



**Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority**

# **A Case Study of the 1994 Work Stoppage**

**MTA Transit Strike in Effect  
July 25, 1994 Through August 2, 1994**



MTA Operations  
December, 1994

# **A CASE STUDY OF THE 1994 MTA WORK STOPPAGE**



**MTA OPERATIONS**

**December 1994**

**Prepared by:**

**Frank Barbagallo  
Roderick Goldman  
B.J. Harris  
Robert Jackson  
Michael Stanford**

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
LIST OF TABLES .....	iii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	vi
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	1
II. INTRODUCTION .....	10
III. BACKGROUND .....	11
A. MTA Service Delivery Statistics .....	11
B. Labor Agreements .....	12
C. Need for a Work Stoppage Contingency Plan .....	13
IV. PRELIMINARY CONTINGENCY SERVICE PLANNING .....	14
A. Goals .....	14
B. Special Committee to Coordinate Work Stoppage Contingency Planning .....	14
C. Preliminary Assumptions .....	15
D. Service Delivery Issues .....	16
E. MTA's Formal Service Continuation Contingency Plan .....	18
F. Routes and Service Levels .....	18
G. Contingency Operations Staffing .....	22
H. Internal/External Communication .....	23
I. Security .....	24
J. Continuation of Essential MTA Functions .....	24
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTINGENCY SERVICE PLAN (PRE-STRIKE ACTIVITIES) .....	25
A. Staff Requirements for a July 1994 Strike .....	26
B. In-House Service Delivery Training .....	27
C. Hiring and Training of Temporary Employees .....	29
D. Contracted Services .....	29
E. Schedule Materials .....	30
F. Interim Administrative Policies .....	30
G. Communications .....	31

# TABLE OF CONTENTS *Continued*

	PAGE
<b>VI. TRANSIT OPERATIONS DURING THE NINE-DAY WORK STOPPAGE</b> .....	34
A. The Strike Begins .....	34
B. Temporary Special Fares .....	35
C. Weekday Bus and Rail Service .....	35
D. Weekend Bus and Rail Service .....	42
E. Bus and Rail Patronage During the Strike .....	44
<b>VII. POST-STRIKE RECOVERY</b> .....	50
A. Resumption of Service .....	50
B. Return of Personnel to Regular Positions .....	50
C. Fare Policy .....	51
D. Private Contractors .....	51
E. Security .....	51
F. Interim Administrative Policies .....	52
G. Communication to the Public .....	52
H. Temporary Employees .....	52
<b>VIII. STRIKE COST ANALYSIS</b> .....	53
A. Labor, Material, and Contracts .....	53
B. Impact on MTA Revenues .....	57
C. Training Costs .....	61
D. Cost to Maintain Enhanced Skills and Credentials .....	61
E. Accidents/Incidents .....	67
<b>IX. MTA'S TEAM EFFORT DURING THE WORK STOPPAGE</b> .....	69
A. Interdepartmental Participation .....	69
B. Represented Workers .....	69
C. Security .....	70
D. Support from Public Officials and MTA Executive Staff .....	70
E. Employee Impacts .....	71
<b>X. LESSONS LEARNED</b> .....	73
A. Pre-Strike Phase .....	73
B. Strike Phase .....	76
C. Post-Strike Phase .....	80
<b>XI. CONCLUSION</b> .....	82
APPENDIX A: MTA CONTINGENCY SERVICE NETWORK .....	A-1
APPENDIX B: 1994 MTA WORK STOPPAGE AND RECOVERY SUMMARY .....	B-1
APPENDIX C: DETAILED SERVICE AND PATRONAGE TABLES .....	C-1
"LACMTA Service Continuation Plan Summary" .....	Separate Document
"LACMTA Strike Contingency Service" .....	Separate Document

# LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
<b>III. BACKGROUND</b>	
III-1 MTA Routes by Type of Service .....	11
<b>IV. PRELIMINARY CONTINGENCY SERVICE PLANNING</b>	
IV-1 Lines to be Operated by MTA Personnel During First Phase of a July 1, 1994 Work Stoppage .....	19
<b>V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTINGENCY SERVICE PLAN (PRE-STRIKE ACTIVITIES)</b>	
V-1 MTA Staffing Requirements to Operate Service During a 1994 Union Work Stoppage .....	26
<b>VI. TRANSIT OPERATIONS DURING THE NINE-DAY WORK STOPPAGE</b>	
VI-1 MTA-Operated Weekday Bus Service Statistics (6:00a.m. - 6:00p.m.) .....	37
VI-2 Total Hours of Service Provided During July 25-August 2, 1994 Strike, by Carrier .....	39
VI-3 MTA-Operated Weekday Rail Service Statistics (6:00a.m. - 6:00p.m.) .....	41
VI-4 MTA-Operated Weekend Bus and Rail Service Statistics (6:00a.m. - 6:00p.m.) .....	43
VI-5 Estimated Weekday Passenger Boardings (All Bus and Rail Lines) .....	46
VI-6 Patronage on MTA-Operated Lines During Strike as a Percentage of Normal Weekday Boardings .....	47
VI-7 Estimated Weekend Passenger Boardings on MTA-Operated Bus and Rail Lines .....	48
<b>VIII. STRIKE COST ANALYSIS</b>	
VIII-1 MTA Strike-Related Costs, by Category .....	53
VIII-2 Cost of Maintenance Material, by Expense Period .....	55
VIII-3 Bus and Rail Farebox Revenues During Work Stoppage (Daily and Weekend) .....	58

## LIST OF TABLES *Continued*

TABLE	PAGE
<b>VIII. STRIKE COST ANALYSIS <i>Continued</i></b>	
VIII-4 Training Costs for Non-Represented Employees (Wages During Training) .....	63
VIII-5 Training Costs for Temporary Employees (Wages During Training) .....	64
VIII-6 Cost of Instruction (Non-Represented and Temporary Employees) .....	65
VIII-7 Cost to Maintain Class B Driver's Licenses for Four Years .....	66
VIII-8 MTA Work Stoppage Accident Summary .....	68

# LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
<b>IV. PRELIMINARY CONTINGENCY SERVICE PLANNING</b>	
IV-1 Proposed Network of MTA-Operated Bus And Rail Lines (First Phase of a July 1, 1994 Work Stoppage) .....	20
<b>V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTINGENCY PLAN (PRE-STRIKE ACTIVITIES)</b>	
V-1 1994 MTA Work Stoppage Planning Time Line .....	33
<b>VI. TRANSIT OPERATIONS DURING THE NINE-DAY WORK STOPPAGE</b>	
VI-1 Total Service Hours, by Operator/Carrier .....	40
VI-2 Estimated MTA Weekday Boardings During 1994 Work Stoppage .....	49
<b>VIII. STRIKE COST ANALYSIS</b>	
VIII-1 Recovery Costs vs. Normal Costs .....	54
VIII-2 Maintenance Cost Breakdown .....	56
VIII-3 Farebox Revenues Received During Strike--Weekdays (Bus Only) .....	59
VIII-4 Farebox Revenues Received During Strike--Weekdays (Rail Only) .....	60

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This case study would not have been possible without the cooperation and support of:

<b>Franklin E. White</b>	MTA Chief Executive Officer
<b>Arthur T. Leahy</b>	Executive Officer, Operations
<b>Ralph De La Cruz</b>	Deputy Executive Officer, Operations
<b>Ralph Wilson</b>	Chairman, Work Stoppage Service Continuation Planning Committee
<b>Jon Hillmer</b>	Vice Chairman, Work Stoppage Service Continuation Planning Committee

The following individuals were instrumental in developing the "Service Continuation Contingency Plan" and/or provided information that was incorporated into this case study:

<b>Sharyn Abernatha</b>	Employee Relations
<b>John Adams</b>	Rail Construction
<b>Maria Aguirre</b>	Local Government
<b>Ricardo Aguirre</b>	Transit Research Unit
<b>Michael Barnes</b>	Marketing
<b>Callier Beard</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>Steven Brown</b>	Countywide Planning
<b>Martha Butler</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>Michael Butler</b>	Accounting
<b>Salvatore Calorino</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>Ralph Carapia</b>	Labor Relations
<b>Brent Cardwell</b>	Administration
<b>Antonio Chavira</b>	Equipment Maintenance
<b>Gary Clark</b>	Government Relations
<b>Dennis Conte</b>	Transit Police
<b>R. Costa</b>	Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept./Blue Line
<b>Bill Currier</b>	Commuter Rail
<b>Gregory Davy</b>	Media Relations
<b>Jesse Diaz</b>	Transportation/Rail
<b>Mary Echternach</b>	Government Relations
<b>Nancy Eksterowicz</b>	Risk Management
<b>Al Frisch</b>	Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department



<b>Roobik Galoosian</b>	Risk Management
<b>Elizabeth Handler</b>	News Bureau
<b>Scott Holmes</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>Louis Hubaud</b>	Rail Construction
<b>Daniel Ibarra</b>	Transportation
<b>Harv Jensen</b>	Contracts
<b>Ashok Kumar</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>David Lane</b>	Equipment Maintenance
<b>Cassandra Langston</b>	Legal
<b>Rudolph Lipscomb</b>	Employee Relations
<b>James McLaughlin</b>	Countywide Planning
<b>Timothy Mengle</b>	Transit Research Unit
<b>Ken Miller</b>	Equipment Maintenance
<b>James Montoya</b>	Material
<b>Theodore Montoya</b>	Stores
<b>M. Moore</b>	Los Angeles Police Department
<b>Ann Neeson</b>	Employee Relations
<b>Don Ott</b>	Facilities Maintenance
<b>Sharon Papa</b>	Transit Police
<b>Marva Phillips</b>	Employee Relations
<b>Jack Rich</b>	Commuter Rail
<b>G. Schoeller</b>	Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
<b>Frank Schroder</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>Denis Shoemaker</b>	Risk Management
<b>Leon Stevenson</b>	Operations Control & Services
<b>Phyllis Tucker</b>	Executive Office
<b>Madeline Van Leuvan</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>Ed Vandeventer</b>	Rail Operations
<b>Ed Walsh</b>	Facilities Maintenance
<b>Alice Wiggins</b>	Marketing
<b>Robert Williams</b>	Customer Relations

Graphics Support:

<b>Susan Chapman</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning
<b>Mark Haddon</b>	Scheduling and Operations Planning

We are especially indebted to the hundreds of dedicated non-represented MTA staff who went the extra mile to ensure transit service was provided to the public during the strike. Thank you for your thoughtful comments.

# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## *OVERVIEW*

---

On Monday, July 25, 1994, the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) initiated a nine-day strike against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). The strike was honored by both the United Transportation Union (UTU) and the Transportation Communications Union (TCU). During the work stoppage, the MTA successfully operated a skeletal network of regional bus and rail lines using non-represented MTA personnel and private bus carriers. It is an unprecedented achievement for a major transit provider to have provided multi-modal service during a strike.

The purpose of this case study is to:

- **provide an overview of the conditions that led to the development of a work stoppage service continuation contingency plan;**
- **detail the development and implementation of the contingency plan including personnel assignments, bus and rail schedules, and the level of service operated during the work stoppage;**
- **describe the extraordinary amount of planning and staff resolve that was involved in preparing for a possible work stoppage;**
- **analyze outcomes associated with operating service during the strike;**
- **summarize the key lessons learned during the planning and implementation of the service continuation contingency plan.**

## **PRELIMINARY SERVICE CONTINUATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING**

---

Approximately 6,200 MTA employees are represented by three collective bargaining units (UTU, ATU, and TCU) under contracts negotiated between the unions and the MTA. In April 1994, representatives of MTA management and the three labor unions began negotiations regarding provisions of new labor agreements. The new agreements would be in effect from July 1, 1994, through June 30, 1997.

When labor negotiations began, the MTA was facing an operating budget deficit of \$126 million for Fiscal Year 1995 (FY95). To offset the projected shortfall, MTA management developed a deficit reduction plan that included:

- **fare increases**
- **service reductions**
- **personnel layoffs**
- **negotiating changes to certain union work rules**
- **no wage increases for represented and non-represented staff**
- **subcontracting selected functions currently performed in-house by represented employees**
- **other cost saving measures**

Several of the deficit reduction proposals promised to be strongly contested during union negotiations. Consequently, the possibility existed that new labor agreements might not be approved by the July 1, 1994, deadline. In anticipation of that eventuality, MTA staff began preliminary preparations for operating service during a union work stoppage.

Management's primary goal was to operate a skeletal network of regional bus and rail lines. This temporary network would provide minimal service levels to MTA riders during a work stoppage. A secondary goal of the preliminary groundwork was to devise a strategy that enabled the systematic expansion of transit services operated in case of a lengthy work stoppage.

To accomplish those goals, MTA Chief Executive Officer Franklin White directed Operations to develop formal contingency plans to provide bus and rail service in the event of a work stoppage. In accordance with this directive, Arthur T. Leahy, Executive Officer, Operations, assembled a multi-departmental Work Stoppage Contingency Planning Committee (WSCPC). The WSCPC was responsible for coordinating all activities associated with contingency planning and implementation. Ralph Wilson, Assistant Director of Transportation, was appointed Chair of the Committee and Jon Hillmer, Operations Planning Manager, served as Vice-Chair. The WSCPC held its first meeting on April 14, 1994.

During the period April 14 - June 25, 1994, the WSCPC worked to develop a comprehensive service continuation plan. A key assumption was that non-represented personnel would operate both bus and rail service, as well as provide support services (e.g., maintenance and telephone information). Additional bus service could conceivably be operated by municipal and private carriers under contract with the MTA.

The WSCPC's effort from April through June, 1994, culminated in the "Service Continuation Contingency Plan Summary." This document served as the framework for most strike-related planning activities. The Plan addressed the following five major issues:

- **routes and service levels to be operated by the MTA**
- **non-represented personnel requirements and training**
- **equipment and facilities maintenance**
- **internal and external communications**
- **security**

### ***IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTINGENCY PLAN (PRE-STRIKE ACTIVITIES)***

---

MTA initially assumed that the Governor of California would declare a 60-day "cooling-off" period prior to any work stoppage. Accordingly, most of the activities delineated in the formal contingency plan reflect a September 1, 1994 strike date. However, after the Plan was

developed, it became apparent that strong disagreement over several major issues would likely prevent labor agreements from being reached before the contracts expired on June 30.

Because the MTA Board of Directors did not want to defer the resolution of labor issues, they decided in early June against requesting an intervention by the Governor of California to extend negotiations. This decision made it much more likely that a strike would occur closer to July 1 than September 1. The Board's decision also meant that MTA Operations had to accelerate the completion of numerous pre-strike tasks delineated in the Plan.

Among the critical tasks that had to be completed in anticipation of a July 1994 work stoppage were: 1) training non-represented employees for their strike assignments; 2) hiring replacement personnel; 3) contracting with municipal operators and private carriers to provide bus service; 4) refining temporary bus and rail schedules; 5) providing scheduling materials to all affected departments (e.g., operating divisions, Operations Control, Transit Police, Telephone Information, etc.); and 6) address various administrative issues. The initial staffing requirements to operate service during the work stoppage are summarized in Table I-1.

