.

In his *Order*, the Special Master maintained from his earlier remedy methodology that a violation of the load factor ceiling recorded in the small data sample after the load factor deadline represents *a larger pattern of ongoing overcrowding on the buses above the required*

level. Further, the Special Master maintained that even a single violation adjacent to other violations represents a pattern of actual overcrowding. He did, however, decide that certain violations in the data sample—though only a small sample of the total violations in reality—were actually isolated, nonrecurring violations caught in the data sample. He therefore proceeded to craft a compromise between the BRU and MTA positions, as expressed on page 61 of his December 9, 2002 *Order*, that defined two types of isolated violations that would be exempt from remedy (unless future data demonstrates that such a violation is not isolated):

> Step Two of the methodology excludes isolated, nonrecurring exceedences, which do not reflect a pattern of overcrowding and for which it is neither feasible nor desirable to develop a remedy. Two types of exceedences are exempted from remediation on this basis; 1) any single exceedence in a (sliding) 20-minute window whose first and last minute is more than 30 minutes away from the edge of another (sliding) 20-minute time period; and 2) any single exceedence of 1.35 LFT or less in magnitude exhibited in any fixed 20-minute period on a line from June 30, 2000 through September 30, 2002.

The Special Master then went on to rule that the number of ESUs determined after these Step 2 "isolated, non-recurring" exemptions (and also the Step 1 and 3 exemptions) would constitute the baseline of required expansion service.

In BRU's opinion, Step 2B is already too broad and eliminates time periods that contain a pattern of overcrowding. If the methodology could be revisited, BRU would ask the Special Master to consider the reduction or elimination of Step 2B. However, the definition of isolated violations has already been decided and applied and cannot be re-litigated now. The two parties briefed this specific issue extensively; the Special Master crafted a compromise that resolved the issue; and then BRU and MTA applied this compromise methodology and agreed to a specific number of ESUs. Accordingly, the ESUs agreed to by BRU and MTA based on the Special Master's December 9, 2002 *Order* are neither conditional on more data (or anything else) nor optional. All 32 ESUs that MTA proposes to exclude by broadening Step 2B of the Special Master's ESU methodology should be implemented along with the rest of the required expansion service in June 2003.[7] Finally, MTA's proposal has no relevance for alternative remedies in addition to ESUs.

C. The Consent Decree prohibits passbys to meet load factor requirements and therefore MTA's "traffic loaders" are prohibited

MTA's proposal to use traffic loaders to prevent bus riders from boarding one bus and having them wait until the next bus runs counter to Section II.A.2 of the Consent Decree's prohibition on passbys to meet load factor targets: "Target load factors shall not be achieved by by-passing passengers at bus stops." MTA's proposal should be rejected.

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[7] While the total number of required ESUs cannot be changed, MTA retains some flexibility in determining where and when it adds into service the matching number of bus trips, buses, and revenue hours. If MTA thinks it has solved the violation in another manner, then MTA can risk, in a limited manner, adding the ESU in another time period of its choosing—perhaps using more up-to-date information.

To the extent MTA would like to use loaders to recommend, in a non-mandatory manner, that riders wait for the next bus, the Bus Riders Union also opposes this. First, it is likely that any supervisor's "suggestion" would have a chilling effect so that even if her instructions are not technically mandatory, people would likely think they are. Second, any time a person follows such a "suggestion," it would add to the rider's travel time. Even on the 66 Line, with one of the lowest headways in the bus system, if a rider catches the next bus this would add another day annually to her waiting time—in addition to the rest of the rider's overall commute time. If the rider has to wait for the third bus, it would be two days annually, and so on.

BRU proposes that these seven ESUs be implemented now with the rest of the expansion service in June 2003. The BRU agrees that the 66 would be a good candidate for the use of articulated buses and proposes that, upon arrival, the articulated buses go to this line first.

D. New Rapid Bus service must include the already determined ESUs

MTA proposes that the implementation of new Rapid Bus service should excuse MTA from adding the required expansion service. MTA proposes this in reference to the four immediate Rapid Bus lines: the two just implemented, and the two to be implemented in June 2003. Presumably MTA is also asking for exemptions for all Rapid Bus lines to come, as the current schedule is to implement two new Rapid Bus lines each six months for the next few years.

MTA proposes this exemption because the Rapid Bus line restructuring might change the ridership patterns on the underlying Local lines on which the determination of ESUs is based. While the Local ridership may change in relationship to Rapid Bus, what has been established, and will not change, is that the corridor as a whole—with both Local and Rapid service—requires additional bus trips. In fact, if existing Rapid Bus is any measure, the corridor will need even more trips than predicted with the current ESUs as ridership grows with Rapid Bus implementation. Accordingly, the ESUs are required and should be added.

The only issue is whether the ESUs should be added to the Local service or to the Rapid Bus. Usually ESUs would be added to the particular line that the violation was recorded on. In this case, since a new line is being implemented in addition to another line, the new line—i.e. Rapid Bus—can count as the added ESUs, provided that *all* the ESU trips are added. In the future, each line will be monitored separately and any required expansion service will be added as the data requires for that particular line.

MTA also proposes that the six months of point check data on a Rapid Bus line and its underlying Local line right after implementation of Rapid Bus should not count in future ESU determinations. However, because the ridership data will determine the loads on each line accurately, MTA's proposal has no merit in this regard and is an effort to postpone any needed remedy on the line. If MTA is worried that some ridership might shift, again, MTA has some limited ability to adjust where and when it adds the trips between those two lines, but cannot adjust the total required.

Lastly, though a new line is being added to a certain corridor, it does not mean that this is fully expansion service, even if Rapid Bus creates more trips that technically add up to the correct number of ESUs. See the section on service cuts later in this document for a fuller discussion.

E. New Limited service must include the already determined ESUs

MTA proposes that implementation of Limited service should exempt a line from the required ESUs. MTA requests this exemption specifically in regard to two lines (the 60 and 66) and has withdrawn its request on three other lines (the 30, 163, and 165). Presumably MTA is asking for exemptions for any Limited service in similar circumstances to come—whether the 30, 163, 165 lines or others.

MTA proposes this exemption because it believes that these Limited service implementations will change the ridership patterns of a line. MTA has not provided data on this, but even if true, it is irrelevant because what has been established, and will not change, is that the corridor as a whole—with both Local and Limited service—requires additional bus trips. Further, in this case no issue arises whether service is added as Local or Limited service because, as compared with Rapid service, Local and Limited are not two different lines but two different routes within a line. MTA retains discretion, as it has had historically, to add service to either the Local portion of a line, or the Limited portion of a line, as long as the required expansion trips are added. Accordingly, the ESUs are required and should be added. Also, because all Local and Limited routes on a line have their overcrowding point check data collected together, whatever the ridership distribution is between these two routes, they are counted collectively and therefore future counting will accurately reflect overall corridor needs.

Lastly, though a Limited service is being added to a certain corridor, it does not mean that this is fully expansion service, even if Limited creates more trips that technically add up to the correct number of ESUs. See the section on service cuts later in this document for a fuller discussion.

II. Add at least 185 buses and 425,500 revenue hours in June 2003 in order to implement the 331 AM and 453 PM expansion service units (it may still be determined that more buses and revenue hours are required)

In his December 9, 2002 *Order*, the Special Master directed MTA to develop an operations plan to implement the required ESUs and to release to the BRU for review the details of where and how MTA would add this additional service.[8] This innovative step should have resulted in allowing MTA flexibility to schedule its service (including this additional service) to the best of its ability, while requiring full disclosure and review of MTA's proposed schedules to ensure that the ESUs are implemented in a manner consistent with the Consent Decree. Unfortunately, though it is proposing that the trips scheduled to meet the ESUs will take 185 buses and 425,500 revenue hours, MTA did not provide the scheduling details of this proposal. Though these bus and revenue hour numbers appear in the range of what is needed according to past work (albeit on the lower end), without all the details, the BRU is not able to evaluate MTA's proposal fully. Accordingly, until more detail is disclosed, the BRU proposes that MTA:

- Implement the 331 AM and 453 PM peak ESUs with at least the 185 buses and 425,500 revenue hours proposed by MTA in June 2003;[9]

- Release the detailed changes in its schedules to evaluate whether the newly scheduled service meets the terms of the Consent Decree so that the BRU can evaluate these proposals with the MTA at the JWG and determine if they are acceptable.

The scheduling changes should have the exact information detailed below for the amount of service, origin of service, impact on existing service, and total equipment needs.

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8 See also the Special Master's March 18, 2003 *Memorandum and Order on Development and Implementation of Service Plan to Meet 1.25 and 1.20 Load Factor Targets.*

9 MTA has also indicated in the budget of its service plan that it intends to implement midday off-peak expansion service on the order of 40 buses and 125,000 revenue hours. The BRU agrees that off-peak service is needed and that it should be added as soon as possible. The BRU also supports MTA's having completed an initial analysis of the need for revenue hours and buses during the off-peak hours. However, it is important to note a few issues related to MTA's statement. First it should be clear that the 40 buses and 125,000 revenue hours are not yet set (either for BRU or MTA) because the line-by-line mapping of violations for off-peak times is not done, and the amount of ESUs have not been calculated. Second, the 162,500 revenue hours listed at the bottom of the budget page in MTA's proposed load factor service plan includes the 125,000 hours MTA has estimated for off-peak additions—which is to say that the actual amount of peak service revenue hours MTA would like to add above and beyond its current revenue hours is 37,500—which is what is stated in the joint JWG letter to the Special Master on March 14, 2003. Third, MTA's estimate of 40 buses and 125,000 revenue hours does not include any estimate for Saturday or Sunday off-peak additions, but only weekday midday off-peak.

At issue in this component of the service plan is the number of buses and revenue hours on the street that will actually be needed to implement the required ESUs.[10] MTA has not yet made clear its method for converting ESUs into equipment and service hours. While MTA has some flexibility in scheduling this additional service, this conversion involves a number of questions regarding whether MTA is truly expanding or simply shifting service around within the bus fleet. How long will the ESU bus trip be in service? Is MTA proposing to add this on top of existing service or is it simply cutting other segments of bus trips to run this "expansion" bus trip? Does MTA propose increasing wait times elsewhere in order to run this ESU bus trip? Or is MTA taking advantage of adding this trip in a manner that will meet other objectives of the Consent Decree such as reduced wait-times and transfers? And so forth. Answers to these questions will determine if MTA's conversion of the ESUs into the actual trips, buses, and revenue hours is fully expansion service and fully within the parameters of Consent Decree.

In his December 9, 2002 *Order*, the Special Master ordered the following:

> The MTA should inform the JWG about the detail of and rationales underlying its Service Plan, including the location and time periods where additional service is being added and the nature, amount, and sources of such capacity.[11]

Instead MTA provided only its final proposal of buses and revenue hours. MTA told the BRU at the JWG only that MTA instructed its schedulers to be as "aggressive as possible" and that the scheduling of this service could involve cuts to existing service. "As aggressive as possible" and "could involve cuts" necessarily raise red flags: MTA's proposal could be creating adverse impacts on riders and using cuts to avoid the necessary reallocation of resources from outside the bus system to fund the ESU service expansion. Without the details, however, the BRU cannot evaluate MTA's proposal fully and is only able to determine that 185 buses seems on the low end of the range compared to past conversions, but that the amount of revenue hours attached to these buses *may* make this possible. Accordingly, with no other option, the Special Master should accept the 185 bus proposal and 425,500 revenue hour proposal as the minimum amount of equipment and revenue hours needed to implement the required ESUs.

The Special Master should again order MTA to produce the scheduling analysis to implement the ESUs—this time with specific requirements to generate the most useful information—in order to ensure that MTA implements the service expansions according to the standards of the Consent Decree and that it has the equipment to do so. MTA should release a detailed scheduling plan that demonstrates specifically how MTA would add these expansion trips. The plan would include, but not be limited to, the following information:

- The time and place the expansion bus trip is scheduled to start, pass the peak load point, and end;

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[10] Though related to the actual need for procurement, this is a separate issue. This is, in essence, an equipment needs analysis prior to procurement upon which procurements will be based. For the amount of buses to procure to match this amount of service to be implemented, see section V, page 26.

[11] See also Special Master's March 18, 2003 *Memorandum and Order on Development and Implementation of Service Plan to Meet 1.25 and 1.20 Load Factor Targets.*

- The same information as above for both the previous and following assignment of the bus scheduled to be used for this expansion bus trip (if straight to or from a bus division, then the MTA should state this);

- The same information as above for the bus trips preceding and following this expansion bus trip and for any bus trips adjusted by this expansion service;

- Identification of proposals for using any scheduling techniques on the expansion trip or any other trip(s) to enable producing this expansion trip (if so, name the type of technique—shortlining, headway adjustment, deadheading, interlining, etc.—by trip, describe textually and quantifiably MTA's policy for applying this technique, describe textually and quantifiably any impacts, and explain why this technique is an improvement and not a diminishment in the quality of service to bus riders);

- The current total number of trips on a line during the relevant time of day the expansion trip would be added (e.g., weekday AM peak, etc.), the proposed total number of trips on this line for the time of day with the proposed expansion, and the total difference between the two;

- The current total in-service revenue hours (daily and annually) on this line during the relevant time of day the expansion trip would be added (e.g., weekday AM peak, etc.), the proposed total in-service revenue hours on this line with this expansion, and the total difference between these two;

- The number of expansion buses MTA would use for each bus line, including specifically listing and identifying the linking of each bus trip to each expansion bus;

- The current total number of buses on this line during the relevant time of day the expansion trip would be added (e.g., weekday AM peak), the proposed total number of buses required on this line with this expansion, and the difference between the two;

- The same information in the last three bullet points above for the line for a whole day, in addition to the relevant time of day.

Overall, this information should be put together in a comprehensive but easy-to-follow form, and not scattershot in numerous existing or new reports. This information should be provided to the JWG for review by the end of April. The JWG should try to come to agreement on whether MTA has proposed the accurate number of buses and revenue hours to implement all the ESUs based on this detailed information by the third week in May, with any disagreements sent to the Special Master one week later.

III. Hire drivers, mechanics, and service attendants to maintain existing personnel-to-assignment/bus ratios as service expands

MTA maintains a certain ratio of operators, mechanics, and service attendants to driving assignments and buses. Whether these ratios have been at the appropriate levels has been an issue in past load factor remedy proceedings. Depending on the outcome of the service reliability plan proceedings (as discussed in a later section of this plan), these ratios may again become an issue, especially in regard to mechanics. However, the issue at the moment is simply to ensure that, as the fleet expands, MTA maintains the appropriate levels of operators, mechanics, and service attendants to operate this expansion service adequately. MTA has indicated at the JWG that it intends to hire operators, but it has not yet committed to this in writing. MTA has also said at the JWG that it will not hire any more mechanics or service attendants. This would mean the same number of mechanics and service attendants would be spread over more equipment. Instead, the BRU proposes that MTA must hire operators, mechanics, and service attendants at least at the existing policy levels for personnel-to-assignment/bus ratios in order to match the load factor expansion of service.[12]

Finally, as described in the Ongoing Monitoring and Reporting section in this proposal, these personnel changes should be documented in the ongoing Quarterly Report—both the actual numbers of personnel (past and present) and the incumbent hiring and training issues.

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12 The ratio of 1.18 operators-to-assignments has long been documented in these proceedings in the Consent Decree Quarterly Report.

IV. Fund load factor expansion service by reallocating resources from outside of the bus system, not by shifting resources around within it

When it signed the Consent Decree in 1996, MTA agreed that the first priority for funds would be to improve bus service for the transit dependent.[13] Particularly in reference to the overcrowding reduction requirements, MTA agreed that: "if MTA fails to meet the target load factors for all bus lines by the dates specified...MTA shall meet the target as soon as possible and reallocate sufficient funds from other programs to meet the next lower target load factor as scheduled."[14] MTA failed to meet the 1.35 load factor by December 31, 1997 and therefore has been required to reallocate funds to meet the 1.35 load factor requirement for the past five years. Additionally, because MTA admitted in the fall of 2002 that it has not met the 1.25 and 1.2 load factor requirements, MTA must again either find new funds altogether or reallocate funds from outside the existing bus system to implement remedial actions to bring it into compliance.[15]

Instead, in order to fund other projects, MTA has made a series of cuts to existing service in "shake-up" after "shake-up" over the past six years that are not even mentioned in MTA's official proposed load factor service plan:

Historical Service Cuts Not Mentioned in MTA Load Factor Service Plan

Date Range	Net Cut in Annual Rev. Hours	Net Cut in Peak Buses
Dec 1996-Jun 2002	92,900	87

MTA's currently proposed load factor service plan is not only a continuation of this pattern, but a significant escalation of its scope. As MTA has said to the BRU in the JWG, MTA's entire plan is a proposal not to reallocate resources from outside the bus system but simply to shift resources within it. First, MTA's ESU exemption proposal is in fact rooted in an attempt not to spend resources on the 117 ESUs discussed earlier—as its unwillingness to spend money even on its own on-time supervision proposal makes evident. Second, the core of MTA's Rapid Bus program is to fund it within the pool of current bus operations resources by cutting existing bus

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13 See Section I.F of the Consent Decree.

