

TRANSIT OPTIONS
FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY

REPORT TO THE
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
NOVEMBER 1977

JEROME C. PREMO
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

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PREFACE

The Los Angeles County Transportation Commission was established by the 1976 California Legislature and was directed to examine all transportation needs throughout Los Angeles County. The Commission is responsible for programming all highway and public transportation investments in the County. A full review of all transportation issues in the County is now underway in order to develop a balanced transportation investment and management plan and program for the years ahead.

An integral part of that plan and program must be a financing element; the Commission is authorized, if it so decides, to bring to a vote of the citizens of Los Angeles County a sales tax increase of up to 1/2 cent, to be used for public transit purposes.

The Commission is the forum in which important decisions involving the quality, priority and cost of our transportation system will be made at the local level. Membership consists of:

John Ferraro, Chairman
President, Los Angeles City Council
Kenneth Hahn, Vice-Chairman
Los Angeles County Supervisor

Edmund D. Edelman
Chairman, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
James A. Hayes
Los Angeles County Supervisor
Peter F. Schabarum
Los Angeles County Supervisor
Baxter Ward
Los Angeles County Supervisor
Tom Bradley
Mayor, City of Los Angeles
Edmond J. Russ
Mayor, City of Gardena
John Zimmerman
Mayor, City of Norwalk
Renee Simon
Councilwoman, City of Long Beach
Wendell Cox
Citizen Representative, City of Los Angeles

Jerome C. Premo
Executive Director

This report represents a resource document, prepared by staff of the Commission, on transit issues in Los Angeles County.

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LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. December 27, 1976 letter from former United States Secretary of Transportation William Coleman to Mayor Tom Bradley and then - SCRTD Board Chairman Byron Cook, regarding Federal funding for transit in Los Angeles.
2. September 8, 1977 memorandum from Ronald L. Schneider, regarding timing of a transit ballot measure.
3. October 25, 1977 letter from John H. Larson, Los Angeles County Counsel, to Supervisor Baxter Ward regarding authorities of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission in calling for a transit ballot measure.
4. October 24, 1977 memorandum from Donald Camph, Transportation Policy Analyst for the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, regarding availability of Proposition 5 funds.
5. May 4, 1977 letters from John Ferraro, Chairman of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission to Senator Robert Presley and Assemblyman Walter Ingalls, and Senator Presley's May 24, 1977 reply, regarding a transit performance audit of operators in Los Angeles County.
6. Memorandum from David Dijulio of the Southern California Association of Governments, regarding the implications of 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.

LIST OF APPENDICES

- A. Regional Transit Development Program Cost Summary: prepared by William R. Wells, Transportation Economist, Southern California Association of Governments.
- B. Analysis of Past Transit Elections in Los Angeles County: prepared by Jerry Leonard, Senior Deputy to Supervisor Baxter Ward and member, Southern California Rapid Transit District Board of Directors.
- C. Certified election results and ballots from 1968, 1974, and 1976 Countywide transit elections.
- D. Projection of total funds potentially available to cities in Los Angeles County, from 1/4¢ sales tax (for 1979-90 period)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This report was prepared by staff of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) in response to a request by the Commission for a discussion of pros and cons of a June or November 1978 transit ballot. It supplements the briefing made by Executive Director Jerome C. Premo to the Commission at its November 16, 1977 meeting. (A summary of that presentation can be found at the end of this chapter.)

Under its enabling legislation the Commission is authorized, if it so decides, to bring to a vote of the electorate of Los Angeles County up to a 1/2¢ sales tax increase, to be used for public transportation purposes. A 1/2¢ sales tax would generate more than \$160 million in its first year, and more than \$3 billion in the 1979-1990 period.

In order to effectively comment on the pros and cons of a ballot measure, staff has endeavored to summarize existing transit operations and financing in Los Angeles County, to review and comment upon transit planning now underway and generally identified as the Regional Transit Development Program and to identify trends apparent in past transit votes here and in other parts of the nation. On the basis of this background and information, options are proposed and some tentative conclusions offered.

Transit Operations and Financing

The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) carries more than 800,000 of the 900,000 transit trips made each day throughout Los Angeles County. Nineteen other bus systems also

operate in the County. SCRTD's buses, with an average age of 11.5 years, are among the nation's oldest, and are expensive to maintain, breakdown too often and need major replacement.

Despite the unattractiveness of such an old bus fleet, ridership has risen almost 70% on SCRTD since 1971 and over 33% on municipal buses in the same period. During the year ending last June 30, fares covered about 35% of the \$200 million operating budget of SCRTD and the other operators. Federal (\$48 million), State (\$66 million), and County and other local funds (\$15 million) made up the \$129 million total public operating subsidy provided transit operators during the past fiscal year.

now.

Since last July SCRTD has raised its base fare, laid off over 850 employees and cut service on many of its routes. For the fiscal year beginning next July 1, SCRTD has tentatively identified an unfunded shortfall of nearly \$14 million, unless it raises fares and reduces service, or both. The next several years beyond FY 1979 call for more of the same, not only for SCRTD but for municipal operators as well.

Neither the federal nor state governments are likely to provide significantly more money to help meet transit operating costs; therefore, either more local money must be provided--from a sales tax increase, county and/or city general funds or some other source--or fares will rise and service will be further reduced.

Regional Transit Development Program

At the same time that transit operators are confronted with problems in meeting day-to-day operating costs, public agencies are also engaged in a thorough examination of how to achieve

Major improvements in public transportation in both the short and long term. SCRTD, Caltrans, the City of Los Angeles, and other agencies are examining a series of improvements collectively identified as the Regional Transit Development Program, including:

- New buses and maintenance facilities
- Better ways of using existing streets and highways, such as the Spring Street contraflow transit lane.
- Bus and carpool lanes on freeways, such as the successful El Monte Busway on the San Bernardino Freeway.
- Downtown People Mover
- Possible starter rail lane between downtown and the San Fernando Valley via Wilshire Boulevard.

Some of these improvements can be made, and need to be made, now. New buses are desperately needed, and will benefit both the riding public and the transit operator. Others, such as the Downtown People Mover and the Starter Rail Line, are under study and decisions on whether to build them must await completion of the analyses.

If this total program is implemented, its costs (escalated at 8% per year compounded annually) are:

Capital	\$3.9 billion
Operating	5.9 billion
Total Costs	\$9.8 billion

Sources of funds to meet this \$9.8 billion program are:

Fares	\$2.4 billion
Federal	4.1 billion
State	1.4 billion
	7.9 billion

Shortfall \$1.9 billion

Assumed in the forecast of funds sources are:

- Full Federal participation; and
- 40% of operating costs from the farebox

Before any decision can reasonably be made on a ballot measure, the Commission will have to decide on the uses of funds to be generated through the tax. The Regional Transit Development Program, while representing a comprehensive planning program, must proceed through further analysis before we can answer such questions as:

- Is the entire program needed and justified?
- Is the 40% farebox ratio reasonable?
- How likely are we to receive \$2.5 billion in capital Federal funds in the 1979-90 period?

Staff is working with participating agencies to review assumptions for all phases of the Program, so that the Commission can exercise the policy direction for the Program as it sees fit.

Transit Ballots Pros and Cons

The report includes a set of pros and cons and a discussion of June and November, 1978 and 1980 votes, as well as the possibility of a temporary 1/2¢ sales tax increase for 1 year, to be authorized by the State Legislature. The most likely time appears to be November 1978, although staff senses no broad base of public support for such a vote at this time.

An additional ballot option is proposed for consideration in this report. Namely, a 1/2¢ sales tax which would consist of 1/4¢ for transit operating and bus capital match, and 1/4¢ returned to local jurisdictions to be used either for improved local transit or for local street improvements, at the option of the community, is discussed.

This option would generate about \$1.5 billion in transit and \$1.5 billion for local option used in the 1979-90 period. Chapter VIII of the report provides more details on this additional option which could be linked to use of already authorized Proposition 5 funds for fixed guideway transit.

Transit's Future in Los Angeles

Transit does have a future in Los Angeles--it must have one, for many are entirely dependent on public transportation to move about this area. The question is, rather: What kind of transit will we have, and how will it be financed?

We need to specify what we want our public transportation system to do: we need to set objectives for public transportation in the context of our overall transportation network. If we want to have a major transit program which would, for example, double transit ridership in the next decade, we shall have to make major transit investments. Such a program will be expensive and will require more tax money to implement. Another choice is to have a minimum transit system, serving primarily those who don't or can't drive. Less public money will be needed for this kind of transit system.

In order to get a clear picture of existing transit operations and financing, the Commission should proceed with initial financial and performance audits of all transit operations. Such audits should prove helpful to all parties concerned with public transportation, but they will not obviate the need for some tough decisions. Additional public funds are needed to support both capital and operating transit improvements.

Generation of a long term financing base can set in motion improvements which would reestablish transit as a vital factor in Los Angeles County - and help address our energy, air quality, mobility, congestion, and urban development problems. The decision on how to proceed from here rests primarily with the Commission.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

November 10, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: LACTC MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES
FROM: JEROME C. PREMO
SUBJECT: Summary of Pros and Cons of a Transit Ballot

In response to your request I have explored issues and factors associated with a June or November 1978 transit ballot issue. Attached is summary information on transit ridership and fiscal trends for SCRTD, which carries nearly 90% of daily transit trips in Los Angeles County, cost information of the Regional Transit Development Program, and pros and cons of transit ballots.

A more comprehensive report is now in preparation and will be available at next Wednesday's meeting. I offer these thoughts on the matter of transit and transportation financing which will be developed in greater detail in the report.

1. Transit costs continue to rise, and current revenue sources are insufficient to meet these increased costs. Currently SCRTD staff projects a \$13.8 million unfunded deficit for the fiscal year beginning next July 1, based on no fare increase and retention of January 1978 levels of service. Lacking additional revenues, fares must rise and service cutbacks must be made.
2. No progress in implementing the Regional Transit Development Program, including such short-term improvements as stabilized fares, higher levels of service, replacement of overage buses and maintenance facilities, etc. will occur unless new funds are available.
3. Generally accepted public objectives such as reduced energy consumption, better mobility for elderly and handicapped citizens, cleaner air, reduction of congestion on freeways and streets and higher qualities of transit service at the local level will go unaddressed if no action is taken. This translates in real world terms to more congestion for everyone, higher fares and poorer service for those who now ride buses (and who are in most instances least able to pay and are most dependent on transit).
4. The Clean Air Act requires adoption of an areawide air quality plan and implementation program by next September. Lacking adoption of a comprehensive plan and program, which will require a transportation component, the region may suffer a major cutoff of Federal funds.

5. On a more positive note, additional transit funds can be used to dramatically improve the quality of service and mobility of the County's residents.
6. Yet, most parties are pessimistic that a transit vote can pass. Accordingly, I offer for your consideration, the option of a transportation use for the 1/2¢ sales tax: 1/4¢ for transit operations and bus transit capital match and 1/4¢ returned to local jurisdictions throughout the County based on population, to be used for either improved local transit or for local street improvements (FAU concept of flexibility).

The Commission was set up to address tough resource allocation and transit issues. The situation is a difficult one, but this region has solved other problems in the past. The Commission is the appropriate body within the County to solve this one.

attach.

SUMMARY

- more public money is needed for transit
 - LACTC performance audit of transit operations needed to establish objectivity
 - 4-Part program requires refinement, overall policy management
 - outlook appears poor for transit - only ballot
 - one option is to consider transportation ballot
 - ballot measure depends on consensus, starting with political leadership
-

A - Impact of no action

- fare increases, service reductions
- clean Air Act implications - may lose eligibility for Federal funds.

B - Positive effects of transit support

- assurances to the public on fare levels, quality of service
- transit impact on congestion
- energy benefits of better transit
- aid in improving air quality
- special support for elderly and handicapped

CHAPTER II

CURRENT TRANSIT OPERATIONS

Overview of Transit Operations

Public transportation in Los Angeles County is provided by the Southern California Rapid Transportation District (SCRTD) and by 19 Municipal Transit Operators. During the past few years, increasing numbers of local communities have initiated new transit operations, primarily intended to serve local trips within their communities and to adjacent major activity centers.

Listed on the next page is information on these transit operators, showing base fares, fleet sizes, annual patronage, and financial operating date as estimated for FY 78 (Table 1)

These figures show that SCRTD carries about 87% of transit trips in Los Angeles County, many of which are long home-to-work trips. [SCRTD's operating budget accounts for approximately 90% of total annual operating costs, while collecting about 91.4% of total operating revenues.] SCRTD receives about 89% of the total operating subsidy for transit in Los Angeles County.

Roughly 900,000 trips are made on transit each day in the County. SCRTD carries about 800,000 of this total, with the municipal operators serving the remaining 100,000 trips.

TABLE 1

BUS OPERATIONS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: FY 1978 ESTIMATES

	<u>Base Fare</u>	<u>Number of Vehicles</u>	<u>Annual Passengers</u> (000)	<u>Annual Operating Costs</u> (000)	<u>Annual Operating Revenues</u> (000)	<u>Annual Cost-Revenue Gap</u> (000)
<u>Regional Carrier</u>						
RTD	.40	2,395	235,498	\$197,220	\$80,500	\$116,720
<u>Other TDA Included Operators</u>						
Santa Monica	.25	116	14,000	5,036	2,779	2,257
Long Beach	.25	134	12,650	8,405	2,650	5,755
Montebello/ Santa Fe Springs	.25	31	3,127	1,952	585	1,367
Torrance	.25	21	1,343	1,576	320	1,256
Commerce	-	10	533	355	-	355
Culver City	.35	21	1,900	1,120	432	688
Irdena	.35	32	1,755	1,705	534	1,171
S/T Other TDA Operators		365	35,308	\$ 20,149	\$ 7,300	\$ 12,849
<u>Other Operators (1)</u>						
Norwalk	.20	29	1,320	1,337	165	1,172
Arcadia	.50	2	61	140	28	112
La Mirada	.25	7	119	225	20	205
Huntington Park	.25	3	57	96	12	84
Hermosa Beach	-	1	36	19	-	19
South Gate	.25	1	15	34	4	30
Redondo Beach	.25	N.A.	25	71	6	65
S/T Other Operators		43	1,633	\$ 1,922	\$ 235	\$ 1,687
TOTAL ALL OPERATORS		2,803	272,439	\$219,291	\$88,035	\$131,256

(1) Data in this table is based on Short Range Transit Plans (SRTP) submitted to and approved by Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG); municipal operators, not included because no approved SRTP exists, are: Inglewood, Manhattan Beach, Monrovia, Carson, and Cudahy.

Trends in Transit Ridership

Table 2 reflects ridership trends for the SCRTD and several of the municipal operators.

TABLE 2
TRENDS IN ANNUAL TRANSIT RIDERSHIP

<u>REGIONAL CARRIER</u>	<u>FY 71</u> (000)	<u>FY 74</u> (000)	<u>FY 77</u> (000)
SCRTD (% increase over FY 71)	137,000 (--)	158,000 (15.3%)	230,000 ^{1/} (67.9%)
<u>OTHER MUNICIPAL OPERATORS</u>			
Santa Monica	10,315	10,552	13,495
Long Beach	9,500	10,250	12,300
Montebello	2,256	2,240	3,050
Gardena	1,226	1,194	1,672
Torrance	500	687	1,244
Total, Other Municipals	23,797	24,923	31,761
(% increase over FY 71)	(--)	(4.7%)	(33.5%)

1/ Annualized estimate based on daily ridership estimate.

These significant increases in transit ridership can be attributed to several factors:

- . increased levels of public support
- . higher levels of transit service
- . fare stabilization and/or fare reductions
(County-wide 25¢ fare initiated in 1974)
- . effect of 1974 Arab oil embargo

The sharp increases in transit ridership evident in the FY 74-FY 77 period have slowed as a result of fare increases and service adjustments implemented by SCRTD which were

necessitated by projected shortages of funds. In the past six months, SCRTD has laid off some 850 employees, or close to 15% of its total work force, and has modified service on nearly 50% of its operating routes. While there was an initial drop in transit ridership following the July fare increase, SCRTD officials indicate that total transit system ridership has returned to near the pre-July levels.

Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity

This situation needs to be carefully evaluated, for SCRTD has reduced service on many routes in the past few months, without apparently suffering a significant systemwide ridership loss. Implicit in this is one of the most critical issues that policy-makers are going to have to face: the trade-off between equity and effectiveness in an era of limited financial resources. It may be that a substantial reduction in subsidy requirements could be achieved through redeployment of service to high productivity corridors, resulting in more passengers carried for the same or less money. However, to the extent that this would reduce or eliminate available (but currently little used) service in other corridors, effectiveness is improved at the expense of equity, since residents of some areas may be left with little or no opportunity to use transit since the service will have been redeployed elsewhere.

Staff's responsibility is to identify these choices; however, there is no purely technical solution to this problem. Value trade-offs must be made by policy makers, based on the most objective information possible. While performance audits may identify cost-saving opportunities, they are unlikely to be large enough to eliminate the dilemma. As one pundit suggests, there is no way to have a seven course dinner when only five courses are available.

Sources of Funds for Transit Operations

The major sources of funds to support the operations of these transit carriers are fares, federal UMTA Section 5 funds, State funds derived from a State sales tax (TDA), and local general funds.

Table 3 shows estimated sources of funding for transit operating costs for the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1977. In evaluating this table, it's important to keep in mind that SCRTD is now (in FY 78) covering nearly 42% of total operating costs from the fare box, based on the July 1977 fare increase and service adjustments.

TABLE 3

SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR TRANSIT OPERATIONS, FY 77

	<u>SCRTD</u>	<u>All other Operators</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fares & other operating revenues	63,500	7,518	71,018
Federal (Section 5)	44,524	3,500	48,024
State (TDA)	62,107	7,236	69,343
Other (incl. County)	12,962	2,165	15,127
Total	183,093	20,419	203,512
Operating revenue as % of total operating costs	34.7%	36.8%	34.9%

Figure I below presents a historical breakdown of SCRTD operating revenues for the period Calendar 1969 through FY 1978.




Figure 1

SCRTD Annual Operating Revenues by Source, in actual dollars

Transit Operating Costs

Transit operating costs have been increasing at a rapid rate in the past few years because the cost of labor, insurance, fuel and replacement parts have been on the rise. In addition, capital costs for fleet replacement and expansion have also increased rapidly.