TABLE I-1

**INITIAL MTA STAFFING REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE SERVICE  
DURING THE 1994 UNION WORK STOPPAGE**

<b>Function</b>	<b>No. Employees Required by July 1, 1994</b>
Bus Operators	175
Rail Operators	20
Maintenance	148
Telephone Information	36
Perimeter Patrol	67
Ride Alongs	43
<b>Total:</b>	<b>489</b>

On Monday, July 25, 1994, the ATU, which had not reached a tentative agreement with MTA management, initiated a work stoppage. Although tentative agreements had been reached immediately prior to the strike deadline with the two other unions, ATU picket lines were honored by both the UTU and the TCU. In accordance with the service continuation contingency plan that

by both the UTU and the TCU. In accordance with the service continuation contingency plan that had been developed during the preceding four months, MTA management responded by implementing skeletal, regional bus and rail service on the first day of the strike.

### ***TRANSIT SERVICE PROVIDED DURING THE 1994 WORK STOPPAGE***

---

Four types of weekday transit services were provided to MTA patrons during the strike:

- **MTA-operated bus service on seven high-demand lines**
- **Bus service operated by private carriers under contract to the MTA on 29 lines**
- **MTA-operated light-rail service on the Metro Blue Line**
- **MTA-operated heavy-rail service on the Metro Red Line**

As a point of reference, the MTA normally operates 204 bus routes in addition to the light-rail and heavy-rail service.

On Friday, July 29, a decision was made by MTA management to operate limited bus and rail service on Saturday and Sunday, July 30 and 31. Staff in the Scheduling and Operations Planning Department, along with staff from the Bus Transportation, Bus Maintenance, and Rail Operations Departments, quickly developed a strategic plan to implement and operate service on four key bus lines as well as the Metro Red and Blue Lines. Scheduled headways were 15 minutes on each of the four weekend bus lines.

Throughout the work stoppage, a simplified fare structure was implemented on bus and rail lines operated by the MTA. Fares were temporarily set at 50 cents per ride for all bus lines as well as the Metro Blue Line. The fare on the Metro Red Line remained at 25 cents per ride. Unlike normal operations, transfers were not issued. Passengers traveling on those lines operated by private carriers under contract to the MTA were not charged a fare because of problems associated with installing fareboxes on school buses. Table I-2 shows the estimated boardings on bus and rail service operated during the strike. More than two million patrons were provided service during the nine-day strike.

TABLE I-2

**ESTIMATED BUS AND RAIL BOARDINGS DURING THE NINE-DAY  
UNION WORK STOPPAGE**

<b>Service Provider/Mode</b>	<b>Weekday</b>	<b>Weekend</b>	<b>Total</b>
MTA/Bus	906,300	61,400	967,700
MTA/Rail	506,000	40,000	546,000
Private/Bus	540,000	0	540,000
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1,952,300</b>	<b>101,400</b>	<b>2,053,700</b>

**POST STRIKE OPERATIONS**

During the work stoppage, negotiations continued between the MTA and the ATU. On the morning of August 2, 1994, the two parties reached a tentative agreement. This agreement was ratified by ATU membership later that night.

MTA management estimated that it would take approximately 72 hours after the end of the work stoppage for the bus and rail system to become fully operational. In actuality, by the morning of Friday, August 5, MTA Operations provided approximately 99% of scheduled service. Fares on all MTA bus and rail service remained at 50 cents during the recovery period. The regular base fare of \$1.10 was reinstated on Monday, August 8. Private bus contractors were released from their contracts immediately following ratification of the ATU contract.

Most non-represented employees reassigned to fill contract positions during the work stoppage reported to their regular assignments on Wednesday, August 3, to begin the process of returning MTA operations to normal. All temporary employees were released from employment on Wednesday, August 3. By Friday, August 5, all Transit Police Officers and Security Guards had been returned to their assignments. Special assistance from local law enforcement jurisdictions ended at the conclusion of the work stoppage.

As outlined in Section V of this case study, the MTA instituted several interim administrative policies immediately prior to and during the work stoppage. All affected departments returned to their regular administrative policies by the end of August.

## **COST ANALYSIS**

---

MTA expended a total of \$3.4 million for all labor, supplies and contracts associated with service delivery during the nine-day work stoppage. Table I-3 below delineates those costs by category.

TABLE I-3

### **MTA STRIKE-RELATED COSTS, BY CATEGORY**

<b>Period</b>	<b>Labor</b>	<b>Material</b>	<b>Contracts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Work Stoppage</b> (9 days)	\$2,708,763	\$214,837	\$450,071	\$3,373,671

The MTA work stoppage had a significant effect on daily farebox revenues. Typical weekday farebox revenues are approximately \$370,000 from bus and \$12,000 from rail ticket-vending machines (TVMs). During the work stoppage, however, farebox revenues dropped notably--bus revenues averaged \$25,000 per weekday and rail revenues averaged \$8,000 per weekday. This was not unexpected because of the temporary fare structures that were in place and the reduced number of lines operated.

Training costs for non-represented employees in positions such as bus operator, service attendant, and telephone information operator totaled \$889,407. Training of temporary employees hired to replace striking workers totaled \$31,032.



A total of 87 non-represented employees received Class B passenger endorsement licenses and operated buses during the work stoppage. An analysis was subsequently undertaken to investigate the possibility of having these individuals maintain their licenses. By maintaining their licenses, these non-represented employees could be available for service in the event of an emergency. The costs associated with maintaining these licenses is estimated to be \$80,352 over a four-year period.

## **LESSONS LEARNED**

---

The 1994 work stoppage provided many important insights into pre-strike contingency planning and transit operations during a strike. Input was solicited from various MTA staff including directors, managers, supervisors, and other non-contract employees regarding their impression of contingency operations. Key lessons learned include:

- **A strong commitment from the highest levels of management is essential to developing and implementing successful transit operations during a work stoppage;**
- **It is important to keep the media, employees, and the riding public apprised of management's objectives and plans to operate contingency service;**
- **Private carrier operations should be integrated with, and administered through, MTA Operations to maximize service quality;**
- **Reduced fares during a work stoppage can have an ameliorative effect on the attitude of the riding public.**

## **CONCLUSION**

---

The successful development and implementation of the "Service Continuation Contingency Plan" proved that a major transit agency can operate both bus and rail service during a work stoppage by its drivers, mechanics, and clerks. The actions of MTA employees in assuming unfamiliar duties and working exceptionally long hours under the most adverse and difficult circumstances demonstrated their commitment to provide transit service to the public. These actions reflect the "can do" attitude of the agency as a whole.

In addition, the MTA has realized a lasting benefit from the training of non-represented employees in the operation of transit buses. The MTA now has a permanent group of employees available to augment contract bus operators in the event of an emergency.

Although the MTA service continuation effort was a major success, the information provided in this case study should be used cautiously. The conditions leading up to the work stoppage in Los Angeles, as well as the factors that led to a successful conclusion of the strike, were unique. Different circumstances would have required different planning and implementation strategies. Nonetheless, it is the hope of the MTA that the information contained in this document will serve as a guide to other transit operators who may be planning to provide transit service during emergency situations.

## II. INTRODUCTION

---

On Monday, July 25, 1994, the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) initiated a nine-day strike against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). The strike was honored by both the United Transportation Union (UTU) and the Transportation Communications Union (TCU). During the work stoppage, the MTA successfully operated a skeletal network of regional bus and rail lines using non-represented MTA personnel and private carriers. This combination of services carried more than two million passengers during the nine-day work stoppage. It was unprecedented for a major transit provider to have operated multi-modal service during a strike.

### *Purpose and Scope of Case Study*

The purpose of this case study is to: 1) provide an overview of the conditions that led to the development of a work stoppage contingency plan; 2) describe the extraordinary amount of planning and staff resolve that was required to prepare for a possible work stoppage; 3) detail the implementation of the contingency plan including personnel assignments, bus and rail schedules, and the level of service operated during the work stoppage; 4) analyze outcomes associated with operating service during the strike; and 5) summarize the key lessons learned during the planning and implementation of the "Service Continuation Contingency Plan."

The issues within this case study provide a framework for the MTA and other transit carriers to use in the event of foreseeable service delivery crises. This case study specifically covers sub-component processes and development strategies that are applicable to enabling service delivery under unusual and extremely constrained conditions.

### III. BACKGROUND

---

#### A. MTA Service Delivery Statistics

##### *Routes*

The MTA provides public transportation to most of Los Angeles County and parts of three adjacent counties (Orange, San Bernardino and Ventura). During normal operations, the MTA transit system consists of 204 bus routes and two rail lines serving more than 18,500 stops within a 1,443 square mile service area. The number of routes within each service type operated by the MTA is as follows:

TABLE III-1

#### MTA ROUTES BY TYPE OF SERVICE

Line Category	Service Description	Number of Routes
1 - 99	Local routes serving Downtown Los Angeles	50
100 - 299	Local routes not serving Downtown Los Angeles	82
300 - 399	Limited stop routes (all areas)	10
400 - 499	Express routes serving Downtown Los Angeles	36
500 - 599	Express routes not serving Downtown Los Angeles	5
600 - 699	Special services	21
800 - 899	Rail services	2
	<b>Total routes</b>	<b>206</b>

## ***Service and Equipment Levels***

In Fiscal Year 1994, the MTA operated 6.8 million revenue bus hours and 81.5 million revenue bus miles. An additional 98,000 revenue train hours and 1.8 million revenue train miles were operated. The MTA's current daily peak vehicle requirements are 1,912 buses, 36 light rail cars, and 16 heavy rail cars.

## ***Ridership***

On an average weekday, the MTA transit system serves 1.15 million unlinked bus passengers and 55,000 unlinked rail passengers. During fiscal year 1994, some 363 million bus boardings and 17.5 million rail boardings occurred on MTA lines.

## ***Passenger Demographics***

More females than males use the MTA bus system (approximately 60% versus 40%). Hispanics represent nearly half of all bus riders (47%), with African-Americans accounting for almost another quarter (23%). About one in five bus patrons is Caucasian. Sixty percent of MTA bus riders have annual household incomes of less than \$15,000, while another 20% have annual household incomes between \$15,000 and \$30,000. A large proportion of MTA bus riders are transit dependent.

### **B. Labor Agreements**

Approximately 6,200 MTA employees are represented by three collective bargaining units under contracts negotiated between the unions and the MTA. The three labor unions and the employee classes represented are as follows:

- **United Transportation Union (UTU)** represents approximately 3,900 bus and train operators, schedule makers, and schedule checkers;
- **Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU)** represents approximately 1,900 mechanics and maintenance personnel; and

- **Transportation Communications Union (TCU)** represents approximately 400 clerks, storekeepers, and telephone information operators.

Before the July 1994 work stoppage, represented employees were covered by three-year contractual agreements, which were in effect from July 1, 1991, through June 30, 1994. These contracts govern aspects of the work environment such as work rules, rates of pay, ancillary benefits (e.g., vacation and sick leave), discipline and grievance policies. In April 1994, representatives of MTA management and the three labor unions began negotiations regarding provisions of new labor agreements. The new agreements would be in effect from July 1, 1994, through June 30, 1997.

### **C. Need for a Work Stoppage Contingency Plan**

When labor negotiations began, the MTA was facing an operating budget deficit of \$126 million for fiscal year 1995 (FY95). To offset the projected shortfall, MTA management developed a deficit reduction plan that included fare increases, the reduction and/or elimination of several bus lines, and personnel layoffs. The financial plan also involved reducing operating costs by: 1) negotiating changes to certain union work rules; 2) maintaining the wages of workers (represented and non-represented) at current levels; 3) subcontracting selected functions currently performed in-house by represented employees; and 4) implementing other business strategies.

Because several of the above proposals to eliminate the budget deficit promised to be strongly contested during union negotiations, there was a very real possibility that new labor agreements might not be approved by July 1, 1994. In anticipation of that eventuality, MTA staff began preliminary preparations for operating service during a work stoppage.

## IV. PRELIMINARY CONTINGENCY SERVICE PLANNING

---

### A. Goals

The primary goal of the MTA during the initial phase of the planning process was to set up a skeletal network of regional bus and rail lines. This temporary network would provide minimal service in the event of a work stoppage. A secondary goal was to devise a strategy that would allow systematic expansion of service, in case of a lengthy strike.

Based on these goals, management outlined a preliminary service continuation strategy. Under this strategy, MTA non-represented personnel (trained as operators) would provide service on several key MTA bus lines, as well as the Metro Blue and Red Lines. MTA non-represented personnel would also provide support services, such as maintenance and telephone information. Additional bus service could conceivably be operated by municipal and private carriers under contract to the MTA.

### B. Special Committee to Coordinate Work Stoppage Contingency Planning

Chief Executive Officer Franklin White directed MTA Operations to develop formal contingency plans to operate bus and rail service during a work stoppage. In accordance with this directive, Arthur T. Leahy, Executive Officer, Operations, assembled a multi-departmental Work Stoppage Contingency Planning Committee (WSCPC). The WSCPC was responsible for coordinating all activities associated with contingency planning and implementation.

The departments initially represented on the WSCPC were: Bus Transportation, Bus Maintenance, Rail Operations, Scheduling and Operations Planning, Planning and Programming, Transit Police, Administration, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Ralph Wilson, Assistant Director of Transportation, was appointed Chair of the Committee and Jon Hillmer, Operations Planning Manager, served as Vice-Chair. The WSCPC held its first meeting on April 14, 1994.

### C. Preliminary Assumptions

The WSCPC began their formal planning activities using several preliminary assumptions outlined by MTA executive staff. These assumptions included:

- A work stoppage might occur as early as July 1, 1994, but was most likely to take place on, or after, September 1, 1994. Underlying this assumption was the strong possibility that a California law known as the "Lockyer Provision", would be invoked on July 1. This provision gives the Governor the power to institute a 60-day "cooling-off" period following the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Both sides, however, must request that Lockyer be invoked;
- Contingency bus and rail service would begin within 24-48 hours after the initiation of a work stoppage;
- Non-represented personnel would be assigned to operate, maintain, and service equipment;
- Subcontractors would operate selected MTA bus lines;
- Contract personnel would be encouraged to work during a strike; and
- Security would be provided by MTA Transit Police and local jurisdictions to ensure the safety of passengers, personnel, equipment, and facilities.



#### D. Service Delivery Issues

The WSCPC proceeded to identify and discuss service delivery issues essential to successful contingency operations. The primary service delivery issues considered are outlined below.

- As a result of insufficient bus-operating staff, a subset of lines had to be identified that could function as a skeletal regional network.
- Bus and rail service would have to be implemented in phases due to several factors including: 1) the number of persons who could be trained during a given driving class; 2) the limited time frame under which the Committee was operating; and 3) the desire not to completely disrupt the functioning of work units (due to staff training requirements).
- The criteria used to identify bus lines to be operated would include: 1) ridership; 2) location of the bus line; 3) route integration with other transit operators; 4) the ease of operator training; 5) the ability to provide supervision; and 6) the ability to provide adequate security to passengers, employees, and equipment.
- Training of bus operating personnel would begin on June 1, 1994. This training could be completed in four (4) weeks by accelerating the training course. The accelerated course would still meet all legal requirements regarding hours and type of training. Moreover, the course would not compromise MTA Operation's normal safety standards.
- Municipal and private carriers would contract with the MTA to operate selected bus lines that contribute to the regional network. It might be possible to contract additional support services, if necessary.
- Bus and rail service would be operated weekdays only, between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Initially, there would be no service on weekends or holidays.
- Non-represented staff would be encouraged to volunteer for contingency duties. However, non-represented employees would be reassigned, if necessary, on a mandatory basis.