14 See Section II.A.4 of the Consent Decree.

15 These funds are available from sources such as the $15 million in discretionary funds MTA will give to municipal operators each of the next four years (in excess of local return and state formula funding), revenue from rail operations, rail operation funds generally, approximately $33 million in discretionary operations funds to new rail projects such as the Pasadena Gold (formerly known as Blue) Line opening in three months (with another $18 million in discretionary pre-operations money starting in one month), highway funds, busway funds, etc. See Attachment 1 for the April 26, 2001 MTA Board Report entitled "Municipal Operator Service Improvement Plan" on giving the municipal operators $15 million a year. Notice that MTA talks as if these funds are a Consent Decree related cost when the municipal operators are not now, nor have ever been, parties to the Consent Decree. As for the Pasadena Gold Line, Dana Woodbury recently told the JWG that the operating costs would be on par with the currently operated Green Line; the MTA website currently lists the Green Line operating costs as $35 million/year.

services. Third, the changes in Limited service are not an expansion but a muscling up of one component of service on a line while thinning out another—Local service. Fourth, MTA proposes explicitly to cut 69,266 revenue hours and 30 buses from within the MTA directly operated bus service. Fifth, not listed quite so explicitly in MTA's proposed plan is another set of cuts from contracted services, totaling 30,000 annual revenue hours and 21 buses. Lastly, MTA has not yet proved that use of Hastus will not deplete service and, in any case, MTA proposes using these revenue hours toward load factor instead of as general bus improvements. In all, these service reductions reflect MTA's effort to target a large number buses and revenue hours to be cut and then reshuffled within the bus system instead of reallocating funds from outside the bus system for load factor purposes.[16] Further, the resulting diminishment in quality of service for the transit dependent has in the past and would now violate the Consent Decree's improvement-in-service and do-no harm principles.[17]

The core question contested here is whether MTA must expand its bus service or not and, *as such, is one of the most important issues of this dispute*. It is also one of the most important issues of the Five Year New Service Plan. For this reason, the Rapid Bus dispute is discussed only briefly below and will be dealt with mainly as part of the Five Year New Service Plan discussion (except as Rapid Bus relates to MTA's ESU exemption proposal discussed earlier). In regards to the rest of MTA's proposal, instead of shifting resources—revenue hours and buses—within the existing bus service, the BRU proposes that MTA must:

- Add 87 buses and 92,900 revenue hours to the bus system by reallocating funds from outside the bus system (in addition to current ESU requirements) by September 2003 to restore what has been cut over the last six years and work with the JWG to develop a service plan to do so;

- Retain 30 peak buses and 69,266 revenue hours in the existing MTA directly operated service and reallocate these same amounts of resources from outside of the bus system;

- Retain 21 buses and 30,000 revenue hours in the existing contracted service and reallocate these same amounts of resources from outside of the current bus system.

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16 Further escalating this pattern of not re-allocating funds from outside the bus system for load factor or the Consent Decree overall is MTA's proposal to raise the cost of the passes beginning in January 2004. MTA is proposing: a $10 increase in the regular monthly pass from $42 to $52; a $4 increase in the student pass from $20 to $24; and $3 increase in the disabled/senior pass from $12 to $15; and other proposals. MTA names the need to recover the costs of the Consent Decree as its reason. Interestingly, MTA projects such a fare increase would bring in between $40-$50 million dollars in revenue, which just happens to be about the amount MTA projects for its proposed load factor plan, and also about the amount just mentioned in discretionary funds going to other non-bus projects. See the March 5, 2003 MTA Board Report entitled "Public Hearing for Fare Restructuring" in Attachment 2 for details.

17 See generally the Basic Principles and Objectives section and the Overall Principles section of the Consent Decree. Also see generally the Special Master's February 1998 *Memorandum Decision and Recommendations in re Late Night and Owl Service Modifications*; the Special Master's May 14, 1999 *Memorandum Decision and Order Re Motion for Clarification and Modification in Re to Load Factor Compliance*, page 30; Judge Hatter's September 23, 1999 *Memorandum Opinion and Order* generally; and the Special Master's December 9, 2002 *Order*, pages 53 and 58, and generally.

Lastly, the BRU cannot fully respond to MTA Limited service proposal because MTA has not provided the adequate data to do. MTA must provide this data within the next couple of months.

Below is a discussion of each of MTA's proposals and the BRU alternative.

A. Restore at least 87 buses and 92,900 annual revenue hours of cut service

MTA's proposal in its load factor service plan to cut existing service—with the implementation of Rapid Bus and Limited service, in sector cuts, and in contract service—comes in the context of a series of cuts to existing bus service over the last six years. In almost every six month "shake-up" from December 1996 until June 2002 MTA has cut service, totaling 481,400 annual revenue hours and 164 buses (separate from any lines considered part of the Five Year New Service Plan). During the same time period, MTA re-invested only 77 buses and 388,500 revenue hours back into bus service (other than for load factor and the Five Year New Service Plan), for a net reduction of 92,900 hours and 87 buses:[18]

Bus Service Changes (other than Load Factor or Five Year New Service Plan)[19]

Date	Peak Buses Cut	Annual Revenue Hours Cut	Peak Buses Added	Annual Revenue Hours Added
Dec 96	-11	-36,100	1	0
Jun 97	-23	-12,500	22	46,500
Dec 97	-8	-46,100	2	0
Jun 98	-1	-89,200	2	25,200
Dec 98	-2	-5,500	10	14,800
Jun 99	-6	0	0	14,100
Dec 99	-14	-62,600	10	96,200
Jun 00	-40	-102,300	15	80,500
Dec 00	-1	-19,500	3	21,400
Jun 01	-25	-52,900	6	500
Dec 01	-20	-30,000	5	58,900
Jun 02	-13	-24,700	1	30,400
Totals:	**-164**	**-481,400**	**77**	**388,500**

Net totals since Dec 96: - 87 buses; -92,900 hours

[18] Obviously, MTA needs to make many ongoing minor adjustments in the normal operations of the bus system that do not diminish bus service. These are not registered here. The changes listed here are ones with a net change in revenue hours.

[19] The source for this data is the MTA's "Chronology of Annualized Revenue Hour Changes" and "Chronology of Weekday Peak Bus Changes" with data through June 2002. MTA included these spreadsheets as part of its report relating to actions taken in response to Judge Hatter's September 23, 1999 *Memorandum Opinion and Order.* The "comments" column on the far right of the chronology lists each set of changes with a brief description and the accompanying change in annual revenue hours and peak buses.

MTA made a series of service reductions and then added only part of those resources back, showing a failure to fully prioritize and reallocate funds to bus service. Further, MTA's documentation of service changes demonstrates a pattern of diverting bus eligible funds to help expand other programs, as is evident in the fact that during these same six years MTA has expanded its rail operations budget, on new and old projects, by 52%.[20] Previously, the BRU has contested these sets of cuts with the MTA directly at each "shake-up" and not with the Special Master. However, as the scale and pattern of MTA's diversion of resources out of the bus system are now evident, this pattern must be addressed directly and corrected by restoring these resources to the bus system. Therefore, in the current context, MTA bus operations must go up by 87 buses in the peak fleet and 92,900 annual revenue hours in addition to the current ESUs requirements, which also must be a complete addition to bus operations.

Further, cuts made since December 1996 have resulted in a deterioration of bus service for thousands of riders. Transit dependent riders are bearing the additional burdens of increased commuting time, the extra costs and inconvenience of transfers, and decreased countywide mobility. For example, MTA has lengthened the headways on at least 19 lines over the last six years, mostly in the midday off-peak time—such as on the 234 Line, which went from 25 to 30 minute headways, from bad service to worse. Another category is MTA cancellation of freeway service. As an example, MTA cancelled the 436 freeway line, increasing riders' travel time by at least 10 minutes and adding $127/year in extra costs for non-pass users due to added transfers. MTA has also cancelled a variety of other lines and segments of lines. The cumulative impact is a substantial diminishment in the quality of service for bus riders.

Therefore, the BRU proposes that a service plan for restoration of these 92,900 revenue hours and 87 buses should be developed jointly by the JWG with an eye toward restoration of past cut service first and then implementation of other new services. If, however, BRU and MTA cannot agree on re-instating a particular service, either side can propose re-investing the same total amount of buses and revenue hours as other on-street bus service as long as this service is consistent with the Consent Decree—such as reducing wait-times—and is separate from load factor and the Five Year New Service Plan. Again, this last condition is very important in order to protect Consent Decree load factor and New Service as their own sets of expansion services. Finally, this service plan may exceed the 87 buses and 92,900 revenue hours, but can be no less.

BRU proposes that MTA present a service plan to re-instate these resources to bus services by the middle of May 2003. JWG would try to come to agreement on the plan by the middle of June. If there is disagreement, both sides would indicate such disagreement to the Special Master on June 15 and submit formal positions two weeks later for the Special Master to resolve the issue. Once agreed upon by the JWG, or ordered by the Special Master if necessary, this service plan would be implemented in September 2003.

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[20] On page 19 of its FY97 Budget, MTA lists 110.8 million as the annual costs for its rail operations. In appendix 9 and on page I-20 of its FY03 Budget, MTA lists 153.2 million as the annual costs for its rail operations. The difference in costs is 52.54 million per year—a 52% increase.

B. MTA's Rapid Bus program fits into MTA's pattern of non-expansion but should be dealt with as part of the Five Year New Service Plan over the next six months

The core of MTA's Rapid Bus program is to fund it within the pool of current bus operations resources by cutting existing bus services. Of MTA's entire Rapid Bus program of 24 lines (after the 720 and 750) with 400 in-service buses and 95 spare buses, only one bus is planned to be expansion service:

MTA's Rapid Bus Program[21]	Revenue Hours (in thousands)			Buses		
	Before Rapid Bus	After Rapid Bus	Diff	Before Rapid Bus	After Rapid Bus	Diff
24 Lines (after 720 & 750)	2,827	2,843	15	808	809	1

The rest—i.e., all—of the Rapid Bus service hours and buses are drawn from eliminating any existing Limited service on that line or converting Local service—sometimes both. For example, Wilshire, Vermont, and Broadway have all had their Limited service completely canceled, and Van Nuys is proposed to have its Limited service cut in June 2003. Some Rapid Bus lines are also constituted partially from cuts to existing Local service. For example the Vermont Line had 27.4% of its revenue hours cut from Local service to resource Rapid Bus.[22] MTA is able to produce more total trips from the same resources because the faster running time *from skipping many stops* results in a faster round trip cycle by the bus. The BRU strongly supports the Rapid Bus practice of having a bus line with fewer stops in order to go faster *as long as this bus line is full expansion service and not simply re-shuffled existing service.* MTA's current Rapid Bus program, however, constitutes a series of service reductions that have significant adverse impacts on riders.

Despite repeated requests from the BRU, MTA has provided little quantifiable data on any negative impacts—increased transfers, increased walking, or increased waiting times—resulting from implementation of Rapid Bus in this way. What is known is that because Rapid Bus is implemented on some of the highest volume lines in the city, tens of thousands of people are affected to some degree by these negative impacts. Riders from the cancelled Limited service whose starting and destination points are not served by Rapid Bus stops either: a) use only the Local service which will slow down their travel times; b) use Local and Rapid, which as a combination may or may not be faster, but definitely results in less seamless travel by having to transfer more, or; c) walk more to access a Rapid Bus stop—up to a quarter mile at all times of day. For the Local ridership, any cuts result in buses coming less often, increasing riders' overall travel time. And although Rapid Bus may have a higher percentage of overall corridor ridership than Limited, now the Local service will carry not only most of its current riders, but also

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21 From Table 4 in Attachment A to MTA's September 18, 2002 Proposal Re: Metro Rapid Five Year Implementation Plan that was passed by the MTA Board. This table is enclosed here as Attachment 3.

22 See Attachment 4 for MTA's "Comparison Service Plan for Vermont Rapid Bus Corridor" provided in supporting detail to MTA's proposed load factor service plan sent to Special Master on March 3, 2003.

displaced Limited riders, as well as some altogether new riders—as on Wilshire where Local ridership went up 26%.[23] For all of these riders, less Local service means either wait or walk.

Though the Rapid Bus program is still primarily a component of the Five Year New Service Plan, it also overlaps with load factor issues because the designated Rapid Bus corridors are the same as some of the highest load factor corridors. In this context, as it springs from simply reshuffling existing service and not expanding service, MTA's Rapid Bus program contradicts the Consent Decree agreement that funds from outside of the bus system should be reallocated for load factor purposes, and also the specific Court directives not to diminish the quality of service to the transit dependent. However, as indicated in the JWG letter to the Special Master on February 6, 2003, no specific action in these proceedings is required on Rapid Bus as this issue (except for MTA's ESU exemption proposal) should be addressed more fully as part of the Five Year New Service Plan over the next six months and not here. At that point, the dispute between the Bus Riders Union and MTA regarding whether Rapid Bus will be expansion service or service cut from existing bus operations will be addressed. Significant analysis regarding the above points and others will need to be examined and resolved at that time.

C. MTA has not provided adequate data on the implementation on any of the newly proposed Limited service lines; MTA should provide such data within the next two months.

MTA's proposed Limited service continues MTA's drive not to reallocate resources from outside the bus system for load factor expansion, but instead to reshuffle existing resources, in this case within a single bus line—cutting from one piece to add to another. MTA admits this, but will also try to say it is a transit driven action; however, if this proposal was transit related, as compared to budget related, it would have already been done because Limited service is not a new concept to MTA.

Unfortunately, despite repeated requests from the BRU, MTA has provided little data and analysis regarding the proposed Limited lines. This is particularly true in regard to potential negative impacts such as increased wait/travel times and more transfers, but is also true for many aspects of this proposal. As MTA has not provided the adequate data regarding its proposed implementation of Limited service—on any of the newly proposed Limited service lines—BRU cannot fully respond here. MTA should provide such data, as has been outlined in previous document requests and also at the JWG, within the next two months.

D. MTA must reallocate 69,233 revenue hours and 30 buses from outside the bus system, not from cuts to existing service

Instead of reallocating funds from outside the bus system, and in addition to all the other past and proposed cuts, MTA proposes another set of service cuts for June 2003 that will continue the pattern of deterioration of the bus system. MTA proposes a total reduction of 30 buses and

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[23] See Attachment 5 for page 6 of MTA Board Report entitled "Los Angeles Metro Rapid Demonstration Program Final Report" February 2002.

82,762 annual revenue hours, with 0 buses and 13,496 revenue hours re-invested into other bus services, for a net reduction of 30 peak buses and 69,266 revenue hours:[24]

FY 2003 Service Change Proposals (other than for ESUs)				
MTA Service Sector	**Peak Buses Cut**	**Annual Rev. Hours Cut**	**Peak Buses Added**	**Annual Revenue Hours Added**
Gateway Cities	-8	-8,636	0	9,399
San Gabriel Valley	-3	0	0	3,355
San Fernando Valley	-6	-16,066	0	742
Westside & South LA	13 est.	-58,060	Unknown	Unknown
Totals:	-30	-82,762	0	13,496

Net Reduction: -30 buses and -69,266 annual revenue hours

Again, the Consent Decree requirement is very clear that the load factor must be met by reallocating funds from outside the bus system and not by siphoning-off existing bus operations money and equipment to be shifted around in the bus system for load factor purposes.

Also again, these are not innocuous changes but represent a deterioration in the bus system—even in sectors that have service added back into them. As an example from the San Fernando Valley, MTA is proposing a further scaling back of freeway service by cutting the 418 Line—increasing travel time by approximately 20 minutes each way. San Gabriel is also slated to have freeway service cut, this time the 401 Line. This is particularly interesting because the 401 was listed as the alternative service to the 402 Line which MTA cut a few years ago. Cancellation of Line 401 will increase travel times by approximately 15 minutes—30 minutes a day roundtrip for 1,930 riders.

In the Gateway Cities Service Sector, MTA's proposal to truncate the 105 Line (in order to fund another improvement) results in at least a 20-minute increase on average in travel time for roundtrip riders and an increase in cost of $.50 a day (or $127/year) for non-pass holders. The 119 Line has a similar story: truncation increases travel time for some riders by 40-45 minutes on average and adds a cost of $.50/day for cash fare riders.

In contrast to the others, MTA has not provided any detailed information for the Westside/Central and South Bay Service Sectors beyond what was listed on the one-page sheet submitted to the Special Master on March 3, 2003. Nor has MTA held a public hearing on these proposed cuts yet, whereas the other sectors have.

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[24] MTA's one-page service change summary sheet in the supporting details of its proposed service plan lists a 73,460 revenue hour reduction and does not list the number of buses associated with these revenue hours. MTA's budget spreadsheet at the end of its proposed service plan lists 70,000 revenue hours and 30 buses. The more detailed sector-specific spreadsheets shared by MTA in the JWG show the changes for all sectors as 69,266 revenue hours, so BRU will use this as the most exact accounting. Also, as compared to MTA's initial one-page service change summary sheet referenced at the beginning of this footnote, the table in the text lists changes in five sectors because these are what are listed in the same sector-specific spreadsheets given to the MTA Board and the BRU at the JWG.

Just as service should not have been cut from 1996 through 2002, neither should this current set of cuts occur. Further, the "re-investment" portions of this series of changes should be done as overlay additions to the existing service. This is also what some MTA Board members think, as six voted to support the ultimately failed motion by MTA Board Member and County Supervisor Yvonne Burke to do just that on a subset of the lines. If MTA continues to disagree, it must come up with a plan to re-invest those 30 buses and 69,233 annual revenue hours into the bus system for other improvements—separate from load factor or the Five Year New Service Plan—and cannot cut these buses and hours to feed load factor requirements.

E. MTA must not cut contract services and instead must reallocate resources from outside the bus system

Unmentioned in the rest of MTA's plan, but which appears in the budget summary, is a line item stating that 30,000 of the annual revenue hours to meet the load factor requirements would come from contracted services. MTA told the JWG that these annual revenue hours are not a cut from existing service but are in fact revenue hours that had been planned for other contracted expansion that MTA is now using for load factor. If so, fine.

However, in the table titled "MTA Bus Fleet Requirements and Procurements for FY03-FY10" in MTA's Bus Fleet Management Plan from February 27, 2003, MTA states in a footnote: "21 Contract buses are being reallocated due to cancellations of some contract service lines (part of the June 2003 Service Change Program), which results in a zero impact in their bus requirements."[25] If this is so, and it must be given more weight until proven otherwise, this is another part of MTA's pattern of not reallocating enough equipment and funds from outside the bus system and instead aiming for "zero impact"—that is "zero impact" on MTA's budget, not on riders.