Because of its size and importance to transit users throughout the County, SCRTD's financial situation is particularly worth noting. The average age of SCRTD's bus fleet deserves particular mention. The average SCRTD bus is 11.5 years old; the industry average is 6-7 years. Obviously, older buses are more costly to operate and to maintain, and are often unreliable and unattractive to users. Key elements in generating and retaining transit ridership are convenience, dependability service coverage, and comfort, as well as fare levels. It is extremely difficult for SCRTD or for any transit operator to offer dependable, comfortable service when old, unreliable equipment must be used. Thus, a top priority in improving transit in Los Angeles County--to benefit the user and the operator(s) of public transportation--must be the purchase of new, attractive and dependable transit vehicles.

*How much
due to old
buses bought
in 74?*

Table 4 shows the recent trend in operating costs for SCRTD. Following enactment of the 25¢ fare in 1974, fares of the SCRTD as a percentage of total operating costs dropped to about 30%. This 30 to 35% ratio continued until the current fiscal year, when SCRTD increased its fare in light of a Board policy calling for the fare box to cover 40% of total operating costs.

SCRTD indicates that fare box revenues are currently covering about 42% of total operating costs, following the July 1977 fare increases.

TABLE 4
SCRID FINANCIAL TRENDS
(\$ MILLIONS)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>4-YEAR TOTAL</u>
FEDERAL	0	16.5	28.5	44.5	91.1
STATE	41.2	51.9	59.1	62.1	219.9
OTHER	5.8	13.6	21.8	13.0	50.2
OPERATING REVENUE	49.4	36.5	55.9	63.5	206.0
TOTAL	96.4	118.5	165.3	183.1	567.2
TOTAL PUBLIC SUBSIDY	47.0	82.0	109.4	119.6	361.2
OPERATING REVENUES AS % OF TOTAL OPERATING COSTS	51.2	30.8	33.3	34.7	36.3

For FY 1978, no unfunded deficit is currently projected by SCRTD officials. However, it must be remembered that this was achieved only because fares were raised, some service was reduced, some future years' Section 5 allocations were borrowed upon, and previous years' carryover funds were exhausted.

The prospects for FY 1979 are not pleasant to contemplate. SCRTD has not yet finalized its budget for FY 79, but preliminary SCRTD staff analyses indicate an unfunded deficit of at least \$13.8 million (and quite possibly substantially more) if fares remain stable and January, 1978 levels of service are maintained. Given currently projected levels of state and federal funding, an increase in fares and/or further reductions in service will be unavoidable for SCRTD and/or the other municipal operators in the fiscal year starting next July 1. It is unlikely that this picture will improve in the foreseeable future.

Projected Shortfall in TDA and UMTA Section 5 Funds

In order to define service levels and capital and operating requirements for future years, all transit operators receiving federal or state assistance must prepare Short Range Transit Plans. The Commission has formally endorsed this requirement among its requirements of eligibility for Section 5 funds.

Of important use to the Commission are the future year financial projections contained in the Short Range Transit Plans. Our analysis of the plans and other budget documents shows that a serious funding shortfall will occur over the next four years. Beginning in FY 1979 (which starts on July 1, 1978) operators' UMTA Section 5 requests are estimated to exceed projected available funds by about \$9.8 million; this figure rises to \$22.6 million in FY 1982. Similarly, projected TDA claims are expected to exceed available funds by amounts ranging from

\$2.9 million in FY 1979 to \$9.4 million FY 1982. The cumulative shortfall for the four year period is approximately \$89 million. These data are presented in table 5 below; figure 2 (shown on the next page) presents the same information graphically.

TABLE 5

PROJECTED SHORTFALL OF TDA AND UMTA SECTION 5 FUNDING


FY 1979-82

(\$ millions)

	<u>FY 1979</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>4-Year Total</u>
UMTA Sec. 5	9.8	13.8	18.1	22.6	64.3
TDA	2.9	5.6	6.8	9.4	24.7
	<u>12.7</u>	<u>19.4</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>89.0</u>

Figure 2

Projected Shortfall of TDA and UMTA Section 5 Funding



Conclusion: Financing Current Public Transportation in Los Angeles County

Good public transportation means different things to different people: different types of service have different cost and benefit implications for both the user and non-user. But one conclusion seems manifest: there is just not enough money available to fund all the different types of service at a level we might desire--not in some utopian world where financing is not a concern, but in the real world of today. What this means is that policy-makers must make the difficult priority-setting value trade-offs among the many objectives that are commonly set for public transportation.

In addition, it is the responsibility of the operators in cooperation with Commission staff to provide policy makers with the basic data which will allow them to make those trade-offs on a timely and informal basis. Allocation among the operators, while obviously important, is not the total issue we must address; rather, we must come to a decision on what, exactly, we are trying to accomplish with public transportation in Los Angeles County. This question cannot be answered with generalities or wishful thinking. As stated previously, there is no analytic solution which will give us everything we want. In the final analysis, it is a policy choice which must be made by policy-makers.

The Commission staff is communicating with operators throughout the County to secure statements of their goals, objectives and service standards, in anticipation of submitting a policy overview document to the Commission for consideration.

CHAPTER III

REGIONAL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Program Overview

At the same time that transit operators are confronted with problems in meeting day-to-day operating costs, public agencies are also engaged in thorough examination of how to achieve major improvements in short and long-term public transportation service. Federal grants are supporting engineering, environmental and operational studies of the Regional Transit Development Program (RTDP), pursuant to former Secretary of Transportation William Coleman's letter of December 22, 1976. (attachment 1)

The RTDP currently is comprised of these elements:

<u>Element</u>	<u>Lead Agency</u>	<u>Content</u>
1. Transportation Systems Management (TSM)	SCRTD	-Bus operations improvements -Better use of existing streets -Community-level transit -Routine capital replacement/improvements
2. High Level Bus-on-Freeway	Caltrans	-El Monte - type busways -Additional freeway lanes to achieve "free flow" -Bus stations on freeways
3. Downtown People Mover (DPM)	City of Los Angeles - Community Redevelopment Agency	-Automated, largely elevated fixed guideway between the Convention Center and Union Station
4. Starter Line	SCRTD	-Bus and rail alternatives in the Wilshire-San Fernando Valley corridor under consideration

Institutional Framework

Work on each of these elements is proceeding, and is being coordinated through an Interagency Coordinating Committee (ICC) and Interagency Technical Committee (ITC). Membership is as follows:

<u>Policy Committee</u>	<u>Technical Committee</u>
FHWA-----1	FHWA
UMTA-----1	UMTA
City of L.A.-----2	City of L.A.
SCRTD-----2	SCRTD
Caltrans-----2	Caltrans
LACTC-----1	LACTC
County of L.A.-----1	County of L.A.
SCAG (ex officio)---1	SCAG

The Interagency Technical Committee is reporting through the Commission's Technical Advisory Committee on a monthly basis, so that all parties are informed of progress on each aspect of the RTDP.

Financial Analysis: Capital Costs

Attached is a detailed cost analysis of the RTDP prepared by SCAG in cooperation with all participants in the RTDP. (Appendix A) Numerous assumptions are made in the analysis, only some of which are noted here. We should review this document in detail before making any decision on a ballot issue, so that all assumptions and choices among options are fully considered.

With this in mind, the following summary cost information on the RTDP is offered:

TABLE 6
RTDP CAPITAL COST SUMMARY
 (\$\$ in millions)

	<u>1976 COSTS</u>	<u>THRU 1990</u> ^{1/}
TSM		
a. Existing Systems	280	558
b. Operational Improvements	133	189
Bus-on-Freeway	836	1,796
DPM	136	165
Starter Line	739	1,150
	2,124	3,858
Total		

^{1/} All capital costs escalated at 8% rate of inflation, compounded annually.

The sources of funds for this \$3.8 billion program are forecast as follows:

TABLE 7
RTDP Capital Costs -- Sources
 (\$\$ in millions)

Federal Share ^{2/}		3,151
FHWA	665	
UMTA	2,486	
Non-Federal Share		707
Total Capital Cost		3,858

^{2/} Full Federal participation in the RTDP is assumed.

A \$3,858 billion capital program could support the following physical improvements:

- . new bus fleet totalling 3120 regular buses and 600 high capacity buses
- . New bus maintenance facilities
- . More than 55,000 parking spaces
- . 36 miles of new exclusive bus lanes (excluding I-105)
- . 2.7 mile Downtown People Mover
- . 15 mile rail line connecting downtown with the San Fernando Valley via Wilshire and La Brea or Fairfax

Figure 3 (on the next page) shows the starter line and exclusive bus-on-freeway portions of this program. For nearly \$4 billion the region could enjoy an array of transit capital improvements consisting of buses; exclusive busways; automated fixed guideway transit; and rail rapid transit.

Financial Analysis: Operating Costs


Assuming the entire RTDP is implemented, the annual total operating cost of transit throughout the County will increase from about \$260 million in 1979 to about \$828 million in 1990 (Again, an 8% per year inflation rate is assumed; this equates to \$355 million in 1979 dollars).

The sources of operating costs are projected as follows:

TABLE 8
RTDP OPERATING COSTS (FY1979-90)
(\$\$ in millions)

Sources of Funds:




UMTA Section 5	900	
TDA/325 Funds	1,460	
Fares	2,377	
Total Funding	4,737	
Total Projected Operating Costs	5,943	
Projected Shortfall	1,206	




LEGEND

MILES*

BUS-ON-FREEWAY ELEMENT

-  El Monte Busway 11
-  Existing Freeways 24
-  Proposed Freeways 36

STARTER LINE ELEMENT

-  Rail Line 15

*L.A. County Only

III-5




FIGURE 3

Assumed in these projections are the following;

- . fares will cover 40% of operating costs
- . UMTA Section 5 funds will increase by 5% per year
- . TDA/325 funds will increase by 6.58% per year

Some \$1.2 billion in additional operating funds will be needed to implement the RTDP, assuming it is entirely executed.

Work needs to be done to estimate revenue needs under a variety of operating and fare policy assumptions.

Financial Analysis: Combined Capital and Operating Costs

The combined capital and operating costs of the proposed program are currently estimated as follows:

TABLE 9
RTDP Financial Cost Summary through 1990
(\$\$ in millions)

Costs:	Capital	3,858	
	Operating	5,943	
		<hr/>	
	Total		9,801
Sources:	Federal	4,051	
	State	1,460	
	Fares	2,377	
		<hr/>	
	Total		7,888
			<hr/> <hr/>
Shortfall			1,913

Assumptions:

- . Costs escalated at 8% per year, compounded annually.
- . Full Federal participation anticipated.
- . 40% of operating costs from farebox.

The Commission is authorized to bring to a vote of the Los Angeles County electorate a 1/2¢ sales tax increase. Such a tax is estimated to produce \$3,026 million through 1990. (See table___, Appendix A. This estimate uses a conservative annual growth rate in sales tax revenues of 6.58%). Thus, a surplus of

\$1,113 million would be available. Of course, it must again be pointed out that a 40% fare box return is assumed, and that capital and operating costs are as forecast.

Issues on RTDP

The obvious questions which arise from these figures and discussion include:

- Should the entire RTDP be carried out, and if so over what time frame?
- How reasonable is the 40% fare box return assumption, especially for elements which are fundamentally different from existing service?
- Can we reasonably expect to receive nearly \$2.5 billion in UMTA capital grants in the FY 79-90 period?
- What impact on our road program would occur if we were to use \$665 million in FHWA funds for transit-related capital improvements? } yab
- Is the entire 1/2¢ needed for transit?
- How important are assumptions about the number of persons in each car at peak hour? That is, if a major High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) program is instituted, as currently being planned by both SCAG and Caltrans, what effect will it have on the transit program, especially the Bus-on-Freeway element? } ych
- What is the likelihood of substantial capital and/or operating cost over-runs?
- How do the parts of the RTDP interrelate? Does each require the existence of the others to make sense?
- What are the actual levels of patronage forecast for each RTDP element? Could these be achieved in a more economical manner? Is it worth the cost?
- Have we, or can we, clarify and quantify the objectives of the RTDP?

As we consider these questions, the following observations may be of help.

Regarding the RTDP, no one disputes the fact that new buses are needed. Most agencies are interested in using existing streets better, to facilitate the movement of people. Examples of this interest are in the City's proposals to CALTRANS, under the 283 program, for exclusive transit lanes on Glendale Boulevard and the Broadway Street Mall. The studies of both the Downtown People Mover and starter line are being undertaken with a careful eye to both capital and operating costs of each element, and to the environmental effects of each. It is simply too early at this stage to speculate on the results of these studies and, therefore, to clearly define whether each or both should proceed to final engineering and construction.

There seems to be a general concern with the timing and extent of the CALTRANS Bus-on-Freeway Program. In escalated dollars, this program could cost nearly \$1.8 billion through 1990 to build. While there appear to be significant reasons to add lanes to certain freeways, so that the El Monte Busway condition could be achieved on other congested freeways, the full extent of such additions is open to debate.

UMTA has issued policies regarding the kind of justification needed before it will support major transit capital investments. The essence of these regulations as it relates to the Bus-on-Freeway element is that an alternative analysis of all available options must be carried out if Federal aid is expected. The current work program for the Bus-on-Freeway program may not conform to these UMTA requirements. We are working with CALTRANS and other local agencies, and in turn, with UMTA, to see what modifications in the CALTRANS Bus-on-Freeway program need to be made to bring ongoing planning into line with Federal requirements.

UMTA or FHWA § for the construction?

Regarding the overall RTDP, the Commission has a responsibility to insure coordination among elements of the Program and the best possible product emerging from this overall effort. The staff is now engaged in a review of assumptions for each portion of the RTDP. We intend to bring to the full Commission a statement of these assumptions and the staff's view of them. We believe that it is essential for all parties concerned to understand what assumptions are driving forecasts of transit usage and capital and operating costs. The Commission itself may have problems with some of the assumptions that are being made and which, if not addressed now, could result in the unnecessary expenditure of significant time and money.

CHAPTER VI

PAST TRANSIT ELECTIONS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Before offering pros and cons of another transit vote, it is useful to review information on past transit votes. Appendix B was prepared by Jerry Leonard, Senior Deputy to Supervisor Baxter Ward and members of the SCRTD Board of Directors. This analysis traces election returns from the 1968, 1974, and 1976 transit elections. Appendix C contains the exact wording for each of these 3 elections.

In summary, these elections proposed the following:

1968	98 mile rail rapid transit system; bus system improvements.	1¢ sales tax
1974	145 miles of rail; 2 busways bus system expansion	1¢ sales tax
1976	232 miles of rail	1¢ sales tax

I believe that Mr. Leonard's thoughtful analysis deserves personal reading by all Commission members, for it portrays those areas throughout the County which have supported and not supported past transit ballots. Further analysis of this information, to determine more precisely why voters acted as they did, is needed as we consider the ballot options cited in this paper.

CHAPTER V

VOTES IN OTHER AREAS

As we consider the possibility of bringing another transit vote to the electorate in Los Angeles, it may be constructive to reflect on similar experiences in other major areas of the nation.

San Antonio is the most recent major area in the nation to have approved a transit-only referendum. Earlier this month, voters in the San Antonio area approved by a 2-to-1 margin a 1/2¢ sales tax increase to support public transportation. A number of other areas passed transit tax votes in the early to mid-70's, most notably in Atlanta, Cleveland, Seattle, Denver, Chicago, and Santa Clara County. The Cleveland area enacted 1¢ sales tax increase for transit in July 1975.

Staff will develop analyses of these votes for consideration by the Commission. The San Antonio and Cleveland successes will be of particular interest to us as various ballot options are considered.

Massachusetts

Two states have recently made significant commitments to improve transportation, and a summary of their experiences is interesting. First, the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed a \$290 million transportation issue in June 1977. Of this total amount, \$227 million was for highways and \$63 million for public transportation, with most but not all of this amount earmarked for the Boston area.

Since Massachusetts has a population of some 5.8 million, and since its physical makeup includes rural, suburban and dense urban centers, it is not unlike the makeup of Los Angeles County. The key point about the Massachusetts vote was that there was a mix of highway and transit improvements.

Washington

The Washington State Legislature increased the State's gas tax by 2¢ effective July 1, 1977, to support both highway and public transportation capital and operating needs throughout the State. A public initiative to repeal the tax increase was on the November 1977 ballot. Following an intensive public debate and campaigns waged by both sides of the issue, voters approved retention of the gas tax increase, and with it needed transportation financing. Staff is working with Washington State and local officials to secure additional information on the recent vote, and to evaluate its relevance to the Los Angeles situation.

Visit and Letter of Terrell Hill

In order to secure the advice of a nationally recognized expert on transit elections, staff invited Terrell Hill of the Chicago Transit Authority to come to Los Angeles for a short visit. Mr. Hill has been instrumental in either directing or assisting in positive transit votes in Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Seattle, and other areas. He met with numerous agency officials and individuals while here earlier in November, and offered his thoughts in the following letter. (see next page)

Chicago Transit Authority

Merchandise Mart Plaza PO Box 3555, Chicago, Illinois, 60654 (312) 664-7200

November 18, 1977

Mr. Jerome C. Premo
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission
120 S. Spring Street - Room 300
Los Angeles, California 90012

Dear Jerry:

Enclosed is the memo I promised you regarding my visit to Los Angeles.


After going over my notes, I must say I was impressed by both the quality and quantity of the individuals I had an opportunity to meet. The length and substance of the meetings were sufficient to gain a strong feeling of where the Commission is at present, and its role in the community.

Possibly the point that was most evident to me, yet not included in the memo, was that of the uniqueness of the Commission's structure as it relates to public transportation.

The role that the Commission has in establishing transit and highway research, priorities, and funding is better constructed for accomplishment than that of any state or local government in America. Los Angeles County has a fantastic opportunity to demonstrate to the entire country that it is addressing the subject of public transportation in totality and not on a fragmented, piece-meal basis. While it will prove a lot to America, it will prove more to Los Angeles County.

Jerry, I enjoyed being of assistance. I stand ready to offer more help when and where you need it. Do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,



Terrell W. Hill
Special Assistant
to the Executive Director

:dz
att.

The statements expressed in this document represent impressions gained from some 27 separate meetings with individuals and agencies involved in, and concerned with government and transportation in Los Angeles County. As my visit to Los Angeles was brief, this report, too, will be brief. The comments made will, therefore, represent images that can be addressed by your staff and members of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission.

1. The newness of the Commission is an asset that should be exploited.

There is no history (good or bad) to protect.

There is no action that can be anticipated.

The absence of history and custom has introduced an element of surprise.