- Many normal MTA functions would be reduced or deferred. Those functions that could not be reduced or deferred needed to be identified quickly so that appropriate coverage could be assured.
- Transit Police would provide 24-hour armed coverage at all MTA facilities and on those routes operated by MTA Operations. Private security firms would also be hired to enhance security. A security subcommittee, including the MTA Transit Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LACSD) would be formed to coordinate all security plans.
- The hiring of replacement personnel would be accelerated. Initially, those persons would provide some relief for non-represented personnel as bus operators, service attendants, and mechanics as they complete training.

Based on the assumptions and service delivery issues outlined by the Committee, each department initially represented on the WSCPC was asked to submit a Work Stoppage Contingency Plan for their respective work unit. Each departmental plan was essential in determining agency-wide staffing needs, critical functions, training timetables, and other relevant issues.

It became clear during the preliminary planning phase that other departments such as Risk Management, Marketing, and Contracts, should be added to the Committee to ensure that all aspects of the planning process were considered. Also, at the request of the WSCPC, the Accounting Department established a work order number (Work Order 2868) to keep track of strike-related costs. All expenses incurred during the planning and implementation of any work stoppage activities were to be identified under this work order.

**E. MTA's Formal Service Continuation Contingency Plan**

During the period April 14 - June 25, 1994, the WSCPC developed a comprehensive service continuation contingency plan. The WSCPC's effort throughout this period culminated in a volume entitled, Service Continuation Contingency Plan Summary. This document, which was distributed to key personnel in June, served as the framework for most strike-related planning activities. A copy of the Plan is included as a stand-alone appendix to this case study.

MTA's formal service continuation contingency plan expressly addressed the following five major issues: 1) routes and service levels to be operated by the MTA; 2) personnel requirements and training; 3) equipment and facilities maintenance; 4) internal and external communications; and 5) security. The sections below describe many of the critical planning activities that occurred during the preliminary implementation of the plan.

**F. Routes and Service Levels**

Based on the criteria approved by the WSCPC, Operations Planning selected several bus routes that would be initially operated by MTA personnel. In addition, the MTA planned to operate rail service on the Metro Blue and Red Lines. Figure IV-1 and Table IV-1 shows the rudimentary bus and rail network of MTA-operated services.

Once the first set of lines were in place, additional bus routes would be phased into service. This process would continue until 42 bus lines were operational by September 6, 1994. If a work stoppage were to last beyond September 1994, additional lines could be phased in as temporary operators completed their training. The implementation dates, and location

TABLE IV-1

**LINES TO BE OPERATED BY MTA PERSONNEL  
DURING FIRST PHASE OF A JULY 1, 1994 WORK STOPPAGE**


Line Number	Line Name (Proposed Route)	Approximate Frequency	Estimated Vehicle Requirements
21	Wilshire Blvd. (U.C.L.A. to Alvarado)	6 min.	30
30	Pico Blvd. - E. 1st St. (Two segments: Rimpau-Alvarado & Rowan-Hill)	10 min.	15
45	Broadway (Imperial-Rose Hills)	10 min.	17
180	Hollywood-Pasadena (Highland-Lake)	15 min.	15
204	Vermont Ave. (Imperial-Hollywood)	8 min.	18
801 (rail)	Metro Blue Line (Willow Station-Metro Center)	10 min.	10 (2-car trains)
802 (rail)	Metro Red Line (Union Station-Westlake)	10 min	2 (4-car trains)

# Proposed Network of MTA-Operated Bus and Rail Lines (First Phase of a July 1, 1994 Work Stoppage)

MTA Operations  
December, 1994



FIGURE IV-1



of specific lines, were based on the need to serve areas of greatest passenger demand, while considering the limited number of available operators.

### ***Preliminary Contacts With Municipal and Private Carriers***

Some of the bus lines in the network, especially those that did not have extremely high daily ridership, could conceivably be operated by municipal and private carriers. This was a required element of the Plan as there were not enough in-house staff to fully implement the bus service schedule. To assess the feasibility of involving other carriers, informal communications with several transit operators in the area were conducted by Planning and Programming staff during the months of April and May, 1994.

Following these discussions, a decision was made to develop a formal request for contracted services. The initial need was for approximately 250 contracted buses. It was at this point that the Contracts Department was brought into the process. Working with other MTA staff, the Contracts Department prepared a Request for Proposals (RFP), including a Scope of Work, for bid by outside carriers. These documents outlined the service characteristics to be operated in the event of a work stoppage, as well as the operating requirements expected by the MTA.

### ***Scheduling Activities***

Once a tentative set of routes was established, non-represented staff in the Scheduling and Operations Planning Department began to develop schedules, maps, route sheets, and work runs for contingency service. The actual number of MTA operating personnel required for a July 1, 1994 skeletal operation was determined to be 173 bus operators and 18 rail operators. Schedules, maps, routing information, and work runs for MTA-operated services would be forwarded to operating divisions. Similar scheduling materials, with the exception of operator work runs, would be forwarded to municipal and private operators.

Schedules on each line were tailored to operate at a frequency of no less than half of their regular peak intervals. Some lines were redesigned to operate only segments of their regular routes to ensure that service be provided on certain multi-route lines (e.g., MTA Line 20--Wilshire Boulevard). By doing this, the number of operator work runs would be reduced and service could be targeted at line segments with the highest levels of ridership.

### **G. Contingency Operations Staffing**

By May, 1994, it was necessary to begin identifying the potential replacement manpower pool from the ranks of non-represented staff. To accomplish this task, a questionnaire was mailed in mid-May to the approximately 1,800 non-represented MTA employees. Respondents were asked to list their preferences for work assignments in priority order. The choices included: 1) Bus Operator; 2) Rail Operator (for those employees with the required FRA & PUC credentials); 3) Service Attendant; 4) Telephone Information Operator; and 5) office staff. Approximately 1,200 questionnaires were returned. A subcommittee was tasked with reviewing the questionnaire responses and determining the number of available volunteers for each position.

It should be noted that some departments ensured a relatively high questionnaire return rate by keeping track of those employees who completed the form. Other departments apparently indicated to employees that completing the preference questionnaire was optional.

#### ***Replacement Bus Operator Training***

The Transportation Department estimated that approximately 125 non-represented employees could be trained as bus operators by their Instruction Department between June 1 and July 1, 1994, with an equal number completing training every four weeks. Based on this estimate, a target number of 100 MTA operated buses was set for a July 1, 1994 work stoppage. As operators completed training every four weeks, several MTA bus lines could be phased into the contingency service delivery system. In addition to these newly trained Operators, the Transit Operations Supervisors (TOS) pool was given refresher courses. Because the TOS pool had previous operating experience, only a limited amount of training would be required.

Upon the notification of a strike date, job announcements for temporary bus operators, mechanics and other personnel would be placed in newspapers. Training for persons in Service Attendants and Telephone Information Operator positions could be scheduled immediately prior to July 1. Other support staff could be trained on the job at the outset of a strike.

#### **H. Internal/External Communication**

An important part of contingency planning was the coordination of verbal and written communication during a possible work stoppage. Coordinated messaging was necessary to keep the general public and MTA employees informed of the status of transit service and contract negotiations. Further, this information pipeline would prevent the spread of rumors and misinformation. To help achieve these goals, a communications coordinator was retained by MTA to serve as the liaison between the CEO, the negotiating team, the Work Stoppage Contingency Planning Committee, MTA staff, the news media, and the general public.

Key persons were designated within functional areas to interface with the communications coordinator. These functional areas included the CEO's office, General Counsel, Transit Police, Administration/Human Relations, Employee Relations, Marketing, Media Relations, Intergovernmental Affairs, Customer Relations, other Operations Departments, and Planning/Programming.

It was agreed that, in the event of a strike, daily briefings would be conducted each morning to update key parties on the status of service delivery and negotiations. The participants would include the CEO, Operations, all departments with communications responsibilities, as well as the negotiating team. The daily briefings were also intended to ensure that correct and accurate information would be issued to the public, employees, and mass media.



## **I. Security**

Security of passengers, employees, equipment, and facilities was a major concern to the MTA. In the earliest stages of contingency planning, the Transit Police Department was assigned to develop a comprehensive security plan for bus and rail operations, and MTA facilities. As such, various preliminary security plans were considered. Among the assumptions contained in these preliminary plans were: 1) Transit Police Officers would be stationed at all operating divisions and major facilities, including the 425, 818, and CMF buildings; 2) Transit Police Officers would ride each MTA bus in service; and 3) the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department would provide security on the Metro Blue Line during the work stoppage. These preliminary security plans were subsequently revised, however, when security responsibilities for the Metro Blue Line were transferred to the MTA Transit Police, effective July 1, 1994. This revision shifted Metro Blue Line strike security away from the Sheriff's Department to MTA Transit Police.

The additional responsibility of providing security for the Metro Blue Line, coupled with expanding projected service levels, necessarily meant that Transit Police Officers would not be available to ride each bus during a work stoppage. Instead, the final security plan called for dividing the MTA service area into zones. Transit Police Officers would then patrol assigned areas in their vehicles. Approximately 70% of the officers would be deployed between 5:30a.m.-6:00p.m. A second shift would patrol between the hours of 5:30p.m.-6:00a.m.

## **J. Continuation of Essential MTA Functions**

In addition to providing staff for bus and rail operations, each MTA department was assigned the task of identifying "critical" functions and the skeletal staffing required to support them. As departments submitted their contingency plans, estimates were made to determine the number of employees needed for each operations related contingency function. These estimates were necessary to determine how staff would be allocated throughout the agency.

## **V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTINGENCY SERVICE PLAN (PRE-STRIKE ACTIVITIES)**

---

MTA Operations initially assumed that there would be a 60-day "cooling-off" period prior to any work stoppage (see Part IV). Accordingly, most of the activities in the formal service continuation contingency plan reflect a September 1, 1994 strike date. It became apparent during negotiations, however, that strong disagreement over several major issues would likely prevent labor agreements from being reached before the contracts expired on June 30.

Because the MTA Board of Directors did not want to defer the resolution of labor issues, in early June they decided against requesting that the Lockyer Provision be invoked. This decision made it more likely that a strike would occur closer to July 1 than September 1. The Board's decision also meant that MTA Operations had to accelerate the completion of numerous pre-strike tasks outlined in the service continuation plan. As the reality of an earlier potential strike date set in, non-represented staff increased their efforts and resolve so that a viable service continuation capability was in place by July 1. (The unions ultimately announced July 18 as a strike date--see below).

Among the critical tasks that had to be completed in anticipation of a July 1994 work stoppage were: 1) training non-represented employees for their strike assignments; 2) hiring replacement personnel; 3) contracting with municipal operators and private carriers; 4) refining temporary bus and rail schedules; 5) providing scheduling materials to all affected departments (e.g., operating divisions, Operations Control, Transit Police, Telephone Information, etc.); and 6) resolution of various administrative issues.

Details concerning these and other pre-strike activities leading up to the actual work stoppage are presented below.

**A. Staff Requirements for a July 1994 Strike**

Based on an analysis of staffing requirements necessary to continue transit service during a July 1994 strike, it was initially determined that nearly 500 non-represented employees, or just over twenty-five percent of all non-represented employees, would have to be reassigned. The specific contingency functions that were to be filled during an actual work stoppage were: 1) bus and train operators; 2) vehicle maintenance; 3) telephone information; 4) perimeter patrol; and 5) "Ride Alongs." Table V-1 shows the number of required staff, by job type.

TABLE V-1

**MTA STAFFING REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE SERVICE  
DURING A 1994 UNION WORK STOPPAGE**

<b>Function</b>	<b>No. Employees Required by July 1, 1994</b>
<b>Bus Operators</b>	175
<b>Rail Operators</b>	20
<b>Maintenance</b>	148
<b>Telephone Information</b>	36
<b>Perimeter Patrol</b>	67
<b>Ride Alongs</b>	43
<b>Total:</b>	<b>489</b>

The next step in the process required the Transportation Department's Instruction Section review of the preference questionnaires in greater detail, in an attempt to match employees with their preferred positions. Based on this effort, tentative contingency assignments were made. Non-represented employees not directly assigned to contingency functions were to remain in their departments to provide skeletal coverage.

## **B. In-House Service Delivery Training**

### ***Bus Operators (Transit Operations Supervisors--TOS)***

In preparing for a potential work stoppage, Transportation Central Instruction (TCI) began certifying TOS personnel on May 9, 1994. TOS personnel attended refresher training at TCI for two days. The curriculum consisted of eight hours of classroom instruction and eight hours of on-street training. Because most TOS personnel were former bus operators with valid license credentials in their possession, only minimal training was necessary. By May 28, 107 certified TOS personnel were ready to provide service in the event of a work stoppage.

Classroom instruction provided to the TOSs covered the following topics:

- **defensive driving**
- **customer relations**
- **Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)**
- **sensitivity training**
- **MTA fares/tariffs**

On-street training provided to the TOSs included:

- **one-on-one instruction with a federally certified instructor**
- **pre-trip safety inspection procedures**

### ***Bus Operators (Non-Represented Employees)***

On June 9, 1994, TCI began training non-represented employees as bus operators in the event of a work stoppage. Non-represented employees reported to TCI for four weeks and were given the complete Basic Bus Operator Training Course. Federally certified instructors from TCI provided the training.

The first two bus operator training classes began on June 9 and June 13, 1994, respectively. A combined total of 62 non-represented employees started training on these dates. On July 8, 46 non-represented employees from these first two classes completed training and

certification. These employees were prepared and ready to provide service in case of a work stoppage.

The second two bus operator training classes began on July 5 and July 7, 1994, respectively. Forty-seven non-represented employees started training on these dates combined. On August 3, 41 employees from the second two classes completed training and certification and were prepared to provide service. This group of non-represented employees were in training throughout the actual work stoppage.

### ***Metro Blue and Red Line Rail Operators***

MTA's Rail TOS were already certified to operate rail vehicles. As a consequence, Rail TOS did not require any special or additional instruction to operate trains.

### ***Service Attendants***

On July 6, Maintenance Instruction began training non-represented employees as Service Attendants in anticipation of a possible work stoppage. Training emphasized the proper handling of potentially hazardous materials as well as basic safety procedures. A total of 36 non-represented employees were designated to be trained as Service Attendants during the pre-strike effort. By July 15, all 36 non-represented employees had completed training as Service Attendants and were ready to be placed in service.

### ***Equipment Record Specialists***

A total of 11 non-represented employees were assigned to work as Equipment Records Specialists (ERS). Because ERS' responsibilities do not involve working with potentially hazardous materials, it was felt that non-represented employees given these assignments could be appropriately trained to carry out their duties on-the-job. Training for ERS, therefore, would commence as the non-represented employees reported for strike duty.

## ***Telephone Information Operators***

On July 6, Telephone Information began training non-represented employees for the possibility of a work stoppage. A total of 49 non-represented employees trained as temporary telephone information operators. By July 15, all 49 non-represented employees had completed training. Once the work stoppage began, an additional 40 non-represented employees trained as telephone information operators and were placed into service on an as-needed basis.