F. New Hastus program may result in no change to on-street service, but MTA needs to prove it; regardless any savings should be re-invested to the bus system separate from load factor requirements

MTA proposes that it can provide 150,000 revenue hours and 40 buses by applying a new scheduling program called MinBus as part of its Hastus scheduling program. The BRU has two issues here: First, MTA has acknowledged in JWG meetings that some on-street service changes could occur from MinBus depending on the parameters given to the software, but that MTA plans no reduction to on-street service, only reductions in "inefficient off-route, deadhead and layover operations." BRU acknowledges that theoretically this may be possible to do, but MTA has not provided the back-up data and analysis to test and prove this assertion. MTA must provide a method for testing its actions and demonstrate that the Hastus program passes the test to not reduce service.

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[25] See Attachment 6 for the "MTA Bus Fleet Requirements and Procurements for FY03-FY10" in Appendix 11 of MTA's February 27, 2003 "Bus Fleet Management Plan".

Second, and more importantly, even if MTA proves that this new computer software does not reduce existing service, MTA must use these hours to make other improvements within the bus system and cannot divert them to load factor requirements.

V. Establish a three-year procurement plan, starting with immediate purchase of 380 buses (in addition to those buses already bought/planned to be bought by MTA) to replace the "inactive" contingency fleet buses which will be used temporarily to fulfill the required expansion service

After determining the amount of equipment needed to fulfill the required service levels (as discussed in the previous sections), the next step is to ensure that actual buses are available to fulfill them—especially while maintaining the steady retirement of overage or newly-coming-of-retirement-age buses. BRU and MTA agree that MTA does not have enough buses to do so now or with imminent bus deliveries and initially will have to add already retired buses from MTA's "inactive" fleet to the road. BRU and MTA also agree that these already retired "inactive" buses will have to be re-retired as soon as possible—requiring purchases now in order for buses to be delivered over the next one to three years.[26] MTA and the BRU do not agree on the scale of the procurement, primarily because of the difference in the proposed service levels. Also in dispute is ensuring that regular retirement of old buses continues on time and that expansion service is actually implemented with new buses. To meet all expansion and retirement needs, the BRU proposes a three year procurement plan, starting with the immediate purchase of 380 buses (in addition to those already ordered/planned).[27]

Current and near-future bus availability has been significantly shaped by MTA's choice to slow down the end of the court-ordered "Accelerated Procurement Plan" from 1998, so that not enough new buses are available now, or even close to now, for current needs. A comparison between the total bus deliveries by date in the court-ordered "Accelerated Procurement Plan" and in the MTA's newly proposed procurement plan demonstrates this fact:

Cumulative bus deliveries from Accelerated Procurement Plan

End of fiscal year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06
Court ordered	1818	1848	2095		
Current MTA	1798	1818	1828	1948	2098

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26 MTA has stated this position in its written plan and at the JWG. However, MTA indicated last week that it may try to change its proposal to keep old buses on the road and then re-retire them in the future. MTA has indicated it is considering lowering its spare ratio from the long established 20% in order for MTA to expand the number of buses in service but not increase its total active fleet (peak buses plus spares). This, of course, results in fewer spare buses being available to substitute for broken down in-service buses. This also results in more wear and tear on the existing in-service buses as they are being asked to do more with less. Given historical and current mechanical reliability issues (detailed in the following section), BRU opposes this shift. The Special Master should order the MTA to maintain a 20% spare ratio.

27 Past load factor proceedings have focused primarily on particular bus orders. This will continue, but as part of a multi-year plan of procurements, in order to avoid any slippage between buses used for retiring old buses and buses used for expanding the bus fleet. Tracking all retirement and expansion needs by year over a multi-year period and timing the total procurements/deliveries correctly will ensure all needs are met.

The court-ordered "Accelerated Procurement Plan" originally established that 2095 buses would be delivered by the end of FY04 (June 2004). MTA now will not complete the delivery of the last 277 buses until FY06.[28] This results, again, in MTA keeping old buses on the road for longer, buying fewer buses overall, and buying them later.[29] On page 26 of his March 6, 1999 *Order*, the Special Master stated, "should MTA modify or scale back its accelerated bus replacement plan...additional measures may be required at that time." The expansion of service levels for load factor requires "additional measures" now—a new procurement plan.

The total need for newly purchased buses for the next three years (June 2003 to June 2006) for load factor expansion service and for bus retirement is 727.[30] This is 381 buses to retire currently overage buses and buses that will come to retirement over that time frame, and 346 buses to re-retire the old buses to be temporarily used for expansion, shown below by year: [31]

New Equipment Needs

By end of fiscal year:*	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	TOTAL
Overage Buses to Retire by Year (separate from the "inactive" contingency fleet buses temporarily used for below expansion)	55	7	123	196	381
Load Factor Expansion Buses	185				
Spares for LF Expansion	37				
Past Cuts Restoration Buses		87			
Spares for Restored Service		15			
SF Valley BRT Expansion Buses			18		
Spares for SF Valley BRT			4		
Total	277	109	145	196	727

*MTA's fiscal year ends in June of that calender year (i.e., FY03 ends June 30, 2003)

MTA currently only has 300 buses that are bought or planned to be bought for this same three year period, with most to be delivered in the last two years—fiscal years 2005 and 2006. This

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28 Based on the "MTA Bus Fleet Requirements and Procurements for FY03-FY10" in Appendix 11 of MTA's February 27, 2003 "Bus Fleet Management Plan" (see Attachment 6) and also JWG discussion. This assumes that all of these last buses will actually be purchased; as discussed later, only 100 buses have been so far.

29 In reference to past procurements, also notice the difference between MTA's "Delivery Schedule Summary" from MTA's Fourth Quarter 2001 Consent Decree Quarterly Report and the same report from two years prior (see both in Attachment 7). The earlier report listed the need for 297 buses for the previous expansion order from Judge Hatter, but this had disappeared by the later report, as MTA simply held old buses on the road longer.

30 Additionally, depending on the outcome of the Five Year New Service Plan discussion, this total may increase by another 550 buses, but this projection is not included here. Any future off-peak expansion service will not require additional purchases because the need for peak buses is greater than off-peak, so any equipment needed would be available.

31 See Attachment 8 for amount of overage buses from MTA's "VMS: Distribution of Buses/Number of Buses by Age by Division" report for January 1, 2003. All the expansion service needs are discussed in the previous sections of this plan except the San Fernando Valley Bus Rapid Transit Project (BRT). Though contested, MTA includes 22 buses in its fleet plan for the BRT project, so they are included here.

leaves MTA short a total of 427 buses over the next three years (727 total need, minus 300 planned).

Of these 300 buses planned for by MTA, so far only 100 have actually been purchased. Beyond that the MTA Board has approved the plan to buy 200 articulated buses, but no contract has been established yet. This means that MTA must follow through with actually purchasing the 200 articulated buses already in its plan and then buy an additional 427 buses over the next three years to meet the remaining need. The following, therefore, is a multi-year delivery schedule assuming the immediate purchase of the first 380 buses to be delivered in FY04 and FY05:

Proposed Bus Delivery/Procurement Plan

Fiscal year	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	TOTAL
Total MTA	20	10	120	150	300
Total BRU	20	160	350	197	727

Amount within above totals already purchased and awaiting delivery only	20	10	20	50
Amount within above totals already planned by MTA, but awaiting purchase and delivery			100	100
Amount within above totals not planned, which require immediate purchase and delivery for BRU Plan		150	230	47

Specifically, the Special Master should order MTA to:

- Establish a three-year procurement plan with the total delivery amounts shown in the "Total BRU" row above;

- Immediately purchase the 380 buses shown above in the row titled "Amount within above total not planned, which requires immediate purchase and delivery" for FY04 and FY05;

- Purchase 47 more buses over the next six months that have not yet been ordered, to be delivered by the end of FY06.

An option for up to 696 40-seat NABI buses already exists, as does an option for up to 400 articulated NABI buses. The delivery of these buses would be faster than a totally new procurement because the base contract is already established (i.e., the bidding process is already completed).

Service Plan to
Improve Service Reliability

I. Create a service plan for missing bus trips focused on reducing mechanical breakdowns within one month

On page 32 of his December 9, 2002 *Order*, the Special Master described his analysis of load factor violations from "missing bus trips":

> While the MTA is to be lauded for the substantial improvement in the reliability of its fleet operation, the portion of exceedences above the 1.25 and 1.20 LFTs due to "missed trips" nonetheless is still significant. Under the Consent Decree, the MTA is obligated to meet the specific load factor targets on each and every bus line; accordingly, it is appropriate to develop remedies to enable the MTA to reduce the approximately 15 to 20 percent of exceedences attributable to mechanical failures, lack of bus operators, in-service failures and other factors. Consistent with the precedent applied during the 1.35 LFT, which both parties acknowledge has led to a decrease in overcrowding levels, I believe that the JWG should ascertain the sub-causes of "missed trips" exceedences and that tailored, specific remedies should be developed to address these factors.

Based on this analysis, on page 60 of his December 9, 2002 *Order*, the Special Master ordered:

> Consistent with the precedent followed during the 1.35 LFT phase, the JWG should identify the sub-causes of "missed trips" exceedences, and the MTA should develop narrowly tailored remedies to address these specific sub-causes. The MTA, after consultation with the JWG, should develop a remediation plan to reduce overcrowding attributable to "missed trips," which should be submitted to the JWG and the Special Master as part of the Service Plan.

In response, MTA offered no proposal to remedy missed trip violations, nor even any analysis about the sub-causes of these violations. In fact, MTA has addressed these issues even more extensively in its Consent Decree Quarterly Reports and in JWG discussions than it has in its proposed service plan. In its service plan, MTA proposes only to:

- Review the missed trip violations that have no information regarding the sub-cause to determine why the agency has no information (mostly to fix the process that resulted in no information but also to determine if MTA occasionally erroneously identified a violation as missed trip that actually had a data or checker error);

- Study some bus lines to see if there are "identifiable reasons for the missed trip."

MTA is not operating as if a remedy has been ordered as required by the Special Master, but as if it is still investigating the problem, and for that matter, is in no hurry to do so.

In this area in particular the BRU is heavily reliant upon MTA to provide some data and analysis on current operating performance (and therefore potential remedial actions). Since MTA has provided virtually no such data and analysis in its current plan, the BRU cannot provide a full remedy plan. However, the BRU has been able to develop specific alternatives to MTA's non-proposal based on other MTA documentation and past work in this area.

A. Improving in-service mechanical reliability

First, while a small part of the remedy involves fixing the documentation process, significant MTA analysis already exists identifying the primary cause of missed trip violations. MTA has already produced analysis of missed trip violations from January 2002 to June 2002 that shows that 78% of the missed trip violations throughout the bus system are due to mechanical breakdowns—mostly while a bus is in service.[32] MTA's latest Consent Decree Quarterly Report has corresponding statistics. For example, mechanical problems—specifically with engines, brakes, etc.—caused 85% of the in-service failures from October 2001 through December 2002.[33] Further, from January 2002 to December 2002, mechanical failures caused 77% of the out-lates and cancellations of buses from bus divisions.[34] Mechanical problems—particularly while a bus is in-service—have been clearly identified by MTA as the predominant cause of missed trip violations for which remedies need to be developed.

Measuring the miles between in-service failures as a gauge for improvement in fleet reliability has been included in previous load factor proceedings, as the Special Master ordered MTA to raise the miles between total roadcalls. MTA now lists its miles between total roadcalls as up from about 700 in June 1998 to about 3500 today.[35] As a result of this improved fleet reliability, missed trip violations have decreased. As in-service failure is the main sub-cause of missed trip violations, the total miles between in-service failures will continue to be the baseline barometer of improvement. A corresponding key indicator will be the miles between mechanical breakdowns (i.e., "chargeable" breakdowns in MTA lexicon) which specifically measures mechanical problems only, and not all service interruptions.

MTA should be required to develop and then implement a specific plan of action for increasing mechanical reliability, particularly in-service reliability. This plan should draw from MTA's extensive data on its mechanical reliability performance and include a textual and quantifiable analysis of the ability of the following issues to raise the miles between roadcalls (both total

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[32] See Attachment 9 for MTA's list of missed trip violations by cause given to BRU at the JWG in October 2002 and included in the official record of the October 29, 2002 hearing with the Special Master. After the 78% (except for an occasional data problem) the remainder is due to a variety of non-mechanical problems. MTA agreed with the BRU at the JWG that this ratio of 78% due to mechanical problems and 22% due to non-mechanical problems would be the same split for the undocumented missed trip violations.

[33] See Attachment 10 for page 47 of MTA Fourth Quarter 2002 Consent Decree Quarterly Report.

[34] See Attachment 11 for page 40-41 of MTA Fourth Quarter 2002 Consent Decree Quarterly Report.

[35] See Fourth Quarter 2002 Consent Decree Quarterly Report, page 23.

roadcalls and mechanical failure only roadcalls), most of which have been addressed by this Court before:

- Total available number of operators, mechanics, service attendants, and maintenance supervisors
- Ratio of mechanics, service attendants, and maintenance supervisors to buses
- Recurring defect and mechanical failure analysis—by bus, sub-fleet, type of problem and location of problem
- Prioritization of worst cases of mechanical repairs
- Time to finish mechanical repairs
- Preventative maintenance
- Past-due critical maintenance
- Level of supervision
- General, vendor specific, and advanced technology training—especially for CNG buses
- Spare parts availability
- ADA specific training
- New facilities

This plan can also include any other issues MTA deems relevant for improving mechanical reliability. From this analysis, MTA should develop a specific set of remedy actions—textually and quantifiably—to reach, in stages:

- The levels of 5,000 miles, 6,000 miles, and 7,000 miles between total roadcalls on average for all sectors (MTA averages systemwide about 3,500 to 4,000—some sectors are higher, some lower);

- The levels of 8,000 miles, 10,000 miles, and 12,000 miles between mechanical only (i.e. chargeable) roadcalls on average for all sectors (MTA averages systemwide about 6,000 miles, with some sector higher, some lower).[36]

This would include specific schedules for reaching these levels over the next three years and the expected impact on reducing missed trip violations.

B. Analysis and remedy for non-mechanical problems

MTA's January 2002 to June 2002 analysis of missed trip violations revealed 23% of the missed trip violations are caused by non-mechanical problems. These sub-causes, in fact, do need to be

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[36] MTA has provided little detail on the possible and required levels of in-service reliability. The only discussion has been referencing other transit properties. While measuring against other properties is not the relevant standard in this case, as none of those properties have the same performance requirements agreed to by MTA in the Consent Decree, other properties demonstrate what is possible at least. For instance, in the JWG, MTA referenced that the Washington, D.C. transit system is at 5,400 miles between total road calls. And Deputy CEO John Catoe told the JWG that some transit agencies are at 10,000 and 12,000 miles between mechanical only road calls.

studied and specific remedies developed for them. MTA should include these as a specific separate section in the plan for improved service reliability.

C. Establish procedures to document sub-causes

Ongoing monitoring and reporting should include study of the missed trips violations which lack the sub-cause supporting data in order to understand why there is no documentation. If, in the course of this study, MTA identifies—and BRU agrees—that some trips MTA identified as missed trip violations actually had data or checker errors, they should be re-classified as such. After MTA identifies why in some instances it has no data on the sub-cause of a missed trip violation, MTA *should set up a process to ensure all sub-causes are properly documented henceforth*. Once this new set of procedures is operating, all missed trips should be identified by sub-cause in MTA's Consent Decree Quarterly Report in the causal analysis section, and also in a total list similar to the one already used for January 2002 through June 2002.

This plan for overall improved service reliability should be provided by MTA to the JWG one month from the Special Master's decision regarding these service plans. BRU proposes that JWG have three weeks to determine agreement or disagreement. If needed, the BRU would submit an alternative plan two weeks later.

Ongoing Reporting and Monitoring

I. Ongoing Reporting and Monitoring

The creation of the Consent Decree Quarterly Report was one of the major steps forward during the last set of load factor remedies.[37] It established a set of information about load factor violations, remedy actions, and general bus operations performance that is routinely produced in a uniform, comprehensive, and yet fairly concise manner. It should be continued throughout the lifetime of the Decree.

It should also be made better—more responsive and more tailored. First, some pieces of information—such as the line-by-line mapping of violations—should continue to be included but with a few improvements. Second, some information—such as on operators and mechanics—has only been partially included in the past and should be expanded now. Third, some basic MTA reports—on fleet size, procurements, aging, etc.—that have been included sporadically should be a consistent attachment to the Quarterly Report. Fourth, some information—such as total revenue hours and the chronology of changes in peak buses and revenue hours—has not been included in previous Quarterly Reports but should be now. Finally, some information never yet produced by MTA—such as specific scheduling information of some trips—should also be included. Accordingly, the BRU proposes that the following information be included regularly in the Quarterly Report and provided to the BRU both in hardcopy and computer form (as is done now).

A. Production and analysis of line-by-line overcrowding data

Line-by-Line Mapping of Load Factor Violations. Undoubtedly the core piece of information required, MTA should continue to produce the line-by-line mapping of violations on a quarterly basis until 2006. For the most part, the form of the line-by-line mapping should remain the same as now. However, the following improvements should be implemented:

- Include peak and off-peak (midday, evening, owl, Saturday, and Sunday) data—separated by category;
- Include data for two years prior to the last day of the current quarter (rather than for one year prior as MTA does now);
- List all non-overlapping violations for the above date range;[38]

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[37] MTA titled this report the Consent Decree Quarterly Report but in reality it has only been on load factor and not on the entire Consent Decree. This report is also sometimes referred to simply as the Quarterly Report.

[38] MTA has occasionally had some problems listing all the violations in the line-by-line mapping. MTA has sometimes only listed one non-overlapping violation that actually straddled two non-overlapping violations, thereby listing only half of all the existing violations. See Attachment 12 for a list of MTA corrections to Quarterly Report data given to the BRU in which numerous of these instances were fixed. While MTA corrected these mistakes in this instance, such a process should be re-enforced as required.