This then, demands of both citizens and the media, a close attention to the Commission's actions.

2. The Commission should carefully establish, and deliberately articulate, a statement of goals and objectives.

In preparing this, due attention should be given to the legislative mandate that established the Commission.

Adoption of a Goals program will assist the Commission to move forcefully, and in a single direction.

A clear understanding of the role of the Commission should not be left to chance.

3. The Commission should be the arena where all elected officials are elevated to a common level of understanding on the transportation options that affect Los Angeles County.

Many of the issues regarding public transportation fail to receive a full and careful discussion.

Each issue should be brought to the same level of understanding.

The public, too, can gain its education in this arena.

4. The Commission should encourage public debate. It should also become the body where debate takes place.

The interrelationship of all public transportation issues would be better understood if all issues were debated before the same body.

Public concern would be exhibited by this public debate of issues.

This debate would provide the Commission with a greater understanding of the public's awareness.

5. No vote for transit only should be placed before the public at this time.

Merely placing another transit issue on the ballot will not change the mind-set of voters.

The number of issues before the community are too numerous.

No clear comprehension of them is recognized.

No single mind-set is evident. Each issue has both strong advocacy and strong opposition.

The Commission has been charged with, and is in a leadership position, to direct Public Transportation within Los Angeles County. That this Commission was established with such a prestigious membership is a clear indication of the superior product demanded. To attain this superior product will require that careful attention be given to the action of the Commission. A direction for the Commission's actions is provided in this memo, with the intent of assisting the Commission in achieving the leadership role expected of it.

CHAPTER VI

PROS AND CONS OF A TRANSIT BALLOT

Ballot Timing

In order to go to the voters in 1978, these deadlines exists:

	<u>Decision By</u>	<u>Formal LACTC Ordinance By:</u>
June 1978	March 24	April 7
November 1978	August 25	September 8

Commission Counsel Ronald A. Schneider's detailed memorandum on this subject is attached (attachment 2), as is an October 25, 1977 opinion from the Los Angeles County Counsel to Supervisor Baxter Ward, on the subject of whether the Commission can propose a separate City-County transit ballot (attachment 3). That opinion concludes:

- (1) That the Commission can only place the issue on the ballot on a County-wide basis, but
- (2) The ordinance adopting the tax could be framed in such a way as to require that a fixed or determinable proportion of the revenues derived from the tax be expended within certain geographic areas.

Ballot Pros and Cons

The following pages summarize the pros and cons of prospective future transit ballots:

June 1978

Pros

-Positive vote resolves
SCRTD financial short fall

-someone must fund SCRTD
shortfall or further service
cuts and/or fare increases
needed

Cons

-too early to define plan, develop
support and sell program

-other tax-related issues on ballot

-loss would severely hurt LACTC
credibility

-anti-taxing atmosphere

Discussion: A positive 1/2¢ sales tax vote in June 1978 would obviate the need for the County or other local governments to

provide substantial additional funds to assist the SCRTD. As noted earlier, SCRTD faces up to a \$13.8 million deficit during its Fiscal Year beginning next July 1. However, significant work remains to be done to develop a plan and enlist support on behalf of that plan. People would not know what they were voting on, since planning work on each element of the RTDP is scheduled for completion in roughly mid-1978.

November 1978

Pros

- Time sufficient to refine plan and try to enlist support
- More funds needed to stabilize transit operations and initiate set of capital improvements
- Demonstrate LACTC use of its legislative authority ("concern, leadership in transit")

Cons

- no "crisis" in transit evident to public
- anti-taxing atmosphere
- property tax bills mailed November 1

Discussion: A November 1978 vote would provide adequate time to develop a plan, enlist political support for that plan and communicate its benefits to the public. By November 1978, the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission will have been formally in existence for some 21 months. The Commission was established to address a whole range of transportation issues here in the County, and most importantly the financing problem of improved transit. Not to proceed to the ballot in November 1978 could well be construed by many as an abdication of our responsibility to seek a longer-range solution to public transportation financing here in the County.

On the other hand, we must first decide for ourselves whether a transit ballot in 1978 is prudent, and for what purposes. The current opposition to increased taxes throughout the County is well known to all on the Commission; a compounding problem in a November 1978 vote is the fact that County property tax bills are mailed on the 1st of November and would arrive just days before the November vote. An unknown in the November 1978 vote would be the position of candidates on the state and national tickets, since November 1978 is an election for both statewide and Congressional offices.

1980

Pros

- No risk to LACTC
- Avoids impact of possible election loss

Cons

- failure to address increasingly serious funding problems
- no transit capital program
- fare increases and/or service cutbacks mandatory

Discussion: To wait until 1980 may appear to be promising, for it imposes no risk to the Commission in terms of a possible transit vote defeat in 1978. On the other hand, a delay until 1980 without some parallel effort on the part of the Commission to secure transit financing would represent a failure to address increasingly serious funding problems for transit throughout the County. There would be no increase in transit service unless other jurisdictions (either the County or individual cities) came up with several tens of millions of dollars to keep fares low and service levels at their current level. Otherwise, a wait until 1980 for a transit vote would result in substantial increased fares and a rapid deterioration in the level of service available to the public.

NO VOTE

Pros

- Provides for stabilized fare
- Major Bus capital replacement
- No risk of another transit vote loss

Cons

- requires Legislature, Governor's approval
- LACTC "passing buck back to State"
- temporary solution
- no funds for transit expansion

Discussion: SCRTD staff has proposed that the option of not going to the voters for a transit sales tax be considered. Rather the support of all political leaders in Los Angeles County, including the State Legislature, would be solicited for an appeal to the Legislature for a temporary, 1-year increase in the sales tax. This 1/2¢ increase in the sales tax for 1 year would produce approximately \$170 million in public revenues. This amount would be sufficient to stabilize transit fares for a 4 or 5 year period, as well as to proceed with a major transit capital investment program designed to replace all overage buses and construct needed new maintenance facilities.

The obvious drawback to this approach is the question of whether the Legislature and the Governor would approve a levying a 1/2¢ sales tax increase in the County without a vote of the people. Such an approach would potentially create the image of on the one hand the State establishing this Commission, and on the other the Commission immediately turning back to the State to seek a solution to our financing problem here.

CHAPTER VII

PROPOSED ADDITIONAL BALLOT OPTIONS

Introduction

The foregoing summary of pros and cons of ballot issues does not adequately reflect a concern which I have heard in discussions with numerous officials throughout the County. Specifically, many elected individuals and other public officials are concerned that the taxpayers are not yet convinced that investing their tax funds in public transportation makes sense. We have not done a conclusive job in defining the energy, urban development, congestion relief and overall environmental benefits of public transportation. Further, the social objectives of mobility for those who do not have private transportation and the role of transit in meeting the mobility needs of elderly and handicapped citizens have not been adequately documented and communicated to either elected officials or the general public.

Highway Financing

On the other hand, most parties are concerned with the increasing costs of maintaining existing streets and highways, many of which are now showing the signs of age and heavy wear.

We have looked into the financing of the road program throughout this County, in order to get an idea of how much federal, state and local funding supports the road program. The following table summarizes investments by source and objective. This information is from the FY 1975-76 Annual Report of the State Controller entitled, "Financial Transactions Concerning Streets and Roads of cities and counties of California".

TABLE 10

RECEIPTS OF FUNDS FOR "STREET PURPOSES" BY SOURCE

(\$\$ in millions)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY76</u>
Federal	11.5	14.0
State	117.6	123.2
Local	156.2	144.0 <u>1/</u>
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	285.3	281.2

1/ Local receipts are as follows:

City of Los Angeles	58.1
Los Angeles County	21.6
Other cities in County	64.3
	<hr/>
Total	144.0

TABLE 11

USES OF FUNDS FOR "STREET PURPOSES" BY EXPENDITURE CATEGORY

(\$\$ in millions)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>
Administration and Engineering	27.3	30.4
Right-of-Way and Construction	102.1	86.1
Maintenance	130.5	140.6
	5.3	3.5
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Sub-total	265.2	260.6
Aid to Other Agencies	26.2	22.4
Adjustment	(.5)	(1.8)
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	291.9	281.2 <u>2/</u>

2/ Local expenditures are as follows:

City of Los Angeles	99.7
Los Angeles County	79.7
Other cities in County	101.8
	<hr/>
Total	281.2

A common concern of officials throughout the County regarding the road program is the increasing maintenance costs which must be borne by local government. Property taxes are the usual source of funding for local budgets, including portions of the budget devoted to road maintenance and construction.

An essential point to be made here is that the Legislature established the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, rather than a transit commission. We at the local level are charged with making trade-offs of public funds for both roads and public transportation. With this in mind, and in recognition of the strain on local budgets which an ongoing local road program imposes, the Commission may want to consider the following option.

PROPOSED ADDITIONAL BALLOT OPTION

1/2 ¢ Sales Tax Vote

-1/4¢ for transit operating and for bus capital match
-1/4¢ returned to local jurisdictions throughout the County based on population; to be used for either improved local transit or for local street improvements (FAU concept of flexibility)

Pros

-broadens support base
-provides for basic transit operations needs
-supports ambitious capital program, but one scaled down from RTDP

Cons

-probably requires emergency legislation
-anti-taxing atmosphere

Discussion: The above summary shows an alternative use for the 1/2¢ sales tax. It is likely that emergency legislation would be required to provide an opportunity for the Commission to place such an issue on the November 1978 ballot. The principle benefit of this option is that it will significantly broaden the base of potential support for the issue, so that the chances of passage of a 1/2¢ sales tax increase will improve. Some jurisdictions may be in a position to reduce their property taxes as a result of the return to the community of funds generated by the increased sales tax. It might be possible in some instances for communities to devote lower amounts of property tax revenues to support their road and/or transit programs.

A distinguishing feature of the option of a transportation issue in Los Angeles County is that local governments throughout the County would be directly involved in the decision-making process. Local governments would have over \$1.5 billion in the 1979-90 period available for discretionary highway or transit use. This direct involvement of local governments in fiscal resource decisions could stimulate far greater interest at the local jurisdiction level in supporting a transit-transportation ballot.

A potential disadvantage of this approach is that it might not provide sufficient local matching funds to proceed with the entire Regional Transit Development Program. As noted earlier, however, we should objectively question whether we need to proceed with the whole RTDP in any event.

If the Commission wishes to pursue this option, it must decide what, if any, conditions would be imposed on the uses of funds returned to local jurisdictions.

RETURN TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM 1/4¢ SALES TAX

Table 12 shows the amount of money which would be available to selected cities in Los Angeles County for local transportation purposes in the period 1978-1990, in the event the Commission selects this ballot option and it finds favor with the electorate. A complete list for all cities is included in Appendix D.

TABLE 12

PROJECTION FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR LOCAL TRANSPORTATION 1/
PURPOSES FROM 1/4¢ SALES TAX

(1978-1990, total, in \$\$ millions)

Burbank	\$ 18.0
El Monte	14.5
Gardena	9.3
Glendale	28.3
Hawthorne	12.0
Inglewood	17.9
L.A. City	594.8
L.A. County (unincorp.)	205.7
Lakewood	17.1
Long Beach	73.5
Monterey Park	10.7
Norwalk	18.7
Palmdale	2.2
Pasadena	23.3
Pomona	18.2
Redondo Beach	13.6
Santa Monica	19.2
Torrance	28.9
West Covina	15.7

per rep. basis?

1/ Figures are based on current population estimates and sales tax revenues escalated at 6.58% per year.

REASONS FOR CONSIDERATION

I believe that a 1/2¢ transportation tax ballot should be considered with these options:

- 1) Transit funds from the 1/4¢ would be for bus-only capital and to support over-all public transportation operating costs;
- 2) The vote would not include another public decision on fixed guideway rapid transit (either the starter line or the DPM). The vote of the citizens of the County in 1974, on Proposition 5, was a public referendum on fixed guideway rapid transit;
- 3) Proposition 5 funds could be used to build either the starter line or the Downtown People Mover, or both, if ongoing analyses justify their construction; and
- 4) If both the City of Los Angeles and County provided donations from their available Proposition 5 funds for fixed guideway transit, the 1/4¢ sales tax returned to individual jurisdictions could be used to replenish these Proposition 5 funds. The point here is that there would be no net decrease in funds available for road building or maintenance, which would be the case if Proposition 5 funds were used for transit without a commensurate increase in available revenues for the road program.

PROPOSITION 5 FUNDS STATUS

The following table reflects the Proposition 5 funding which is available each year for possible fixed guideway use:

TABLE 13
Available Proposition 5 Monies for Transit
(\$\$ in millions)

L.A. County	12.6
City of L.A.	7.0
Other cities within L.A. County	8.1
Caltrans	16.3 ^{1/}
	<hr/>
	44.0

^{1/} This level is based on the CALTRANS 6-year Planning Program.

Caltrans has already programmed \$82.2 million in its current 6-year Planning Program (FY 79 through FY 84); the California Highway Commission approved this level of Proposition 5 funding for the next six years at its November 17, 1977 meeting.

If the City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County committed their available Proposition 5 funds for fixed guideway transit during this same FY 79 - FY 84 period, a total of some \$200 million in non-Federal funds would be available. This would potentially generate \$800 million in UMTA capital grants and would be sufficient to proceed with construction of both the DPM and starter line. Some Proposition 5 funding for starter line construction would be needed in both FY 85 and FY 86 to complete work.

A more detailed analysis of the Proposition 5 funding situation is included as Attachment 4.

CHAPTER VIII

LOS ANGELES ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSPORTATION

As part of its General Plan Revision Program, the Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission contracted with Opinion Research of Long Beach to carry out a detailed survey of some 1100 households throughout the County. The findings of the interviews which were carried out in November 1976 were included in a June 1977 report, excerpts of which follow. I have underlined certain portions for emphasis.

...the sample's reliance on the automobile in travel habits is described as "an almost total dependency". That situation is subject to change in the future according to response from the sample. In fact, based on response to various questions relative to transportation it would appear that, given the right combination of events, almost half the respondents would eventually make use of public transportation.

Increased use could start with the current public transportation system...

...while there is reluctance to rely on public transportation as it is presently constituted--almost one-third of those who do not currently ride the bus say they would do so if service is improved. Improving proximity and timing are reported to be more important than cost and comfort by most respondents.

Of all suggestions made for solutions to the transportation problem, somewhat less than half (45.1%) suggest mass transit (Rail transit is suggested by 23.8 per cent while rapid transit is suggested by 21.3%). Improving public transportation generally constitutes 18.8 per cent of the suggestions, while increasing the number of buses is mentioned in 12.5 per cent of the cases.

Automobiles are not absent from respondent thinking, for 6.3 per cent recommend more and better freeways.

...the data indicates that most respondents understand that rapid transit will require some type of tax funding, but claim future voter approval to be contingent upon a greater educational effort by advocates, and assurance of comprehensive planning and wider service.

Respondents indicate that they feel the automobile should remain an important part of the transportation modal mix in the future, and tend to support features which will lessen congestion on both the major street system and freeways.

In addition to this work, Caltrans has also done extensive surveys on the transportation habits of County residents. We expect to receive the data from these surveys soon, and will share interpretations with the Commission as soon as the analysis is completed.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

This report includes considerable information on existing and projected transit financing and improvements. The following conclusions can be drawn from this information:

1. Transit financing: SCRTD is in financial difficulty; in addition, operating deficits for other operators have been increasing and are projected to increase in the future. More money is needed if existing service is to be continued; and clearly, substantially more public funds are needed to improve aging transit capital facilities and make significant transit capital investments.
2. Transit Efficiency and Effectiveness: Officials in many quarters are asking if we are getting the best return for the transit dollar, not only for SCRTD but for the municipal operators as well. But efficiency studies in the absence of agreement on objectives and measures of effectiveness are of limited value.

Toward the goal of rationally allocating subsidies among the various operators (and among the many types of service), the Commission should place priority on defining specific objectives for transit in Los Angeles County, against which performance can be measured. In addition initial financial and performance audits should be carried out to get a clear and accurate portrayal of how efficient and effective transit operators actually are, and what the potential savings and improvements might be. The Commission has already set aside \$50,000 for this purpose, as documented in Attachment 5.

3. Attitudes Toward Transportation: We need more information on the attitude of the public regarding their willingness to pay for transit/transportation improvements before we decide to go to the voters again. We should both work with the Commission's Citizens Advisory Committee and consider further opinion research polling on this issue.
4. Sales Tax Pros and Cons: Before we can expect the public to support a transit or transportation vote, we must better define what the program and its benefits are, and then seek a genuine political consensus. The Commission would seem to benefit from a broadening of its legislative authority, so that sales tax revenues could be used for transportation purposes, as contrasted with the current limitation for "public transit purposes." The Commission must decide what, if any, limitations it would impose on the use of sales tax-generated funds.
5. Transit Future: Los Angeles has a rich transit past, an unstable transit condition today, and a most uncertain future. Generation of a long-term transit financing base can set in motion a variety of capital and operating improvements which would reestablish transit as a vital factor in this area--and help address our energy, air quality, mobility, congestion and urban development/redevelopment problems. The decision on how to proceed from here rests primarily with the Commission.

ATTACHMENT 1



THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

DEC 22 1976

Honorable Tom Bradley
Mayor
City of Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California

Mr. Byron Cook
Chairman
Southern California Rapid Transit District
425 South Main Street
Los Angeles, California

RECEIVED

DEC 27 1976

SCRTD. SECRETARY

Dear Mayor Bradley and Mr. Cook:

I am writing you in response to the four-part program for improvement of public transportation which you have submitted to the Department of Transportation. This program includes: (1) a regional transportation systems management (TSM) plan (identified in your analysis as Alternative II); (2) high level bus-on-freeway service (identified as Alternative IX-A); (3) a Downtown People Mover for the Los Angeles central business district; and (4) a rail rapid transit system in the Wilshire/La Brea corridor (identified as Alternative E).

The development of a consensus around this region-wide public transportation improvement program under your far-sighted leadership represents important progress in cooperative decision-making by the public agencies in the Los Angeles area and the State, and I want to compliment all agencies involved. The Los Angeles metropolitan area is the second largest urbanized area in the nation, and the provision of adequate public transportation alternatives for people in the region is of vital interest to this Department. We welcome the opportunity to respond positively to your proposals.

Our detailed review of your proposals has produced the following conclusions. We find the first two elements of your proposal--transportation systems management improvements, and high level bus-on-freeway service--to be well

justified by the analysis. Accordingly, the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) are prepared to provide the \$7.8 million requested for preliminary engineering and environmental impact analysis on these proposals. The State Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) should begin the appropriate steps to secure FHWA funding, and should deal directly with FHWA on that matter; UMTA funds should be sought directly from that agency.