### **C. Hiring and Training of Temporary Employees**

TCI began training 23 temporary bus operators on July 18. Two temporary bus operators who had prior experience completed training on the first day of the strike (July 25); these two operators were assigned bus runs. On August 1, the start of the second week of the strike, MTA began training six temporary Service Attendants to assist in the work-stoppage effort. In addition, eight temporary employees were hired and trained as telephone information operators. No temporary mechanics were scheduled for training during the work stoppage.

### **D. Contracted Services**

Preliminary planning for a work stoppage assumed the sub-contracting of some MTA bus lines to private carriers and municipal operators (see Part IV). To achieve this goal, MTA issued a RFP to contract bus service in late June. The pre-bid conference was held on July 2.

At the pre-bid conference potential bidders were concerned with the actual start date. It was necessary, therefore, to have clauses in the contracts that addressed start-up, training, and mobilization costs, regardless of the start date. The tentative duration of the work was also of some concern to interested carriers.

Ultimately, two companies, Laidlaw Transit Services and Mayflower Contract Services, Inc. agreed to operate school buses on the majority of lines identified by MTA. Laidlaw Transit Services was given 15 lines to operate and Mayflower Contract Services was to operate service on eight lines. None of the municipal carriers in the region had the resources available to operate both their own service and MTA contingency service. By mid-July, private operators were prepared to deliver contingency service.

#### **E. Schedule Materials**

During the final weeks leading up to the eventual work stoppage, Scheduling and Operations Planning Department non-represented staff developed temporary schedules for all bus lines to be operated either by the MTA or by private carriers. Staff also compiled a document containing schedules, maps, route sheets (and work runs for MTA-operated lines). The "LACMTA Strike Contingency Service" document, a copy of which is contained in a separate Appendix to this report, was issued on July 14, 1994. This compilation of schedules and routes proved to be a valuable reference for both MTA and non-MTA staff involved in service-delivery.

Rail schedules for the Metro Blue and Red Lines were prepared separately by non-represented staff within the Special Projects Unit of the Scheduling and Operations Planning Department.

#### **F. Interim Administrative Policies**

The contingency plans developed by the WSCPC required nearly 500 non-represented employees to operate and maintain a skeletal network of regional service. Additional staffing would be assigned in the event of a prolonged work stoppage. It was essential, therefore, that non-represented employees be available to perform their duties. To ensure this, interim administrative policies were developed. These policies are summarized as follows:

- All scheduled vacations were postponed. Hardship cases would be reviewed by executive officers on a case-by-case basis;
- All sick leave of eight hours or more would be paid upon receipt of verification by a doctor;

- Alternate work schedules (9/80, 4/10, etc.) were suspended;
- Overtime would be paid in accordance with FLSA regulations. Non-exempt employees would be paid time-and-a-half for all overtime worked, while exempt employees reassigned to strike duties would receive straight time;
- Employee pay rates would be the higher of either the employee's regular position, or the vacated position being temporarily filled;
- Personnel reassigned to alternate work sites would be reimbursed for round-trip mileage;
- Staff could use vacation time to observe religious holidays.

These interim policies were designed to also apply to any represented employees who crossed picket lines to report to work.

#### **G. Communications**

As part of the pre-strike planning process, a series of briefings were conducted for MTA staff working at the 425 S. Main Street Building, the 818 W. 7th Street Building, and the Central Maintenance Facility (Location 30). These staff briefings were to update employees on the progress of negotiations and to determine potential positions needed in the event of a strike.


On July 6, 1994, the unions announced a strike date of July 18. Shortly after the unions' announcement, advertisements were placed in major Los Angeles area newspapers explaining the MTA's bargaining position. Immediately prior to the announced strike date, Marketing personnel issued notices to the public at major transfer points, rail stations, senior citizen centers, community centers, etc., outlining the routing and frequency of bus and rail lines to be operated in the event of a work stoppage. Press releases were issued to the electronic media and major newspapers to inform the public of a possible strike. Preparations for a July 18 work stoppage were tentatively placed on hold when the three unions rescheduled their strike deadline to July 25.



Figure V-1 presents a time line that summarizes the MTA's strike contingency planning activities during the period April-July, 1994. Part VI of this case study describes several aspects of actual bus and rail operations during the nine-day work stoppage.

FIGURE V-1

1994 MTA WORK STOPPAGE PLANNING TIME LINE



## VI. TRANSIT OPERATIONS DURING THE NINE-DAY WORK STOPPAGE

---

### A. The Strike Begins

On Monday, July 25, 1994, the ATU, which had not reached a tentative agreement with MTA management, initiated a work stoppage. Although tentative agreements had been reached immediately prior to the strike deadline with the two other unions, the ATU picket lines were honored by both the UTU and TCU. In accordance with the "Service Continuation Contingency Plan" that had been developed during the preceding four months, the MTA responded to the strike by implementing skeletal, regional bus and rail service on the first day of the work stoppage. Four types of weekday transit services were immediately provided to MTA patrons: 1) MTA-operated bus service; 2) bus service operated by private carriers under contract to MTA Operations; and 3) MTA-operated rail service on the Metro Blue Line (light rail) and 4) MTA-operated rail service on the Metro Red Line (heavy rail). In addition to weekday transit service, the MTA operated a limited amount of bus and rail service on Saturday, July 30 and Sunday, July 31.

Several steps were taken to ensure that the planned transit service would be in place at the outset of the work stoppage. First, all non-represented MTA personnel with strike-related support responsibilities were advised on Friday, July 22, that they should report to their pre-assigned work locations on Monday, July 25. Second, non-represented replacement bus and rail operators with sign-ons between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. were required to report to their assigned operating divisions by 4:30 a.m. Third, supervisory personnel in the Maintenance Departments at affected operating divisions reported early Monday morning to ensure that the required complement of buses were available for the Monday morning rollout.

Private carriers (Laidlaw and Mayflower) were also placed on standby on Friday, July 22, for a possible work stoppage on Monday, July 25. When a strike was called at 12:01 a.m. on Monday, July 25, the two carriers were notified to begin service at 6:00 a.m. that morning.

## **B. Temporary Special Fares**

During the work stoppage, a simplified fare structure was implemented on transit lines operated by the MTA. Fares were temporarily set at 50 cents per ride for all MTA bus lines as well as the Metro Blue Line. The fare on the Metro Red Line remained at 25 cents per ride. Unlike normal operations, transfers were not issued. Patrons who had purchased July passes could use their pass as a valid fare medium for rides on buses and rail lines for the period July 25-July 31. A small subset of patrons also used discounted tokens (90 cents per token versus the regular \$1.10 fare) to pay for rides.

The school buses that were operated by Laidlaw and Mayflower did not have fareboxes. MTA's Maintenance Department estimated that it would require one week to outfit approximately 230 school buses with fareboxes. Therefore, it was agreed that no fare would be charged to passengers using these services during the first week of the strike. An inspection of these buses later identified problems such as a lack of space to install fareboxes and the need to drill holes in the floor to secure them. Because of the problems associated with farebox installation, the fare policy was later amended so that no fare would be charged on school buses for the duration of the work stoppage.

The decision to not charge fares on lines operated by private carriers was also intended to offset some of the inconvenience that would likely be incurred by MTA patrons during the strike. These patrons would not only have to ride non-conventional buses but also endure much wider headways than is normally the case.

## **C. Weekday Bus and Rail Service**

### ***MTA-Operated Bus Service***

Preliminary contingency service plans called for the MTA to operate weekday service on five key bus lines between the hours of 6:00a.m. - 6:00p.m. In actuality, staff was able to increase the number of bus lines to seven throughout the strike. As discussed in Section IV above, routing was simplified on several of the bus lines operated by the MTA. For example, on the

"parent" Line 20 (Wilshire Boulevard), which normally has three different "local branch" lines in addition to two limited-stop services, only the "local branch" Line 21 operated during the work stoppage. Moreover, to maximize service frequency, Line 21 terminated at the Westlake Metro Red Line Station--approximately 1.5 miles east of Downtown Los Angeles as opposed to terminating in the Los Angeles Central Business District (LACBD). To minimize headway variability, all limited-stop service was discontinued during the work stoppage. Appendix A includes a map that shows the geographic coverage provided by the seven MTA-operated bus routes.

Table VI-1 shows, among other things, the scheduled number of buses on each line, the key areas served by the line, the scheduled number of one-way trips, and the number of bus hours operated on each line during the work stoppage. By 8:00a.m. on July 25, (i.e., the first day of the strike), approximately 96% of the scheduled service on the seven target lines was in operation. By noon, 100% of the scheduled buses were operating on their designated routes. This remarkable accomplishment reflects the dedication and resolve of non-represented employees to successfully operate service during the strike.

Throughout the work stoppage, the MTA operated an average of 131 buses per weekday. The count was taken at 11:00a.m., which represented the equipment-related peak on several lines during the strike; under normal conditions the MTA operates approximately 1,900 weekday buses during the 6:00a.m.-9:00a.m. peak. Taken together, the 131 buses provided more than 1,200 one-way trips daily, or about 1,400 hours of revenue service, per weekday, to MTA patrons. During the entire work stoppage, MTA Operations delivered a total of 9,800 hours of weekday revenue service. Average scheduled headways on the seven bus lines operated by the MTA varied from six minutes on Line 21 (Wilshire Boulevard) to 15 minutes on Lines 180, 251, and 560 (see Table VI-1).

**TABLE VI-1**  
**MTA-OPERATED WEEKDAY BUS SERVICE STATISTICS**  
**(6:00AM - 6:00PM)\***

Line	Key Service Areas	No. of Revenue Hours (Daily)	No. of One-Way Trips (Daily)	No. of Work Runs (Daily)	No. of Buses In Service (11:00a.m.)	Average Headway (Minutes)
21	U.C.L.A. Beverly Hills Wilshire Corridor Westlake/MacArthur Park	301.5	242	37	31	6
30/31	Downtown Los Angeles Boyle Heights East Los Angeles West Los Angeles	174.0	296	20	15	10
45	El Sereno Lincoln Heights Downtown Los Angeles South-Central Los Angeles	232.9	154	28	21	10
180	Hollywood Glendale Eagle Rock Pasadena	142.5	104	22	15	15
204	Hollywood Vermont Ave. Corridor U.S.C. South-Central Los Angeles	246.4	192	31	25	8
251	Huntington Park Vernon Boyle Heights Pasadena	124.8	110	13	10	15
560	Pacoima Van Nuys Sherman Oaks Westwood	177.9	108	21	14	15
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,400.0</b>	<b>1,206</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>—</b>

\* Based on scheduled service; actual service levels varied slightly on certain days.

NOTES: (1) Line 21 service terminated at Westlake/MacArthur Station.  
(2) Line 30/31 operated two separate daily work schedules for the first week;  
The work schedules were combined for weekend and daily service beginning July 30, 1994.

### ***Bus Service Provided by Private Carriers***

The contractual agreement between MTA and the two private carriers provided that both carriers would operate school buses on their assigned routes between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Laidlaw was scheduled to operate 158 buses on 15 lines, while Mayflower was scheduled to operate 73 buses on 8 lines. Due to shortages in manpower both carriers were unable to provide the full number of scheduled buses. Laidlaw averaged approximately 130 buses daily, and Mayflower averaged approximately 70 buses daily for the duration of the work stoppage.

By the end of the first week, several other private carriers contracted with MTA Operations to provide bus service. On Friday, July 29, Mark IV began service on Lines 130 (Artesia Boulevard) and 232 (Long Beach-LAX), and Santa Barbara Transportation began service on Lines 90 (L.A.-Sunland-Slymar) and 234 (Sepulveda Boulevard-Magnolia Boulevard-Glendale). On Monday, August 1, Roesch began operation of Lines 70 (Garvey Avenue) and 78 (L.A.-Alhambra-Arcadia). Together, these three carriers averaged approximately 36 buses in daily service.

Table VI-2 and Figure VI-1 show the relative number of revenue hours operated during the strike by: 1) MTA Operations (bus and rail combined); 2) Laidlaw; 3) Mayflower; and 4) all other private carriers. Appendix A includes a map that shows the geographic coverage provided by the 29 supplemental routes operated by the five private carriers.

### ***Blue Line Rail Service***

Table VI-3 shows the weekday service that was operated on the Metro Blue Line during the work stoppage. As can be seen, 11 two-car trains were operated on the Blue Line during the first four days of the strike. To increase the frequency of Metro Blue Line service, trains travelling south towards Long Beach were terminated at the Willow Station located approximately 2.5 miles north of Downtown Long Beach. During normal operations, nearly all Blue Line trains travel the full length of the 21.7 mile route (i.e., from the LACBD to Downtown Long Beach). Passengers desiring to continue to Downtown Long Beach during the strike were able to access Long Beach Transit service from Willow Station and travel south on Long Beach Boulevard.

On the fifth day of the strike (Friday, July 29), an additional train was operated on the Blue Line during the p.m. peak in response to increased ridership demand at the Metro Center Station in Downtown Los Angeles. On the last two weekdays of the strike (August 1 and 2), a total of 12

TABLE VI-2

**TOTAL HOURS OF SERVICE PROVIDED DURING  
JULY 25 - AUGUST 2, 1994 STRIKE, BY CARRIER**

Operator/Carrier	No. of Lines Operated	Total Hours of Service Provided
MTA (Bus and Rail)	9	11,688
Laidlaw Transit Services	15	8,316
Mayflower Contract Services	8	6,000
Santa Barbara Transportation	2	449
Mark IV	2	391
Roesch Lines, Inc.	2	174
<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>27,018</b>

NOTE: MTA's and Mark IV's hours include in-service and layover time only; all other private carriers' hours include preparation time, deadhead, in-service and layover time.



FIGURE VI-1




TABLE VI-3

MTA-OPERATED WEEKDAY RAIL SERVICE STATISTICS  
(6:00AM - 6:00PM)\*

Line	Key Service Areas	No. of Revenue Hours (daily)	No. of One-Way Trips (daily)	No. of Work Runs (daily)	No. of Trains (daily)	Average Headway (minutes)
Metro Blue Line	Downtown Long Beach - Downtown Los Angeles	118.7	122	13	11	10
Metro Red Line	Westlake/MacArthur Park - Downtown Los Angeles	24.6	148	5	2	10
Total		143.3	270	18	13	--

\* The numbers shown reflect scheduled work runs on July 25, 1994 (first day of strike). The actual number of revenue hours, one-way trips, work runs, etc. increased slightly when service was added later in the week. See Appendix C for a day-by-day breakdown of revenue hours on the Metro Blue and Red Lines during the nine-day strike.

NOTES: (1) For Metro Blue Line service, one extra train was allocated in case of a breakdown.

(2) On Friday, July 29, an additional trip was added on the Blue Line to augment pm-peak service; on August 1-2, 1994, an additional train was added on the Blue Line.

(3) On July 29 and August 1-2, 1994, an additional round trip was added on the Red Line to extend pm-peak service.

two-car trains operated on the Metro Blue Line. For the seven weekdays, taken together, the MTA operated 840 revenue hours of light-rail service. Owing largely to the experience of the Rail TOS, the Metro Blue Line had consistently high on-time performance throughout the duration of the strike.