- Of all possible violations (see above), if a choice exists between overlapping windows of overcrowding, choose the highest load factor as the core violation to be listed;

- List the data for the whole time period checked in the accompanying Causal Analysis, with all missed trips marked by cause, and all bus trips identified by bus series and number of seats;

- Mark any added service by additional trip and the 20-minute time period it was added to, and then list the total added trips for this quarter and each preceding quarter;

- Produce total time range of violations graph showing the time range in which violations have occurred over the last two years for each line, location, and direction separated by AM peak, midday off-peak, PM peak, evening off-peak, owl off-peak, Saturday, and Sunday. See example in Attachment 13.

Frequency of point checks. Increase point checks on the next 20 heaviest volume lines after the non-top 20 lines (i.e., 21st to 40th heaviest volume lines) to twice a month. Begin checks on the five heaviest volume owl service lines.

B. Additional data and analysis of load factor violations and bus system operations and performance, with all sources of data referenced

Specific information, data, and analysis to be included in Quarterly Report	**Already Receive?/ Comments**
Number of lines that did not meet the 1.2 load factor standard that quarter, with a list of such lines	No
Total number of violations by causal analysis category by line and totaled for all lines	Yes
Number of days point checked for each line, location, direction by quarter compared against the number of point checks mandated to be done for that line, location, direction for that quarter	No
Discussion of action steps and progress on each remedy action ordered by the Special Master—textually and quantifiably	Yes But could be fuller
Any newly required ESUs (with spreadsheet of calculations attached in an appendix)	N/A in past
Any new trips added, listed by the time and place the expansion bus trip is scheduled to start, pass the peak load point, and end;	No
Bus ridership by line and systemwide	Systemwide only
In-service revenue hours, buses and trips for each line by time of day (i.e., AM peak, midday off-peak, etc.) and whole day for the last three years through the present quarter, with any differences noted	Partially received; last three years allows baseline comparison
In-service revenue hours systemwide (directly operated and contracted) for bus and rail for the past three years through the present quarter	Partially received; last three years allows baseline comparison
Number of bus and rail operators (part-time, full time, and total) by fiscal year (indicating end or beginning of year) for the past three years through the present quarter and projected for next year	Last three years allows baseline comparison
Operator-assignment ratio with discussion of whether any shortfalls exist	Yes

Updated "Chronology of Buses" spreadsheet for daily peak, off-peak, Saturday, and Sunday	Once
Updated "Chronology of Annualized Revenue Hours" spreadsheet for daily peak, off-peak, Saturday, and Sunday	Once
Number of mechanics, service attendants, and maintenance supervisors for the past three years through the present quarter and projected for next year	Last three years allows baseline comparison
Mechanic and service attendant-to-bus ratio with discussion of MTA's policy, actual levels and any shortfalls	Never given in the past
VMS Fleet Aging reports: VMS: Distribution of Buses/ Number of buses by age by division VMS: Distribution of Buses/ Number of buses by age and by bus series Number of buses by accumulated life mileage by division Number of buses by accumulated life mileage by bus series	Generally given outside of QR, sporadically with QR
Same summary of bus delivery schedule with a status report for each bus procurement but modified to include tag for replacing any buses held on the road until new buses arrive	Partially
Same Fleet Activity Model as current but modified to include source information and comparison or reconciliation with other fleet size numbers such as in the 4-12 and 4-24 reports, as well as to include contract service levels	Partially and occasionally
Headways for each line (with any differences for different segments of a line noted, i.e., for the end of a line) for each six months from the beginning of the Consent Decree forward	Partially and occasionally provided
Missed trip violations by sub-cause	Once
In-service equipment failures by line, bus series, and sub-cause (with totals also), and including analysis	Yes
Out-lates and cancellations by reasons by division	Yes
Analysis of facilities capacity and need for new facilities	Occasionally
All money that is bus eligible (local, state, and federal) that is currently *not* allocated to the bus system, separated by capital and operations (list from largest amount to smallest amount); itemize Prop A and Prop C funding by amount and expenditure	Never given in the past

Also, in the causal analysis section of the Quarterly Report, MTA lists details for each bus line with specific updates for that line. This page should be improved to become a more exact line profile with line-specific information, including the following (from the systemwide reports listed above):

- Number of days checked for location and direction by quarter compared against the number of checks mandated to be done for that location and direction for that quarter
- Changes in service including scheduling information and trip, bus, and revenue hour changes (with totals past and present)
- Ridership (past and present)
- Types of buses in service
- Headways (past and present)

This would allow for a quick, comprehensive reference for each line.

C. Exclusion of irrelevant information

Finally, MTA should be ordered to exclude its unilateral percentage compliance claims (in any form) and its claims about static windows as the compliance standard because neither is consistent with the law of the case.

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BOARD MEETING
APRIL 26, 2001

Metropolitan
Transportation
Authority

One Gateway Plaza
Los Angeles, CA
90012-2952

SUBJECT: MUNICIPAL OPERATOR SERVICE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

ACTION: **AUTHORIZE STAFF TO IMPLEMENT THE MUNICIPAL OPERATOR SERVICE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND EXECUTE THE RESULTING FUNDING AGREEMENTS**

RECOMMENDATION

A. Approve the creation of an ongoing Municipal Operator Bus Service Improvement Program beginning in FY 02 to improve service to the transit dependent countywide by reducing overcrowding and expanding services.

B. Authorize the Chief Executive Officer or his designee to execute funding agreements with the Municipal Operators, which will include the joint agreement that for the duration of the program neither the MTA nor the Municipal Operators will pursue legislation, legal or other actions to alter the funding sources currently subject to formula allocations

C. Program $15 million of Proposition C 40% funds for FY 2002 to fund the first year of the Program. Funding of $15 million of Prop C 40% funds will be programmed in each of the following four years for a total of $75 million, plus 3% cumulative annual increases.

D. Support a jointly draft amendment to AB974 to incorporate the terms of this agreement between the MTA and the Municipal Operators.

ISSUE

The Municipal Operators have requested the MTA to formularize Proposition C 40% funds programmed to the MTA's bus operation to meet Consent Decree and bus policing costs. The Consent Decree states that:

> Consistent with MTA's other statutory responsibilities and obligations, MTA's first priority for the use of all bus-eligible revenue realized in excess of funds already specifically budgeted for other purposes shall be to improve bus service for the transit-dependent by implementing MTA's obligations pursuant to this Consent Decree.

In order to satisfy both its statutory responsibilities as the county transportation planning and programming agency as recognized in the Consent Decree, and its other Consent Decree obligations the MTA has been working with the Municipal Operators to develop a Countywide program which conditions a new distribution of Proposition C 40% funds for improved bus service for the transit dependent.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

There are several major policy issues to be addressed. One issue is whether any share policy should apply to Proposition C 40% funds that are used to meet the requirements of the Consent Decree, which is exclusively an MTA obligation. Another issue is whether the Board should approve any new funding for Municipal Operators.

OPTIONS

One option is to continue excluding the funding of Consent Decree expenses from the existing formula allocation practice. This option was rejected because Consent Decree related operations have been absorbing an increasing share of Proposition C 40% revenues. As spending on the Consent Decree becomes a larger and larger share of the MTA's bus budget, it becomes increasingly difficult to support its total exclusion from formulization.

Another option is to deal with this issue in the state legislature. The Municipal Operators, are currently seeking legislation to compel inclusion of all Proposition C 40% bus related funding, as well as other bus related funds, in the pool of funds distributed to bus operators Countywide under the current statutory Formula Allocation Procedure. Depending upon the final terms, such legislation could greatly expand the amount of funds subject to statutory formula allocation. This was rejected also because it would not guarantee the Muni's a recurring source of funding and would not guarantee that the distributed funds are spent for Consent Decree specified purposes.

The third and recommended option is a compromise between the above two options to provide additional funding to the Municipal Operators without unreasonably reducing the MTA's limited operating revenues. In addition this option provides a basis for the Municipal Operators to help reduce the MTA's current and future operations and capital costs and further the countywide goals of the Consent Decree.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

Under the proposal, the MTA and the Munis will agree on the amount of Prop C funds which will be distributed over the next five years. The Municipal Operators will not receive retroactive funding for Fiscal Years 1998 through 2001. Beginning in FY 2002, the program will provide $15 million in each of the next five years including an annual 3% cumulative increase beginning in year two.

DISCUSSION

Since the formation of the MTA, whenever discretionary operating funds were used for MTA Transit Operations, a proportionate, share was typically allocated to the Municipal Operators. This share policy was not used when funds were allocated for service required by the Consent Decree. The MTA's position was that the Consent Decree was a regional responsibility, and like funding for the rail system, could be paid out of regional funds without matching distributions. The Municipal Operators argued that the concept applied to all funding for MTA bus operations and asked for proportionate distribution. MTA staff was then directed by the Board to work with the Municipal Operators to attempt to resolve the difference. This process was accelerated during the past month when the framework for this program was conceptually approved by all parties. The proposed program scope was to improve service countywide for the transit dependent by reducing overcrowding and expanding service. The program was envisioned to include more collaboration by the Municipal Operators and the MTA in identifying common goals and objectives and modifying the program to adjust to changing priorities that often occur over time. A significant obstacle to the proposed program has been the MTA's obligation under the Consent Decree to prioritize bus eligible funds to meet the Consent Decree costs. However, in his September 23, 1999 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Judge Hatter appears to recognize the benefits of having the Municipal Operators included in developing countywide service plans to achieve the Consent Decree's objectives.

Judge Hatter's order specifically stated that:

> "the Special Master...should consider, with the input of the joint working Group, the MTA and the Bus Riders other capacity increasing measures beyond the purchase of additional buses. For example, the Special Master should consider...the possibility of reducing or eliminating MTA service to those municipalities served by the sixteen municipal bus lines that offer overlapping service to the service provided by MTA."

After thoughtful consideration MTA staff and representatives of the Municipal Operators have agreed to jointly draft an amendment to AB974 to incorporate the terms of this agreement. It should be noted that consistent with existing legislation regarding the statutory formula allocation practice, a three-fourths vote of the Board would be required to change the Municipal Operator Service Improvement Program.

To reduce the operating costs of the MTA the Municipal Operators have agreed to begin discussions within 30 days to:

1. Identify overlapping services operated by MTA and develop strategies for operating these services, which will result in savings to the MTA.

2. Work with the MTA on new countywide service expansion plan to reduce over crowding, expand new services to transit dependents and provide ,which will reduce MTA's future operations and capital costs.

3. Provide input into MTA's vehicle purchase plan with the intent of reducing the capital cost of MTA's transit vehicles.

4. Continue to work with the MTA on the Universal Fare System to implement a countywide fare instrument.

The premise of the funding for this program would be that the Municipal Operators will assist MTA in reducing its operating and capital costs, which will help offset the program funding. As part of this program, all participating parties would agree not to pursue legislation or any legal action to alter the funding sources currently subject to formula allocations.

NEXT STEPS

If approved by the Board, staff will begin meeting with the Municipal Operators to implement the program beginning July 1, 2001 for FY 2002.

Prepared by: Jim McLaughlin

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MTA BOARD MEETING
MARCH 5, 2003

SUBJECT: PUBLIC HEARING FOR FARE RESTRUCTURING

ACTION: SCHEDULE A PUBLIC HEARING DATE ON APRIL 12, 2003; AUTHORIZE PUBLICATION OF LEGAL NOTICE

RECOMMENDATION

A) Schedule a public hearing date on Saturday, April 12, 2003 to receive public comment on possible fare adjustments; and

B) Authorize publication of the attached legal notice (Attachment A).

ISSUE

MTA's Ten Year Financial Plan assumes that limited adjustment will be made to MTA bus and rail fares effective in fiscal year 2004. This adjustment is necessary to help finance additional bus service mandated by the Consent Decree, and is consistent with the FTA Restructuring Plan submitted in May 1998 and the FTA 5309 report submitted in August 2002. The fare adjustments being considered include lowering the base cash fare, implementing a day pass to replace transfers and tokens, and increasing pass prices. The fare adjustments being considered will only recover a portion (approximately half) of anticipated annual Consent Decree costs.

There has been no fare increase in eight years. Effective November 1, 1998, the Consent Decree allowed the MTA to implement CPI adjustments to its transit fares. After November 1, 2003, Consent Decree restrictions to adjust fares are lifted.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In compliance with federal public hearing requirements and MTA policy, the Board is required to hold a public hearing and receive public testimony before approving a modification to fares. In addition, the Board will consider the potential impacts these changes may have on the community.

There are two options (A and B) under consideration. Both options include fare adjustments to lower the base cash fare, implement a day pass to replace transfers and tokens, and increase regular pass prices. For these options, day pass vouchers could be used by the Immediate Needs and General Relief programs that currently distribute tokens to their clients. Option A includes an increase to discounted passes and cash fares for seniors, disabled and students. In Option B, there is no change from the current fares for seniors, the disabled and students.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

It is estimated that the limited fare restructuring adjustments in Option A will generate an incremental $50 million per year and the fare restructuring adjustments in Option B will generate an incremental $45 million per year, making up about half the annual $100 million Consent Decree costs, with operating efficiencies making up the difference.

BACKGROUND

There has been no fare increase in eight years (since February 1995). As labor and other costs have increased, MTA's fare revenues have not kept pace with inflation. And with Consent Decree costs running at an annual rate of about $100 million, MTA needs to increase its fare revenues to adhere to its Ten Year Financial Forecast and be able to meet its expenses.

Much of the additional Consent Decree cost will be covered through improved efficiencies in operations. The Sector General Managers have already started working on cutting costs, a process that will take several years. In addition, there is a two-year lag time for Formula Allocation Program (FAP) funding to kick in.

Rather than implement an "across-the board" increase, MTA is proposing to make more equitable changes to the fare structure, including lowering the base cash fare in both Option A and Option B, implementing a day pass to replace transfers and tokens, and increasing regular pass prices. Option B recognizes the special fare needs of the elderly, disabled and students, by proposing no increase to those fare categories.

The attached proposed Notice of Public Hearing notifies the public of a hearing on April 12, 2003 and a description of the changes under consideration. The approved Notice will be posted and distributed following the March 5, 2003 Board adoption. The Board would preside at the hearing and receive testimony from the public on these matters. A staff report would then be prepared summarizing the findings of the hearing along with specific staff recommendations. The report would be presented to the Board of Directors at its regular meeting in May 2003 for action. Implementation of the fare adjustments is proposed for January 1, 2004.

NEXT STEPS

With Board approval, staff will initiate the publication of the legal notice and prepare for the upcoming public hearing.

ATTACHMENT

A. Notice of Public Hearing

Prepared by: April McKay, Executive Manager, Communications
Nalini Ahuja, Director, Regional Transportation Planning & Development

Matt Raymond
Chief Communications Officer

Roger Snoble
Chief Executive Officer

ATTACHMENT A

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING

Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

A public hearing will be held by the Board of Directors of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) on Saturday April 12, 2003 at 10 a.m. in the MTA's Headquarters Building, located at One Gateway Plaza, Los Angeles. The hearing is being held in conformance with federal public hearing requirements outlined in Section 9 (e) (3) (H) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, as amended, and public hearing guidelines adopted by the MTA's Board of Directors in 1993, as amended.

The purpose of the hearing is to receive public testimony on possible adjustments to MTA's fare structure. These changes are necessary to finance bus and rail operations in Fiscal Year 2004 and are consistent with those permitted by a federal Consent Decree affecting MTA's bus operations. Listed below are the proposals now under consideration:

PROPOSED FARE MODIFICATIONS *

CASH FARES	CURRENT FARE	OPTION A FARE	OPTION B FARE
Cash	$1.35	$1.25	$1.25
Tokens	.90	N.A.	N.A.
Transfers	.25	N.A.	N.A.
Senior Cash Fare	.45	.60	(no change) .45
Express Fare	$1.85 - $3.85	$1.75 - $2.25	$1.75 - $2.25
PASS FARES	**CURRENT FARE**	**OPTION A FARE**	**OPTION B FARE**
Weekly	$11.00	$14.00	$14.00
Semi-Monthly	21.00	27.00	27.00
Monthly	42.00	52.00	52.00
Senior	12.00	15.00	(no change) 12.00
Disabled	12.00	15.00	(no change) 12.00
Student K-12	20.00	24.00	(no change) 20.00
College/Vocational	30.00	36.00	(no change) 30.00
Day Pass	N.A.	3.00	3.00
Zone	4 @ $15.00	2@ $15.00	2@ $15.00
EST. IMPACT	**CURRENT FARE**	**OPTION A FARE**	**OPTION B FARE**
Avg. Fare/Boarding	$.56	$.66	$.64
Impact on Boardings	N.A.	-3.2%	-2.5%
Increase in Fare Rev.	N.A.	$37,000,000	$33,000,000
FAP* Rev. Increase	N.A.	$13,000,000	$12,000,000
Total Rev. Increase	N.A.	$50,000,000	$45,000,000
Farebox Recovery Ratio	28.9%	33.1%	32.7%

❖ The Day Pass will replace transfers and tokens. FAP increase occurs after two years.