With regard to the Downtown People Mover (DPM), UMTA has reviewed your proposal in the context of the nation-wide competition which it has been conducting and in which Los Angeles remains as one of 11 finalists. I am pleased to inform you that Los Angeles has been selected as one of four winning cities in that competition to receive UMTA funds for implementation of such a system, commencing with a \$1.28 million grant of preliminary engineering funds. Subject to satisfaction of environmental clearances and other statutory conditions, it is our intention to provide up to \$100 million from UMTA discretionary capital grant funds to assist in the construction of your proposed DPM system. This dollar ceiling is necessitated by the fact that our resources are limited and that your proposal was more than twice as expensive as any other we were considering. We suggest that you consider funding the parking and highway elements of your plan from Federal-aid highway sources, in order to permit you to lower your need for UMTA capital grant funds to an amount within the \$100 million ceiling.

With respect to your rapid transit proposal (Alternative E), we conclude that further study of fixed guideway alternatives in the Wilshire/La Brea corridor--but only in that corridor--is merited. This study may include initial engineering and environmental analysis, but before full preliminary engineering will be authorized, several issues must be resolved. Specifically:

- relationships between the proposed rapid transit and DPM systems must be examined, and any overlaps in service eliminated;
- all-bus alternatives must continue to be evaluated for the corridor, as your request for engineering funds itself suggests, and the possibility of

high-level bus transit along the Hollywood freeway to the San Fernando Valley should be explored as an alternative to extending the rapid transit line into the Valley;

--detailed information must be provided on the relationship between the proposed rapid transit line and the region's land use objectives as identified in the Regional Development Guide or other plans; and


--the position of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors on Alternative E must be stated, since the Board is identified as providing a portion of the capital funding for the proposal.

To support these further studies and initial engineering and environmental work on Alternative E, UMTA will entertain an application for up to \$2 million under Section 9 of our Act.

I want to emphasize the importance which we place upon your aggressively pursuing Transportation Systems Management solutions in the months ahead. We believe that much can be accomplished by giving buses, carpools and other high occupancy vehicles preferential treatment through newly constructed exclusive lanes, new ramps, ramp metering and other techniques short of taking existing lanes from auto traffic. Your intentions and future success in these efforts, which are proposed in Alternative II, will figure importantly in our further reviews of the appropriateness of rail transit in the region. As we evaluate your overall public transportation improvement program, you should know that the willingness of the State and of local governments to provide funds needed to support transit operating costs associated with that program will be an important factor in our capital funding decisions. It does not make sense for the Federal government or for public agencies concerned with public transportation in the Los Angeles area to commit hundreds of millions of public dollars for improved transit capital facilities if a consensus for meeting future transit operating costs cannot be achieved. Therefore, as you proceed with planning and preliminary engineering of your ambitious and far-sighted four-part program, I urge you to continue your leadership roles in examining funding sources and in reaching a consensus on meeting the region's long-term transit operating needs.

You, of course, appreciate that neither UMTA nor FHWA can be committed at this time to provide capital funds to implement your program. Under Federal law, such commitments can be made only after environmental clearances and other statutory conditions have been fulfilled. Nevertheless, we do commit today to provide over \$11 million for engineering and other studies from a combination of UMTA and FHWA sources. We look forward to continuing work with you in developing a public transportation system which will effectively serve the citizens of the Los Angeles region.

Sincerely,



William T. Coleman, Jr.

cc: Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Los Angeles City Council
CALTRANS
Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG)


ATTACHMENT 2

RECEIVED SEP 12 1977

MEMORANDUM

September 8, 1977

TO: JEROME PREMO, Executive Director
L. A. County Transportation Commission

FROM: RONALD L. SCHNEIDER 
Principal Deputy County Counsel

RE: Schedule and Procedure for Placing Sales Tax Measure on Ballot
in 1978

Section 130350 of the Public Utilities Code provides that the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission may impose a transaction and use tax subject to voter approval. Voter approval or disapproval is to be expressed at a special election called by the Commission (Section 130351, Public Utilities Code).

In 1978 a tax measure special election can be consolidated either with the statewide primary election on June 6, 1978 or the statewide general election on November 7, 1978.

Section 130351 of the Public Utilities Code specifies the procedure and time frame for the election.

"Whenever an election called by a district, city or other political subdivision for the submission of any question, proposition, or office to be filled is to be consolidated with a statewide election, and such question, proposition, or office to be filled is to appear upon the same ballot as that provided for such statewide election, the district, city or other political subdivision shall, at least 74 days prior to the date of the election, file with the board of supervisors, and a copy with the county clerk, a resolution of its governing board requesting such consolidation and setting forth the exact form of any question, proposition, or office to be voted upon at such election, as the same is to appear on the ballot. The question or proposition to appear on the ballot shall not exceed 175 words in length. The resolution requesting the consolidation may be adopted and filed prior to the adoption of the ordinance, resolution or order calling the election, but in that event the ordinance, resolution or order calling the election must be adopted at least 59 days before the election. The names of the candidates to appear upon the ballot

where district, city, or other political subdivision offices are to be filled shall be filed with the county clerk no later than 67 days prior to the election."

At least 74 days prior to the election - March 24, 1978 for the June 6 primary election, or August 25, 1978 for the November 7, 1978 general election - the Commission will have to adopt a resolution requesting a consolidation of a special election for imposition of the sales tax with the specified statewide election. This resolution, together with either a proposed or adopted ordinance, imposing such a tax, must be filed by those dates with both the Board of Supervisors and the Registrar of Voters. The wording of the ordinance, whether proposed or adopted, must be in the exact form in which it is to appear on the ballot.

If the Commission has not adopted the ordinance at that time, it has until 59 days prior to the election (April 7, 1978 for the June 6 election, or September 8, 1978 for the November 7 election) to adopt the ordinance. However, the Commission cannot change or modify the wording of the ordinance at that time. If the Commission fails to adopt the ordinance by that date, the measure will not appear on the ballot.

If the tax ordinance is approved by the voters, it would be operative on the first day of the first calendar quarter commencing not less than 180 days after adoption of the ordinance (Section 130352, Public Utilities Code).

RLS:bs

ATTACHMENT 3

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RECEIVED NOV 8 1977

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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL

648 HALL OF ADMINISTRATION

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012



October 25, 1977

JOHN H. LARSON, COUNTY COUNSEL
DONALD K. BYRNE, CHIEF DEPUTY

974-1904

Honorable Baxter Ward
Supervisor, Fifth District
869 Hall of Administration
Los Angeles, California 90012

Re: County Transportation Commission

Dear Supervisor Ward:

You have requested our advice whether the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, in placing a one-half cent sales tax increase on the ballot, could place it as a separate issue in various parts of the County rather than on a County-wide basis.

We have concluded:

- (1) That the Commission can only place the issue on the ballot on a County-wide basis, but
- (2) The ordinance adopting the tax could be framed in such a way as to require that a fixed or determinable proportion of the revenues derived from the tax be expended within certain geographic areas.

The basic authority for the Commission to impose such a tax is §130350 of the Public Utilities Code, which provides as follows:

"A retail transactions and use tax ordinance applicable in the incorporated and unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles may be adopted by the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission in accordance with Part 1.6 (commencing with Section 7251)

S.C.R.T.D. LIBRARY

Honorable Baxter Ward

Page Two
October 25, 1977

6

of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, provided that a majority of the electors voting on the measure vote to authorize its enactment at a special election called for that purpose by the commission."

Part 1.6 is the "Transactions and Use Tax Law" which provides for the collection of the tax by the State Board of Equalization after it is properly authorized. One of the requirements of the law is that the transactions and use tax ordinance include a provision imposing a tax for the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail "upon every retailer in the district" (for our purposes, "district" is defined to mean the County). Revenue and Taxation Code §7261.

A

Based upon these sections, it is our conclusion that the tax measure could not be submitted as separate issues in various parts of the County but must be submitted County-wide. To permit the issue to be split raises the possibility that it might be authorized in one portion of the County and defeated in another. This would violate the provisions of §7261 requiring imposition on every retailer in the County. Furthermore, the logical reading of §130350 is that it was intended to provide for one election measure. We do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.

B

What we have said, however, regarding the requirement for the election to be held County-wide, does not limit the right of the Commission in adopting the ordinance to state how the revenues will be spent. The only requirement of law is that the Commission expend the revenues for "public transit purposes." Public Utilities Code §130354. The Commission could, however, in the transactions and use tax ordinance submitted to the voters, further restrict its power to spend the money in any reasonable manner. You may recall that in 1976 the Sunset Coastline proposal was very precisely described in the ordinance itself. Likewise, we believe that the Commission could in its discretion allocate

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
Honorable Baxter Ward
Page Three
October 25, 1977

a certain percentage of the revenues, either on a fixed or determinable basis, to certain geographic areas of the County.


Very truly yours,

JOHN H. LARSON
County Counsel

By


GERALD F. CRUMP, Chief
Public Works Division

APPROVED AND RELEASED:


JOHN H. LARSON
County Counsel

CFC/je

ATTACHMENT 4

LOS ANGELES COUNTY TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

October 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO: JEROME C. PREMO
 FROM: DONALD CAMPH
 SUBJECT: Available Prop. 5 Monies

For the 6-year planning period (FY 78/79 thru FY 83/84) a total of \$264.0 million in Prop. 5 monies is theoretically available for fixed guideway construction in Los Angeles County. This amount is comprised of \$75.6 million for Los Angeles County, \$42.0 million for the City of Los Angeles, \$48.6 million for other cities in the County, and \$97.8 million for CALTRANS. It should be noted that CALTRANS has programmed only \$82.2 million based on requests from CRA, LAX, and SCRTD.

Based on the State Controller's Streets and Roads financial report for FY 75/76, the following Prop. 5 monies will theoretically be available for fixed guideway transit construction projects in Los Angeles County for the next 6 years (exclusive of CALTRANS portion)

	<u>County of L.A.</u>	<u>City of L.A.</u>	<u>Other Cities</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 78/79	12.6	7.0	8.1	27.7
FY 79/80	12.6	7.0	8.1	27.7
FY 80/81	12.6	7.0	8.1	27.7
FY 81/82	12.6	7.0	8.1	27.7
FY 82/83	12.6	7.0	8.1	27.7
FY 83/84	12.6	7.0	8.1	27.7
6-Year Total	75.6	42.0	48.6	166.2

These amounts assume a constant level of gasoline consumption, with whatever gains made in vehicle efficiency being offset by increases in vehicle miles traveled.

CALTRANS has programmed \$82.2 million in the 6-Year Planning Program covering the period FY 78/79 thru FY 83/84. Of this, \$15.1 million is for CRA, \$2.1 million is for LAX, and \$64.9 million is for SCRTD. The following table presents these amounts by year (in \$ millions)

	<u>CRA</u>	<u>LAX</u>	<u>SCRTD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SEC. 200 LIMIT</u>
FY 78/79	6.6	0.2	0.5	7.3	16.3
FY 79/80	7.0	0.5	3.5	11.0	16.3
FY 80/81	1.5	1.0	12.5	15.0	16.3
FY 81/82	0	0.5	15.8	16.3	16.3
FY 82/83	0	0	16.3	16.3	16.3
FY 83/84	0	0	16.3	16.3	16.3
Total	15.1	2.2	64.9	82.2	97.8

Available Prop. 5
Monies
10/24/77

Page 2

The programmed amounts for FY 78/79, FY 79/80, and FY 80/81 are based on needs statements submitted by the various agencies; over this three year period, total expressed needs are \$15.9 million less than the amount theoretically available under Section 200 of the Streets and Highways Code. For the last three years of the six year period, total expressed needs are in excess of the limitation by a total of \$20.1 million, all for SCRTD. It should be noted that while the June 7, 1977 CALTRANS, Article XIX Guideway Funding Guidelines state that "The department will also prepare a list of alternate highway projects from future years of the Multiyear Program which could be funded ahead of schedule if the expected guideway proposals are not submitted or funded 90 days prior to the end of the budget year," subsequent legislative budgeting action effectively precludes this possibility; thus, unused funds revert to the State to be reprogrammed in subsequent years.



DONALD CAMP
Transportation Policy Analyst

DC:bn

ATTACHMENT 5

LOS ANGELES COUNTY TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
Room 300 - 120 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
(213) 620-2849

May 4, 1977

Mr. Walter M. Ingalls, Chairman
Assembly Transportation Committee
State Capitol, Room 4016
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Mr. Ingalls:

PUBLIC TRANSIT
PERFORMANCE AUDIT

One of the charges to the newly formed Los Angeles County Transportation Commission is that they report to the Legislature on the methods and criteria for auditing the performance of transit operators in Los Angeles County to ensure that costs and revenues of each reflect maximum public benefits and levels of service.

I have enclosed a copy of a resolution approved by the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission requesting an audit of the transit operators within Los Angeles County by the Auditor General's Office. The resolution, I believe, is self-explanatory.

Such an audit, I believe, is necessary to instill public confidence in the Southern California Rapid Transit District's and municipal operators' ability to provide efficient and effective public transit service for the people of Los Angeles County. Since this matter is of vital concern to the Commission, it is willing to fund a portion of the cost of the audit.

Because I am sure you share the Commission's concern over providing the best possible public transit service at the least cost to the taxpayer, I would appreciate it if you would lend your support to this effort and urge the Auditor General's cooperation in expediting the performance of this audit.

Your assistance in this matter is deeply appreciated.

Very truly yours,


JOHN FERRARO
Chairman, County Transportation Commission

Encl.

RESOLUTION REQUESTING CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE
TO DIRECT AUDITOR GENERAL AND/OR THE LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST TO AUDIT THE SORTD AND MUNICIPAL OPERATORS
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

WHEREAS, Section 130290, Et Al of the Public Utilities Code requires the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission to report to the Legislature on the methods and criteria for auditing the performance of transit operators to insure that costs and revenues of each reflect maximum public benefits and levels of service, and all other matters as, in the opinion of the Commission, may be necessary; and

WHEREAS, annually the Southern California Rapid Transit District and the Municipal Operators of Los Angeles County receive about \$125 million in operational subsidies from the Federal, State and County governments; and

WHEREAS, this Commission has been advised that, unless additional subsidies are provided, transit fares will be increased and bus services curtailed; and

WHEREAS, it is essential that the Legislators and citizens of this State and County have utmost confidence and receive assurances from independent sources that the public resources are being properly utilized to provide the maximum transit services to the citizens of this County; and

WHEREAS, the State Legislature may direct the State Auditor General and/or the Legislative Analyst to perform such audit and review; and

WHEREAS, this Commission is willing to finance a portion of this essential study to fund the employment of a private consultant on bus operations to complement and work with a State Auditing Team.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission requests the California State Legislature to direct the Auditor General or the Legislative Analyst, or both, to perform a complete and thorough analysis, audit and study of the management, organization, operating procedures, service delivery and other matters critical to the effective operation of the Southern California Rapid Transit District and Municipal Operators of the County of Los Angeles; and

THAT, the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission will fund to a maximum of \$50,000 the employment of a consultant, mutually acceptable to the State Auditing Team and the County Transportation Commission, to assist in this endeavor. Further, that such study be instituted at the earliest possible date.

The foregoing resolution was adopted on the _____ day of _____, 1977 by the Transportation Commission of the County of Los Angeles.

JOHN FERRARO, Chairman

15

COMMITTEES
 TRANSPORTATION
 AGRICULTURE AND WATER
 RESOURCES
 BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS
 HEALTH AND WELFARE

JOINT COMMITTEES
 MOTOR VEHICLE INSPECTION
 (CHAIRMAN)

SELECT COMMITTEES
 CHILDREN AND YOUTH
 (CHAIRMAN)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
 RUTH NEELEY

California State Senate

STATE SENATOR
ROBERT PRESLEY
 THIRTY-FOURTH SENATORIAL DISTRICT
 CHAIRMAN
 SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

TO ADDRESS
 MAIL ROOM
 1000 CALIFORNIA STREET
 SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95833
 (916) 224-3563



May 24, 1977

Mr. John Ferraro, Chairman
 Los Angeles County Transportation Commission
 Room 300 - 120 South Spring Street
 Los Angeles, CA 90012

Dear Mr. Ferraro:

In your letter of May 4, 1977, you requested my assistance in directing the Auditor General to conduct an audit of the Southern California Transit District and the municipal operators of the County of Los Angeles. I applaud the commission's decision to proceed with a badly needed audit.

The Auditor General recently conducted a study of auditing procedures and performance evaluation of major transit districts throughout the state. His report is quite critical of the lack of proper audits that are required by the Mills, Alquist, Deddeh Act of 1971. These periodic audits must be conducted and paid for by the regional planning agencies.

The Auditor General is not an appropriate source for these audits. I suggest that you and the district directly employ a private consultant for this endeavor.

Sincerely,

Robert Presley
 ROBERT PRESLEY
 State Senator

RP:mb

LOS ANGELES COUNTY TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
Room 300 - 120 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
(213) 620-2849

May 4, 1977

Mr. Robert B. Presley, Chairman
Senate Transportation Committee
State Capitol, Room 4076
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Mr. Presley:

PUBLIC TRANSIT
- PERFORMANCE AUDIT

One of the charges to the newly formed Los Angeles County Transportation Commission is that they report to the Legislature on the methods and criteria for auditing the performance of transit operators in Los Angeles County to ensure that costs and revenues of each reflect maximum public benefits and levels of service.


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Because I am sure you share the Commission's concern over providing the best possible public transit service at the least cost to the taxpayer, I would appreciate it if you would lend your support to this effort and urge the Auditor General's cooperation in expediting the performance of this audit.

Your assistance in this matter is deeply appreciated.

Very truly yours,


JOHN FERRARO
Chairman, County Transportation Commission

Encl.

S.C.R.T.D. LIBRARY

ATTACHMENT 6

MEMORANDUM

TO: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMITTEE AND
TRANSPORTATION AND UTILITIES COMMITTEE

FROM: DAVID DI JULIO

SUBJECT: CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977 (PL 95-95)

Based on our initial interpretation of the new Clean Air Act it will have more far reaching effects on the planning programming and development of our region than the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. Under the threat of Federal Sanctions we (state and local governments and organizations of local governments) will be required to develop, and implement, a plan to attain air quality standards by July 1, 1987. The Sanction could mean the loss of air, water, highway, and, in some cases all, federal assistance to the region.