### ***Red Line Rail Service***

Table VI-3 also shows weekday service statistics for the Metro Red Line. During the strike, the MTA operated two two-car heavy rail trains on the 4.4 mile route. As was the case with the Blue Line, Red Line service was enhanced slightly during the last three days of the work stoppage in response to heavy passenger demand. For the seven weekdays, taken together, the MTA operated 176 revenue hours of service on the Metro Red Line rail system.

### **D. Weekend Bus and Rail Service**

On Friday, July 29, a decision was made by MTA management to operate limited bus and rail service on Saturday and Sunday, July 30 and 31. Unlike weekday service, where contingency schedules and personnel assignments were determined well in advance of the actual union work stoppage, specific transit schedules and personnel assignments were not in place for weekend bus and rail service. Once the decision was made to operate weekend service, staff in the Scheduling and Operations Planning Department, along with staff from the Transportation and Maintenance Departments, quickly developed a strategic implementation plan.

Four bus lines (Lines 21, 30/31, 45, and 204) were targeted for service. Despite the exceptionally short time frame, management's "can-do" attitude resulted in a combined total of 713 revenue hours of bus service being provided on Saturday and Sunday. Scheduled headways were 15 minutes on each of the four bus lines. Further, 43 TOS assigned as replacement bus operators were asked to provide weekend service after working long hours during the first five days of the strike. These individuals readily sacrificed their days off to ensure the delivery of service to the public. A total of 41 buses operated, per day, on Saturday and Sunday.

In addition to the weekend bus service, six Metro Blue Line trains operated 116 revenue hours and two Metro Red Line trains operated 38 revenue hours over the two-day period. Scheduled headways were 20 minutes for both rail lines. The weekend bus and rail service statistics are summarized in Table VI-4.

TABLE VI-4

**MTA-OPERATED WEEKEND BUS AND RAIL SERVICE STATISTICS  
(6:00AM - 6:00PM)**

Mode / Line	No. One-Way							
	Revenue Hours		Trips		No. Work Runs		Headway	
	Sat	Sun	Sat	Sun	Sat	Sun	Sat	Sun
<b>Bus</b>								
21	86.3	86.3	71	71	11	11	15	15
30/31	76.0	76.0	71	71	9	9	15	15
45	101.8	101.8	72	72	12	12	15	15
204	92.5	92.5	72	72	11	11	15	15
<b>Total Bus:</b>	<b>356.6</b>	<b>356.6</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>43</b>	—	—
<b>Rail</b>								
Blue Line	57.9	57.9	58	58	6	6	20	20
Red Line	18.9	18.9	54	54	2	2	20	20
<b>Total Rail:</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	—	—
<b>Total Bus &amp; Rail:</b>	<b>433.4</b>	<b>433.4</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>51</b>	—	—

NOTES: (1) Line 30 and Line 31 work schedules were combined on July 30.

(2) Metro Blue Line operated from 7th /Flower to Willow Station during the strike.

## **E. Bus and Rail Patronage During the Strike**

Although it would have been desirable to closely monitor bus and rail ridership during the nine-day union work stoppage, no formal field data collection procedures were incorporated into the MTA's "Service Contingency Continuation Plan." Moreover, because the MTA does not currently have any automatic passenger-counting (APC) technologies, *ad hoc* data collection activities had to be implemented throughout the strike in an effort to measure daily patronage.

To estimate ridership on the seven MTA-operated bus lines, non-contract drivers (or, where available, MTA non-contract "ride alongs") were asked to tally the number of persons carried on a trip-by-trip basis. Although there were typically a few bus runs that were not accounted for each day, for the most part, the operators and/or ride alongs complied with this request.

Staff from the Transportation and Scheduling and Operations Planning Departments regularly monitored passenger loads at key stations in an effort to assess ridership on the Metro Blue Line and the Metro Red Line. These counts were then factored to estimate total rail system ridership.

Unfortunately, for the lines operated by private carriers, daily passenger estimates were sporadic, and hence, largely unreliable. For the purposes of this case study, ridership on the lines operated by private carriers was estimated by: first, assuming that total daily boardings were roughly equivalent to the total number of seats available each day; then, assuming approximately 50 seats per one-way trip. Staff's initial estimate was that the private operators carried about 72,000 patrons daily.

Staff then adjusted the initial estimate slightly (to 75,000 per day) to reflect some amount of passenger turnover along the route of the line. This minor adjustment seemed reasonable because under normal operating conditions, total boardings for the system is approximately 2.5 times the number of available seats (due to standees and passenger turnover during each trip). Because of the lack of actual passenger data on the lines operated by private carriers, the estimated boardings figures should be used cautiously.

Table VI-5 shows the estimated weekday ridership on the seven bus lines and two rail lines operated by the MTA during the nine-day work stoppage. Table VI-6 shows the patronage during the strike on these lines as a percentage of normal patronage. Table VI-7 shows the same information for weekend service operated by the MTA.

Below are some highlights concerning bus and rail ridership during strike.

- Weekday ridership on most MTA-operated bus lines increased steadily during the work stoppage (see Figure VI-2). On the first day of the strike ridership on the seven lines operated by the MTA totaled 114,000. By the final day of the strike, ridership had reached 152,000.
- Approximately 38,000 patrons used the Metro Blue Line on the first day of the strike, which is very close to the number carried, per day, during normal operations. Consistent with what occurred on MTA-operated buses, ridership on the Metro Blue Line significantly increased by the ninth and final day of strike (the estimated number of boardings on Tuesday, August 2, was 57,000).
- The most dramatic increase in patronage occurred on the Metro Red Line where ridership more than doubled from the first day of the strike to the final day (13,000 boardings to 27,000). The 27,000 boardings that occurred on the final day of the strike, exceeded by about 10,000 the number of boardings that occur on a typical weekday during normal operations.
- Weekend ridership on MTA-operated bus lines was estimated at 32,000 boardings on Saturday and 29,000 boardings on Sunday. An estimated 13,000 light rail boardings and 7,000 heavy rail boardings occurred on each of the two days.
- For the nine-day work stoppage, MTA non-contract personnel, along with various private service providers, handled more than two million passenger boardings.

In sum, weekday ridership on the bus and rail lines operated by the MTA during the nine-day work stoppage continued to grow on a daily basis as passengers became increasingly confident in the MTA's resolve to operate scheduled service on key routes (see Figure VI-2). By any measure, ridership during the work stoppage was quite substantial, relative to the level of service operated.

TABLE VI-5  
**ESTIMATED WEEKDAY PASSENGER BOARDINGS**  
**(ALL BUS AND RAIL LINES)**

Operator/Mode	Date							Total
	(mon) 7/25	(tues) 7/26	(wed) 7/27	(thu) 7/28	(fri) 7/29	(mon) 8/1	(tues) 8/2	
MTA Bus (7 lines):	114,000	113,200	122,100	123,500	134,000	147,100	152,400	906,300
Contracted Bus* (29 lines):	75,000	75,000	75,000	75,000	78,000	80,000	80,000	538,000
MTA Rail (2 Lines):	51,000	66,000	71,000	74,000	79,000	81,000	84,000	506,000
<b>Total:</b>	<b>240,000</b>	<b>254,200</b>	<b>268,100</b>	<b>272,500</b>	<b>293,000</b>	<b>308,100</b>	<b>316,400</b>	<b>1,950,300</b>

\* Boardings for MTA bus and rail service are based, in large part, on point-check data and on-board staff observations. Actual passenger counts are not available for contracted service. Estimates are largely based, therefore, on the number trips, seating capacity, etc. Contracted carriers include Laidlaw, Mayflower, Santa Barbara, Mark IV and Roesch.

TABLE VI-6  
**PATRONAGE ON MTA-OPERATED LINES DURING STRIKE AS A  
 PERCENTAGE OF NORMAL WEEKDAY BOARDINGS**

Service Type	Non-Strike Av. Daily Boardings	Date							
		7/25	7/26	7/27	7/28	7/29	8/1	8/2	Aver.
MTA Bus (7 lines):	206,615	55%	55%	59%	60%	65%	71%	74%	63%
Metro Blue Line:	35,600	107%	135%	140%	146%	152%	155%	160%	142%
Metro Red Line:	16,400	79%	110%	128%	134%	152%	159%	165%	132%

- Notes: (1) MTA bus lines include Lines 21, 30/31, 45, 180, 204, 251, and 560.  
 (2) Table does not include bus lines operated by private carriers.  
 (3) Average daily boardings are from checking database.




TABLE VI-7

**ESTIMATED WEEKEND PASSENGER BOARDINGS ON MTA-OPERATED  
BUS AND RAIL LINES**

Service Type	Saturday 7/30			Sunday 7/31		
	Est. Boardings	Non-Strike Boardings	Pct. of Normal	Est. Boardings	Non-Strike Boardings	Pct. of Normal
MTA Bus (4 lines)	32,200	116,000	28%	29,200	80,100	36%
Metro Blue Line	13,000	28,500	46%	13,000	22,800	57%
Metro Red Line	7,000	8,900	79%	7,000	7,000	100%
<b>Total Boardings:</b>	<b>52,200</b>	<b>153,400</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>49,200</b>	<b>109,900</b>	<b>45%</b>

- NOTES: (1) Non-strike boardings are estimates based on MTA riding checks.  
 (2) MTA bus lines are Lines 21, 30/31, 45, and 204. See Appendix C for line-level information.  
 (3) Private carriers did not operate service on either Saturday or Sunday during the strike.

FIGURE VI-2



## VII. POST-STRIKE RECOVERY

---

Throughout the work stoppage, negotiations continued between MTA management and ATU union representatives. On the morning of August 2, 1994, the MTA and ATU reached a tentative agreement on a three-year labor contract. The agreement was ratified by ATU membership later that night.

### A. Resumption of Service

MTA management estimated that it would take approximately 72 hours after the end of the work stoppage for the bus and rail systems to become fully operational. On Wednesday, August 3, only hours after final ratification of the labor agreement, MTA Operations provided approximately 81% of scheduled service. The amount of scheduled service provided increased to 98% on the morning of Thursday, August 4. By the morning of Friday, August 5, a full 99% of scheduled service actually operated.

### B. Return of Personnel to Regular Positions

Hundreds of non-represented employees were reassigned to fill contract positions during the strike. Duties included operating buses, riding along with reassigned operators, cleaning and fueling buses, bus maintenance, and assisting with security. More often than not, these employees routinely worked well over eight hours a day. Several employees worked 10-13 hours a day--including the weekend. As might be expected, most reassigned employees were extremely fatigued from the stress and strain of maintaining service during the work stoppage. Nonetheless, these same employees reported to their regular assignments on Wednesday, August 3, to begin the process of returning the MTA to normal operations.

Many non-represented employees who remained in their regular positions during the strike also routinely worked in excess of eight hours a day. Not only did they have to work on their own assignments, they also had to fill in for their reassigned co-workers. Moreover, many of these individuals had to handle various strike-related tasks, as the need arose. Like their reassigned counterparts, these employees also reported to work on August 3, in an effort to restore service as quickly as possible.

Contract employees (bus and train operators, mechanics, schedule makers, telephone

information operators, clerks, etc.) who had been on strike, also returned to work in large numbers on August 3. Although these employees may have been motivated to return so quickly, in part, because they did not receive their normal pay during the strike, they reported to work fully prepared and committed to perform all tasks necessary to restore transit service to the public.

### **C. Fare Policy**

Upon the conclusion of the work stoppage, base fares on MTA bus and rail service remained at \$0.50 (with the exception of the Metro Red Line, which regularly charged a base fare of \$0.25). This policy was instituted both as a gesture of goodwill to the public, and because service would take several days to return to normal. The regular base fare of \$1.10 was reinstated on Monday, August 8.

### **D. Private Contractors**

The contracts under which private contractors operated stipulated that the contractors' services would be discontinued when the work stoppage ended. On the evening of Tuesday, August 2, after ATU members ratified their labor agreement with the MTA, the five private contractors (Laidlaw Transit Services, Mayflower Contract Services, Mark IV, Roesch Lines, Inc., and Santa Barbara Transportation) were notified by the MTA that their services would not be required for Wednesday, August 3.

Private contractors were instructed to compile the number of hours operated under their contracts during the work stoppage and to submit their bills to the MTA for payment. The services rendered by these private contractors throughout the strike were greatly appreciated by the MTA and the public.

### **E. Security**

MTA Transit Police and Security Guards provided an increased level of 24-hour security to all MTA facilities during the work stoppage. Once the work stoppage concluded, Transit Police was able to begin the process of returning their officers to their regular assignments. By Friday, August 5, all MTA Officers and Security Guards had been returned to their assignments.

The Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and other

local law enforcement jurisdictions provided assistance with security for transit operations during the strike. By August 3, these agencies were able to return to normal operations.

During the strike, several private security guards were hired by MTA to assist in securing certain MTA facilities. These guards were released from duty when the work stoppage had ended.

#### **F. Interim Administrative Policies**

As outlined in Section V, the MTA instituted interim administrative policies to be followed immediately prior to, and during, the work stoppage. These policies governed areas such as employee vacations, sick leave, alternate work schedules, and overtime. At the conclusion of the work stoppage, individual departments were allowed to return to regular administrative policies at their discretion. By the end of August, all departments had returned to regular administrative policies, allowing employees to resume alternate work schedules, and to begin scheduling vacations.

#### **G. Communication to the Public**

Throughout Tuesday, August 2, local television stations, radio stations, and newspapers reported that a tentative agreement had been reached between the MTA and ATU. Local television carried live updates on the ATU ratification meeting held at the Los Angeles Convention Center on the evening of August 2, and informed the public that the work stoppage was over. The media also informed the public that MTA service would resume on Wednesday, August 3, but that the full contingent of scheduled buses could not be deployed until the end of the week.

#### **H. Temporary Employees**

By the end of the strike, 37 temporary employees had been hired and trained by MTA as bus operators, telephone operators and service attendants. These temporary employees were released from employment on Wednesday, August 3. Although these individuals did not work at MTA for a long period of time, the opportunity to receive valuable training and work experience in a variety of positions could aid them in securing future employment.

## VIII. STRIKE COST ANALYSIS

---

### A. Labor, Material, and Contracts

MTA expended a total of \$3.4 million for all service delivery labor, material (supplies), and contracts during the nine-day work stoppage. Table VIII-1 below shows those costs by category.

TABLE VIII-1

#### MTA STRIKE-RELATED COSTS, BY CATEGORY

Period	Labor	Material	Contracts	Total
Work Stoppage (9 days)	\$2,708,763	\$214,837	\$450,071	\$3,373,671


MTA Operations was able to normalize transit in the region within three days following ratification of all labor agreements (August 3 - 5, 1994). Approximately \$1,836,950 was expended by the Transportation Department for Bus and Train Operator labor costs, and approximately \$1,096,550 for wages and materials used by the Maintenance Department to prepare the entire bus fleet for a return to full service levels. The total cost of this recovery to Operations was \$2.9 million. By comparison, Transportation and Maintenance costs for a comparative three-day period were \$1,835,800 and \$840,500, respectively.

In reviewing Bus and Train Operator costs during the three-day recovery period with normal Operator costs, there is basically no difference in expenditures, however, a similar comparison of maintenance costs during the recovery period with normal maintenance costs revealed a notable difference. Maintenance costs during the recovery period were higher than costs during normal operations. (see Figure VIII-1).