Fare changes consistent with these proposals may be approved in whole or in part later this year. Approved changes would become effective January 1, 2004. Interested members of the public are encouraged to attend the upcoming public hearing and provide testimony. Persons unable to attend the hearing may submit written testimony postmarked through April 30, 2003. Correspondence should be addressed to:

LACMTA
One Gateway Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90012-2932
Attn: Michele Jackson - 2004 Fare Adjustments

Dated: _____ By: _____
Hal Bernson, Chairman

Table 4

Corridor Service Requirement Comparison

	Metro Rapid Line	Corridor Daily Trips				Corridor Peak Vehicles				Annual Corridor Revenue Hours				Annual Corridor Revenue Miles				Required Metro Rapid Fleet			
		Existing	Proposed	Change	% Change	Existing	Proposed	Change	% Change	Existing	Proposed	Change	% Change	Existing	Proposed	Change	% Change	AM Peak	PM Peak	Spares (20%)	Total
PHASE II A	South Broadway	294	338	44	15.0%	45	43	(2)	-4.4%	123,047	132,378	9,332	7.6%	1,366,879	1,548,746	181,868	13.3%	22	20	5	27
	Vermont	455	515	60	13.2%	52	50	(2)	-3.8%	183,575	184,899	1,324	0.7%	1,891,100	2,182,790	291,690	15.4%	34	32	7	41
	Florence	242	269	27	11.2%	25	26	1	4.0%	99,913	101,271	1,358	1.4%	1,223,062	1,287,931	64,869	5.3%	9	10	2	12
	Van Nuys	204	256	52	25.5%	29	29	0	0.0%	112,379	110,510	(1,869)	-1.7%	1,457,281	1,576,246	118,965	8.2%	18	20	4	24
	Soto	287	304	37	13.9%	32	31	(1)	-3.1%	101,566	102,195	640	0.6%	1,000,927	1,112,225	111,298	11.1%	15	15	3	18
	Crenshaw-Rosemore	209	230	21	10.0%	33	31	(2)	-6.1%	105,280	105,815	536	0.5%	1,241,297	1,355,869	114,572	9.2%	15	15	4	22
PHASE II B	Pico	349	393	44	12.6%	60	62	2	3.3%	204,783	208,011	3,267	1.6%	2,060,721	2,291,879	231,158	11.2%	21	26	6	32
	Santa Monica	384	423	39	10.2%	55	54	(1)	-1.8%	216,708	207,938	(8,770)	-4.0%	2,258,399	2,559,966	301,567	13.4%	33	37	8	48
	Hawthorne	347	260	13	5.3%	42	33	(9)	-21.4%	140,910	139,799	(1,111)	-0.8%	1,562,000	1,641,161	89,062	5.7%	21	20	5	26
	Long Beach Blvd.	311	334	23	7.4%	46	50	4	8.7%	183,621	186,808	3,187	1.9%	1,821,421	2,066,148	244,727	13.4%	20	23	5	28
PHASE II C	Hollywood-Fairfax-Pasadena	442	386	(56)	-12.7%	50	47	(3)	-6.0%	181,724	188,481	6,758	3.7%	1,809,161	2,091,104	281,942	15.6%	20	23	5	28
	Western	381	377	16	4.4%	36	37	1	2.8%	146,202	143,090	(2,112)	-1.5%	1,636,749	1,732,861	196,112	12.8%	15	23	5	26
	Beverly	390	390	0	0.0%	32	35	3	9.4%	107,789	108,432	663	0.6%	1,119,824	1,178,846	58,922	5.0%	8	8	2	10
	Vernon-La Cienega	176	187	11	6.3%	26	28	2	7.7%	91,283	91,606	255	0.3%	1,113,208	1,109,893	(3,315)	-0.3%	14	15	3	18
PHASE II D	Alameda	142	154	12	8.5%	26	28	2	7.7%	88,071	88,224	153	0.2%	1,100,371	1,185,643	85,272	7.7%	13	15	3	18
	Canfield	194	219	25	13.5%	24	25	1	4.2%	74,634	76,037	1,403	1.9%	971,726	922,243	50,516	5.8%	10	10	2	12
	San Fernando-Lankershim		121	121			5	5			19,457	19,457			306,000	306,000		7	5	2	10
	West Olympic	345	369	23	6.8%	42	43	1	2.4%	106,815	113,970	6,355	4.6%	1,197,088	1,374,313	177,225	14.8%	15	15	4	22
PHASE II E	Garvey-Chavez	408	427	19	4.7%	45	44	(1)	-2.2%	192,770	178,776	(13,993)	-7.3%	2,224,855	2,173,991	(50,864)	-2.3%	17	20	4	24
	Manchester	178	186	7	3.9%	26	27	(1)	-3.6%	81,064	81,064	0	0.0%	1,016,283	1,026,993	10,710	1.1%	11	10	3	14
	San Fernando (south)	193	226	33	17.1%	37	31	(6)	-16.2%	120,553	113,084	(7,472)	-6.2%	1,719,031	1,648,141	(70,890)	-4.1%	12	14	3	17
	Sepulveda (south)	140	149	9	6.4%	15	15	0	0.0%	60,029	59,519	(510)	-0.8%	602,700	633,556	30,856	5.1%	6	6	2	8
	Torrance-Long Beach	130	130	0	0.0%	11	14	3	27.3%	51,912	48,597	(3,315)	-6.4%	680,071	664,206	(5,865)	-0.8%	4	4	1	6
	Lincoln	184	205	21	11.4%	17	18	1	5.9%	72,535	73,657	1,122	1.5%	810,139	911,042	100,904	12.5%	5	5	1	6
	Totals	6,206	6,847	641	10.3%	808	809	1	0.1%	2,827,871	2,843,817	15,946	0.6%	31,711,185	34,595,403	2,884,218	9.1%	372	400	86	485

Note: Hollywood-Fairfax-Pasadena Metro Rapid operates over a combination of Line 217-Fairfax and Lines 180/181-Hollywood-Pasadena; this results in 2 local trips combined into one longer Metro Rapid trip, reducing the number of trips, but not service.

COMPARISON SERVICE PLANS FOR VERMONT RAPID BUS CORRIDOR

VERMONT CORRIDOR		WEEKDAY			SATURDAY			SUNDAY			DAILY REVENUE HOURS	SATURDAY REVENUE HOURS	SUNDAY REVENUE HOURS	TOTAL ANNUAL REV HRS ALL DAYS
BUS LINE	SERVICE PLAN	TRIPS NORTH	TRIPS SOUTH	TOTAL TRIPS	TRIPS NORTH	TRIPS SOUTH	TOTAL TRIPS	TRIPS NORTH	TRIPS SOUTH	TOTAL TRIPS				
204 (Local)	Previous Service	133	142	275	168	165	333	126	129	255	357	385	301	128,513
	Current Service	108	111	219	92	92	184	77	82	159	278	206	189	93,300
	Net Chg	-25	-31	-56	-76	-73	-149	-49	-47	-96	-79	-164	-112	-35,213
354 (Limited) Converted to Rapid Bus	Previous Service	93	89	182	0	0	0	0	0	0	219	0	0	55,845
	Current Service	156	144	300	98	97	195	59	61	132	325	204	126	100,791
	Net Chg	63	55	118	98	97	195	59	61	120	106	204	126	44,946
Summary MTA Impact	Previous Service	226	231	457	168	165	333	126	129	255	576	385	301	184,358
	Current Service	264	255	519	190	189	380	136	143	279	603	425	315	194,135
	Total Change	38	24	62	22	24	46	10	14	24	27	40	14	9,777
	Percent Change	16.8	10.3	13.5	13.1	14.5	13.8	7.9	10.8	9.4	9.8	10.4	4.7	5.3

MTA Service Development
March 2003

approximately 25-30 percent. The increase in the Wilshire/Whittier corridor appears to result from major growth in both Metro Rapid and local ridership with the percentage of riders using Metro Rapid dropping slightly from the historic limited-stop service, possibly due to (a) the wider stop spacing for Metro Rapid, (b) the old limited-stop service was only limited-stop for a portion of the route and operated in local service for long segments of the alignment, and (c) some people are transferring between the Metro Rapid and local buses along the corridor. As well, the Wilshire/Whittier Metro Rapid appears to be capacity-constrained in the morning peak period. For instance, an additional 23 trips were introduced on September 10, 2000 to alleviate this constraint resulting in an immediate increase in ridership for the overall Metro Rapid line.

Ridership

Total Unlinked Ridership	Wilshire/Whittier Corridor		Ventura Corridor	
	Before	After	Before	After
Local	39,700	50,000	13,500	8,100
Limited	23,800			
Metro Rapid		40,300		9,000
Total Ridership	63,500	90,300	13,500	17,100
Net Increase		26,800		3,600
% Increase		42.2%		26.7%

% Corridor Ridership			
Local	63%	55%	47%
Limited/Metro Rapid	37%	45%	53%

Passenger survey data indicate that over 1/3 of this overall increase is from non-transit users (patrons who never rode transit before), with 1/3 from current riders riding more often and 1/3 from riders of other MTA transit switching to service on these corridors. Of particular significance is that a 17-to-20 percent increase in ridership came directly from new transit travel (1/3 plus 1/3).

Passenger Trip Lengths

One of the major objectives of Metro Rapid was to provide more convenient travel for longer distance transit riders. From the average trip lengths by riders on the two corridors, it is clear that longer distance travelers are using the Metro Rapid services. However, it appears that Metro Rapid is not solely used by longer distance travelers, but remains similar to the previous limited-stop services with average trip lengths of approximately twice the local service. This makes the Metro Rapid more effective from a seat turnover standpoint and is not inconsistent with expectations from a similar light rail service.

APPENDIX 11

MTA BUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS AND PROCUREMENTS FOR FY03-FY10

Revised 2-21-03

BUS REQUIREMENTS	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	FY 10
DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR CHANGES	4 Metro Rapids (0): -Broadway -Vermont - Florence - Van Nuys Gold Line Bus-Rail Interface Plan (0)	Service Improvement Plan (+55) 3 Metro Rapids (0): - Soto - Crenshaw Rossmore - Santa Monica	SFV BRT (+18) 4 Metro Rapids (0): - Hawthorne - Long Beach - Hollywood/ Fairfax/ Pasadena - Western	Wilshire BRT (0) 4 Metro Rapids (0): - Beverly - Vernon / La Cienega - Atlantic - Central	4 Metro Rapids (0): - San Fernando/ Lankershim - W. Olympic - Garvey/ Chavez - Manchester	Eastside Enhancements (+32) 1 Metro Rapid (0): - San Fernando (south)		
Directly Operated								
35-foot buses	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
40-foot buses	1937	1983	1877	1721	1590	1512	1402	1198
45-foot buses	0	8	25	66	83	83	83	166
Articulated buses	0	0	83	166	250	333	416	500
Hybrid-Articulated buses (test)			6	6	6	6	6	6
Fuel Cell Bus 40-foot bus (test)			1	1	1	1	1	1
Total D.O. In-Service	**1955**	**2009**	**2010**	**1978**	**1948**	**1953**	**1926**	**1889**
Total Seats In-Service:	**78,128**	**80,336**	**82,258**	**82,884**	**83,466**	**85,326**	**85,906**	**86,604**
D.O. Spares								
35-foot buses	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
40-foot buses	388	397	376	345	318	303	281	240
45-foot buses	0	2	5	14	17	17	17	34
Articulated buses	0	0	17	34	50	67	84	100
Total D.O. Spares	**392**	**403**	**402**	**397**	**389**	**391**	**386**	**378**
Total Contract Buses:	**151**	**151**	**151**	**151**	**151**	**151**	**151**	**151**
Total Bus Requirements	**2498**	**2563**	**2563**	**2526**	**2488**	**2495**	**2463**	**2418**
Inactive Fleet								
Training	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
* Others (transitional)	406	309	379	440	471	425	418	433
Total Inactive Fleet	**428**	**331**	**401**	**462**	**493**	**447**	**440**	**455**
Total Fleet Size:	**2926**	**2894**	**2964**	**2988**	**2981**	**2942**	**2903**	**2873**

BUS PROCUREMENTS	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10
Vehicle Deliveries								
35-foot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
40-foot	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
45-foot	0	10	20	50	20	0	0	100
Artics	0	0	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total Deliveries	20	10	120	150	120	100	100	200
Retired / Replace								
Total Retired	(71)	(42)	(50)	(126)	(127)	(139)	(139)	(230)
Cumulative Net Increase / (Decrease)	(51)	(83)	(13)	11	4	(35)	(74)	(104)
Total Base Fleet Ownership	**2926**	**2894**	**2964**	**2988**	**2981**	**2942**	**2903**	**2873**

Assumes:

1) FY03 began with a total base fleet size of 2,977 and an active fleet of 2,498 (Effective July 1, 2002)

2) Seats: 35'=36, 40'=40, 45'=46, and articulated=60.

3) Approximately 55 directly operated buses in-service will be added as part of the Consent Decree Requirements in FY04. 21 Contract buses are being reallocated due to cancellations of some contract lines (part of the June 2003 Service Change Program), which results in a zero impact on their bus requirements.

4) Spare ratios were rounded up and may be greater than 20% as a result.

Special Note (1): Six Hybrid-Electric Articulated buses and one Fuel Cell Bus (40-foot) will be procured in FY05 for testing purposes and may be expanded in FY06.

Special Note (2): In addition to the described Metro Rapid Bus Lines there are four more that may be operated by municipal operators:
1) Pico 2) Sepulveda 3) Torrance / Long Beach 4) Lincoln

ATTACHMENT 1

Delivery Schedule Summary

As of January 1, 2002	294 Bus* Neoplan Order (carried over from FY97)	250 Neoplan (Base)	New Flyer "Las Vegas" Buses	Neoplan (50 Bus Option)	Neoplan (100 Bus Option)	New Flyer (Base)	NABI (Base)	New Flyer (Option)	NABI Option	NABI - 370 Contract	Additional Buses to be bought by MTA Contractors**	"High Capacity Bus Buy	Additional Buses Req'd (through FY04)	Total New Buses (Through FY04)
Total Buses in Contract	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	223	215	370	115	30	247	2095
Technology	High Floor CNG	High Floor CNG	Low Floor Diesel	High Floor CNG	High Floor CNG	High Floor CNG	Low Floor CNG	Low Floor Diesel	Low Floor CNG	Low Floor CNG	Diesel	45' Low Floor CNG	Low Floor	
Final Bus Delivery Date(per Contract)	Sep-97	Sep-98	Sep-98	Dec-98	Jul-99	Dec-99	Oct-01	Dec-01	Jun-01	Jun-02	Jun-00	Jun-03	Jun-04	
Proposed Delivery Date(Current Schedule)	Sep-97	Sep-98	Sep-98	Dec-98	Jul-99	Mar-00	Jul-00	Jan-01	Jun-01	Jun-02	Jun-00	Oct-02	Jun-04	
Summary - Deliveries/Acceptances														
Total Scheduled Deliveries(Thru Jan 1, '02)	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	223	215	84	115	0	0	1532
Actual Buses Accepted(Thru Jan 1, '02)	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	223	215	57	115	0	0	1505
New Buses in Revenue Service	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	223	215	0	115	0	0	1448
Buses Remaining in Contract(s)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	370	0	30	247	944
Percentage Completion	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	69.12%

Status of Accelerated Bus Procurement Plan		Neoplan	New Flyer	NABI 215 Bus Buy	NABI 370 Bus Buy	Contractor Buys	Total
New Buses in Revenue Service	1448	437	466	430		115	1448
Buses remaining in contracts	370				370		370
Option Buses Available (NABI)	700				700		700
Total Buses Available (FY98-FY04)	2518	437	466	430	1070	128	2518

* 37 Buses from the original 294 Bus Neoplan Contract were delivered & accepted in FY98. These buses were included as part of the Accelerated Bus Procurement Plan. There were a total of 257 Neoplan CNG buses delivered to the MTA in FY96 and FY97, so new bus deliveries from FY96 - FY04 total 2649 (257+2095+297).
** MTA Contracted Service Providers have entered into lease agreements to acquire a total of 115 buses for MTA contract service.

Delivery S le Summary

As of January 1, 2000	294 Bus* Neoplan Order (carried over from FY97)	250 Neoplan (Base)	New Flyer "Las Vegas" Buses	Neoplan (50 Bus Option)	Neoplan (100 Bus Option)	New Flyer (Base)	NABI (Base)	New Flyer (Option)	NABI Option	NABI - 370 Contract	Additional Buses to be bought by MTA Contractors**	Additional Buses Req'd (through FY04)	Consent Decree Buses***	Total New Buses (Through FY04)
Total Buses in Contract	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	223	215	370	115	277	297	2392
Technology	High Floor CNG	High Floor CNG	Low Floor Diesel	High Floor CNG	High Floor CNG	High Floor CNG	Low Floor CNG	Low Floor CNG	Low Floor CNG	Low Floor CNG	Diesel	Low Floor	Low Floor	
Final Bus Delivery Date (per Contract)	Sep-97	Sep-98	Sep-98	Dec-98	Jul-99	Dec-99	Oct-01	Dec-00	Jun-01	Jun-02	Jun-00	Jun-04	Jun-02	
Proposed Delivery Date (Current Schedule)	Sep-97	Sep-98	Sep-98	Dec-98	Jul-99	Mar-00	Jul-00	Jan-01	Jun-01	Jun-02	Jun-00	Jun-04	Jun-02	
Summary - Deliveries/Acceptances														
Total Scheduled Deliveries (Thru Jan 1, '00)	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	1	0	0	9	0	0	905
Actual Buses Accepted (Thru Jan. 1, '00)	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	0	0	0	9	0	0	905
New Buses in Revenue Service	37	250	20	50	100	223	215	1	0	0	9	0	0	905
Buses Remaining in Contract(s)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	222	215	370	106	242	297	1452
Percentage Completion	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	0.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	37.83%

Status of Accelerated Bus Procurement Plan		Neoplan	New Flyer	NABI 215 Bus Buy	NABI 370 Bus Buy	Contractor Buses	Total
New Buses in Revenue Service	905	437	244	215		9	905
Buses remaining in contracts	807		222	215	370		807
Option Buses Available (NABI)	700				700		700
Buses to be purchased by Contractors**	115					106	106
Total Buses Available (FY98-FY04)	2527	437	466	430	1070	115	2518

* 37 Buses from the original 294 Bus Neoplan Contract were delivered & accepted in FY98. These buses were included as part of the Accelerated Bus Procurement Plan. There were a total of 257 Neoplan CNG buses delivered to the MTA in FY96 and FY97, so total new bus deliveries from FY96 - FY04 will total 2649 (257+2095+297).