The attached summary of the Clean Air Act has been prepared by the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC) and is the best description of the impacts of the act on organizations of local governments we have seen to date. We recommend a careful reading.

Four sections of the Act are of particular importance to SCAG member governments:

- Sewage Treatment Grants - Section 316 limits funding for sewage treatment plants in areas where induced growth has not been mitigated by the air plan.
- Limitations on Certain Federal Assistance - Section 176 restricts federal agencies from granting certain EPA and highway funds to areas which do not have an acceptable air plan.
- Area Designation - Section 164 requires all areas of a state to be divided into areas which will be classified as non-attainment areas, non-significant deterioration areas or areas pending classification.
- Non-Attainment Plan Provisions - Sub part D requires that a plan to attain air quality standards be developed, submitted and implemented under the threat of limitations on certain federal assistance.

Considering the rigorous and far reaching implications of the Act, we are pleased to find that it contains increased opportunities for local governments to take the lead in developing and implementing the air plan.

MEMORANDUM

CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977 (PL 95-95)

Page 2

Staff Recommends:

That the SCAG Committees and member jurisdictions carefully review the implications of the new act and consider how to improve their role under the new act to insure maximum preservation of existing authorities over transportation, growth and development.

1977 CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON AIR QUALITY PLANNING

On August 7, 1977, the President signed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, P.L. 95-95. These Amendments represent the most extensive rewrite of the Act since its initial passage in 1970. Below is a summary of the Act and some questions dealing with its implications.

The 1977 Amendments propose new policies and implementation strategies for attaining the primary and secondary ambient air quality standards originally established under the 1970 Act. It is probably a fair assessment to indicate that the 1970 Act did not recognize fully the extreme complexities in attaining the national standards and the severe economic dislocations which would ensue if the timetables for meeting such air quality standards were met. The solution to the problem has been made more difficult by the failure of the major automobile manufacturers to meet the emission standards established in the 1970 Act. The Act addresses the problems of attainment in such regions where the primary standards cannot be obtained without severe economic repercussion on the regional community. It is these changes in the Act that directly deal with this aspect of the problem that are analyzed below.

Criteria for Classifying New and Existing Air Quality Regions

Under the 1970 Act, each state was required to establish air quality planning regions within its boundaries. Generally, these areas were delineated on the basis of the nature and extent of the air quality problem within the region. All undesignated areas within a state were treated as a single air quality region for the purposes of the Act.

The 1977 Amendments in Section 103, modify Section 107 of the Act, and establish a different criteria for selecting and classifying air quality regions. Under this change, each state, within 120 days of the date of the enactment, must submit to EPA a list identifying those air quality control regions, or portions thereof, which fit into five (5) basic classifications established under Section 103. For regions with high levels of vehicle emissions, the most important classification is under Section 107(d)(1)(A). That section encompasses regions that do not meet primary ambient air quality standards for any air pollutant other than sulfur dioxide or particulate matter. Any region so classified, must develop a revised Transportation Control Plan (TCP), that will attain primary air quality standards by 1982 or, in certain extraordinary circumstances, by 1987.

should be noted, also, that this particular section also allows the states to redesignate air quality regions within the state for the purpose of developing more efficient and effective air quality management programs. Such redesignation must be approved by the Administrator of EPA. This is not a sweeping policy mandate to require modification of existing regions, however. The Conference Report on the Amendments, H.R. 95-564, recognizes that revisions of boundaries shall not be made in any cases other than for the improvement of the capacity of air quality control agencies to perform authorized functions. Moreover, alteration of boundaries in multistate regions would require not only the Administrator's approval, but the consent of several governors.

Transportation Control Planning

Section 109 of the Act amends Section 108 of the Clean Air Act of 1970; it requires the Administrator of EPA, within 180 days of the enactment, to publish guidelines on the basic program elements for transportation control planning. The guidelines must include information on:

- methods to identify and evaluate alternative planning and control activities;
- methods of reviewing plans on a regular basis as conditions change or new information is presented;
- identification of funds and other resources necessary to implement the plan, including interagency agreements on providing such funds and resources;
- methods to assure participation by the public in all phases of the planning process; and
- such other methods as the Administrator determines necessary to carry out a continuous planning process.

Subsequent to the publication of the guidelines, the Administrator, within six (6) months after the enactment of the statute, must at least prepare information on the process, procedures and methods to reduce and control pollutants, including but not limiting the following:

- motor vehicle emission inspection and maintenance programs;
- programs to control vapor emissions from fuel transfer and storage operations and operations using solvents;
- programs for improved public transit;
- programs to establish exclusive bus and carpool lanes and areawide carpool programs.

Information concerning other sources of pollutants and programs to ameliorate them shall be published within a year of the enactment. Information in these areas will encompass, for example, programs for retrofit of emission devices, conversion of diesel vehicles to cleaner engines, controls on extended idling of vehicles, use of staggered work hours, etc.

In publishing such information for use in formulating transportation control programs, EPA must include an assessment of the relative effectiveness of such approaches, the potential effect on providing transportation services and the environmental, energy and economic impact of their implementation.

Planning in Non-Attainment Areas

Part D of the Amendments deals with plan requirements for non-attainment areas. This part defines non-attainment areas to include regions which cannot attain primary standards because of emissions from mobile sources. In such cases where the national primary ambient air quality standards for photochemical oxidants or carbon monoxide (or both) has not been met, a revised transportation control plan must be formulated and implemented to attain primary standards prior to December 31, 1982. There are exceptions to this cutoff date, however, and where diligent efforts will not provide attainment by that date, the period for compliance can be extended until December 31, 1987, if certain conditions maintain. Further, Section 172 of the Act requires that such non-attainment areas must develop revised implementation plans in order to be given a longer period (1982) for attaining primary ambient standards. The salient conditions for developing a revised plan include that it must:

- o be adopted by the state(s) after reasonable notice and public hearings;
- o provide for implementation of all reasonably available control measures as expeditiously as practicable;
- o require, during the interim period of plan formulation, progress toward reduction in emissions from existing sources in the area through the application of reasonably available control technology;
- o include a comprehensive and accurate inventory of emissions from all sources;
- o expressly identify and quantify the emissions, if any, of any pollutant which will be allowed to result from the construction and operation of major new stationary sources;
- o require permits for construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources;
- o identify and commit financial and manpower resources necessary to carry out the plan;
- o contain emission limitations, schedules of compliance and such other measures as may be necessary to attain air quality standards;
- o evidence public, local government and state legislative involvement and consultation in the process;
- o include written evidence that the state, general public local governments or a regional agency designated by general-purpose local governments for such purpose have adopted by statute, regulation or other legally enforceable document, the

necessary requirements and timetables for enforcement of the appropriate elements of the plan;

- o establish a program which requires, prior to issuance of any permit for construction or modification of a major emitting facility, an analysis of alternative sites, sizes, production processes and environmental control techniques which demonstrate that the benefits of the proposed source significantly outweigh environmental and social costs imposed as a result of its development;
- o establish a specific schedule for implementation of a vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance program; and
- o identify other measures necessary to provide for attainment of the applicable national ambient air quality standard not later than December 31, 1987.

The Planning Process

Under Section 174, the states and local governments must define within six (6) months after the enactment, how they will develop a RTCP for those regions which require such a component within the state's overall air quality implementation plan. The process for making this decision requires that the states and the elected local officials of affected general-purpose local governments within such region, "shall jointly determine which elements of a revised implementation plan will be planned for and implemented or enforced by the state and which such elements will be planned for and implemented or enforced by local governments or regional agencies, or any combination of local governments, regional agencies, or the state."

This section encourages the preparation of a revised implementation plan and could be accomplished by an organization of elected officials of general local government, "designated by agreement of the local governments in an affected area, and certified by the state for this purpose." In the absence of such joint action by the local governments and the states, however, the governor(s) shall designate an organization of local elected officials to carry out this responsibility if such local accord is not attained during the six-month period. Where feasible, the Act provides that the metropolitan planning organization designated to undertake multimodal transportation planning under Section 134 of Title 23 of the U.S. Code, or the organization responsible for the air quality maintenance process, should be the designated organization.

Section 175 provides that the designated organization is eligible to receive a 100% grant for the payment of the reasonable cost for the development of a revised TCP. These funds are to supplement any funds already available under federal law to such organizations for transportation or air quality maintenance planning. \$75 million is authorized to fund this grant program and the money is available without fiscal year limitations.

Limitations on Certain Federal Assistance

Section 176 of the Act requires that the EPA Administrator shall not approve any project or award any grant under the Clean Air Act and the Secretary of Transportation shall not approve any project or award any grant for transportation purposes, other

than for safety, mass transit, or transportation improvement projects related to air quality improvement or maintenance in any air quality control region where the Administrator finds that after July 1, 1979 that the governor(s) have not submitted an implementation plan for a revised TCP or that reasonable effort toward submitting such an implementation plan has not been made.

Similar restrictions on the Administrator's authority must be invoked if a general-purpose local government or the state has failed to implement any element of a revised TCP which it has agreed to undertake once the RTCP has been approved by the state and EPA. Moreover, no department, agency or instrumentality of the federal government shall support or provide financial assistance for, license or permit, or approve any activity which does not conform to an approved revised TCP. Accordingly, no metropolitan planning organization designated in Section 134 shall give approval to any project, program or plan which does not conform to the revised TCP.

To support the implementation of the revised plan, subsection (d) of Section 176 requires that each federal department or agency shall give priority in the exercise of its authority, consistent with statutory requirements, for the allocation of funds among states or other jurisdictions to the implementation of the portions of the revised plan. This subparagraph particularly addressed itself to the programs of the Urban Mass Transit Administration and to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. ☆

Section 316 of the Act explicitly addresses the relationship of the air quality program and sewage treatment construction of sewage treatment facilities where such treatment works are not consistent with the implementation of the revised TCP. The Administrator is authorized to invoke this authority if it is found that the sewage treatment facility would result, directly or indirectly, in an increased emissions from stationary or mobile sources, in excess of the increase provided in a revised TCP.

Other Provisions of Interest to Regional Councils

Several provisions of the Act do not fit into any of the above classifications, but should be noted:

Federal Facility Compliance: Section 118 of the Clean Air Act is amended by Section 110 to unequivocally insure that federal facilities shall comply with federal, state and local requirements respecting the control and abatement of air pollution, to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirement. This policy deals with not only meeting the substantive standards, but adherence to the procedural requirements under state and local laws. It is a reiteration, in unequivocal terms, of the policy originally enunciated in the 1970 Act, but which was more narrowly construed by some courts and federal agencies..

Consultation with Local Governments: Section 112 of the Act requires the state to establish satisfactory processes for consultation with general-purpose local governments in carrying out most of the important responsibilities vested in them under the Act. This consultation process also applies to regional agencies..

Plan Implementation Requirements—Indirect Sources: Section 108 of the Act revised certain provisions in Section 110 of the Clean Air Act concerning plan implementation.

Among other things, it enunciates a policy that no State Implementation Plan (SIP) shall be required to contain an indirect source review program. Programs dealing with indirect sources had previously been required under EPA regulations. Such sources include, among others, facilities that directly or indirectly generate traffic. In furtherance of this policy, no TCP can be required to include regulations of existing off-street parking facilities. However, such parking facility regulations and other indirect source programs can be included in the state plan if the state, on its own volition, decides that such programs are reasonable approaches to attaining standards.

Temporary Suspension of Certain Elements in Existing TCPs: Under certain circumstances, valid and enforceable parts of existing TCPs requiring retrofit on non-commercially owned, in use, vehicles, gas rationing and reduction of on-street parking spaces, may be suspended by the Administrator on application by the state. However, such suspension can only be obtained where the state has indicated it will proceed to revise the TCPs in accordance with subtitle (d) of the Amendments.

A P P E N D I X A

FUNDING THE RTDP:
A PRELIMINARY CASH
REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS

~~DRAFT~~

(VERSION 2)
10/17/77 REVISED 10/21/77

ITC FINANCE SUBCOMMITTEE
W.R.WELLS (SCAG)

TABLE 2
RTDP ELEMENT II (HI BUS)
(CALTRANS - 36 MILES OF GUIDEWAY ALT)
CAPITAL COSTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS
(\$ Millions)

Revised 10/17/77
W. R. W.

FISCAL YEAR	BUSWAYS				PARK & RIDE FACILITIES			MAINT. FACIL., STATIONS			VEHICLES			TOTALS			
	COSTS	FHWA	UMTA	LOCAL	COSTS	FHWA	LOCAL	COSTS	UMTA 3	LOCAL	COSTS	UMTA 3	LOCAL	COSTS	FHWA	UMTA 3	LOCAL
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)				
TOTALS	385.0				199.0			150.0			102.0			836.0			
76\$																	
1981	56.6	18.1	29.4	9.1	29.2	26.0	3.2	22.0	17.6	4.4				107.8	44.1	47.0	16.7
1982	61.2	19.6	31.8	9.8	31.6	28.1	3.5	23.8	19.0	4.8				116.6	47.7	50.8	18.1
1983	66.1	21.2	34.4	10.5	34.2	30.4	3.8	25.8	20.6	5.2	21.8	17.4	4.4	147.9	51.6	72.4	23.9
1984	71.1	22.8	37.0	11.3	36.8	32.8	4.0	27.7	22.2	5.5	23.6	18.9	4.7	159.2	55.6	78.1	25.5
1985	77.0	24.6	40.0	12.4	39.8	35.4	4.4	30.0	24.0	6.0	25.5	20.4	5.1	172.3	60.0	84.4	27.9
1986	83.2	26.6	43.3	13.3	43.0	38.3	4.7	32.4	25.9	6.5	27.5	22.0	5.5	186.1	64.9	91.2	30.0
1987	89.9	28.8	46.8	14.3	46.4	41.3	5.1	35.0	28.0	7.0	29.7	23.8	5.9	201.0	70.1	98.6	32.3
1988	96.9	31.0	50.4	15.5	50.1	44.6	5.5	37.7	30.2	7.5	32.1	25.7	6.4	216.8	75.6	106.3	34.9
1989	104.8	33.5	54.5	16.8	54.2	48.2	6.0	40.8	32.6	8.2	34.7	27.8	6.9	234.5	81.7	114.9	37.9
1990	113.5	36.3	59.0	18.2	58.5	52.1	6.4	44.1	35.3	8.8	37.5	30.0	7.5	253.6	88.4	124.3	40.9
TOTALS (ESC. \$)	820.3	-	-	-	423.8			319.3			232.4			1795.8	639.7	868.0	288.1

NOTES FOR COLUMNS

All costs escalated at 8% to year of implementation; assumes constant real effort per year.

- (1) Busway costs assume construction of 36 miles of exclusive guideway of which 12.5 miles are on Interstate routes (Estimate excludes El Monte Busway and I-105).
- (2) FHWA = 32% of costs: represents 92% Federal share of FAI busway costs - an 8% local match is required.
- (3) UMTA = 52% of costs: represents 80% of remaining busway costs - a 20% local match is required.
- (4)
- (5) Assumes 50,000 spaces, locations not yet determined, with 40,000 in structure or right-of-way required at \$5,000/space and 10,000 fitted into available right-of-way at \$1,500/space (rate in 1977\$).
- (6) FHWA = 32% of costs on FAI routes - an 8% local match is required.
FHWA = 57% of costs on Non-FAI routes - a 17% local match is required.
- (8) Assumes 98 stations.

TABLE 3
ELEMENT III

WRW 10/3/77

CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT - CASH REQUIREMENTS AND FED/LOCAL FUNDING
RTDP - ELEMENT III
DPM

FISCAL YEAR	COST DPM	FUNDING ALT. A		
	ELEM II	UMTA	FHWA	LOCAL
1979	53.7	25.0	10.0	18.7
80	54.1	35.0	10.0	9.1
81	57.6	40.0	5.0	12.6
82				
83				
84				
85				
86				
87				
88				
89				
90				
TOTAL (ESC \$)	165.4	100.0	25.0	40.4
TOTAL (1976 \$)				
DIRECT	74.85			
INDIRECT	8.33 = 9.93	less 1.60 expended in FY 1978		
INTERCEPT	34.00			
CONTINGENCY	19.22			
1976 \$ TOTAL	136.40			

B

C

D

TABLE 5
SALES TAX PROJECTIONS FOR LA COUNTY
TDA (SB-325) AND ½¢ SALES TAX
(\$MILLIONS)

WRW
10/21/77

FISCAL YEAR	ESCALAT RATE	GROSS TAXABLE RETAIL SALES	TDA GROSS REVS FROM ½¢	TDA NET TO LA TRANS (91.7%)	TDA FOR OPERAT. (85%)	TDA FOR CAPITAL (15%)	GROSS REVS FROM ½¢ TAX	NET REVS TO DIST. FROM ½ (95%)
1975		24,662						
1976	9.18%	27,415						
1977		29,932						
1978		32,680						
1979		35,679.6	89.2	81.8	69.5	12.3	178.4	169.5
1980	6.58%	38,999.0	97.4	89.3	75.9	13.4	194.8	185.0
81				95.2	80.9	14.3		197.2
82				101.4	86.2	15.2		210.2
83				108.1	91.9	16.2		224.0
84				115.2	97.9	17.3		238.8
85				122.8	104.4	18.4		254.5
86				130.9	111.3	19.6		271.2
87				139.5	118.6	20.9		289.1
88				148.7	126.4	22.3		308.1
89				158.5	134.7	23.8		328.4
90				168.9	143.6	25.3		350.0
91				180.0	153.0	27.0		373.0
92				191.9	163.1	28.8		397.5
93				204.5	173.8	30.7		423.7
94				218.0	185.3	32.7		451.6
95	Y			232.3	197.5	34.8		481.3

TABLE C
RTD: TOTAL OPERATIONS COSTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS
(\$ MILLIONS)

FISCAL YEAR	VEHICLES		OPERATING COSTS				TOTAL	NET	UMTA SEC. 5	SOURCES OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR OPS	FUNDS AVAILABLE		
	ELEM I TSM (1)	ELEM II HI BUS (2)	ELEM I (3)	ELEM II (4)	ELEM III (5)	ELEM IV (6)					% TAX TOT. REV. (11)	% TAX FOR OPS (12)	% TAX AVAILABLE (13)
1979	2881		259.9				259.9	155.9	56.1	69.5	169.5	30.3	139.2
80	2962		288.6				288.6	173.2	59.4	75.9	185.0	37.9	147.1
81	3043		320.2				320.2	192.1	62.4	80.9	197.2	48.8	148.4
82	3125		355.2				355.2	213.1	65.5	86.2	210.2	61.4	148.8
83	3125	75	383.6	9.2			392.8	235.7	68.8	91.9	224.0	75.0	149.0
84		150	414.3	19.9			434.2	260.5	72.2	97.9	238.8	90.4	148.4
85		225	447.4	29.8			477.2	286.3	75.8	104.4	254.5	106.1	148.4
86		300	483.2	46.3			529.5	317.7	79.6	111.3	271.2	126.8	144.4
87		375	521.8	62.6		35.9	620.3	372.2	83.6	118.6	289.1	170.0	119.1
88		450	563.6	81.2		38.8	683.6	410.2	87.8	126.4	308.1	196.0	112.1
89		525	608.7	102.3		41.9	752.9	451.7	92.2	134.7	328.4	224.8	103.6
90		600	657.4	126.1		45.2	828.7	497.2	96.8	143.6	350.0	256.8	93.2
91		600	710.0	135.4		48.9	895.3	557.2	101.6	153.0	373.9	282.6	90.4
92			766.8	147.3		52.8	966.9	590.1	106.7	163.1	397.5	310.3	87.2
93			828.1	159.2		57.0	1044.3	626.6	112.0	173.8	423.7	340.8	82.9
94	↓	↓	894.4	171.6		61.5	1127.5	676.5	117.6	185.3	451.6	373.6	78.0
95	3125	600	965.9	185.7		66.5	1218.1	730.9	123.5	197.5	481.3	409.9	71.4
NOTES FOR COLUMNS													
1) Total vehicles in LA County increases from today's 2800 to 3125 by 1982.								9) Assumed growth 5% per year after 1980					
2) Large express buses - total fleet of 600 by 1990								10) Net available for transit operation in LA County (RTD) dist. area) equals 85% of total available for transit in area from Table 5.					
3) & 4) Assumes 1979 unit operating cost per vehicle is \$90,230 escalated at 8% per year.								11) Net proceeds from tax implemented in the RTD district equal 95% of gross revenues (from table 5).					
5) DPM operating costs covered by fares, parking fees, etc.								12) Column (11) less col. (12) equals amount available for the capital program					
6) First rail starter line operation in 1987													
7) Total of columns (3), (4), and (6)													
8) Fares assumed to cover 40% of the operating costs thus net operating costs equal 60% of column 7.													