FIGURE VIII-1

## RECOVERY COSTS VS. NORMAL COSTS

Vehicle Transportation and Maintenance



Most of the higher than usual maintenance costs during the recovery period can be directly attributable to deferred maintenance activity during the nine-day work stoppage. A cost analysis showed that, under normal operations, the ratio of labor-to-parts expenditures is approximately 2:1. However, during the recovery period, the ratio of labor-to-parts expenditures was closer to 2:3 (see Figure VIII-2).

Table VIII-2 shows the total value of supplies issued for: 1) the nine-day work stoppage; 2) the three-day recovery period; and 3) an average day. Comparing maintenance supply costs during normal operations to the other periods reveals that the cost of supplies was abnormally low during the work stoppage, and abnormally high during the recovery period. This suggests that only necessary safety items were replaced and/or repaired during the work stoppage. All other work was deferred until the mechanical work force was reestablished.

TABLE VIII-2

**COST OF MAINTENANCE MATERIAL, BY EXPENSE PERIOD**


Period	Total Value
<b>Work Stoppage:</b>	
Daily Average	\$23,871
<b>Recovery Period:</b>	
Day 1	\$227,743
Day 2	\$256,452
Day 3	\$130,621
<b>Normal Operations:</b>	
Daily Average	\$91,781




FIGURE VIII-2

## MAINTENANCE COST BREAKDOWN

### Recovery Period



### Comparative Period



## **B. Impact on MTA Revenues**

The MTA work stoppage had a significant effect on daily farebox revenues. A few days prior to the strike (specifically, Thursday, July 21) the MTA received approximately \$370,000 in bus farebox revenues, and \$12,000 in rail farebox revenues. These amounts are fairly typical. During the work stoppage, however, farebox revenues dropped notably—bus revenues averaged \$25,000 per weekday and rail revenues averaged \$8,000 per weekday (see Table VIII-3).

Weekend service also experienced a notable drop in farebox revenues. On the Saturday prior to the work stoppage (Saturday, July 23), the MTA received approximately \$260,000 from bus service, and \$12,000 from rail service. During the work stoppage, revenues collected on the four bus lines that operated on Saturday, July 30, totalled \$11,500. (Day-specific rail revenue data are not available because ticket vending machines were not emptied on Saturday, July 30).

Receipts for an average Sunday (July 24) are \$190,000 from bus service, and \$11,000 from rail service. During the work stoppage farebox revenue was \$5,000 and \$8,000, respectively.

Bus farebox revenues during the work stoppage plummeted to less than 5% of normal. The primary reasons for such a substantial reduction can be attributed to three major factors; 1) bus lines operated by private carriers charged no fare during the work stoppage, 2) only seven bus lines were operated by MTA which charged (reduced) fares, and 3) the amount of the base fare charged on those lines was \$0.50 (\$0.25 for elderly and disabled patrons), as opposed to the regular fare of \$1.10 (see Figure VIII-3).

Compared to bus service, rail farebox revenue experienced a relatively small reduction to approximately 67% of normal. There are specific reasons why rail farebox revenues remained fairly stable. First, the manpower provided by rail supervisors operating trains allowed the Metro Red and Blue Lines to operate at a frequency of approximately 10 minutes, quite similar to their regular peak frequencies of five and six minutes, respectively. This furnished the capacity to carry nearly the regular level of riders. Secondly, the regular fare on the Metro Red Line is \$0.25, which remained in effect during the work stoppage. Metro Blue Line fares were set at \$0.50 during this period (see Figure VIII-4).

TABLE VIII-3

**BUS AND RAIL FAREBOX REVENUES DURING WORK STOPPAGE  
(DAILY AND WEEKEND)**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Day</b>	<b>MTA Bus</b>	<b>MTA Rail</b>	<b>Total</b>
7/25/94	Monday	\$20,971	\$10,528	\$31,499
7/26/94	Tuesday	\$18,519	\$ 5,304	\$23,823
7/27/94	Wednesday	\$20,736	\$ 9,354	\$30,090
7/28/94	Thursday	\$20,810	\$ 7,127	\$27,937
7/29/94	Friday	\$18,603	\$ 8,216	\$26,819
7/30/94	Saturday	\$11,520	*	\$11,520
7/31/94	Sunday	\$ 5,416	\$ 8,479	\$13,895
8/01/94	Monday	\$39,496	\$ 7,830	\$47,326
8/02/94	Tuesday	\$37,046	\$ 8,930	\$45,976
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$193,117</b>	<b>\$65,768</b>	<b>\$258,885</b>

\* Ticket Vending Machines were not emptied on Saturday, July 30.

FIGURE VIII-3

# FAREBOX REVENUE RECEIVED DURING STRIKE

Weekdays (Bus Only)





FIGURE VIII-4

### FAREBOX REVENUE RECEIVED DURING STRIKE Weekdays (Rail Only)



On the first day of the work stoppage, farebox revenues were slightly higher than subsequent days. Possible reasons for this occurrence were that patrons were unaware that the base fare was reduced to \$0.50, and paid the full \$1.10 fare on the first day. This can be substantiated by the fact that currency receipts were higher than coin receipts on July 25 (\$17,700 to \$13,800), while the opposite was true during the remainder of the work stoppage as patrons began to pay the \$0.50 base fare.

Farebox revenues were also significantly higher on both Monday, August 1, and Tuesday, August 2, 1994. The most significant factor affecting farebox revenues on these days was the fact that no monthly discount passes were sold for the month of August, thereby requiring all patrons to pay a cash fare. This is supported by the fact coin receipts for those two days doubled the first week's average (average of \$33,000 for August 1 and 2, as opposed to an average of \$16,600 for the first week of the work stoppage). Also contributing to the farebox increase, to a lesser extent, was an approximate 23% increase in ridership on August 1 and 2 over the average for the first week of the strike.

#### **C. Training Costs**

Table VIII-4 shows the wages associated with the training of non-represented MTA employees to prepare for a work stoppage. Table VIII-5 shows the wages paid to temporary employees. Table VIII-6 shows the actual cost of providing instruction for non-represented MTA employees and temporary personnel, respectively. These figures should be used carefully since they do not reflect the wage savings that may have accrued to each employee's assigned department while the individual was in training.

#### **D. Cost to Maintain Enhanced Skills and Credentials**

As a result of completing a rigorous training course involving classroom work and on-street operation, 87 non-represented employees received a California Class B Passenger Endorsement driver's license, which allows them to operate buses and other commercial vehicles. After operating service during the work stoppage, most of these non-represented employees expressed a desire to maintain their Class B licenses. Based on this response, it was felt that it would be beneficial to investigate the possibility of having these persons maintain their licenses. If the licenses were maintained, then these individuals would be available for service in the event of future service delivery emergencies.

In the State of California, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) requires that commercial

vehicle drivers receive a minimum of eight hours of training annually (classroom, in-service or behind the wheel training). These hours are recorded on a DL 260 Form in the appropriate month and kept with the employees records until renewal.

During the last 12 months of certificate validity, the eight hours of training **must** consist of classroom instruction covering, but not limited to, current laws and regulations, defensive driving, accident prevention, emergency procedures, and passenger loading and unloading. Table VIII-7 outlines the cost of maintaining certificate validity.

TABLE VIII-4

**TRAINING COSTS FOR NON-REPRESENTED EMPLOYEES  
(WAGES DURING TRAINING)**

Position	# of Days	# of Employees	# of Hours Per Day	Total # of Hours	Average Wage*	Total Cost
Bus Operators (TOS)	2	107	8	1,712	\$27.00	\$46,224
Bus Operators (Non-TOS)	20	62	8	9,920	\$27.00	\$267,840
	20	47	8	7,520	\$27.00	\$203,040
Service Attendants	1	36	3	108	\$27.00	\$2,916
Equip. Records Spec. (ERS)	1	11	3	33	\$27.00	\$891
Tele. Info. Operators	1	49	6	294	\$27.00	\$7,938
	1	40	3	120	\$27.00	\$3,240
<b>TOTAL SALARY COSTS:</b>						<b>\$532,089</b>

\* Payroll estimates the average non-represented employee's wage to be \$27.00 per hour.



TABLE VIII-5

**TRAINING COSTS FOR TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES  
(WAGES DURING TRAINING)**

<b>Position</b>	<b># of Days</b>	<b># of Employees</b>	<b># of Hours Per Day</b>	<b>Total # of Hours</b>	<b>Average Wage</b>	<b>Total Cost</b>
Bus Operators (1)	8	21	8	1,344	\$9.23	\$12,405
Bus Operators (2)	5	2	8	80	\$9.23	\$738
Service Attendants	2	6	8	96	\$13.16	\$1,263
Tele. Info. Operators	3	8	3	72	\$10.66	\$768
<b>TOTAL SALARY COSTS:</b>						<b>\$15,174</b>

**TABLE VIII-6**  
**COST OF INSTRUCTION**  
**(NON-REPRESENTED AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES)**

Position	Total Hours	Average Wage	Total Cost
<b>Non-Represented Employees:</b>			
Bus Operator (TOS)	992	\$27.00	\$26,784
Bus Operator (Non-TOS)	12,160	\$27.00	\$328,320
Service Attend.\ERS	9	\$27.00	\$243
Service Attend.\ERS	9	*\$75.00	\$675
Tele. Info. Operator	48	\$27.00	\$1,296
		<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>\$357,318</b>
<b>Temporary Employees:</b>			
Bus Operator	528	\$27.00	\$14,256
Service Attend.\ERS	48	\$27.00	\$1,296
Service Attend.\ERS	3	*\$75.00	\$225
Tele. Info. Operator	3	\$27.00	\$81
		<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>\$15,858</b>
<b>Total Cost of Instruction:</b>			<b>\$373,176</b>

\* Safety consultant

NOTE: Payroll estimates the average non-represented employee's wage to be \$27.00 per hour.

TABLE VIII-7  
**COST TO MAINTAIN CLASS B DRIVER'S LICENSES  
 FOR FOUR YEARS**

Training Year	# of Employees	# of Hours Per Year (Employees)	Total # Per Year (Instructors)	*Cost (Employee Wages)	*Cost (Instruction)	Total Cost
First	87	696	48	\$18,792	\$1,296	\$20,088
Second	87	696	48	\$18,792	\$1,296	\$20,088
Third	87	696	48	\$18,792	\$1,296	\$20,088
Fourth (Renewal)	87	696	48	\$18,792	\$1,296	\$20,088
<b>Combined Four-Year Cost:</b>				<b>\$75,168</b>	<b>\$5,184</b>	<b>\$80,352</b>

\* Payroll estimates the average non-represented employee's wage to be \$27.00 per hour.

NOTE: These cost estimates assume that there will be three classes per year with 29 employees per class.

## **E. Accidents/Incidents**

MTA management was particularly sensitive to the possibility of a higher than usual number of accidents and incidents during the work stoppage. As previously noted, to minimize risk, all non-represented staff who were reassigned to other jobs received both occupational and safety training, as appropriate.

During the work stoppage, MTA buses were involved in 24 accidents. Additionally, one accident occurred on the Metro Blue Line. Specific details of the accidents are presented in Table VIII-8. Each accident is categorized as being either strike-related, possibly strike-related, or non-strike-related. As can be seen, the majority of the accidents seemed to be related in some way to the strike. Only 10 of the accidents were considered "non-strike-related." In addition to the accidents, there were two reported incidences of vandalism to employee autos as well as a non-injury shooting incident at the Pico Blue Line station.

According to Hertz Claims Management [HCM] (third-party administrator of the MTA's Workers' Compensation program), the 27 accidents and incidences resulted in 12 liability claims. The total amount incurred from these claims was \$69,750. "Non-strike-related" accidents and incidents accounted for six of the 12 liability claims (total cost \$52,250).

### ***Private Operators***

HCM received 16 incident reports for service contracted to the private operators during the work stoppage (15 from Laidlaw and one from Mayflower). As of October, 1994, no claims had been made on any of those incidents.

### ***Workers' Compensation Claims***

During the nine-day work stoppage, MTA employees filed a total of 10 Workers' Compensation claims. Four of the claims were for injuries received while the employees were working special strike duty assignments. The remainder were for accidents that occurred while employees were working their usual assignments. Out of a total of \$42,314 in compensation claims incurred during the work stoppage, \$24,386 in claims were due to the injuries received while on strike-duty assignments.

TABLE VIII-8

## MTA WORK STOPPAGE ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date	Division	Line	Description
<b>Strike-Related Accidents</b>			
7/25	3207	21	Striking employees disrupted operation.
7/25	3207	21	Striking employees commandeered bus.
7/26	3215	560	Sudden stop (vehicle) in front of bus by striking employee.
7/27	3215	560	Sudden stop (vehicle) in front of bus by striking employee.
<b>Possibly Strike-Related Accidents</b>			
7/25	3201	30	Brick thrown at bus.
7/25	3205	204	Individual broke both outside mirrors.
7/25	3205	204	Individual broke both outside mirrors.
7/25	3215	560	On board accident not otherwise classified.
7/26	3201	30	Injuries or property damage caused by other passengers.
7/26	3210	45	Beer bottle thrown at bus.
7/27	3201	30	Object thrown at bus. Injuries/Damage.
7/28	3210	45	Disturbances, ejections on vehicles, etc.
7/28	3215	180	Injuries or property damage caused by other passengers.
8/1	3215	180	Incidents not otherwise classified.
8/2	3207	21	Object thrown at bus. No injuries/damage.
<b>Non-Strike-Related Accidents</b>			
7/26	3201	31	Other vehicle involved with bus standing in zone.
7/26	3211	801	Blue Line train struck pedestrian.
7/28	3205	204	Rear end of bus hit vehicle.
7/28	3210	45	Collision at intersection - other vehicle from right.
7/30	3201	30	Other vehicle involved with bus standing in zone.
8/1	3201	30	Collision with stationary object.
8/1	3207	21	Rear end of other vehicle hit bus.
8/2	3207	21	Patron fell alighting rear door.
8/2	3215	560	On-board accident (not otherwise classified).
8/2	3215	560	Patron fell alighting rear door.

# IX. MTA'S TEAM EFFORT DURING THE WORK STOPPAGE

---

## A. Interdepartmental Participation

Providing a skeletal network of bus and rail service during the July 25-August 2, 1994 strike was made possible by the unified agency-wide commitment from MTA management and other non-represented staff to deliver multi-modal transit services to the public. On the first day of the strike, 98% of support non-represented personnel reported for duty. As previously noted, support staff came from nearly all departments within the MTA.

From the start of the strike, non-represented staff assigned to the various operating divisions seemed to adjust to their new responsibilities and do whatever was necessary to ensure management's strike-related objectives were met. From most accounts, temporarily assigned staff worked well with regular supervisory personnel at the divisions. During the work stoppage, it was not uncommon to have staff from Risk Management and Planning and Programming, for example, working alongside staff from the Transportation and Maintenance Departments. The fact that personnel from the entire agency were willing to work closely together in a cooperative manner contributed significantly to successful service delivery during the strike.