** MTA Contracted Service Providers have committed to provide up to 150 replacement buses. MTA's authorization to proceed with these purchases is pending.

*** Funding has not been identified for the purchase of 297 buses mandated by the U.S. District Court but subsequently stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pending appeal by the MTA.

Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Equipment Maintenance Department
VMS Support Team
Distribution of Buses / Number of Buses By Age By Division / Service Sectors
As of January 1, 2003

	Age in Years																							
Division/Sector	<1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total	Age
1	18	129	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*186*	*2.6*
2	56	98	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*186*	*2.5*
Gateway City Sector Total	74	227	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	21	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*372*	*2.6*
8	30	0	16	0	0	1	84	10	0	17	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*168*	*5.7*
15	64	47	0	0	0	9	43	48	0	27	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*245*	*4.6*
San Fernando Valley Sector Total	94	47	16	0	0	10	127	58	0	44	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*413*	*5.1*
9	0	0	28	141	0	0	0	0	0	14	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	3	*211*	*5.5*
30	103	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	37	3	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	*194*	*4.8*
San Gabriel Valley Sector Total	103	15	28	141	0	0	0	0	0	38	47	3	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	15	4	*405*	*5.2*
5	25	27	127	43	0	0	0	0	0	20	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*250*	*3.2*
18	30	6	0	7	102	111	6	0	0	13	7	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*284*	*5.0*
South Bay Sector Total	55	33	127	50	102	111	6	0	0	33	15	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*534*	*4.2*
6	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	30	9	0	0	8	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	*79*	*9.4*
7	21	40	166	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*256*	*3.0*
10	0	74	1	1	146	24	0	1	0	6	6	4	1	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*278*	*4.6*
West Central Sector Total	21	114	167	1	166	24	0	1	0	57	23	4	1	22	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	*613*	*5.3*
All Divisions/Sectors Subtotal	347	436	357	192	268	145	133	59	0	196	123	7	9	34	12	0	0	0	0	15	4	*2,337*	*4.0*
First Transit	1	94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*95*	*1.8*
Coach USA	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*25*	*1.6*
MV Transit	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*6*	*1.5*
Trans Concepts	19	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	*21*	*0.6*
Leased	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	*4*	*15.5*
Active Buses Subtotal	367	561	357	194	268	145	133	59	0	196	123	7	9	34	12	4	0	0	0	15	4	*2,488*	*4.2*
Inactive Buses*	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	52	53	201	24	0	0	14	8	3	*359*	*14.3*
Special Assignments**	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	5	10	2	5	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	*43*	*11.4*
MTA Total Owned Fleet	369	561	357	194	269	145	133	59	0	206	128	20	63	92	222	28	0	0	14	23	7	*2990*	*5.6*

* Inactive Buses : Pending for Sale, On Sales List, Contingency and Make Ready Buses

** Special Assignment : Training Buses

VMS / Focus Data

MISSING BUS SUMMARY -- JAN. thru JUNE 2002

DATE	LINE	LOCATION	DIRECTION	TIME	MAGNITUDE	MECHANICAL	NON-MECHANICAL	NO DOCUMENTATION	NOT ANALYZED
26-Jun-02	152	Vineland & Vanowen	NB	4:13 PM	1.40	Air Conditioner			
21-Feb-02	207	Western & Wilshire	NB	5:13 PM	1.24	Air Leak			
12-Apr-02	060	7th & Central	WB	3:00 PM	1.40	Air Leak			
17-Jan-02	028	Olympic & Figueroa	WB	4:45 PM	1.48	B. O. Bus			
20-Mar-02	004	Santa Monica & Highland	EB	3:02 PM	1.47	B. O. Bus			
19-Jun-02	081	Figueroa & Adams	SB	5:02 PM	1.21	B. O. Bus			
8-May-02	180	Vermont & Prospect	SB	3:40 PM	1.21	Brakes			
5-Jun-02	014	Adams & Vermont	EB	8:49 AM	1.27	Brakes			
17-Jan-02	045	Broadway & Solano	SB	3:11 PM	1.29	Breakdown			
18-Mar-02	060	7th & Central	EB	7:46 AM	1.34	Breakdown			
3-Apr-02	750	Ventura & Vineland	WB	3:00 PM	1.25	Breakdown			
1-Apr-02	180	Vermont & Prospect	NB	6:28 AM	1.40	Breakdown			
5-Apr-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	3:37 PM	1.48	Breakdown			
18-Apr-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	3:36 PM	1.35	Breakdown			
18-Mar-02	207	Western & Wilshire	NB	4:31 PM	1.44	Coolant Leak			
13-Feb-02	720	Wilshire & Western	WB	4:19 PM	1.68	Engine			
25-Feb-02	068	Cesar Chavez & Alameda	EB	4:13 PM	1.30	Engine			
29-Mar-02	105	Vernon & Vermont	WB	3:00 PM	1.21	Engine			
23-May-02	060	7th & Central	WB	3:58 PM	1.33	Engine			
4-Jun-02	030	Pico & Figueroa	EB	6:39 AM	1.28	Engine			
5-Jun-02	053	Central & Washington	SB	3:14 PM	1.51	Engine			
28-Jun-02	060	7th & Central	WB	4:16 PM	1.22	Engine			
7-Feb-02	251	Soto & 4th	SB	3:00 PM	1.27	Engine Misses			
17-Jun-02	060	7th & Central	WB	3:33 PM	1.28	Exhaust Problem			
22-Mar-02	018	Whittier & Soto	EB	4:06 PM	1.38	Flat Tire			
9-May-02	217	Fairfax & Beverly	NB	7:41 AM	1.54	Flat Tire			
9-May-02	217	Fairfax & Beverly	SB	8:27 AM	1.23	Flat Tire			
9-May-02	210	Crenshaw & King	SB	7:03 AM	1.26	Front Door			
3-Jun-02	028	N. Figueroa & Ave. 26	SB	7:54 AM	1.20	Front Door			
15-Feb-02	156	Hollywood & Highland	NB	6:43 AM	1.49	Fuel Leak			
26-Jun-02	234	Sepulveda & Parthenia	NB	6:41 AM	1.51	Fuel Problem			
27-Mar-02	066	9th & Figueroa	EB	7:01 AM	1.26	Low Water			
14-Feb-02	251	Soto & 1st	SB	4:54 PM	1.28	No Start			
19-Apr-02	207	Western & Wilshire	NB	5:34 PM	1.42	No Start		X	
26-Apr-02	720	Wilshire & Western	WB	8:37 AM	1.52	No Start			
8-May-02	206	Normandie & Wilshire	SB	4:14 PM	1.27	No Start			
23-May-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	8:00 AM	1.21	No Start			
12-Jun-02	720	6th & St. Paul	EB	7:29 AM	1.46	No Start			
18-Mar-02	045	Broadway & Washington	SB	3:24 PM	1.40	Out Late - Equip.			
5-Jun-02	033	Venice & La Brea	WB	6:58 AM	1.24	Out Late - Equip.			
17-Apr-02	018	Whittier & Soto	EB	5:04 PM	1.35	Rear Door			
12-Jun-02	030	Pico & Figueroa	WB	4:09 PM	1.45	Slow Bus			
21-Jun-02	033	Venice & La Brea	WB	3:00 PM	1.28	Slow Bus			
11-Feb-02	066	9th & Figueroa	EB	7:05 AM	1.21	Stalled			
1-Mar-02	200	Alvarado & 6th	SB	7:21 AM	1.49	Stalled			
4-Mar-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	6:05 AM	1.42	Stalled			
19-Apr-02	207	Western & Wilshire	SB	3:08 PM	1.69	Stalled			
8-May-02	207	Western & Wilshire	SB	4:25 PM	1.28	Stalled			
10-May-02	234	Sepulveda & Parthenia	NB	6:24 AM	1.58	Stalled			
23-May-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	5:35 PM	1.21	Stalled			
6-Jun-02	210	Crenshaw & King	NB	6:12 PM	1.28	Stalled			
26-Jun-02	720	Whittier & Soto	WB	5:26 PM	1.45	Stalled			
26-Jun-02	720	6th & St. Paul	WB	5:21 PM	1.38	Stalled Alternator			
26-Jun-02	720	Wilshire & Western	WB	5:35 PM	1.77	Stalled Alternator			
15-Mar-02	033	Venice & La Brea	EB	5:34 PM	1.57	Steering			
18-Mar-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	NB	5:34 PM	1.34	Steering			
1-May-02	066	9th & Figueroa	WB	5:02 PM	1.38	Steering			
14-Jun-02	045	Broadway & Solano	SB	8:14 AM	1.23	Steering			
1-Mar-02	180	Vermont & Prospect	NB	8:44 AM	1.70	Throttle			
26-Feb-02	092	Glendale & Montana	NB	4:07 PM	1.33	Transmission			
21-Mar-02	026	San Pedro & 8th	NB	5:11 PM	1.22	Transmission			
18-Apr-02	060	Pacific & Santa Fe	WB	6:34 AM	1.40	Transmission			
25-Apr-02	018	6th & St. Paul	EB	7:06 AM	1.25	Transmission			
2-May-02	060	7th & Central	WB	4:56 PM	1.21	Transmission			
28-Jun-02	060	7th & Central	EB	5:40 PM	1.28	Transmission			
21-Mar-02	026	7th & Bixel	EB	6:08 AM	1.40	Turn Signal			
14-Feb-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	7:39 AM	1.52	W/C Lift			
19-Feb-02	033	Venice & La Brea	WB	5:08 PM	1.48	W/C Lift			
18-Mar-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	3:16 PM	1.32	W/C Lift			
21-Mar-02	026	7th & Bixel	EB	6:53 AM	1.27	W/C Lift			
29-Apr-02	033	Venice & La Brea	WB	4:29 PM	1.40	W/C Lift			
25-Apr-02	720	Wilshire & Western	EB	5:40 PM	1.23	W/C Ramp			
10-Jan-02	060	7th & Central	EB	6:38 AM	1.43	X	Passenger Incident		
28-Jan-02	060	7th & Central	EB	6:13 AM	1.27	X			
30-Jan-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	4:30 PM	1.36	X			
21-Feb-02	055	Adams & San Pedro	EB	5:08 PM	1.33	X			
27-Mar-02	060	Pacific & Santa Fe	EB	3:36 PM	1.37	X			
29-Apr-02	053	Central & Washington	NB	6:50 AM	1.33	X			
7-May-02	166	Nordhoff & Balboa	EB	3:05 PM	1.50	X			
28-May-02	014	Adams & Vermont	EB	7:24 AM	1.46	X			
17-Apr-02	720	Wilshire & Western	WB	3:07 PM	1.35		Accident		
18-Mar-02	207	Western & Wilshire	NB	3:04 PM	1.36		Blocked by Train		
30-Apr-02	055	Adams & San Pedro	WB	5:21 PM	1.35		Collision		
14-Feb-02	251	Soto & 1st	NB	3:17 PM	1.81		Dirty Interior		
25-Mar-02	020	Wilshire & Western	EB	8:24 AM	1.43		Dirty Interior		
18-Apr-02	033	Venice & La Brea	WB	4:23 PM	1.42		Dirty Interior		
28-May-02	028	Olympic & Figueroa	WB	5:31 PM	1.44		Dirty Interior		
22-Mar-02	720	Whittier & Soto	EB	3:35 PM	1.63		Disturbance	X	
4-Feb-02	234	Sepulveda & Parthenia	SB	3:34 PM	1.28		Farebox		
19-Feb-02	033	Venice & La Brea	WB	3:32 PM	1.33		Farebox		

MISSING BUS SUMMARY – JAN. thru JUNE 2002									
DATE	LINE	LOCATION	DIRECTION	TIME	MAGNITUDE	MECHANICAL	NON-MECHANICAL	NO DOCUMENTATION	NOT ANALYZED
11-Apr-02	260	Atlantic & Slauson	SB	5:40 PM	1.42		Missed Relief		
18-Mar-02	207	Western & Wilshire	SB	3:40 PM	1.31		Missing Passenger		
4-Feb-02	260	Atlantic & Slauson	NB	7:33 AM	1.36		Operator Error		
5-Mar-02	207	Western & Wilshire	NB	5:12 PM	1.31		Operator Error		
8-May-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	NB	4:35 PM	1.22		Operator Injury		
28-Apr-02	030	Pico & Figueroa	WB	4:51 PM	1.21		Other		
8-Jun-02	105	Vernon & Vermont	EB	7:39 AM	1.21		Out Late		
18-Jan-02	053	Central & Washington	SB	5:37 PM	1.56		Sick Passenger		
9-Jan-02	720	Whittier & Soto	WB	7:19 AM	1.30		Temp. Letter Trip		
13-Feb-02	720	Whittier & Soto	WB	3:50 PM	1.38		Traffic Delay		
14-Feb-02	207	Western & Wilshire	SB	5:40 PM	1.39		Traffic Delay		
14-Feb-02	210	Crenshaw & King	SB	7:06 AM	1.42		Traffic Delay		
25-Feb-02	088	Washington & Figueroa	EB	4:20 PM	1.35		Traffic Delay		
18-Mar-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	4:38 PM	1.23		Traffic Delay		
8-Jan-02	720	6th & St. Paul	WB	6:37 PM	1.26			X	
9-Jan-02	033	Venice & La Brea	EB	3:09 PM	1.34			X	
10-Jan-02	060	Pacific & Santa Fe	EB	5:17 PM	1.24			X	
10-Jan-02	060	Pacific & Santa Fe	WB	8:13 AM	1.42			X	
11-Jan-02	040	Broadway & Washington	NB	4:21 PM	1.21			X	
11-Jan-02	040	Broadway & Washington	SB	5:00 PM	1.27			X	
11-Jan-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	4:08 PM	1.33			X	
11-Jan-02	045	Broadway & Washington	SB	6:28 PM	1.30			X	
11-Jan-02	068	8th & Figueroa	WB	5:29 PM	1.40			X	
15-Jan-02	010	Temple & Figueroa	WB	3:04 PM	1.51			X	
16-Jan-02	018	6th & St. Paul	EB	6:40 AM	1.30			X	
18-Jan-02	033	Venice & La Brea	EB	3:44 PM	1.21			X	
23-Jan-02	081	N. Figueroa & Ave. 26	NB	3:15 PM	1.28			X	
25-Jan-02	108	Gage & Pacific	EB	5:13 PM	1.33			X	
29-Jan-02	040	Broadway & Washington	NB	8:15 AM	1.44			X	
28-Jan-02	040	Broadway & Washington	NB	4:32 PM	1.42			X	
28-Jan-02	040	Broadway & Washington	SB	5:22 PM	1.21			X	
28-Jan-02	042	Broadway & Washington	SB	6:52 AM	1.44			X	
28-Jan-02	045	Broadway & Washington	SB	5:10 PM	1.25			X	
28-Jan-02	055	Adams & San Pedro	WB	6:29 AM	1.32			X	
30-Jan-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	NB	4:35 PM	1.32			X	
4-Feb-02	260	Atlantic & Slauson	SB	3:50 PM	1.72			X	
5-Feb-02	266	Rosemead & Whittier	SB	5:08 PM	1.45			X	
5-Feb-02	750	Ventura & Vineland	WB	7:32 AM	1.27			X	
6-Feb-02	720	Whittier & Soto	WB	7:33 AM	1.34			X	
6-Feb-02	720	Whittier & Soto	WB	3:58 PM	1.77			X	
7-Feb-02	620	Soto & 4th	NB	3:24 PM	1.23			X	
13-Feb-02	720	Wilshire & La Brea	EB	4:48 PM	1.22			X	
14-Feb-02	040	Broadway & Washington	SB	5:40 PM	1.74			X	
18-Feb-02	014	Beverly & Vermont	WB	6:52 AM	1.38			X	
19-Feb-02	068	8th & Figueroa	WB	5:38 PM	1.27			X	
19-Feb-02	068	9th & Figueroa	EB	6:51 AM	1.26			X	
19-Feb-02	081	N. Figueroa & Ave. 26	NB	4:04 PM	1.51			X	
19-Feb-02	081	N. Figueroa & Ave. 26	NB	5:21 PM	1.47			X	
20-Feb-02	720	Whittier & Soto	WB	3:54 PM	1.75			X	
20-Feb-02	720	Wilshire & La Brea	EB	5:29 PM	1.23			X	
22-Feb-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	5:05 PM	1.51			X	
22-Feb-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	5:37 PM	1.21			X	
27-Feb-02	115	Manchester & Broadway	EB	5:18 PM	1.21			X	
27-Feb-02	130	Artesia & Atlantic	EB	3:59 PM	1.61			X	
27-Feb-02	165	Vanowen & Balboa	EB	3:09 PM	1.46			X	
4-Mar-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	4:26 PM	1.25			X	
5-Mar-02	207	Western & Wilshire	NB	3:04 PM	1.36			X	
5-Mar-02	212	La Brea & Pico	NB	6:46 AM	1.49			X	
13-Mar-02	720	6th & St. Paul	WB	7:38 AM	1.35			X	
13-Mar-02	720	Wilshire & La Brea	EB	3:36 PM	1.29			X	
13-Mar-02	720	Wilshire & Western	WB	3:07 PM	1.29			X	
14-Mar-02	014	Beverly & Vermont	EB	4:27 PM	1.58			X	
14-Mar-02	026	San Pedro & 8th	SB	5:33 PM	1.31			X	
18-Mar-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	4:29 PM	1.36			X	
22-Mar-02	016	3rd & Alvarado	EB	7:08 AM	1.50			X	
22-Mar-02	018	6th & St. Paul	EB	7:10 AM	1.23			X	
22-Mar-02	720	6th & St. Paul	EB	8:05 AM	1.40			X	
25-Mar-02	720	Wilshire & Western	WB	5:05 PM	1.23			X	
27-Mar-02	055	Adams & San Pedro	EB	7:00 AM	1.44			X	
29-Mar-02	108	Slauson & Broadway	EB	4:04 PM	1.48			X	
29-Mar-02	110	Gage & Pacific	EB	3:58 PM	1.74			X	
1-Apr-02	111	Florence & Central	EB	3:28 PM	1.24			X	
1-Apr-02	111	Florence & Central	WB	3:44 PM	1.30			X	
1-Apr-02	115	Manchester & Market	WB	6:37 AM	1.35			X	
3-Apr-02	750	Ventura & Vineland	WB	7:37 AM	1.22			X	
11-Apr-02	251	Soto & 1st	SB	7:24 AM	1.37			X	
16-Apr-02	014	Beverly & Vermont	WB	3:33 PM	1.26			X	
17-Apr-02	016	6th & St. Paul	EB	7:24 AM	1.23			X	
17-Apr-02	720	6th & St. Paul	WB	5:28 PM	1.33			X	
17-Apr-02	720	Whittier & Soto	WB	7:13 AM	1.31			X	
18-Apr-02	026	7th & Bixel	EB	6:18 AM	1.26			X	
18-Apr-02	026	7th & Bixel	EB	6:52 AM	1.41			X	
19-Apr-02	060	7th & Central	EB	4:05 PM	1.25			X	
19-Apr-02	066	9th & Figueroa	EB	6:63 AM	1.22			X	
19-Apr-02	204	Vermont & Wilshire	SB	5:12 PM	1.51			X	
19-Apr-02	207	Western & Wilshire	SB	4:29 PM	1.65			X	
22-Apr-02	720	Wilshire & La Brea	EB	5:17 PM	1.44			X	
24-Apr-02	760	Ventura & Vineland	EB	8:29 AM	1.38			X	
25-Apr-02	720	Wilshire & Western	WB	6:54 AM	1.36			X	
1-May-02	066	8th & Figueroa	WB	6:37 PM	1.26			X	
1-May-02	081	N. Figueroa & Ave. 26	NB	5:33 PM	1.49			X	
6-May-02	175	St. George & Aloha	EB	3:02 PM	1.44			X	