TABLE 7
RTDP: CAPITAL COSTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS
ALTERNATIVE A - FULL FEDERAL PARTICIPATION
(\$ Millions)

10/21/77
W. R. W.

CAPITAL COSTS							SOURCES OF PUBLIC FUNDS								
FISCAL YEAR	NULL REPLACE	ELEM I TSM	ELEM II HI BUS	ELEM III DPM	ELEM IV STARTER	COSTS TOTAL	FHWA	UMTA SEC. 3	LOCAL REQD	TDA (15%)	½¢ SALES TAX AVAIL.	½¢ SALES TAX USED	BALANCE ANNUAL	BALANCE ACCUM	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	
1976 S	279.6	133.0	836.0	136.4	739.0	2124.0									
1979	29.3	41.9	-	53.7	28.0	152.9	10.0	104.4	38.5	12.3	139.2	26.2	113.0	113.0	
1980	31.8	45.2	-	54.1	23.0	154.1	10.0	115.0	29.1	13.4	147.1	15.7	131.4	244.4	
1981	34.3	48.8	107.8	57.6	170.5	419.0	49.5	289.9	79.6	14.3	148.4	65.3	83.1	327.5	
1982	37.0	52.8	116.6	-	169.5	375.9	47.7	258.2	70.0	15.2	148.8	54.8	94.0	421.5	
1983	40.0	-	147.9	-	168.0	355.9	51.6	238.8	65.5	16.2	149.0	49.3	99.7	521.2	
1984	43.2	-	159.2	-	168.0	370.4	55.6	247.1	67.7	17.3	148.4	50.4	98.0	619.2	
1985	46.7	-	172.3	-	242.0	461.0	60.0	315.4	85.6	18.4	148.4	67.2	81.2	700.4	
1986	50.4	-	186.1	-	181.0	417.5	64.9	276.3	76.3	19.6	144.4	56.7	87.7	788.1	
1987	54.4	-	201.0	-	-	255.4	70.1	142.1	43.2	20.9	119.1	22.3	96.8	884.9	
1988	58.8	-	216.8	-	-	275.6	75.6	153.3	46.7	22.3	112.1	24.4	87.7	972.6	
1989	63.5	-	234.5	-	-	298.0	81.7	165.7	50.6	23.8	103.6	26.8	76.8	1049.4	
1990	68.6	-	253.6	-	-	322.2	88.4	179.2	54.6	25.3	93.2	29.3	63.9	1113.3	
TOTAL	558.0	188.7	1795.8	165.4	1150.0	3857.9	665.1	2485.4	707.4	219.0	1601.7	488.4	1113.3		

TABLE 8

10/21/77

RTDP: TOTAL CAPITAL AND OPERATING COSTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS
 ALTERNATIVE A (FULL FEDERAL PARTICIPATION & 1/2 CENT SALES TAX)
 (\$ Millions)

FISCAL YEAR	COSTS			PRESENT SOURCE OF FUNDS					TOTAL FUNDS	DEFICIT	1/2 CENT TAX	BALANCE	
	OPER.	CAPITAL	TOTAL COSTS	FHWA	UMTA SEC 3&5	TDA	FARES	DISTRICT REV.			ANNUAL	CUMULATIVE	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
1979	259.9	152.9	412.8	10.0	160.5	81.8	104.0	356.3	56.5	169.5	113.0	113.0	
1980	288.6	154.1	442.7	10.0	174.4	89.3	115.4	389.1	53.6	185.0	131.4	244.4	
1981	320.2	419.0	739.2	49.5	352.3	95.2	128.1	625.1	114.1	197.2	83.1	327.5	
1982	355.2	375.9	731.1	47.7	323.7	101.4	142.1	614.9	116.2	210.2	94.0	421.5	
1983	392.8	355.9	748.7	51.6	307.6	108.1	157.1	624.4	124.3	224.0	99.7	521.2	
1984	434.2	370.4	804.6	55.6	319.3	115.2	173.7	663.8	140.8	238.8	98.0	619.2	
1985	477.2	461.0	938.2	60.0	391.2	122.8	190.9	764.9	173.3	254.5	81.2	700.4	
1986	529.5	417.5	947.0	64.9	355.9	130.9	211.8	763.5	183.5	271.2	87.7	788.1	
1987	620.3	255.4	875.7	70.1	225.7	139.5	248.1	683.4	192.3	289.1	96.8	884.9	
1988	683.6	275.6	959.2	75.6	241.1	148.7	273.4	738.8	220.4	308.1	87.7	972.6	
1989	752.9	298.0	1050.9	81.7	257.9	158.5	301.2	799.3	251.6	328.4	76.8	1049.4	
1990	828.7	322.2	1150.9	88.4	276.0	168.9	331.5	864.8	286.1	350.0	63.9	1113.3	
TOTALS	5943.1	3857.9	9801.0	665.1	3385.6	1460.3	2377.3	7888.3	1912.7	3026.0	1113.3		

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL PATTERNS RESULTING
FROM RAPID TRANSIT PROPOSALS IN LOS ANGELES*

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Introduction

The analysis which follows was prepared as a consequence of the June, 1976, ballot referendum for rapid transit known as Propositions "R" and "T". That joint ballot proposition was founded on several rather unique qualifications insofar as the design of a rapid transit proposal is concerned but still it did not pass voter approval. As a consequence of the failure of that ballot proposition, it was felt appropriate to determine to the best of our ability why that proposition had failed and put that failure in the perspective of why the two preceding rapid transit ballot measures had failed as well.

Another reason for getting into this rather extensive analysis was due to the fact that Supervisor Ward was being approached by numerous representatives from the public with the request that he initiate another ballot referendum in behalf of rapid transit. As a consequence of this continued interest by a rather numerous segment of the population, the Supervisor's office began to study the electoral returns of

*Excerpted from paper entitled
A Geographic Analysis of Electoral
Patterns Resulting from Rapid
Transit Proposals in Los Angeles,
Gerald B. Leonard.


of the three rapid transit referenda for purposes of postulating a new position in behalf of rapid transit.

This paper which has been excerpted from a more extensive analysis has been put together at the request of Jerry Premo, Executive Director of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, to assist in the staff work being conducted for that Commission preparatory to a decision by them for the possible placement of a ballot measure for rapid transit on a June or November 1978 ballot. At a recent presentation on the subject of Community Level Transit Service at a seminar conducted by California State University at Long Beach, Mr. Premo had occasion to hear the information which has been derived as a consequence of the analysis described in this paper by the author. It was Mr. Premo's contention that this information might be helpful to the members of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission in their deliberations on the subject of a possible tax referendum in behalf of the 4-Part Transit Development Program.

Background

Much of the information which follows in the description of the election results in the three rapid transit referenda is contained in a series of maps. In Figure 1, a map of Los Angeles

AREA OF COVERAGE FOR STUDY




County, the shaded area depicts that portion of Los Angeles County which is the subject area of the succeeding maps. The shaded area generally coincides with the boundaries of the Southern California Rapid Transit District.¹

When discussing the subject of rapid transit throughout the County of Los Angeles, most of us find that there are a great many people who can still remember the days of the Pacific Electric Railway. Almost without exception these people remember very fondly that this system provided a far superior service than the bus network which has replaced it. Figure 2 illustrates quite graphically that portion of the Pacific Electric Railway System which was in Los Angeles County as a part of an overall 1100 mile network stretching throughout a large portion of Southern California. In 1925 the Pacific Electric Railway with more than 1100 miles of lines was the largest inter-urban rail network in the United States and possibly throughout the world for that matter.

As depicted so clearly in testimony given by Mayor Thomas Bradley before the Senate Sub-committee on Anti-trust and

¹The Southern California Rapid Transit District area includes that finger of Los Angeles County projecting to the west inclusive of the Malibu area. For the sake of scale of the map series that area was not included.



PACIFIC ELECTRIC RAILWAY

1925

Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, the case is made quite clearly that through an interlocking Board of Directors between the Southern Pacific Railway, which acquired the Pacific Electric System from Henry Huntington, and in conjunction with General Motors, Standard Oil of California and Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, the P. E. System was very systematically dismantled. One by one many of the rail lines which were the forming agent of the urban patterns as we presently know it were removed and General Motors buses placed in their stead.

In 1951 the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Los Angeles was created as the consequence of strong promotional efforts by civic leaders and public officials for two reasons: They believed that an integrated public transportation system was essential to the economic health of the metropolitan area and that a public agency should provide a system since private investment lacked the necessary capital. The Metropolitan Transit Authority was empowered by its original enabling legislation to formulate plans for a mass transit system, but it was not empowered to develop or operate a system until that legislation was amended in 1957. The MTA revenue base was hardly sufficient to finance the implementation of a mass transit system. In an effort to establish a firmer financial basis for its activities, the MTA was abolished and replaced by the Southern California Rapid Transit District in 1964. The creation of the Southern


California Rapid Transit District not only sheds light on the financial constraints restricting the MTA's operation but also reflects the political opposition that surrounded the MTA.²

Transit Plans and Voter Response

In 1968 the SCRTD Board of Directors placed a measure, Proposition "A", on that year's general election ballot for a one cent sales tax increase which would have funded a rapid transit program. That program is depicted in Figure 3. As seen in that Figure, the 1968 proposition called for a rapid transit plan in which there were five principal corridors identified by the planners. To the East the Rapid Transit Line ran along the San Bernardino Freeway as far as El Monte - the site of the present El Monte Bus Terminal. Other lines ran to Long Beach, the San Fernando Valley and along the Wilshire corridor to Santa Monica. The fifth of these lines ran to the southwest through the Crenshaw district to the Los Angeles International Airport.

The shaded area of the map illustrates those census tracts in which a plurality in favor of that proposition existed. The area in which there is a positive voter response to the 1968 proposal is generally correspondent to the pattern of the physical plan itself.

²Excerpted from: Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress. An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit Volume 6: Los Angeles Case Study Washington, D.C., 1976



1968


PROPOSITION A

CENSUS TRACTS IN WHICH MEASURE PASSED
50% or More

In 1973 and 1974 the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors became a major force in the direction for public transportation. The Board of Supervisors initiated a series of steps which provided a re-invigoration for public transportation in the County. Among the steps taken by the Board of Supervisors was the initiation of the 25¢ flat fare as a consequence of a major subsidization of RTD losses so as to be able to underwrite that differential. The Board also provided for a fund for a demonstration project for a People Mover System to be instituted in the County of Los Angeles. This project, however, was never initiated. The last of the three principal areas in which the Board became involved was to provide funds for the underwriting of a commuter rail service.

The concept of the commuter rail service was initiated by Supervisor Ward in 1973 upon his request of the Southern California Association of Governments that a feasibility study be undertaken to determine where such service might be logically performed within the County. The feasibility study conducted by SCAG proved the feasibility of this form of rail transportation in three principal corridors: The first of these is to the east to San Bernardino, a second through the San Fernando Valley and on to Santa Barbara, and the third, along the Santa Fe right-of-way to San Diego. (Figure 4)


Following the feasibility study and the appropriation by the Board to Supervisor Ward for this purpose, a series of eight cars were acquired by the County and refurbished by a



AMTRAK / COMMUTER RAIL
PROPOSAL

firm in Florida before being shipped to Los Angeles for commuter services to be provided by AMTRAK. Subsequently the agreements among the County of Los Angeles, AMTRAK, and the Santa Fe Railway broke down and the institution of the services has been delayed. The effort to initiate this service continues interjecting Caltrans into the agreement as Caltrans has already achieved an excellent working relationship with AMTRAK for similar services.

It was about this time also that the SCRTD initiated another proposition in behalf of rail transportation in the County of Los Angeles. On the November 1974 ballot, the RTD authored Proposition "A" which called for 145 miles of a Bart-like system to be built in combination with exclusive busways and a major build-up of the bus system itself to provide a feeder network to the rail system. The lines proposed in this proposition are illustrated in Figure 5. As is evidenced in the distinction between Figures 3 and 5 there was a major shift in the emphasis of the plan between these two years. The 1968 proposal had called for a strong central business district orientation with five principal corridors radiating from that area. The 1974 proposal also had the central business district as a major nucleus but provided a lateral line between Pasadena and the San Fernando Valley as well as a non-CBD oriented line running from the San Fernando Valley down to the South Bay. Two other principal differences are the inclusion of two lines to the Southeast part of the



1974

PROPOSITION A
CENSUS TRACTS IN WHICH MEASURE PASSED
50 % OR MORE

County which would have tied together with a similar rail proposal being offered by the Orange County Transit District at that time.


As can be witnessed by this map, the census tracts which voted in favor of the proposition are shaded. The physical pattern produced by this voter response in 1974 bears a very strong similarity to that of the proposition in 1968. The principal difference is that the South Central area solidified behind this proposal more than had been the case in 1968. Also the census tracts in the Hollywood Hills in the Santa Monica Mountains coalesced more behind this proposal than in 1968. It was felt at that time that there was a strong environmental push in the 1974 proposal with the people in the Hills identifying with the issue by virtue of that particular social issue. In addition to the principal aggregation of census tracts in the central part of the County which voted in favor of the proposition one can see several outlying pockets of support which generally correspond to those pockets from the 1968 proposal.

When this proposition failed there was some analysis conducted to determine why the proposition had failed. The general response to that effort indicates that the public felt that the corridors identified in the plan were too imprecise for them to determine whether or not they would, in reality, be capable of riding the rail system. The corridors identified



were four miles wide. As a consequence, it was difficult for an individual to determine whether or not his property would be taken as a consequence of condemnation for the rail right-of-way construction or whether he would need to retain a second car to drive to the system or what particular conditions would prevail by the time that such a line was ultimately built. And this touches on the second principal reason for the issues failure - that the proposition was also too imprecise in regards to the timing for construction of the lines. The program was offered as a two phase program - many people responding negatively to the possibility of being put into the second phase of the program.



Following the 1974 Proposition there was a period of inactivity throughout the Los Angeles area for transit planning. This is essentially atypical of the type of involvement in transit planning for this area as it has been an ongoing activity for approximately 50 years even though we have not begun to built a single foot of any form of guideway.

In early 1975 Supervisor Baxter Ward got into the transit planning business, as it were, with his proposal for the creation of a Light Rail Transit line that would have extended between Canoga Park and the west end of the San Fernando Valley and Long Beach. There were several principles guiding this proposal. First among these was the fact that at that point



STARTER LINE PROPOSALS

County  Aerial or Grade
 Tunnel

City  Aerial
 Tunnel


in time our economy was at a lower ebb than at present and this proposal would have created a great many jobs in Los Angeles County. Additionally, the funding available for a transit guideway project, such as this, would have been through the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. This funding source had wound down from its 1973 congressional appropriation of \$11½ billion to approximately \$800 million by early 1975. The proposal created by Supervisor Ward would have cost approximately \$1 billion. Potentially, 80% or \$800 million of the capital cost of this project would have come from the Federal Government. This coincided with the amount yet remaining in the Federal coffers. One of the motivations for this assumption was that the Los Angeles area has been a donor area to the Federal Government for the funds utilized by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. This area gets back approximately 60¢ per dollar for the money expended by UMTA. Yet cities like Atlanta, Baltimore, Buffalo, Washington and others that are receiving disproportionately large share of funding at this point in time as they are proceeding with construction of rapid transit systems.

In his calling for the creation of the Light Rail line between Canoga Park and Long Beach, Supervisor Ward, as an Elected Official, had entered the sacrosanct area of transit planning. As this had always been the domain of the RTD there was a natural resistance to the Supervisor's efforts.

The RTD created a Rapid Transit Department, a Rapid Transit Advisory Committee made up of all the various agencies involved in transit planning throughout the region, of which there are a great many, and 64 alternatives to the Supervisor's plan. For some months following, the various agencies through the aegis of the Rapid Transit Advisory Committee went through an evaluation of the 64 or 65 alternatives ultimately narrowing it down to two. One of these was the Supervisor's plan, commonly referred to as a County-preferred plan - it consisted of 55 miles of route extending from Canoga Park through Burbank and Glendale, turning south through downtown Los Angeles and proceeding through South Central Los Angeles on to Long Beach. Most of this line would have been built at grade to take advantage of the lower unit cost of construction, hence, the identification with "Light Rail Transit". The total cost of the program for the 55 mile proposal would have been approximately \$1 billion. The other principal alternative was identified as the City-preferred line. It would have extended from Universal City in the San Fernando Valley southerly in a tunnel through the Santa Monica mountains down to the Wilshire corridor and east through downtown to the Union Station. A second line would have branched from this line in the area of the Arco Towers to South Central Los Angeles. This line would have been approximately 22 miles in length and also cost approximately \$1 billion as a consequence of the very high reliance upon tunneling in the central core area of the city.