It should be noted that while performing their work assignments during a work stoppage proved to be difficult and highly stressful, especially for those assigned to contingency duties, MTA non-represented employees in all departments performed superbly in ensuring that some level of transit service was provided to the public. Examples of this commitment would be those bus operators who continued to board and discharge passengers after 6 p.m., while on their pull-in trips to their bus divisions after a long day's work, or those employees throughout the MTA who worked well beyond a normal eight-hour shift on many days prior to, during, and after the work stoppage.

## B. Represented Workers

While the overwhelming majority of represented employees joined their unions in striking against MTA, approximately 14 TCU, 13 UTU, and five ATU members crossed picket lines to continue working. These employees provided a great deal of assistance in areas such as bus

operations, maintenance, telephone information, and printing. Their dedication to providing the public with transit service was greatly appreciated by the MTA.

**C. Security**

Throughout the nine-day work stoppage, a premium was placed on ensuring that the transit system was safe for both its employees and the riding public. Providing adequate security during the strike involved the participation of several groups of MTA employees including Transit Police Officers, Security Guards, and non-represented personnel who provided 24-hour perimeter patrol service at the various operating divisions. Moreover, all MTA non-represented personnel were instructed to immediately report any strike-related problems they observed. In addition to MTA staff, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was responsible for handling labor dispute actions that occurred on City property.

**D. Support from Public Officials and MTA Executive Staff**

Successful implementation of the Work Stoppage Contingency Plan required the full and absolute support of the MTA Board of Directors, local political and administrative officials, and MTA Executive Staff. These officials supplied Committee members with support at each phase of planning and implementation. The Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles, Richard Riordan, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, and all other MTA Board members indicated their desire to provide some level of transit service in the event of a work stoppage, and gave strong approval to contingency plans developed by MTA staff.

In addition to elected officials, MTA Executive Staff was constantly briefed on the development and implementation of contingency plans. These executive officers and department heads provided relevant input, training, and manpower to the contingency operation. Their focus and commitment to provide all elements necessary for a successful implementation was vital to the effectiveness of the plan.

E. Employee Impacts

A major concern of employees prior to, and during the work stoppage was safety. Not only were non-represented employees asked to cross picket lines, but many of them would have to cross picket lines to perform jobs normally performed by striking workers. Employees were afraid of the possibility of violence by strikers.

Employees were also concerned about the location of their work stoppage reassignments. Although there was an attempt to assign employees as close to their homes as possible, some employees were asked to work long distances from home, on day or night shifts.

There was also a concern about the type of work employees would be asked to perform. Many employees were apprehensive about operating a 40 foot long transit bus. This apprehension was compounded by the fact that they might spend an entire day carrying 60 or more passengers. It should be noted that at the conclusion of the work stoppage the Instruction Department received high praise from trainees regarding the Instructors' ability to make everyone feel at ease in learning to operate a bus.

In many cases, employees worked long hours, sometimes 10-13 hours every day. As a result, employees were extremely tired. There were concerns among employees that they would not be able to maintain this type of work schedule. In the event that the work stoppage continued indefinitely, groups of temporary workers would have periodically replaced reassigned non-represented workers.

At the conclusion of the work stoppage, employees sensed that they had just been a part of a truly significant event--the continuation of transit service during a work stoppage. As a result, there was a profound sense of pride in having successfully accomplished something that seemed impossible to most observers.

On Wednesday, August 3, the day after the strike ended, employees returning to their regular jobs throughout the agency gathered in groups to share their experiences with their co-workers. Many employees gained a greater sense of respect for the effort that takes place every day to operate transit service. Employees could not contain their pride for having risen to the occasion and performing jobs they never imagined, or previously desired to do. To have overcome the stress and pressure of dealing with a very emotional situation, and perform effectively was very satisfying to all individuals involved.



During the contingency planning and implementation stages, the MTA was in the process of completing a difficult merger between the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCR TD) and the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC).

Furthermore several employees of the former SCR TD had been involved in work stoppages in 1973 and 1976; however, employees of the former LACTC, and recently hired MTA employees had little or no experience with a transit work stoppage, and had no idea what to expect in preparing for the operation of service.

In spite of the problems encountered during the merger process, and the uncertainty related to the work stoppage, the planning and implementation of the contingency plan had the unanticipated effect of uniting the recently merged employees under a common cause. All employees dedicated themselves as MTA employees to the provision of transit service under some of the most demanding circumstances imaginable.

## X. LESSONS LEARNED

---

The 1994 work stoppage provided the MTA with many important insights. The following sections summarize some of the key lessons learned through contingency planning and service implementation. This information should prove useful to future service continuation planning efforts and provide insight to other transit agencies considering similar contingency strike operations. Input was provided by various directors, managers, supervisors, and other non-contract employees.

### A. Pre-Strike Phase

#### *PLANNING*

- **A strong commitment from the highest levels of management is essential to developing and implementing successful transit operations during a work stoppage.** Because the MTA was thoroughly committed to having a viable service continuation plan in place in the event of a work stoppage, non-represented staff responded with a largely supportive and highly energized effort. Throughout the contingency planning process, top MTA management provided the resources necessary to ensure that contingency service operations efforts would be a success.
- **Involve as many department heads, managers, and other key personnel as possible in the planning process.** Having the right people to deal with issues as they arise enhances the planning process. Also, have a representative assigned from Administration-Management Services to handle the myriad of administrative tasks that arise.

#### *INTERNAL COMMUNICATION*

- **Department heads and managers should receive regular updates during the pre-strike planning process.** Even if some department heads and managers are not part of the formal planning committee, these individuals should be kept apprised of the contingency plan. This is especially important because of possible staff impacts.

- **Managers should be asked to provide evaluations concerning which of their staff members would be most suitable for the various contingency assignments.** By involving managers in this process, assignments that make best use of employee skills and abilities could be determined.
- **Management's strategy and rationale for possible personnel reassignments should be clearly articulated to staff.** Detailed specifics about job assignments (e.g., typical shift hours) should be thoroughly explained to potential reassignment candidates, especially if the effort is voluntary. During the 1994 strike, several people had very long commutes because they were assigned to operating divisions that were far from their homes. This should be minimized to whatever degree possible.
- **Contingency personnel should have the opportunity to express fears or concerns during the pre-strike phase without feeling that they're being viewed as "whining."** Despite occupational and safety training, several reassigned employees did not know what to expect in the event of an actual work stoppage. Some discussion of these concerns is healthy and important to maintain a team spirit and positive morale.
- **Prepare non-striking personnel for the possible verbal and mental abuse that may be directed towards them by individuals walking picket lines.** In several cases, non-striking MTA personnel were not prepared for the harassment tactics employed by picketers. A briefing concerning what to expect when crossing a picket line might include: 1) passage may be restricted for +/- 5 minutes; 2) only one vehicle may be allowed to pass through the gate at a time; 3) swearing, racial slurs, threats, and lewd gestures may occur; 4) touching of your vehicle may occur; and 5) a good strategy is to keep car windows rolled up, doors locked, and not respond to any taunting.

## **EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION**

- **It is important to keep the media and the riding public apprised of management's contract-related objectives and plans to operate contingency service.** For example, several news stories were written and reported on the training that was being provided to possible replacement operators. As a result, the riding public was able to see the LACMTA's commitment to providing safe, reliable contingency service during a work stoppage.

## **COST ACCOUNTING**

- **Establish multiple work-order numbers to track costs incurred before, during, and after a work stoppage.** During the 1994 work stoppage, the MTA established a single work order to track costs associated with the strike. It would have been more useful to establish more work-order numbers to track costs incurred during the work stoppage. For example, one work-order number could have been used to track the costs incurred by the Instruction Department to provide operator training to non-contract employees. A second work-order number could have been used to track non-contract employee wages during their training as operators. Yet another work order number could have been used to track the cost of "temporary" workers hired to temporarily replace striking employees, and so forth.

It is also very important to train all staff to properly charge time to the appropriate work orders throughout the process.

## **ROUTES AND SCHEDULES**

- **The contingency plan for transit operations during a strike should provide coverage to all sectors within the regular service area.** Toward this end, duplicate service (i.e., parallel service within a half-mile) should be minimized and the use of municipal or other contracted service should be maximized. Service Planning should be consulted early in the process to develop the contingency network and build schedules.

## **CONTRACTED SERVICES**

- **Use a comprehensive approach to procuring contracted services.** This is best accomplished by receiving bids from municipal and private carriers for specific services identified by Operations Planning. Proposals should also be solicited from other available sources for other types of service within the MTA service area.
- **Develop a clear, comprehensive RFP for contracted services to maximize responses from private and municipal carriers.** Among the key issues that need to be addressed are: 1) rate per service hour; 2) administrative and planning fees; 3) mobilization costs; 4) standby rates (in case contractors are told to prepare to operate and a strike does not occur on the predicted date); 5) insurance and workers compensation liabilities; 6) security; 7) on-street supervision; 8) training of operators; and 9) orientation to the plan.

### **B. Strike Phase**

#### **SECURITY**

- **Provide non-represented staff with information concerning the role of Transit Police during a strike.** During the 1994 work stoppage, many non-striking workers (mostly non-contract) who crossed picket lines were discouraged by the apparent lack of response by the LACMTA Transit Police Department. As it were, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has exclusive jurisdiction of any labor-dispute activities that transpired on city property (e.g., all sidewalks). Employees who were detained by striking personnel outside of MTA facilities expected the Transit Police to intervene when, in fact, they were within the jurisdiction of the LAPD. This needs to be articulated to non-striking staff prior to a work stoppage. A written policy might be established outlining the Transit Police Department's and LAPD's roles during any future labor dispute.
- **Hire private services for facility security (namely, perimeter patrols) instead of using reassigned non-contract employees.** Although most MTA staff assigned to security-related responsibilities performed well, the monitoring and reporting process could be standardized by using private services.

## **OPERATOR ASSIGNMENTS**

- **Provide special consideration for replacement operators to minimize fatigue and stress during a strike.** For example, give split assignments to experienced drivers/TOSs and shorter straight assignments to new drivers to reduce the demand on the latter. Replacement operators should also be given additional recovery time during a work stoppage to allow for sufficient breaks and to enable them to recover the schedule.

## **CONTRACTED SERVICE**

- **Integrate MTA operations with private carrier operations to improve service quality during a work stoppage.** For various reasons, some of the service operated by private carriers was, from an operational standpoint, unreliable. Suggestions to make contracted service more reliable and effective in the future include: 1) having daily joint meetings with the concerned private operators, Operations staff, and other appropriate personnel to determine the number of revenue vehicles operating on each line, identifying schedule problems, etc.; 2) having integrated on-street supervision (i.e., MTA supervision working closely with private carrier supervision) to achieve better service management and reliability; and 3) taking advantage of contractor personnel located in the Bus Operations Command Center to quickly disseminate information, requests, etc. to private carrier managers.
- **Assign a Contracts Department representative to work with contracted private and municipal carriers throughout the work stoppage.** This will facilitate billing as well as address questions that may arise concerning contractual obligations.

## **SCHEDULES AND ROUTES**

- **Operate pull-in buses in service along the regular route.** Because service is at a premium during a strike, an attempt should be made to operate as many trips as possible with existing resources. Operating pull-in buses in revenue service provides additional evening service at no additional cost. Pull-in buses can be short-lined at a location near the pull-in division.

## **EMPLOYEE "RIDE ALONGS"**

- **Greater use of reassigned employees as "ride alongs" should be considered when planning for future work stoppages.** During the 1994 work stoppage, several non-contract employees were assigned to ride with replacement operators. These "ride alongs" not only provided important support for non-contract replacement operators but also provided valuable on-board customer service. Among the suggestions concerning "ride alongs" were: 1) they should be provided with a contingency strike-plan book that contains all routes and schedules--this information would prove useful when answering route and schedule questions; 2) they should routinely provide customers fare-information handouts to, among other things, explain the refund policy for monthly passes and to identify locations where passes can be purchased; and 3) as no "ride alongs" were assigned to the rail system, future planning should provide "ride alongs" on each train operated.
- **Consult with replacement operators regarding "ride alongs"**  
During the 1994 work stoppage, there were insufficient ride-along personnel to accompany all buses operated. Although certain operators felt confident enough to operate without a "ride along", replacement operators were not consulted regarding their individual needs. As a result, some operators who really wanted a "ride along" had to do without, while other operators were willing to volunteer their assigned "ride alongs" to those who needed them.

## **BUS FARES**

- **Reduced fares during a work stoppage can have an ameliorative affect on the attitude of the riding public** The temporary fifty-cent bus fare had a very positive affect on MTA passengers. Given the inconvenience they were experiencing, the special fare was appreciated. Moreover, having a simplified fare structure was less confusing for the replacement operators.
- **Temporary fare policies should be unambiguous and articulated to all Operations personnel during a strike; any changes in the fare structure during the strike should be disseminated in a comprehensive and timely manner.** Because the 1994 strike occurred over portions of two months (July and August) there was considerable confusion about the availability and validity of August monthly passes. To the extent possible, all fare-related contingencies should be thoroughly addressed prior to any work stoppage and fare policies provided to affected staff at the start of the strike.

## **COMMUNICATIONS**

- **Communications capability is crucial for operators and "ride alongs" as well as staff assigned to perimeter patrol.** If two-way radios do not function properly, then cellular phones should be provided.
- **Timely official reports from top management can enhance employee morale during a work stoppage.** Reports apprising staff of such things as: 1) the details of a restraining order; 2) whether and when talks were scheduled; 3) what is or is not acceptable strike behavior; and 4) how to report incidents, can be helpful. Also, a telephone hotline informing non-striking staff of whether they should report to their contingency assignments or return to regular duty might be useful.



## **EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE**

- **Each operating division should have a "shop toolbox" that is completely stocked with required tools during a strike.** The lack of required tools during the 1994 strike was a key concern of Bus Maintenance staff. Highly technical maintenance procedures were difficult to accomplish at some divisions.
- **Maintaining the inactive fleet is important during a work stoppage to minimize problems with the resumption of service when the strike ends.** To the extent possible, sufficient staff should be made available to perform routine maintenance service on buses not included in the daily rollout (e.g., daily start-up of revenue equipment).
- **The effectiveness of reassigned non-contract workers who do not have Class B licenses can be enhanced by training them to operate vehicles within the bus yard.** During the 1994 strike, some assigned staff could not move buses in the yard for routine maintenance purposes (e.g., from the washer to the fueling area), which partially offset their effectiveness.

## **RESTRAINING ORDER**

- **Obtain a temporary restraining order early in the work-stoppage process.** Once the restraining order was issued and served, picketers seemed to respect the rights of non-represented workers (e.g., picketers generally adhered to the five-minute rule).

### **C. Post-Strike Phase**

## **COST ACCOUNTING**

- **Bills submitted by private carriers under contract to MTA to provide contingency service should be in the same format, regardless of the carrier.** Additional work order numbers should be used to track the costs of returning to normal service following the conclusion of a strike. These numbers should be separated by labor, supplies, and contracts so that costs can be accurately captured.

## **CONTINGENCY PLAN**

- **It is important to have a standing written contingency plan in the event of a work stoppage.** Perhaps the key to the success experienced by MTA management during 1994 contract negotiations was the existence of a viable, phased-in, written plan to continue service in the event of a work stoppage. It is the intent of the MTA to maintain a standing written contingency plan.