MISSING BUS SUMMARY – JAN. thru JUNE 2002

DATE	LINE	LOCATION	DIRECTION	TIME	MAGNITUDE	MECHANICAL	NON-MECHANICAL	NO DOCUMENTATION	NOT ANALYZED
8-May-02	207	Western & Wilshire	SB	3:11 PM	1.66			X	
10-May-02	236	Balboa & Vanowen	NB	3:18 PM	1.33			X	
20-May-02	014	Beverly & Vermont	EB	3:28 PM	1.31			X	
20-May-02	026	7th & Bixel	EB	6:57 AM	1.33			X	
20-May-02	561	Van Nuys & Sherman Way	SB	7:08 AM	1.48			X	
22-May-02	010	6th & St. Paul	EB	6:33 AM	1.30			X	
22-May-02	720	Wilshire & La Brea	EB	6:39 PM	1.36			X	
22-May-02	720	Wilshire & La Brea	WB	7:04 AM	1.41			X	
23-May-02	066	8th & Figueroa	WB	6:29 PM	1.23			X	
28-May-02	014	Beverly & Vermont	WB	3:22 PM	1.29			X	
28-May-02	014	Beverly & Vermont	WB	3:42 PM	1.23			X	
30-May-02	720	Wilshire & Western	EB	8:15 AM	1.31			X	
11-Jun-02	251	Soto & 1st	SB	7:12 AM	1.26			X	
12-Jun-02	016	6th & St. Paul	WB	6:23 PM	1.61			X	
12-Jun-02	018	6th & St. Paul	EB	6:45 AM	1.36			X	
14-Jun-02	045	Broadway & Solano	NB	3:56 PM	1.27			X	
14-Jun-02	108	Stauson & Broadway	WB	3:17 PM	1.23			X	
17-Jun-02	060	Pacific & Santa Fe	WB	6:43 AM	1.24			X	
19-Jun-02	720	6th & St. Paul	EB	7:26 AM	1.27			X	
20-Jun-02	026	7th & Bixel	EB	6:43 AM	1.31			X	
25-Jun-02	260	Atlantic & Stauson	NB	7:29 AM	1.69			X	
26-Jun-02	720	Wishire & Western	WB	6:08 PM	1.48			X	
22-Jan-02	068	Washington & Figueroa	EB	7:25 AM	1.24			X - 2 buses missing	
22-Jan-02	068	Washington & Figueroa	EB	7:50 AM	1.34			X - 2 buses missing	
18-Mar-02	045	Broadway & Washington	NB	7:32 AM	1.36			X - 2 buses missing	
26-Mar-02	720	Wilshire & Western	EB	3:19 PM	1.35			X - 2 buses missing	
1-May-02	045	Broadway & Washington	SB	5:25 PM	1.33			X - 2 buses missing	
28-Jan-02	060	Pacific & Santa Fe	EB	3:32 PM	1.61			X - Checker on Break	
30-Jan-02	175	St. George & Tracy	WB	3:04 PM	1.28			X - Interline	
21-Feb-02	028	Olympic & Figueroa	WB	5:32 PM	1.32			X - Interline	
7-May-02	165	Victory & Van Nuys	EB	3:16 PM	1.21			X - Interline	
18-Jun-02	028	Olympic & Figueroa	WB	5:36 PM	1.29			X - Interline	
20-Mar-02	002	Sunset & Echo Park	WB	4:53 PM	1.26				X
20-Mar-02	002	Sunset & Western	EB	5:24 PM	1.48				X
					TOTALS	84	25	115	2
					OVERALL	216 Missing Bus Incidents involving 226 missing buses			

	TOP 20	RAPID BUS	OTHER	COMBINED
TOTAL ONE-WAY CHECKS CONDUCTED	788	139	804	1711
TOTAL 1.20 LF EXCEPTIONS	722	238	521	1481
EXCEPTIONS DUE TO MISSING BUS(ES)	129	36	51	216

X. MONITORING AND REPORTING-IN-SERVICE EQUIPMENT FAILURES

Equipment Failure In-service by Reason - October 2001 to December 2002

DEFECT TYPE	Oct-01	Nov-01	Dec-01	Jan-02	Feb-02	Mar-02	Apr-02	May-02	Jun-02	Jul-02	Aug-02	Sep-02	Oct-02	Nov-02	Dec-02
A/C & HEATING	41	29	29	17	33	27	12	27	42	68	71	68	20	30	8
ACCIDENT	2	1	2	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
ADVERTISING SIGN	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-
AIR SYSTEM	69	60	68	59	65	57	48	62	54	64	84	67	84	69	66
BRAKES	157	147	134	126	155	139	134	126	132	105	106	105	125	136	111
BROKEN GLASS	3	2	2	3	2	3	5	2	1	1	2	2	8	5	0
CANCELLED BY DIS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	0	1	-
DIRTY BUS	25	18	22	16	13	9	18	18	9	12	20	26	32	23	33
DOOR	142	129	124	119	121	136	97	106	103	137	104	103	79	74	74
ELECTRICAL	366	371	316	239	261	240	281	257	232	199	218	222	187	203	184
ENGINE	863	747	762	716	761	755	664	564	695	618	698	687	673	604	566
FAREBOX	13	18	10	12	7	10	17	9	8	7	8	11	8	9	10
FET ROAD CALL	709	560	543	533	539	508	508	383	318	372	397	428	456	431	436
MISCELLANEOUS	173	140	118	103	133	136	140	151	133	149	129	121	79	80	64
NO DEFECT FOUND	251	267	124	78	86	101	101	84	83	125	74	120	124	103	87
NO EQUIPMENT/PERSON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
O.K. COACH CHANGE	3	4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	0	1	-
OPERATOR ERROR	4	3	3	1	-	3	-	1	-	1	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATOR REFUSED BUS	5	13	8	8	4	5	8	8	10	8	20	14	10	10	10
PASSENGER INCIDENT	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	0	1	0	1	0	0
RADIO	15	9	9	16	10	11	9	9	5	7	14	7	15	9	6
ROACHES	6	10	13	7	9	5	2	11	4	10	7	11	3	5	1
SICK PASSENGER	29	23	31	24	16	16	20	11	11	20	15	12	26	18	19
STEERING	35	20	24	21	27	27	32	34	30	17	27	20	23	24	15
TIRES	109	65	82	89	62	47	50	48	64	77	84	79	83	75	59
TRANSMISSION	149	141	146	123	142	159	133	113	80	97	104	110	112	98	77
UNDERCARRIAGE	59	55	54	48	53	40	60	40	42	54	46	38	57	39	40
UNKNOWN	10	9	4	12	6	-	2	24	4	6	39	27	5	2	26
VANDALISM	20	20	13	5	6	13	12	21	8	10	20	29	23	13	17
WHEELCHAIR LIFT	62	60	48	48	65	54	37	46	44	48	37	37	47	50	60
WINDOWS AND GLASS	3	3	1	1	4	-	1	2	1	3	1	3	1	1	2
WIPERS	7	29	27	9	2	6	5	3	1	0	2	4	4	26	7
WRONG BUS NUMBER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3,331	2,953	2,718	2,434	2,565	2,510	2,390	2,160	2,114	2,217	2,332	2,352	2,285	2,140	1,978

X. MONITORING AND REPORTING-CANCELLED AND LATE RUNS

Outlates & Cancellations by Division - January - March 2002

	OUTLATES		CANCELLATIONS			REASONS FOR OUTLATES and CANCELLATIONS		
Division	Number	% of Pull-outs	Number	% of Pull-outs	ON-TIME PULL-OUT RATE	No Operator Available	Bus Mechanical Failure	Other
1	18	0.10%	0	0.00%	99.89%	0	14	4
2	97	0.59%	0	0.00%	99.40%	6	87	4
3	59	0.30%	0	0.00%	99.70%	5	52	2
5	46	0.23%	0	0.00%	99.76%	2	40	4
6	14	0.24%	0	0.00%	99.76%	2	12	0
7	51	0.22%	2	0.01%	99.77%	14	38	1
8	43	0.29%	0	0.00%	99.71%	1	38	4
9	21	0.12%	2	0.01%	99.86%	4	17	2
10	76	0.30%	1	0.00%	99.70%	10	55	12
15	65	0.30%	4	0.02%	99.68%	1	63	5
18	49	0.18%	0	0.00%	99.81%	6	37	6
TOTAL	539	0.26%	9	0.00%	99.73%	51	453	44

Outlates & Cancellations by Division - April - June 2002

	OUTLATES		CANCELLATIONS			REASONS FOR OUTLATES and CANCELLATIONS		
Division	Number	% of Pull-outs	Number	% of Pull-outs	ON-TIME PULL-OUT RATE	No Operator Available	Bus Mechanical Failure	Other
1	24	0.14%	0	0.00%	99.86%	1	19	5
2	90	0.54%	0	0.00%	99.46%	0	80	9
3	63	0.32%	0	0.00%	99.68%	0	54	9
5	38	0.19%	0	0.00%	99.81%	2	30	6
6	7	0.11%	3	0.05%	99.84%	3	6	1
7	67	0.29%	0	0.00%	99.71%	2	56	9
8	48	0.31%	0	0.00%	99.69%	1	37	10
9	18	0.10%	2	0.01%	99.88%	8	11	1
10	149	0.57%	1	0.00%	99.43%	10	115	25
15	61	0.28%	0	0.00%	99.72%	2	52	7
18	56	0.21%	0	0.00%	99.79%	9	39	8
TOTAL	621	0.29%	6	0.00%	99.70%	38	499	90

X. MONITORING AND REPORTING-CANCELLED AND LATE RUNS

Outlates & Cancellations by Division - July - September 2002

	OUTLATES		CANCELLATIONS			REASONS FOR OUTLATES and CANCELLATIONS		
Division	Number	% of Pull-outs	Number	% of Pull-outs	ON-TIME PULL-OUT RATE	No Operator Available	Bus Mechanical Failure	Other
1	35	0.21%	0	0.00%	99.79%	3	27	5
2	75	0.45%	0	0.00%	99.55%	2	54	19
3	50	0.24%	0	0.00%	99.76%	1	44	5
5	43	0.21%	1	0.00%	99.78%	4	33	7
6	7	0.11%	0	0.00%	99.89%	0	7	0
7	117	0.50%	1	0.00%	99.50%	14	86	18
8	19	0.12%	0	0.00%	99.88%	2	16	1
9	20	0.12%	3	0.02%	99.87%	10	10	3
10	159	0.59%	2	0.01%	99.40%	12	113	36
15	42	0.20%	0	0.00%	99.80%	1	33	8
18	75	0.28%	0	0.00%	99.72%	8	56	11
TOTAL	642	0.30%	7	0.00%	99.69%	57	479	113

Outlates & Cancellations by Division - October - December 2002

	OUTLATES		CANCELLATIONS			CANCELLATIONS		
Division	Number	% of Pull-outs	Number	% of Pull-outs	ON-TIME PULL-OUT RATE	No Operator Available	Bus Mechanical Failure	Other
1	24	0.14%	0	0.00%	99.86%	2	15	7
2	38	0.23%	0	0.00%	99.77%	0	34	4
3	71	0.35%	0	0.00%	99.65%	0	59	12
5	78	0.38%	1	0.00%	99.62%	4	51	24
6	10	0.16%	0	0.00%	99.84%	0	7	3
7	106	0.44%	0	0.00%	99.56%	8	78	26
8	34	0.22%	0	0.00%	99.78%	0	26	8
9	22	0.13%	0	0.00%	99.87%	8	12	2
10	141	0.52%	0	0.00%	99.48%	15	98	28
15	60	0.28%	1	0.00%	99.71%	3	43	15
18	79	0.30%	1	0.00%	99.70%	4	61	22
TOTAL	663	0.30%	3	0.00%	99.69%	44	484	151