The evaluation continued once the two alternatives had been identified with each side making the appropriate claims for their alternative over the other. By October, 1975, Supervisor Ward had concluded that the effort to capture the Federal money had been lost as had the initiative in the transit planning area. So to extricate himself from this situation it was his best judgment that the best means by which to advance public transit in the Los Angeles area was to come up with a better proposal - a County-wide proposal that would serve a far greater element of the population than the two alternatives.

In October, 1975, Supervisor Ward initiated work on a Countywide rapid transit proposal which ultimately became known as the Sunset Coast Line or Propositions "R" and "T" on the June 1976 ballot. He brought several unique qualities to this planning effort as he had with his earlier effort for the Light Rail proposal. While many millions of dollars had been spent in the 1974 campaign for rapid transit, the Sunset Coast Line effort expended only those funds necessary for a few people over the course of eight months. There were three unique considerations made by the Supervisor in the development of this program. First, the prior two transit referenda had failed conclusively in the San Gabriel Valley and in the southeast portion of Los Angeles County. The Supervisor reasoned that the two earlier proposals would have provided no service to those elements of the County. Consequently, there was no reasonable



1976

PROPOSITIONS R & T
CENSUS TRACTS IN WHICH MEASURE PASSED
50% or More


expectation why they should be asked to support such a measure without receiving any of the benefits in return. Therefore, the Sunset Coast Line proposed several lines in the Southeast portion of the County and in the San Gabriel Valley to hopefully turn around the voter reaction to a rapid transit proposal. Second, the Supervisor put this plan together with a very small amount of funding as has previously been mentioned on the assumption that the most critical judgment to be made in the planning of such an activity is not whether all precise engineering questions can be answered before the ballot referendum but simply whether or not, yes or no, the people want rapid transit. He reasoned that the earlier propositions were too restrictive in their route alignments not serving a large enough proportion of the population. The Sunset Coast Line offered rapid transit service Countywide with several truly unique features, therefore, the Supervisor's activities called for the planning of a rapid transit plan with sufficient detail to get such a measure onto a ballot proposal and allow for an informed vote of the people. If the measure had passed, there would have been ample time and funding with which to do the final design work before beginning construction.

Judging from the shaded area in Figure 7 it is apparent that there was a lower voter response to this proposal than

there had been in 1974. In the 1974 campaign however, the RTD was able to expend \$500,000 to promote the ballot proposition, whereas, in 1976 a mere \$80,000 was raised. By the time that the RTD Board of Directors had entered Propositions "R" and "T" onto the ballot on the last day legally possible, there was only six weeks remaining in which to identify a committee to sponsor this issue, have that committee raise funds and then actually campaign for the issue. It would seem evident to any rational person that by the time that the measure was placed on the ballot, it was a lost cause. In the voter response, however, there is once again a consistent pattern of voter support identified. There are the outlying pockets in Pacoima, Altadena, Pomona, Long Beach and Santa Monica once again evident as in the two prior referenda as well as the principal block of support beginning in the Crenshaw area extending through South Central Los Angeles including Watts and Compton.


Relationship to Socio-Economical Variables

Figure 8 portrays those census tracts in which the rapid transit measure has passed consistently from 1968, to 1974 and in 1976. That is to say the tracts shaded in Figure 7 are those tracts in which rapid transit has consistently passed among




CENSUS TRACTS IN WHICH THE RAPID TRANSIT
MEASURE PASSED IN ALL 3 ELECTIONS

the three rapid transit referenda. One can clearly see that this represents the heart area among each of the three earlier patterns and generally resembles the pattern of 1976 as a least common denominator. Figure 8 is a map portraying those census tracts in which there is a majority of Black population, that is, census tracts in which there is a population 50% or more Black. Without making a precise empirical measurement it appears on a intuitive basis that there is an extremely high correlation between those census tracts in which the rapid transit measures have historically passed and those tracts which are predominately Black. One can therefore reason that it is essentially the Black population which has consistently voted in behalf of rapid transit. But it would also seem that being Black alone does not offer a cause for a positive vote in rapid transit. Therefore, an attempt was made to identify the census tracts in which there is a predominance of Spanish Surname population. Those tracts in which there is 50% or more Spanish Surname population are illustrated in Figure 9. Again without the precise empirical measurement it is evident that there is an extremely low rate of correspondence or correlation between those tracts which are predominately Spanish and those tracts in which the rapid transit measure has historically passed. It is essentially part of the East Los Angeles area that does overlap with the tracts where the measures have already passed.




CENSUS TRACTS WITH BLACK MAJORITY
50 % OR MORE



CENSUS TRACTS WITH SPANISH MAJORITY
50 % OR MORE

A reason is offered for this relationship but a reason for which there is no means by which at present to validate. Since the population of the Los Angeles area is essentially a migrant population having moved to this area since World War II, for the most part, it is reasonable to assume that the Spanish Surnamed population that has migrated to this area has done so from rural Mexico from where there would be no identification with rapid transit and its potential values for society. It is also reasoned with even less assurance of validity, that the Black population which has migrated to the Los Angeles area has done so from major Eastern cities of the United States from where there has been an historic relationship with rapid transit and its potential values for society. At present there is no way to validate either of these two hypotheses short of an indepth study to be performed in each of those two principal communities.

Figures 10, 11 and 12 are offered as further substantiation of the social and economic patterns which exist relative to support or non-support for rapid transit. The map depicting median family income corresponds rather closely to the distribution of the Black population implying that the Black population is typified by a lower median family income and is supportive of such a public proposal as that of rapid transit. Included in this lower income echelon is the East Los Angeles community and pockets in the Pacoima, Altadena and Long Beach




MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME

 **\$ 7,999 and Less**

 **\$ 15,000 and More**

1970 CENSUS




MEDIAN HOME VALUES

■ \$ 19,999 and Less

▨ \$ 40,000 and More

1970 CENSUS



MEDIAN AGE OF THE POPULATION

25 Years and Less

50 Years and Over


1970 CENSUS

areas as well. To some extent these correspond to census tracts identified as Spanish Surname predominance. The map depicting median home values again is very close in its representation to that of median family income as one would expect combining a relationship between low home value to both the concentrations of both Black and Spanish Surnamed tracts. The most significant message discernable in Figure 12 which depicts the median age of the population on a census tract basis is that the Southeast portion of the County and the San Gabriel Valley are characterized as possessing a lower than median age population. This lower average age suggests possibly larger families with numerous children below the voting age, consequently, a lower percentage of the population voting than in other portions of the County.

Possible Futures

The following set of maps, Figures 13-15, portray those census tracts in which a planning effort should concentrate its efforts for increasing the positive vote on the respective transit ballot measures. On the assumption that a proposition such as the sales tax increase in support of an issue like rapid transit is usually determined within a 5% margin, plus or minus, from 50%. The following set of maps has been put together to illustrate where this marginal vote might be derived. In this set of maps, the tracts shaded in light blue are those tracts in which the vote in favor of rapid transit was 55% or above. Seemingly a vote at this level or


I



1968

PROPOSITION A


- YES VOTE ABOVE 55.0 %
- YES VOTE WAS 50.1 - 55 %
- YES VOTE WAS 46.1 - 50 %



1974

PROPOSITION A

- YES VOTE ABOVE 55.0 %
- YES VOTE WAS 50.1 - 55 %
- YES VOTE WAS 46.1 - 50 %



1976

PROPOSITION R & T

- YES VOTE ABOVE 55.0 %
- ▒ YES VOTE WAS 50.1 - 55 %
- ░ YES VOTE WAS 46.1 - 50 %

above implies a strong support in behalf of the measure so that the assumption can reasonably be made that there is no point in strongly pursuing the voters in these tracts as they are more than likely a consistent audience in behalf of such a measure. The census tracts which are left unshaded, or white, are those census tracts in which the positive vote in behalf of rapid transit in any one of the respective measures was 46% or below. Seemingly the voter response is so low in these tracts that strongly pursuing the measure in these tracts will have too small a rate of return for the effort expended. It is in the tracts which are shaded dark blue or pink where the marginal or swing vote resides. The dark blue tracts are those in which the measure had a positive vote of 50.1 to 55%. It is possible to retain these voters or to lose them depending on the issue. In the tracts shaded pink the positive vote was 46.1 to 50%. These are the voters which we just narrowly missed attracting to the proposition. Consequently, it is in these pink and dark blue tracts where a considered effort would have to be made to draw the voters to the particular proposition at hand. A correlation between these maps and our present planning activities with respect to the 4-part transit development program is not possible. The shading of these tracts and the implication that turning the vote around in these tracts is relevant to passing such

a ballot measure relates only back to the proposition which was before the public at the time of that particular response.
That is to say, that the tracts shaded dark blue and pink in the 1976 proposal are those which we would attempt to attract to a new ballot measure if the plan put before the public was essentially the same as that voted on to produce the voter pattern which exist at that point in time.

APPENDIX C

1968 ELECTION

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.) ss.

I, RAY E. LEE, Registrar-Recorder of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, do hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct Canvass of the Votes Cast For and Against Bond Proposition A for the Southern California Rapid Transit District Election consolidated with the General Election held in the Southern California Rapid Transit District on November 5, 1968.

I further certify that the total vote for the Southern California Rapid Transit District Election is as follows:

<u>VOTE</u>	<u>ABSENTEE VOTE</u>	<u>TOTAL VOTE CAST</u>
2,573,690	91,531	2,665,221

I further certify that the total of the votes cast on said Bond Proposition A is as follows:

<u>BOND PROPOSITION</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
A	1,042,655	1,305,312
Absentee	48,303	34,797
TOTAL	1,090,958	1,340,109

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this 26th day of November, 1968.



Ray E. Lee
 RAY E. LEE
 Registrar-Recorder
 County of Los Angeles

1968 General

SPECIAL DISTRICT ELECTION

A	<p>RAPID TRANSIT: To reduce traffic congestion and improve public transportation by establishing a modern smog-free rapid transit system and expanded local transportation network by the acquisition and construction of any or all improvements, works, property or facilities including stations, parking areas and other facilities necessary or convenient therefor and the refunding of bonds constituting a district liability, together with incidental costs, shall the Southern California Rapid Transit District incur a bonded indebtedness in the principal amount of Two Billion Five Hundred Fifteen Million Dollars and shall a special sales and use tax be levied within the district at a maximum tax rate of up to one-half of 1 percent to be used as the primary source of funds to pay principal and interest on said indebtedness as provided in the ordinance calling the election?</p>	YES	
		NO	

NOV. 1968

ARGUMENTS FOR RAPID TRANSIT - PROPOSITION A

Los Angeles County is literally strangling in its own smog and traffic congestion. There are now more than 7 million people and 4 million autos in the County, and autos are increasing faster than people. Proposition A will help alleviate our critical traffic and air pollution problems.

This measure will provide our County with a smog-free, safe, high-speed, modern, rapid rail transit system and expanded bus network that will extend into virtually every area of the County. The combined system will carry 1,400,000 persons daily.

Bonds will be paid from a 1/2¢ sales tax as a primary source. The proposal will not single out the already overburdened property owner. The cost for the average family will be less than 3 1/2¢ a day. Benefits include a lessening of smog, reduced traffic congestion, fewer traffic fatalities, thousands of jobs created and a stimulated Southland economy, increased real estate values and many others.

The alternative is catastrophic for the citizen and taxpayer. Every year that we delay boosts the cost of rapid transit by another \$150 million. If this measure is not passed, it will probably be many years before similar legislation is presented to the voters.

Meanwhile, smog levels continue to rise. Freeway and street systems are clogged with traffic. Each day finds it more difficult for us to get to and from work. Traffic fatalities and injuries mount daily.

We must build a modern rapid transit system to reverse these alarming trends.

Proposition A has been endorsed by many leading organizations . . . including City Councils, the League of Women Voters, organized labor, religious organizations, minority groups, chambers of commerce and leaders of both Republican and Democratic parties.

To assure the orderly growth of our community and to avoid traffic strangulation . . . without heavy new tax burdens, vote YES on Proposition A.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR RAPID TRANSIT

Ernest J. Loebbecke, General Chairman

Sigmund Arywitz, Executive Secretary, Los Angeles County
Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO

Leslie N. Shaw, Postmaster, City of Los Angeles

Dionicio Morales, Executive Secretary, Mexican-American
Opportunities Foundation

Mrs. Sylvia Bartlett, President, League of Women Voters,
Los Angeles County

Nov. 1968

ARGUMENT AGAINST PROPOSITION A

There is no question of our need for rapid transit.

But we must ask ourselves whether the \$2½ billion request in PROPOSITION A will give us taxpayers our money's worth. Will motorists receive enough benefits? If not, will needed future additions be practicable later? For a specific plan to spend your \$2½ billion is already approved. And as catalyst I must ask these breakthrough questions:

- Do you like to pay for grade separation structures for high-speed freights at some mainline crossings, then not get to use the same structures for rapid transit? If you want a chance at your money's worth, vote NO on PROPOSITION A.

- Do you like the long slow freight trains that delay you at other mainline crossings? If you want this considered for improvement, vote NO on PROPOSITION A.

- Would you prefer to talk out labor problems – rather than to fully automate the rapid transit – so that labor can make its full efficient contribution? Then vote NO on PROPOSITION A.

- Do you want metropolitan Los Angeles to lead in getting modern clean smog-free electric rapid transit trains at lowest cost? Is railroad electrification under consideration? Your vote of NO on PROPOSITION A is your way of telling the transit district you want them to find that breakthrough that more fully conserves our human, material, and environmental resources.

- A specific: Do you ratify the specific approved \$2½ billion plan which provides that nobody arriving at the Airport to take the all-express rapid transit will be able to get off at intermediate Inglewood, Coliseum, or Convention Center stations without going to downtown Los Angeles first to catch a local back, and vice versa? If not, join the transit catalyst – who's around on these matters for us all – in voting NO on PROPOSITION A.

ROBERT J. SWAN,
Public Transit Catalyst

1974 ELECTION

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, }
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. } ss.

I, LEONARD PANISH, Registrar-Recorder of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, do hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct Canvass of the Votes Cast For and Against Tax Proposition A for the Southern California Rapid Transit District Special Election consolidated with the General Election held in the Southern California Rapid Transit District on November 5, 1974.

I further certify that the total Ballots Cast for the Southern California Rapid Transit District Special Election is as follows:

<u>VOTE</u>	<u>ABSENTEE VOTE</u>	<u>TOTAL BALLOTS CAST</u>
1,971,560	55,948	2,028,508

I further certify that the total of the votes cast on said Tax Proposition A is as follows:

<u>PROPOSITION</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
A	828,342	963,323
Absentee	<u>26,573</u>	<u>24,763</u>
TOTAL	854,915	988,086

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this 26th day of November, 1974.



Leonard Panish

LEONARD PANISH
Registrar-Recorder
County of Los Angeles

1974. General

SPECIAL ELECTION
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT

<p>A</p> <p>SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT - SPECIAL TAXES PROPOSITION: To improve public transportation through the development of a modern rapid transit system and expanded local transportation network by providing capital financing which may consist of either pay-as-you-go financing or limited tax bonds for capital facilities and for the maintenance and operation of the district's public mass transit guideway system and its related fixed facilities pursuant to the District Law, by the acquisition and construction of any improvements, works, property or facilities including additional buses, stations, parking areas and other facilities necessary or convenient therefor together with incidental costs and to improve service, to reduce and ensure the lowest possible fares and to eliminate transfer and zone charges by and between all included municipal operators and the district, and for any maintenance and operation purposes of the district, shall the Southern California Rapid Transit District levy a special transactions and use tax within the district at a maximum tax rate of not to exceed 1 percent as provided in the ordinance calling the election?</p>	<p>YES</p>
	<p>NO</p>

Punch Positions: 115 - 116

134 - 135

PRO BALLOT ARGUMENT — PROPOSITION A

We've talked about rapid transit for 50 years. Now is the time to act. Traffic congestion is choking our streets. California automobiles are using a billion gallons of gasoline each month. Every day that goes by increases the cost of building a realistic transit system.

We've spent the last generation in our cars with the windows rolled up, hoping the problem would go away. It won't.

A YES vote on PROPOSITION A will create a workable transportation system. It means:

- Development of a 145-mile high-speed transit network serving the entire county—Long Beach, Pasadena, Santa Monica, San Fernando Valley, South Bay, San Gabriel Valley, Watts and all Los Angeles.
- Transit capacity to handle more than 30% of the trips to and from work in the county.
- 1,000 additional new buses within three years.
- Additional routes—shorter waits.
- Continuation of the 25¢ fare.

PROPOSITION A will open the way for substantial Federal transit funding. Unless we vote YES, Federal matching funds generated by our tax dollars will go to other cities because we have no rapid transit program.

PROPOSITION A also means thousands of new jobs, which will pour millions of dollars into our local economy.

Well documented studies show that a wage earner can save \$1,100 annually by using public transit instead of driving to work. The family which does without a second car will save \$1,900 a year.

Yet, PROPOSITION A's 1¢ sales tax will cost the family of four with a \$15,000 income only a dollar a week.

PROPOSITION A is supported by the League of Women Voters, The AFL-CIO, the L.A. Chamber of Commerce, the Auto Club and the Southern California Association of Governments.

We've had enough traffic congestion, air pollution and high gasoline prices.

Rapid transit starts with A—vote YES on PROPOSITION A.

Mayor Tom Bradley
City of Los Angeles

Supervisor Kenneth Hahn
Chairman, Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors

Dr. William S. Banowsky
Republican National Committeeman
President, Pepperdine University

Mrs. Garth Sweetnam
President, Los Angeles County
League of Women Voters

Thomas G. Neusom
President, Southern California
Rapid Transit District

BALLOT ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSITION A

Proposition A is an attempt by the R.T.D. to extend its mass transit monopoly by socking it to the taxpayer once again.