## **XI. CONCLUSION**

---

The successful development and implementation of the MTA's Service Continuation Contingency Plan proved that it is possible for a major transit agency to provide both bus and rail service to the public even during a work stoppage by its drivers, mechanics, and clerks. The plan carried out by the MTA demonstrated the agency's resolve to provide an ever-increasing level of safe and reliable service to the riding public.

As might be expected, an extraordinary amount of time and effort was devoted to the planning and implementation of this operation. The overwhelming majority of MTA employees worked very long hours in various assignments on weekdays and weekends with few, if any, days off. Many employees were trained to perform duties they never conceived of performing, or particularly desired to perform. Employees were subjected to a great deal of hostility and verbal abuse from striking union members who hoped to erode their resolve. The end result of these efforts by the dedicated employees of the MTA can be found in the success of the work stoppage contingency operation.

In addition, planning and implementation of the Service Continuation Contingency Plan had the unanticipated effect of uniting the recently merged former employees of the SCRTD and LACTC under a common cause during a difficult transition period. All employees dedicated themselves to the provision of service to the public under the most trying circumstances.

Although the MTA service continuation effort was a major success, the information provided herein should be used cautiously. The conditions leading up to the work stoppage in Los Angeles, as well as the factors that led to a successful conclusion of the strike, were unique. Different circumstances would have required different planning and implementation strategies. Nonetheless, it is the hope of the MTA that the information contained in this document will serve as a guide to other transit operators who may be planning to provide transit service during emergency situations.

**APPENDIX A**


**MTA CONTINGENCY SERVICE NETWORK**

# MTA Contingency Service Network During July 25 - August 2, 1994, Union Work Stoppage

MTA Operations  
December, 1994



**MTA-OPERATED BUS SERVICE**  
**LIDLAW OPERATED BUS SERVICE**  
**MAYFLOWER OPERATED BUS SERVICE**  
**SERVICE PROVIDED BY OTHER PRIVATE CARRIERS**



**APPENDIX B**

**NINE-DAY WORK STOPPAGE SUMMARY**

**APPENDIX B  
1994 MTA WORK STOPPAGE AND RECOVERY SUMMARY**

	DAY 1 (MON. JULY 25) -STRIKE-	DAY 2 (TUE. JULY 26) -STRIKE-	DAY 3 (WED. JULY 27) -STRIKE-	DAY 4 (THU. JULY 28) -STRIKE-	DAY 5 (FRI. JULY 29) -STRIKE-	DAY 6 (SAT. JULY 30) -STRIKE-	DAY 7 (SUN. JULY 31) -STRIKE-	DAY 8 (MON. AUG. 1) -STRIKE-	DAY 9 (TUE. AUG. 2) -STRIKE-	DAY 10 (WED. AUG. 3) -RECOVERY-	DAY 11 (THU. AUG. 4) -RECOVERY-	DAY 12 (FRI. AUG. 5) -RECOVERY-
<b>MTA-OPERATED BUS:</b>												
VEHICLES OPERATED	131	132	132	136	136	43	44	128	131	1,427	1,731	1,754
SCHEDULED REVENUE HOURS	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	357	357	1,403	1,403	--	--	--
SCHEDULED REVENUE MILES	12,553	12,553	12,553	12,553	12,553	3,280	3,280	12,857	12,857	--	--	--
<b>METRO BLUE LINE:</b>												
VEHICLES OPERATED	11	11	11	11	12	6	6	12	12	--	--	--
SCHEDULED REVENUE HOURS	119	119	119	119	121	58	58	122	122	--	--	--
SCHEDULED REVENUE MILES	2,663	2,663	2,663	2,663	2,717	1,293	1,293	2,725	2,725	--	--	--
<b>METRO RED LINE:</b>												
VEHICLES OPERATED	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	--	--	--
SCHEDULED REVENUE HOURS	25	25	25	25	26	19	19	26	26	--	--	--
SCHEDULED REVENUE MILES	450	450	450	450	474	348	348	474	474	--	--	--
<b>NO. OF BUS ROUTES OPERATED:</b>												
MTA-OPERATED	7	7	7	7	7	4	4	7	7	204*	204	204
PRIVATE CARRIERS	23	23	23	23	27	0	0	29	29	--	--	--
<b>PASSENGER BOARDINGS:</b>												
MTA-OPERATED BUS	114,000	113,200	122,100	123,500	134,000	32,200	29,200	147,100	152,400	--	--	--
MTA BLUE & RED RAIL LINES	51,000	66,000	71,000	74,000	79,000	20,000	20,000	81,000	84,000	--	--	--
PRIVATE BUS (ESTIMATED)*	75,000	75,000	75,000	75,000	78,000	0	0	80,000	80,000	--	--	--
<b>FARE REVENUES:</b>												
MTA-OPERATED BUS	\$20,971	\$18,519	\$20,736	\$20,810	\$18,603	\$11,520	\$5,416	\$39,496	\$37,046	\$196,470	\$271,066	\$276,180
METRO BLUE & RED LINES	\$10,528	\$ 5,304	\$ 9,354	\$ 7,127	\$ 8,216	--*	\$8,479*	\$ 7,830	\$ 8,930	15,180	\$13,425	\$ 12,630
<b>NO. TELEPHONE CALLS RECEIVED BY CUSTOMER INFORMATION</b>	18,584	23,429	15,978	13,687	15,039	10,003	10,816	13,270	19,531	27,550	20,237	16,712
<b>NO. ACCIDENTS:</b>												
STRIKE RELATED	6	3	2	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
NON-STRIKE RELATED	0	2	0	2	0	1	0	2	3	9	11	13
<b>NO. OPERATORS:</b>												
Bus	145	145	145	145	147	43	44	145	145	2,399	2,656	2,716
Train	15	15	15	15	15	8	8	15	15	57	55	51
<b>OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS/ACCOMPLISHMENTS</b>	ATU MEMBERS WENT ON STRIKE AT 12:01AM  UTU AND TCU MEMBERS HONORED ATU PICKET LINES  MAYFLOWER AND LAIDLAW OPERATED SELECTED SERVICE	MTA SOUGHT A RESTRAINING ORDER TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL STRIKE ACTIVITIES AT OPERATING DIVISIONS	A LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT GRANTED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER	MTA CONTRACTED WITH THREE ADDITIONAL PRIVATE CARRIERS TO EXPAND ITS BUS SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC	MTA AND ATU RESUME CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS  MTA MANAGEMENT DECIDES TO OPERATE WEEKEND BUS AND RAIL SERVICE  MARK IV OPERATED SELECTED SERVICE	LIMITED MTA BUS AND RAIL SERVICE OPERATED  *TVM FARE COLLECTION NOT PERFORMED ON SATURDAY	LIMITED MTA BUS AND RAIL SERVICE OPERATED  *COMBINED SATURDAY AND SUNDAY REVENUES	ROESCH LINES AND SANTA BARBARA TRAN. BEGAN OPERATING SELECTED SERVICE	UNION CONTRACT AGREEMENT BETWEEN MTA AND ATU WAS REACHED	81% OF SCHEDULED SERVICE OPERATED  *ALL ROUTES OPERATED; SOME WITH LIMITED SERVICE	98% OF SCHEDULED SERVICE OPERATED	99% OF SCHEDULED SERVICE OPERATED

NOTE: DUE TO ROUNDING SOME FIGURES IN THIS TABLE MAY VARY FROM THE RESULTS SHOWN IN THE MAIN REPORT.

**APPENDIX C**

**DETAILED SERVICE AND PATRONAGE TABLES**



Appendix C

REVENUE HOURS DURING JULY 25 - AUGUST 2, 1994 STRIKE, BY DAY  
(MTA-OPERATED BUS AND RAIL SERVICE)

Line	Date									
	7/25 (Mon)	7/26 (Tue)	7/27 (Wed)	7/28 (Thu)	7/29 (Fri)	7/30 (Sat)	7/31 (Sun)	8/01 (Mon)	8/02 (Tue)	Total
21	301.5	301.5	301.5	301.5	301.5	86.3	86.3	301.5	301.5	2283.1
30/31	174.0	174.0	174.0	174.0	174.0	76.0	76.0	176.7	176.7	1375.4
45	232.9	232.9	232.9	232.9	232.9	101.8	101.8	232.9	232.9	1833.9
180	142.5	142.5	142.5	142.5	142.5	0.0	0.0	142.5	142.5	997.5
204	246.4	246.4	246.4	246.4	246.4	92.5	92.5	246.4	246.4	1909.8
251	124.8	124.8	124.8	124.8	124.8	0.0	0.0	124.8	124.8	873.6
560	177.9	177.9	177.9	177.9	177.9	0.0	0.0	177.9	177.9	1245.3
Blue Line	118.7	118.7	118.7	118.7	120.6	57.9	57.9	122.2	122.2	955.6
Red Line	24.6	24.6	24.6	24.6	26.0	18.9	18.9	26.0	26.0	214.2
<b>Total Bus:</b>	<b>1400.0</b>	<b>1400.0</b>	<b>1400.0</b>	<b>1400.0</b>	<b>1400.0</b>	<b>356.6</b>	<b>356.6</b>	<b>1402.7</b>	<b>1402.7</b>	<b>10518.6</b>
<b>Total Rail:</b>	<b>143.3</b>	<b>143.3</b>	<b>143.3</b>	<b>143.3</b>	<b>146.6</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>148.2</b>	<b>148.2</b>	<b>1169.8</b>
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1543.3</b>	<b>1543.3</b>	<b>1543.3</b>	<b>1543.3</b>	<b>1546.6</b>	<b>433.4</b>	<b>433.4</b>	<b>1550.9</b>	<b>1550.9</b>	<b>11688.4</b>

Source: Scheduling and Operations Planning Dept., October 1994

Note: Does not include service provided by private carriers.

Appendix C

ESTIMATED WEEKDAY PASSENGER BOARDINGS DURING JULY 25 - AUGUST 2, 1994 STRIKE, BY DAY  
(MTA-OPERATED BUS AND RAIL LINES)

Line	Date									Total
	7/25 (Mon)	7/26 (Tue)	7/27 (Wed)	7/28 (Thu)	7/29 (Fri)	7/30 (Sat)	7/31 (Sun)	8/01 (Mon)	8/02 (Tue)	
21	28,300	28,600	31,900	30,100	32,900	7,300	6,000	33,800	36,700	235,600
30/31	18,700	17,600	19,000	20,000	19,200	7,200	8,500	22,100	23,300	155,600
45	13,500	13,400	14,400	14,600	15,800	6,100	5,800	23,900	20,700	128,200
180	10,500	10,700	11,700	11,200	15,300	---	---	12,200	11,300	82,900
204	27,300	28,400	30,600	32,000	35,500	11,600	8,900	39,700	41,600	255,600
251	6,800	6,600	6,500	7,000	6,800	---	---	7,200	8,600	49,500
560	8,900	7,900	8,000	8,600	8,500	---	---	8,200	10,200	60,300
Blue Line	38,000	48,000	50,000	52,000	54,000	13,000	13,000	55,000	57,000	380,000
Red Line	13,000	18,000	21,000	22,000	25,000	7,000	7,000	26,000	27,000	166,000
<b>Total Bus:</b>	<b>114,000</b>	<b>113,200</b>	<b>122,100</b>	<b>123,500</b>	<b>134,000</b>	<b>32,200</b>	<b>29,200</b>	<b>147,100</b>	<b>152,400</b>	<b>967,700</b>
<b>Total Rail:</b>	<b>51,000</b>	<b>66,000</b>	<b>71,000</b>	<b>74,000</b>	<b>79,000</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>81,000</b>	<b>84,000</b>	<b>546,000</b>
<b>Total:</b>	<b>165,000</b>	<b>179,200</b>	<b>193,100</b>	<b>197,500</b>	<b>213,000</b>	<b>52,200</b>	<b>49,200</b>	<b>228,100</b>	<b>236,400</b>	<b>1,513,700</b>

Appendix C

PATRONAGE AS A PERCENTAGE OF NORMAL BOARDINGS JULY 25 - AUGUST 2, 1994 STRIKE, BY DAY  
(MTA-OPERATED BUS AND RAIL SERVICE)

Line	Date								
	7/25 (Mon)	7/26 (Tue)	7/27 (Wed)	7/28 (Thu)	7/29 (Fri)	7/30 (Sat)	7/31 (Sun)	8/01 (Mon)	8/02 (Tue)
21	58%	58%	65%	61%	66%	25%	27%	69%	75%
30/31	53%	50%	54%	56%	54%	21%	37%	62%	66%
45	55%	54%	58%	59%	64%	34%	44%	97%	84%
180	60%	61%	67%	64%	88%	---	---	70%	65%
204	60%	62%	67%	70%	78%	33%	41%	87%	91%
251	37%	35%	35%	38%	37%	---	---	39%	46%
560	58%	51%	52%	56%	55%	---	---	53%	66%
Blue Line	107%	135%	140%	146%	152%	46%	57%	155%	160%
Red Line	79%	110%	128%	134%	152%	79%	100%	159%	165%
<b>Total Bus:</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>59%</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>74%</b>
<b>Total Rail:</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>127%</b>	<b>137%</b>	<b>142%</b>	<b>152%</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>156%</b>	<b>162%</b>
<b>Total:</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>82%</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>102%</b>	<b>106%</b>

Appendix C

SCHEDULED REVENUE MILES DURING JULY 25 - AUGUST 2, 1994 STRIKE, BY DAY  
(MTA-OPERATED BUS AND RAIL SERVICE)

Line	Date									
	7/25 (Mon)	7/26 (Tue)	7/27 (Wed)	7/28 (Thu)	7/29 (Fri)	7/30 (Sat)	7/31 (Sun)	8/01 (Mon)	8/02 (Tue)	Total
21	2,456	2,456	2,456	2,456	2,456	700	700	2,456	2,456	18,592
30/31	1,222	1,222	1,222	1,222	1,222	708	708	1,526	1,526	10,578
45	2,202	2,202	2,202	2,202	2,202	1,014	1,014	2,202	2,202	17,442
180	1,518	1,518	1,518	1,518	1,518	0	0	1,518	1,518	10,626
204	2,328	2,328	2,328	2,328	2,328	858	858	2,328	2,328	18,012
251	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	0	0	1,144	1,144	8,008
560	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,683	0	0	1,683	1,683	11,781
Blue Line	2,663	2,663	2,663	2,663	2,717	1,293	1,293	2,725	2,725	21,405
Red Line	450	450	450	450	474	348	348	474	474	3,918
<b>Total Bus:</b>	<b>12,553</b>	<b>12,553</b>	<b>12,553</b>	<b>12,553</b>	<b>12,553</b>	<b>3,280</b>	<b>3,280</b>	<b>12,857</b>	<b>12,857</b>	<b>95,039</b>
<b>Total Rail:</b>	<b>3,113</b>	<b>3,113</b>	<b>3,113</b>	<b>3,113</b>	<b>3,191</b>	<b>1,641</b>	<b>1,641</b>	<b>3,199</b>	<b>3,199</b>	<b>25,323</b>
<b>Total:</b>	<b>15,666</b>	<b>15,666</b>	<b>15,666</b>	<b>15,666</b>	<b>15,744</b>	<b>4,921</b>	<b>4,921</b>	<b>16,056</b>	<b>16,056</b>	<b>120,362</b>

Source: Scheduling and Operations Planning Dept., October 1994

Note: Does not include service provided by private carriers.