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
2	Sunset & Western	EB	10/28/2002	DELETE 1.40(3:16)	
			11/4/2002	REPLACE 1.30(3:56) with 1.23(3:48) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	10/28/2002	REPLACE 1.52(6:47) with 1.70(6:52)	
				DELETE 1.23(7:07) & 1.24(8:14)	
	Sunset & Echo Park	EB	7/10/2002	REPLACE 1.27(6:30) with 1.46(6:32)	
4	Sunset & Echo Park	WB	11/14/2002	MOVE 1.39(5:17) to 11/4/02 & REPLACE with 1.45(5:10)	
				MOVE 1.57(5:34) to 11/4/02	
10	Maple & Pico	SB	7/22/2002	REPLACE 1.30(5:59) with 1.30(5:40)	
14	Beverly & Vermont	EB	8/2/2002	REPLACE 1.31(3:27) with 1.40(3:32)	
			9/11/2002	ADD 1.23(8:29) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	12/4/2002	REPLACE 1.75(3:59) with 1.24(3:54)	
	Adams & Vermont	WB	10/2/2002	REPLACE 1.56(3:53) with 1.38(3:49)	
			11/5/2002	REPLACE 1.30(3:38) with 1.30(3:29) -- needs causal analysis	
16	Third & Alvarado	EB	7/9/2002	REPLACE 1.34(7:00) with 1.21(6:50) & 1.21(7:10) -- needs causal analysis	
			7/16/2002	REPLACE 1.66(8:59) with 1.66(8:40)	
			8/20/2002	REPLACE 1.39(8:24) & 1.40(8:38) with 1.29(8:20) & 1.39(8:40)	
			9/10/2002	ADD 1.22(3:00) -- needs causal analysis	
			12/3/2002	REPLACE 1.41(8:33) with 1.26(8:19) -- needs causal analysis	
	Sixth & St. Paul	WB	10/30/2002	REPLACE 1.28(5:28) with 1.24(5:38) -- needs causal analysis	
18	Sixth & St. Paul	EB	8/6/2002	ADD 1.49(7:34) -- needs causal analysis	
			8/13/2002	REPLACE 1.28(7:21) with 1.23(7:14) & 1.27(7:34)	
			8/28/2002	REPLACE 1.40(7:40) with 1.33(7:44)	
			10/16/2002	REPLACE 1.43(6:42) with 1.21(6:42)	
			11/12/2002	REPLACE 1.36(6:41) 1.42(7:06) 1.44(7:17) 1.48(7:29) with 1.27(6:29) 1.28(6:50) 1.36(7:10) 1.23(7:30) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/20/2002	REPLACE 1.29(6:53) 1.31(7:19) with 1.25(6:43) 1.29(7:03) -- needs causal analysis	
			12/3/2002	REPLACE 1.32(6:40) 1.27(7:01) 1.71(7:30) with 1.22(6:33) 1.22(6:56) 1.31(7:17) -- needs causal analysis	
			12/10/2002	REPLACE 1.66(7:04) with 1.23(6:47) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	11/8/2002	MOVE 1.27(5:17) to 11/20/02	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
26	Seventh & Bixel	EB	7/8/2002	ADD 1.23(7:14) -- needs causal analysis	
			8/12/2002	REPLACE 1.43(6:46) with 1.27(6:42) & 1.26(7:03) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/6/2002	REPLACE 1.29(7:15) with 1.23(7:04) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/14/2002	ADD 1.31(6:54) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/21/2002	REPLACE 1.37(7:06) with 1.30(6:53) -- needs causal analysis	
			12/2/2002	REPLACE 1.54(7:16) with 1.36(7:13)	
	San Pedro & Eighth	NB		MOVE SECTION DIVIDER from after 8/27/02 to after 9/23/02	
			9/9/2002	ADD 1.21(6:41) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB		MOVE SECTION DIVIDER from after 8/27/02 to after 9/23/02	
28	Broadway & Solano	SB	12/19/2002	MOVE 1.26(7:27) 1.26(7:50) to Figueroa & Ave. 26 SB on same date	
	Figueroa & Ave. 26	NB	11/13/2002	ADD 1.49(5:20) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	11/18/2002	REMOVE 1.42(4:38)	
			12/19/2002	ADD 1.26(7:27) 1.26(7:50) copied from Broadway & Solano SB (see above)	
30	Pico & Figueroa	EB	7/17/2002	REPLACE 1.22(6:42) with 1.29(6:46)	
			10/1/2002	ADD 1.34(6:33) 1.46(7:29) 1.24(8:19) copied from Pico & Figueroa WB (see below)	
			10/7/2002	ADD 1.30(7:46) copied from Pico & Figueroa WB (see below)	
				MOVE 1.23(8:31) to Pico & Figueroa WB (see below)	
				MOVE 1.45(3:09) to Pico & Figueroa WB (see below)	
			10/17/2002	MOVE 1.30(3:45) to Pico & Figueroa WB (see below)	
		WB	10/1/2002	MOVE 1.34(6:33) 1.46(7:29) 1.24(8:19) to Pico & Figueroa EB (see above)	
			10/7/2002	MOVE 1.30(7:46) to Pico & Figueroa EB (see above)	
				ADD 1.23(8:31) copied from Pico & Figueroa EB (see above)	
				ADD 1.45(3:09) copied from Pico & Figueroa EB (see above)	
			10/17/2002	ADD 1.30(3:45) copied from Pico & Figueroa EB (see above)	
33	Venice & La Brea	EB	11/19/2002	REPLACE 1.41(3:09) with 1.25(3:00) & 1.22(3:21) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	9/11/2002	REPLACE 1.43(7:03) with 1.21(6:30) & 1.30(6:52) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/13/2002	REPLACE 1.74(7:07) with 1.40(7:02)	
			11/19/2002	REPLACE 1.64(7:17) with 1.23(6:58) & 1.54(7:19)	
38	Jefferson & Vermont	WB	11/17/2002	MOVE 1.42(4:41) to 11/7/02 then REMOVE 11/17/02 row [No Check conducted on that date]	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
40	Broadway & Washington	NB	7/10/2002	REPLACE 1.24(7:22) with 1.22(7:16) & 1.22(7:38) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/18/2002	ADD 1.22(8:12) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	9/12/2002	REPLACE 1.45(5:00) 1.55(5:20) with 1.25(4:49) 1.36(5:09) 1.47(5:29) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/8/2002	REPLACE 1.36(5:14) with 1.22(5:03) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/23/2002	REPLACE 1.29(5:28) with 1.30(5:15) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/13/2002	ADD 1.22(4:23) & 1.40(5:16) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/18/2002	ADD 1.28(3:52) & 1.36(5:19) -- needs causal analysis	
42	Broadway & Washington	SB	7/3/2002	ADD 1.21(7:10) -- needs causal analysis	
			7/10/2002	REPLACE 1.59(6:47) with 1.58(6:29) & 1.60(6:49) -- needs causal analysis	
			7/23/2002	ADD 1.55(6:30) -- needs causal analysis	
45	Broadway & Washington	NB	8/5/2002	ADD 1.22(8:38) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/23/2002	MOVE 1.29(4:55) to 10/28/02	
		SB	7/23/2002	REPLACE 1.29(5:29) with 1.24(5:15) -- needs causal analysis	
			8/26/2002	REPLACE 1.40(5:08) with 1.22(5:21) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/4/2002	REMOVE 1.26(7:32) 1.35(8:06)	
			10/15/2002	ADD 1.23(3:11) -- needs causal analysis	
			12/19/2002	REMOVE 1.23(5:15)	
	Broadway & Solano	NB	9/19/2002	MOVE 1.35(3:18) to Broadway & Solano SB on same date (see below)	
		SB	9/19/2002	ADD 1.35(3:18) copied from Broadway & Solano NB on same date (see above)	
55	Adams & San Pedro	EB	7/30/2002	ADD 1.21(5:32) -- needs causal analysis	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
60	Seventh & Central	EB	7/2/2002	ADD row of data for 7/2/02 copied from Seventh & Alameda (see below)	
	Seventh & Alameda	EB	7/2/2002	MOVE row of data for 7/2/02 to Seventh & Central (see above)	
			7/30/2002	MOVE 1.37(3:45) 1.44(4:30) to Seventh & Alameda WB on same date (see below)	
			7/31/2002	ADD 1.23(8:18) copied from Seventh & Alameda WB on same date (see below)	
			8/1/2002	MOVE 1.45(4:20) 1.33(5:23) to Seventh & Alameda WB on same date (see below)	
			8/8/2002	MOVE 1.51(5:13) to Seventh & Alameda WB on same date (see below)	
			8/12/2002	ADD 1.24(6:15) copied from Seventh & Alameda WB on same date (see below)	
				MOVE 1.29(4:28) to Seventh & Alameda WB on same date (see below)	
			9/9/2002	REMOVE 1.44(3:07) & 1.72(4:35)	
			10/11/2002	REPLACE 1.30(6:26) with 1.24(6:15) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/13/2002	ADD 1.25(6:12) -- needs causal analysis	
				REMOVE 1.26(4:34)	
		WB	7/30/2002	ADD 1.37(3:45) 1.44(4:30) copied from Seventh & Alameda EB on same date (see above)	
			7/31/2002	MOVE 1.23(8:18) to Seventh & Alameda EB on same date (see above)	
			8/1/2002	ADD 1.45(4:20) 1.33(5:23) copied from Seventh & Alameda EB on same date (see above)	
			8/8/2002	ADD 1.51(5:13) copied from Seventh & Alameda EB on same date (see above)	
			8/12/2002	MOVE 1.24(6:15) to Seventh & Alameda EB on same date (see above)	
				ADD 1.29(4:28) copied from Seventh & Alameda EB on same date (see above)	
			10/23/2002	REPLACE 1.74(4:23) with 1.56(4:19)	
	Pacific & Santa Fe	EB	8/8/2002	MOVE 1.58(7:43) to Pacific & Santa Fe WB on same date (see below)	
			8/19/2002	MOVE 1.30(4:00) to Pacific & Santa Fe WB on same date (see below)	
		WB	8/8/2002	ADD 1.58(7:43) copied from Pacific & Santa Fe EB on same date (see above)	
			8/19/2002	ADD 1.30(4:00) copied from Pacific & Santa Fe EB on same date (see above)	
			9/9/2002	ADD 1.23(6:34) & 1.21(7:49) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/28/2002	CHANGE DATE to 11/18/02	
66	Ninth & Figueroa	EB	8/14/2002	REMOVE 1.22(7:39)	
			9/11/2002	ADD 1.22(7:32) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/11/2002	REPLACE 1.27(7:20) with 1.21(7:06) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/31/2002	REPLACE 1.42(7:09) with 1.24(7:00) -- needs causal analysis	
			12/4/2002	REPLACE 1.33(7:11) with 1.31(7:06) -- needs causal analysis	
	Eighth & Figueroa	WB	9/11/2002	ADD 1.25(5:22) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/14/2002	REPLACE 1.36(5:11) with 1.27(5:02) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/13/2002	REPLACE 1.48(5:16) with 1.33(5:03) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/29/2002	Left paren missing in 1.49(3:04)	
			12/4/2002	REPLACE 1.38(5:23) with 1.22(5:04) -- needs causal analysis	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
68	Washington & Figueroa	EB	9/13/2002	ADD 1.22(7:13) & 1.23(8:29) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	7/26/2002	INSERT ROW for this date ADD 1.47(3:08) -- needs causal analysis	
			9/13/2002	ADD 1.23(7:54) -- needs causal analysis ADD 1.22(5:39) -- needs causal analysis	
78	Mission & Griffin	SB	9/13/2002	ADD 1.23(6:29) -- needs causal analysis ADD 1.23(4:36) -- needs causal analysis	
81	Figueroa & Adams	SB	11/15/2002	ADD 1.33(5:40) -- needs causal analysis	
	Figueroa & Ave. 26	NB	9/12/2002	ADD 1.22(3:03) & 1.24(5:09) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	9/12/2002	REPLACE 1.44(7:31) with 1.23(7:26) & 1.28(7:48) -- needs causal analysis	
90	San Fernando & Fletcher	SB	8/28/2002	ADD 1.33(8:29) -- needs causal analysis	
108	Slauson & Broadway	WB	7/23/2002	ADD 1.33(3:51) -- needs causal analysis	
	Gage & Pacific	WB	11/25/2002	ADD 1.38(5:22) -- needs causal analysis	
125	Rosecrans & Long Beach	WB	8/6/2002	ADD 1.34(4:06) -- needs causal analysis	
130	Artesia & Atlantic	WB	10/30/2002	MOVE 1.26(3:34) to 10/31/02	
	Artesia Station	WB	10/30/2002	REPLACE 1.47(6:21) with 1.21(6:18)	
150/240	Ventura & Vineland	WB	11/6/2002	MOVE 1.48(7:27) to 11/5/02	
156	Hollywood & Highland	NB	10/8/2002	REPLACE 1.98(8:01) with 1.26(7:58)	
158	Woodman & Sherman Way	NB-EB	11/26/2002	REPLACE 1.40(4:44) with 1.40(4:14)	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
163	Sherman Way & Sepulveda	EB	10/10/2002	REPLACE 1.33(3:51) 1.44(4:23) 1.58(4:25) with 1.23(3:49) 1.25(4:09) 1.36(4:36) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/24/2002	REPLACE 1.56(3:35) with 1.55(3:22) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	8/26/2002	ADD 1.25(7:24) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/10/2002	REPLACE 1.24(6:55) with 1.23(7:05) -- needs causal analysis	
165	Victory & Van Nuys	EB	12/20/2002	ADD 1.21(4:30) & 1.30(5:32) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	12/20/2002	ADD 1.49(7:34) -- needs causal analysis	
	Vanowen & Balboa	EB	11/26/2002	REPLACE 1.28(3:48) with 1.28(3:29)	
		WB	12/20/2002	ADD 1.40(5:01) -- needs causal analysis	
167	Plummer & Van Nuys	WB	8/16/2002	REPLACE 1.34(7:00) with 1.29(6:47) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/31/2002	ADD 1.36(6:38) -- needs causal analysis	
				REMOVE 1.53(7:03)	
169	Van Nuys & Saticoy	WB	11/13/2002	ADD 1.38(6:52) copied from Van Nuys & Saticoy EB on same date (see below)	
				MOVE 1.33(3:21) to Van Nuys & Saticoy EB on same date (see below)	
		EB	11/13/2002	MOVE 1.38(6:52) to Van Nuys & Saticoy WB on same date (see above)	
				ADD 1.33(3:21) copied from Van Nuys & Saticoy WB on same date (see above)	
175	St. George & Aloha	EB	8/26/2002	INSERT ROW for this date	
				ADD 1.23(3:01) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	10/25/2002	REPLACE 1.67(3:19) with 1.50(3:05) -- needs causal analysis	
180	Vermont & Prospect	SB	11/22/2002	ADD 1.26(5:39) -- needs causal analysis	
204	Vermont & Wilshire	NB	9/9/2002	ADD 1.25(5:38) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	7/25/2002	ADD 1.23(4:37) -- needs causal analysis	
			9/9/2002	REPLACE 1.36(3:38) 1.28(4:00) with 1.24(3:35) 1.28(3:55) 1.28(4:15) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/7/2002	REPLACE 1.40(4:23) with 1.24(4:10) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/17/2002	REPLACE 1.30(5:22) with 1.21(5:15) -- needs causal analysis	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
207	Western & Wilshire	NB	7/15/2002	REPLACE 1.41(3:54) with 1.28(3:14) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/17/2002	REPLACE 1.52(5:23) with 1.35(5:04) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	8/8/2002	REPLACE 1.40(3:46) with 1.24(3:39) -- needs causal analysis	
			8/21/2002	REMOVE 1.23(3:19)	
			8/27/2002	ADD 1.27(3:41) -- needs causal analysis	
			9/9/2002	REPLACE 1.51(3:44) with 1.23(3:30) & 1.26(3:51) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/7/2002	REPLACE 1.47(3:31) with 1.22(3:17) -- needs causal analysis	
210	Crenshaw & King	NB	10/21/2002	MOVE 1.42(8:34) to 10/22/02	
212	La Brea & Pico	NB	10/31/2002	CHANGE DATE from 10/31/01 to 10/31/02	
				REPLACE 1.24(7:06) with 1.21(6:52) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	10/31/2002	CHANGE DATE from 10/31/01 to 10/31/02	
217	Fairfax & Beverly	SB	9/17/2002	REPLACE 1.55(3:41) with 1.37(3:23) & 1.27(3:48) -- needs causal analysis	
	Fairfax & Santa Monica	NB	9/11/2002	REPLACE 1.41(3:18) with 1.34(3:13)	
			10/10/2002	REPLACE 1.25(3:28) with 1.25(3:38)	
			10/22/2002	REPLACE 1.83(3:24) with 1.31(3:07) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	9/11/2002	ADD 1.25(5:19) -- needs causal analysis	
			9/30/2002	REPLACE 1.33(7:47) with 1.29(7:35) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/1/2002	REMOVE 1.24(5:10)	
230	Laurel Canyon & Victory	NB-WB	8/30/2002	ADD 1.25(4:04) -- needs causal analysis	
232	Figueroa & Anaheim	NB	11/6/2002	Left paren missing in 1.55(6:26)	
		SB-EB	9/27/2002	REPLACE 1.53(4:05) with 1.26(3:51) -- needs causal analysis	
234	Sepulveda & Parthenia	SB	10/9/2002	REMOVE 1.31(7:23)	
243	Desoto & Roscoe	NB	7/8/2002	MOVE 1.23(3:36) to Desoto & Roscoe SB on same date (see below)	
			10/24/2002	REPLACE 1.72(7:12) with 1.35(6:59) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	7/8/2002	ADD 1.23(3:36) copied from Desoto & Roscoe NB on same date (see above)	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
251	Soto & First	SB	9/30/2002	REPLACE 1.57(7:28) with 1.31(7:23)	
			10/10/2002	REPLACE 1.51(7:38) with 1.25(7:21) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/22/2002	REPLACE 1.55(7:29) with 1.36(7:25)	
260	Atlantic & Slauson	SB	9/20/2002	ADD 1.30(6:57) -- needs causal analysis	
			11/7/2002	ADD 1.50(3:12) -- needs causal analysis	
				REPLACE 1.45(3:32) with 1.45(3:35)	
426	Hollywood & Highland	NB	11/5/2002	REMOVE 1.36(6:35)	
		SB	11/5/2002	REMOVE 1.30(3:46)	
434	PCH & Sunset	NB	7/31/2002	MOVE 1.43(5:22) to PCH & Sunset SB on same date (see below)	
			10/31/2002	REPLACE 1.25(6:28) with 1.30(6:13) -- needs causal analysis	
		SB	7/31/2002	ADD 1.43(5:22) copied from PCH & Sunset NB on same date (see above)	
484	Valley & Garvey	EB	9/13/2002	ADD 1.23(6:39) -- needs causal analysis	
				ADD 1.21(5:19) -- needs causal analysis	
561	Van Nuys & Sherman Way	NB	9/19/2002	ADD 1.27(4:21) copied from Van Nuys & Sherman Way SB on same date (see below)	
		SB	9/19/2002	MOVE 1.27(4:21) to Van Nuys & Sherman Way NB on same date (see above)	

ERRATA -- LOAD FACTOR COMPLIANCE MAPS FOR JULY - DECEMBER 2002

Line	Location	Direction	Date	Description	Action
720	Sixth & St. Paul	WB	10/21/2002	REMOVE 1.40(7:54) ADD 1.40(5:39) -- needs causal analysis	
	Wilshire & La Brea	EB	7/9/2002	REPLACE 1.28(4:44) with 1.44(4:15) -- needs causal analysis	
			9/18/2002	REPLACE 1.45(4:10) 1.45(4:24) with 1.29(3:59) 1.35(4:19) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/9/2002	ADD 1.35(5:29) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	10/29/2002	ADD 1.35(6:43) & 1.21(7:04) -- needs causal analysis REPLACE 1.38(7:28) 1.25(7:40) with 1.35(7:24) REMOVE 1.34(5:24)	
	Wilshire & Western	EB	7/16/2002	ADD 1.23(8:17) -- needs causal analysis	
			9/18/2002	ADD 1.32(3:22) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	9/13/2002	ADD 1.23(3:23) -- needs causal analysis	
			9/18/2002	REMOVE 1.32(3:22)	
			10/16/2002	REMOVE 1.33(7:00)	
			10/21/2002	ADD 1.29(3:14) -- needs causal analysis REMOVE 1.36(4:33)	
			11/15/2002	Left paren missing in 1.35(7:00)	
750	Ventura & Vineland	EB	9/11/2002	ADD 1.25(5:15) -- needs causal analysis	
		WB	8/1/2002	ADD 1.33(4:10) -- needs causal analysis	
			10/8/2002	REPLACE 1.24(7:29) with 1.21(7:10) -- needs causal analysis	

LINE 33 - PM

TIME RANGES OF LOAD FACTOR VIOLATIONS

Location	Direction	L.F.	Date	Weekday PM Lack of Capacity Violations (5-10% Sample)										
				3PM			4PM				5PM			6PM
Venice@ La Brea*	Eastbound	1.35	Jan 99-June 00		3:14			3:52			4:26			5:59
		1.25	July 00-June 02	3:00				3:52		4:07				5:59
		1.2	Oct. 01-Aug 02	3:00	3:21	3:24		3:55			4:20			5:57
	Westbound	1.35	Jan 99-June 00	3:00				3:52		4:04		4:35	4:42	5:48
		1.25	July 00-June 02	3:00		3:28	3:34	3:53		4:04	4:23	4:35	4:55	5:03	5:50
		1.2	Oct. 01-Aug 02	3:00		3:28	3:35	3:54		4:04	4:23	4:35			5:50

Note on time ranges: Each minute graphed yellow has at least one lack of capacity violation crossing it--and often more--as it is a compilation of violations over many days within the indicated date range.

Source Data: *Line by Line Mapping of Load Factor Violations*

*Prior to June 2001, location was Venice @ Cadillac for Eastbound and Venice @ Crenshaw for Westbound