The R.T.D. wants to add another cent to our already excessive sales tax, to increase the scope of its inefficient, bureaucratic, monopolistic transit system. At the same time, the R.T.D. is vigorously opposing any attempt to allow free competition in transportation services, even though private transportation systems would not cost the taxpayer one cent.

At the heart of the R.T.D.'s proposal is a rail line that will cost billions of dollars, yet will carry only 6 per cent of the people in the district. How will this achieve "mass transit?" And why should the other 94 per cent be forced to pay for it?

If we allow the R.T.D. to maintain and extend its monopoly, we will be helping to create a situation where a transit strike could cripple the metropolitan area. San Francisco's recent troubles can happen here—if we let it.

It's time to put a stop to the R.T.D.'s attitude that our tax money is theirs for the taking. This money rightfully belongs to the people who earn it, and they should have the right to spend it on whatever form of transportation they require.

Rather than being extended, the R.T.D.'s mass transit monopoly should be repealed; and competitive taxis, minibuses, jitneys and other vehicles should be allowed to operate in a free market to provide the transportation service we so desperately need.

Don't let the R.T.D. have another "free ride" at your expense. Vote No on Proposition A.

Charles F. Barr Jr., Chairman
Libertarian Alternative of Los Angeles

1976 ELECTION

I, LEONARD PANISH, Registrar-Recorder of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, do hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct Canvass of the Votes Cast For and Against Tax Propositions R and T for the Southern California Rapid Transit District Special Election consolidated with the Primary Election held in the Southern California Rapid Transit District on June 8, 1976.

I further certify that the total Ballots Cast for the Southern California Rapid Transit District Special Election is as follows:

<u>PRECINCT BALLOTS CAST</u>	<u>ABSENTEE BALLOTS CAST</u>	<u>TOTAL BALLOTS CAST</u>
1,871,211	66,031	1,937,242

I further certify that the total of the votes cast on said Tax Propositions R and T is as follows:

<u>PROPOSITION</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
R	656,515	961,253
Absentee	<u>23,240</u>	<u>31,729</u>
TOTAL	679,755	992,982
T	524,932	797,351
Absentee	<u>19,956</u>	<u>32,411</u>
TOTAL	544,888	829,762

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this 29th day of June, 1976.



Leonard Panish

SPECIAL DISTRICT ELECTION

R

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT—RAPID TRANSIT — Shall the DISTRICT approve an ordinance authorizing a companion ¼ percent sales tax for funding of and setting the following policies in building a rail mass rapid transit system?

That a districtwide system be built, approximately 232 miles long, servicing the following cities substantially in conformity with the map below:

- | | | |
|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| Alhambra | El Monte | Pasadena |
| Arcadia | Glendale | Pico Rivera |
| Baldwin Park | Hawthorne | Pomona |
| Bell | Industry | Redondo Beach |
| Bell Gardens | Inglewood | Rosemead |
| Bellflower | Irwindale | San Dimas |
| Beverly Hills | Lakewood | San Gabriel |
| Burbank | Lawndale | Santa Fe Springs |
| Carson | Long Beach | Santa Monica |
| Cerritos | Los Angeles | South El Monte |
| Commerce | Lynwood | South Gate |
| Covina | Monrovia | Torrance |
| Culver City | Monterey Park | Vernon |
| Downey | Norwalk | West Covina |
| Duarte | Paramount | |

213 YES → ○

214 NO → ○

R

ELECCION ESPECIAL DEL DISTRITO

DISTRITO DE TRANSITO RAPIDO DE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA—TRANSITO RAPIDO — ¿Deberá el DISTRITO aprobar una ordenanza autorizando un impuesto acompañante sobre ventas de ¼ por ciento para la provision de fondos de y estableciendo las siguientes políticas en la construcción de un sistema de tránsito rápido masivo por rieles?

—que un sistema por todo el distrito sea construido, de aproximadamente 232 millas de largo, sirviendo las siguientes ciudades substancialmente en conformidad con el mapa abajo:

- | | | |
|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| Alhambra | El Monte | Pasadena |
| Arcadia | Glendale | Pico Rivera |
| Baldwin Park | Hawthorne | Pomona |
| Bell | Industry | Redondo Beach |
| Bell Gardens | Inglewood | Rosemead |
| Bellflower | Irwindale | San Dimas |
| Beverly Hills | Lakewood | San Gabriel |
| Burbank | Lawndale | Santa Fe Springs |
| Carson | Long Beach | Santa Monica |
| Cerritos | Los Angeles | South El Monte |
| Commerce | Lynwood | South Gate |
| Covina | Monrovia | Torrance |
| Culver City | Monterey Park | Vernon |
| Downey | Norwalk | West Covina |
| Duarte | Paramount | |


← 213 SI ○

← 214 NO ○

—que el sistema use primariamente derechos de via superficiales, existentes tales como autopistas; —que el Distrito pueda contratar con el Condado de Los Angeles para servir como director del proyecto para diseño y construcción;

Esta proposición es una acompañante a la Proposición T y el sistema puede construirse solamente si ambas proposiciones son aprobadas.

That the system use primarily existing surface rights of way, such as freeways; That the District may contract with the County of Los Angeles to serve as project manager design and construction; This proposition is a companion to Proposition T and the system may only be built if both propositions pass.



(The foregoing policies are further defined in and subject to the ordinance.)



(Las precedentes políticas son adicionalmente definidas en y sujetas a la ordenanza.)

T

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT—RAPID TRANSIT — Shall the DISTRICT approve an ordinance authorizing a companion ¼ percent sales tax with different limitations on purpose and expenditure than the other tax under Proposition R for funding of and setting the same policies in building a rail mass rapid transit system as are set forth in Proposition R?

(The referenced policies are further defined in and subject to the ordinance.)

227 YES → ○

228 NO → ○

T

DISTRITO DE TRANSITO RAPIDO DE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA—TRANSITO RAPIDO — ¿Deberá el DISTRITO aprobar una

ordenanza autorizando un impuesto acompañante de ¼ por ciento sobre ventas con limitaciones de proposito y desembolso distintas de la otra ordenanza bajo la Proposición R para la provision de fondos y estableciendo las mismas políticas en la construcción de un sistema de tránsito rápido masivo por rieles como están expuestas en la Proposición R?

(Las mencionadas políticas están adicionalmente definidas en y sujetas a la ordenanza.)

← 227 SI ○

← 228 NO ○

END OF BALLOT

FIN DE LA BOLETA

ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BALLOT MEASURE

The Sunset Coast Line will go to so many places that it will change our way of life in Southern California. It will become a business, social, and recreational convenience that some cities have known for decades.

The Sunset system will be a bargain even if it is used only to go to and from work, when its costs are compared to the gasoline, tires, insurance, upkeep, and depreciation expense that each of our autos accounts for every workday.

In early construction, the work will move very rapidly. The project will be built mainly on freeways, flood control embankments, and other existing rights-of-way—the costs and time delays of massive condemnation will be avoided.

In 1984 over fifty miles will be operational.

Within twelve to fourteen years, lines will be operating to West Covina, Encino, Pasadena, Paramount, Long Beach, Santa Monica, and LAX, plus a connecting western line from Redondo Beach to Van Nuys—and that is less than half the system. When completed, the County will be laced with the finest and fastest service in the world.

Many other transit systems use the property tax—this one will not. The Sunset line will be the most soundly financed system built—fully capable of supporting construction and operations.

Pay-as-you-go financing means no bonds, no debt, no interest—all funds go into stations, service, and track.

The funding also will permit the Los Angeles region to participate fully in current and future Federal matching programs that can provide additional hundreds of millions of dollars for our own transit system.

The construction will be expensive, but that is simply because we have so much catching up to do. It will be far less costly now than if we wait until tomorrow. And we can enjoy it that much sooner.

Baxter Ward, Chairman, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Tom Bradley, Mayor, City of Los Angeles
Byron E. Cook, President, Southern California Rapid Transit District
Marguerite Ernstene, President,
Los Angeles County League of Women Voters
Dr. Thos. J. Clark, Mayor, City of Long Beach

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF OR OPPOSITION TO THE BALLOT MEASURE ARE THE OPINIONS OF THE AUTHORS.

REBUTTAL TO THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BALLOT MEASURE

The Sunset rail system will cost \$13.2 billion to build—the costliest rail system ever proposed. That is only the estimate. In San Francisco, BART was to cost \$792 million to construct. In reality, it cost twice as much—\$1.6 billion. The Washington Metro's construction costs also doubled. Such cost overruns are not a bargain by anyone's standards.

It is implied that the car and bus will be replaced by rail transit. Nothing could be further from the truth. Only 10% of our population will be able to use the Sunset Coast Line. If you are one of the few rail commuters, you will still need a car or bus to get to and from the rail stations. Everyone will still pay for gas, tires, upkeep, depreciation, and insurance. Shifting only 10% of our population to rail transit will not clean our air or relieve congestion on our streets and freeways.

We no longer have the tax dollars to squander on projects that benefit so few people.

Politicians may press for rail transit, but the voters have twice rejected rail transit proposals in 1968 and 1974. Transportation planners along with voters recognize the need to serve all of Los Angeles with a flexible, low cost transit system.

Los Angeles does not need a rail system that will burden the County taxpayers for many decades to come.

Vote NO on Proposition R.

Pete Schabarum
Member, RTD Board of Directors
County Supervisor, First District

Ernani Bernardi
L.A. City Councilman, 7th District

Arthur Snyder
L.A. City Councilman, 14th District

Bill Rudell
Mayor of Burbank

Ray Lepire
Mayor of Pomona

C-13

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BALLOT MEASURE

For a third time in less than a decade, you are being asked to supply a blank check to pay for a 230 mile transit system that will be utilized by less than 10 percent of the 7 million people in Los Angeles County. This 1¢ sales tax increase will cost in excess of \$13.2 billion over the 30-year construction period.

This proposition is nothing less than an ill-conceived adventure that will place a tax burden on generations yet to come. Beyond the sales tax increase, additional revenue will be required by the cities along the proposed routes.

The consensus of transportation experts and planners is that the sprawling urbanity of Los Angeles County does not provide the necessary population-density centers to support an extensive fixed rail system. All our money and effort should not be thrown into a fixed rail project that has so little flexibility.

Experts have declared that the proposed system will not improve our air quality or conserve energy. This system will not get you to work any faster or change the driving habits of Los Angeles residents. The system will take at least 30 years to complete and during that period, freeway speeds in construction areas will slow to 30 m.p.h.

By voting NO on Proposition R, you will put a halt to the largest and most costly public works project ever considered in the United States. Never before has the public been asked to pay so much for so little.

Vote NO on Proposition R.

- Peter F. Schabarum,
Member, RTD Board of Directors
Supervisor, 1st District
- William B. Rudell,
Mayor of Burbank
- Ray J. Lepire,
Mayor of Pomona
- Ernani Bernardi,
Councilman, City of Los Angeles
7th District
- Arthur K. Snyder,
Councilman, City of Los Angeles
14th District

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF OR OPPOSITION TO THE BALLOT MEASURE ARE THE OPINIONS OF THE AUTHORS.

REBUTTAL TO THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BALLOT MEASURE

We are being forced to recognize that if we really want transit here, then we must be prepared to build it ourselves. Nobody else has come forward to finance transit in the last twenty years — and no one is going to come forward in the twenty years ahead.

Our decision will lead to either a sizable solution of our transportation problem, or (if we vote no) it will lead us to more of what we already have — more autos, more buses, more smog, and more time required to move anywhere in the County.

Although our population sometimes is described as sprawling, many of our outlying communities are larger than major cities in the Midwest and the East that already have full transit systems of their own.

Placement of the lines on or above freeways does constitute a fixed rail system. That inflexibility is to our advantage — because the freeways will be here for at least the next 100 years, and will serve as the primary transportation corridors for that time.

During construction on freeways it is likely that each lane would be narrowed slightly, but no lanes would be taken away or seriously impaired.

Train speed will average at least 55 miles per hour. The convenience of that speed, coupled with the safety and the extensiveness of the system, will change the driving habits of residents all over the County — not for just commuting, but for social and recreational trips as well.

We believe the usage of the lines will exceed any expectations — with obvious reductions in smog.

There will be no debt in the transit system — because pay-as-you-go means exactly that.

BAXTER WARD
 Director, Southern California Rapid Transit
 District Board of Directors
 Chairman, Los Angeles County Board of
 Supervisors

C-14

ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BALLOT MEASURE

The Sunset Coast Line will go to so many places that it will change our way of life in Southern California. It will become a business, social, and recreational convenience that some cities have known for decades.

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- Tom Bradley, Mayor, City of Los Angeles
- Byron E. Cook, President, Southern California Rapid Transit District
- Marguerite Ernstene, President,
- Los Angeles County League of Women Voters
- Dr. Thos. J. Clark, Mayor, City of Long Beach

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We no longer have tax dollars to squander on projects that benefit so few people.

Politicians may press for rail transit, but the voters have twice rejected rail transit proposals in 1968 and 1974. Transportation planners along with voters recognize the need to serve all of Los Angeles with a flexible, low cost transit system.

Los Angeles does not need a rail system that will burden the County taxpayers for many decades to come.

Vote NO on Proposition T.

Pete Schabarum
Member, RTD Board of Directors
County Supervisor, First District

Ernani Bernardi
L.A. City Councilman, 7th District

Arthur Snyder
L.A. City Councilman, 14th District

Bill Rudell
Mayor of Burbank

Ray Lepire
Mayor of Pomoma

C-15

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BALLOT MEASURE

The proponents of Proposition T are asking you to levy a \$300 million a year tax against yourself. You will be paying well into the 21st century for a fixed rail transit system the experts say will serve only a small segment of the population.

They are asking that you be assessed, once again, in a time of runaway inflation and ever-increasing taxes and cost, for "just one more cent per dollar" on every taxable item you buy for the next 30 years, billions of your hard earned dollars to finance a system that would not have the flexibility to meet the needs of a dynamic, ever-changing community.

Proposition T, and its equally inept companion, Proposition R, are earmarked irrevocably for the construction of a \$13.2 billion fixed-rail system that respected transportation planners view as a project to be used by fewer than 10 per cent of the population of Los Angeles County.

The proposed system does not provide the alternative transportation modes required of a vast urban community such as Los Angeles County. Our population sprawl lacks density centers essential to support any part of the rail network.

Our tax dollars and our efforts should not be devoted to a fixed rail project that has so little flexibility, serves so few people and will never be self-supporting. Propositions T and R do not solve any transit problems. They create the worst of all problems—indebtedness.

C-16

Vote NO on Proposition T.

Peter F. Schabarum,
Member, RTD Board of Directors
Supervisor, 1st District

William B. Rudell,
Mayor of Burbank

Ray J. Lepire,
Mayor of Pomona

Ernani Bernardi,
Councilman, City of Los Angeles
7th District

Arthur K. Snyder,
Councilman, City of Los Angeles
14th District

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We believe the usage of the lines will exceed any expectations—with obvious reductions in smog.

There will be no debt in the transit system—because pay-as-you-go means exactly that.

BAXTER WARD
Director, Southern California Rapid Transit
District Board of Directors
Chairman, Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

Projection of Funds Available to Cities
for Local Transportation Purposes From
1/4¢ Sales Tax (Total, 1979-1990)

	<u>1976 Population</u>	<u>Funds Available For Local Transportation Purposes</u>
County (Unincorporated)	954,462	205.7
Alhambra	58,303	12.6
Arcadia	45,554	9.8
Artesia	15,571	3.4
Avalon	1,606	.4
Azusa	25,064	5.4
Baldwin Park	47,207	10.2
Bell	21,755	4.7
Bellflower	49,766	10.7
Bell Gardens	28,376	6.1
Beverly Hills	31,686	6.8
Bradbury	858	.2
Burbank	83,552	18.0
Carson	79,663	17.2
Cerritos	41,950	9.0
Claremont	25,264	5.5
Commerce	10,227	2.2
Compton	74,116	16.0
Covina	32,921	7.1
Cudahy	16,821	3.6

	<u>1976 Population</u>	<u>Funds Available For Local Transportation Purposes</u>
Culver City	37,719	8.1
Downey	88,563	19.1
Duarte	14,909	3.2
El Monte	67,486	14.5
El Segundo	14,652	3.2
Gardena	42,954	9.3
Glendale	131,455	28.3
Glendora	34,006	7.3
Hawaiian Gardens	9,823	2.1
Hawthorne	55,812	12.0
Hermosa Beach	18,511	4.0
Hidden Hills	1,674	.4
Huntington Park	32,657	7.0
Industry	705	.2
Inglewood	83,266	17.9
Irwindale	768	.2
La Canada - Flintridge	26,181	5.6
Lakewood	79,270	17.1
La Mirada	40,309	8.7
Lancaster*	43,000	9.3
La Puente	30,324	6.5
La Verne	17,862	3.9
Lawndale	23,384	5.0
Lomita	19,370	4.2
Long Beach	341,171	73.5

	<u>1976 Population</u>	<u>Funds Available For Local Transportation Purposes</u>
Los Angeles	2,759,564	594.8
Lynwood	37,325	8.1
Manhattan Beach	32,665	7.0
Maywood	16,651	3.6
Monrovia	29,260	6.3
Montebello	47,647	10.3
Monterey Park	49,584	10.7
Norwalk	86,811	18.7
Palmdale	10,382	2.2
Palos Verdes Estates	14,732	3.2
Paramount	30,599	6.6
Pasadena	107,917	23.3
Pico Rivera	51,400	11.1
Pomona	84,616	18.2
Rancho Palos Verdes	41,353	8.9
Redondo Beach	63,261	13.6
Rolling Hills	2,153	.5
Rolling Hills Estate	8,693	1.9
Rosemead	39,854	8.6
San Dimas	18,164	3.9
San Fernando	15,169	3.3
San Gabriel	28,017	6.0
San Marino	13,330	2.9
Santa Fe Springs	15,812	3.4
Santa Monica	89,072	19.2

	<u>1976 Population</u>	<u>Funds Available For Local Transportation Purposes</u>
Sierra Madre	12,264	2.6
Signal Hill	4,970	1.1
South El Monte	15,617	3.4
Southgate	52,542	11.3
South Pasadena	22,842	4.9
Temple City	28,670	6.2
Torrance	134,000	28.9
Vernon	240	.1
Walnut	9,004	1.9
West Covina	72,647	15.7
Whittier	71,237	15.4
Total	<u>7,018,603</u>	<u>1,513.0</u>

Amounts are based on 1976 population, estimates published by the Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission (Bulletin No. 133, published July 1977), and assume a 6.58% annual revenue escalation rate.