


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## Urban Transportation Decision Making : 6

### MINNEAPOLIS - ST. PAUL: A CASE STUDY

Prepared for  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Office of the Secretary  
Report No. OST-TPI-76-02, IV

The contents of this report reflect the views of the Contractor who is responsible for the facts and the accuracy of the data and judgement presented herein. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of the Department of Transportation. This report does not constitute a standard, specification or regulation.

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UNITED STATES		CANADA	EUROPE	
Atlanta		Toronto	Hamburg	
Minneapolis/St. Paul		Montreal	Manchester and Leeds	
Miami/Dade County			Stockholm & Gothenburg	
Seattle			Amsterdam	
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URBAN TRANSPORTATION DECISION MAKING: 6

Minneapolis - St. Paul: A Case Study

BY

Frank C. Colcord

Steven M. Polan

JULY 1973

FINAL REPORT

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Springfield, Virginia 22151

PREPARED FOR

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

REPORT NO.: OST-TPI-76-02, IV

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## PREFACE

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This monograph is one of a series of ten prepared under the terms of contract No. DOT-OS-30036 of the U.S. Department of Transportation. An analytical summary report has also been prepared as a part of the study. The monographs cover the following metropolitan areas:

- U.S.: Miami-Dade County, Florida  
Atlanta, Georgia  
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota  
Seattle, Washington
- Canada: Montreal, Quebec  
Toronto, Ontario
- Europe: Manchester and Leeds, England  
Stockholm and Gothenburg, Sweden  
Hamburg, Germany  
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

The broad objective of these monographs is to describe the urban political and planning contexts within which urban transportation planning and programming take place. It need hardly be stated that transportation is not a purely technical matter. Many if not most of the frustrations experienced in our large cities in connection with this policy area arise out of political or institutional problems rather than the limitations of technology.

The cities included in the study were selected because it was felt that each had something valuable to show to large American cities struggling with their urban transportation needs. The American cities chosen have been particularly innovative in the development of metropolitan institutions for urban transportation decision-making. The Canadian and European cities were chosen either because of innovative institutional forms or because their political systems have been particularly responsive to the need for new and in some cases unusual transportation solutions.

The monographs covering the Canadian and European cities are considerably longer than the American ones because we felt that substantially more background material was required on their history, social and economic characteristics, and political systems for American readers to fully understand the transportation planning and decision-making processes.

As director of this research effort, I am enormously appreciative of the time and cooperation given by the hundreds of people who were interviewed in these twelve metropolitan areas and in the national and sub-national capitals involved. In particular, I would like to thank the following people for their advice and help in identifying appropriate contacts and informants

in the foreign cities involved: Dale Taylor (National Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, Ottawa); Richard Soberman (Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review); Kenneth Orski (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris); Thomas Atmer (Office of City Planning, Stockholm City); Wolfgang Teischgraber and Karl Heinz Muller (Baubehorde, Hamburg); Senator Dr. Ernst Heinsen (Hamburg representative, Bundesrat); Ann Gittleson (Department of the Environment, London); J. Kenneth Lee (Department of the Environment, Manchester Regional Office); Ronald Saich (Engineer's Office, Leeds); and Mr. 't Hart (City Engineering, Amsterdam).

Without the untiring and skillful efforts of two research assistants--both former Tufts students--Ron Lewis and Steven Polan, the vast amount of writing required for this project would not have been completed even close to the deadline. These two were also responsible for setting up interviews, making travel arrangements, and taking notes at meetings. Several other Tufts students also participated in and helped with aspects of the project; namely, John Brouder, Neil Whitman, and Sarah Sullivan. I greatly appreciate the contributions of all these associates.

The editing and typing job involved in this project was also vast in scope. We were most fortunate in having the services of Ms. Miriam Berry as editor of most of the manuscripts. Her skill in dealing not only with the English language but several others was invaluable. She participated in the typing job, as did Elizabeth Goode, Molly Crowley, Lisa Boesten, Mary Shelton, and Deborah Manning. My thanks especially go to Ms. Manning for her patience and fortitude in times of urgency.

Finally, I wish to thank the U.S. Department of Transportation for making the project possible, and particularly William Goodman, Carl Rappaport, and Ray Weil, for their help, support, and sympathy while this project was underway.

Frank C. Colcord, Jr.  
Associate Professor  
Tufts University

June 1974

## Introduction

### I. Background

The typical organizational response to the urban transportation crisis in Western nations has been twofold: functional reorganization at the metropolitan level and an increasing sharing of the responsibility for this function with higher levels of government. This is resulting in reduced local autonomy and an increased bureaucratization of decision-making. Parallel to this development is a growing insistence by citizens' groups on a role in planning, a contradiction of the first trend. Both of these trends evidenced themselves sooner in the U.S. than elsewhere because the impact of the automobile on cities was felt earlier.

In the U.S. and elsewhere, governments are groping for a better definition of the distribution of functions among levels of government; in the U.S., three levels are involved; in the other urban areas studied only two. A basic problem everywhere, except now in England owing to 1974 local government reforms, continues to be the absence of a viable government congruent to the Territorial need, i.e. metropolitan. One particular problem this raises is the difficulty in relating transport planning (metropolitan) to land use planning (typically municipal).

A universal problem, also, has been the seeming lack of recognition of the need to consider all aspects of urban transportation together. Transportation planning involves more than just highways, buses, and subways; it also involves traffic controls, pedestrian planning, parking facilities, etc. Some European cities are beginning to demonstrate that only through placing a major emphasis on these relatively inexpensive, but often politically explosive programs, can there be any real hope of arriving at viable solutions to transport needs in large, congested cities.

Future policy in U.S., Canadian, and European cities is likely increasingly to emphasize comprehensive planning, these alternative approaches, and controls over private motor vehicles. But, successful integration of all these policy tools seems clearly to require a great reduction in the degree of fragmentation in the policy-making process. This need not require a single focus of power; indeed, in the U.S., given our federalist political structure and strong tradition of grass roots government, something like a dual system of decision-making seems both more likely and more desirable. For urban transportation in the U.S., the two key units seem likely and logically to be the metropolitan and state levels.

The thirteen urban areas included in this research are: Atlanta, Miami, San Francisco, Boston, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle in the U.S.; Montreal and Toronto in Canada; Stockholm, Sweden; Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Hamburg, Germany; and Manchester and Leeds in England. These



areas range in population from one to almost three million. They are all large, complex metropolises, but none are "super-cities". Thus, they are thoroughly representative, in the writer's opinion, of the metropolitan transportation problem. With a few exceptions, however, they are unrepresentative in one important respect, that for which most of them were chosen; most have been very innovative in the development of new, improved institutions for transportation planning and programs.

The results of this research are contained in a series of monographs which have been written and separately published on eleven of the urban areas studied (all except Boston and San Francisco), and in a summary report.

## II. American, Canadian, and European Cities

American cities have dealt less effectively with their transportation problems than have Canadian and European cities. Our "solutions" have, on the whole, been less responsive to overall transport needs and they have been less cognizant of the relationships between transportation and the broader, changing problems of the American city. Unlike the other nations visited, the U.S. has not developed a viable, comprehensive strategy for the future of its cities, and thus transportation policy has floundered. Also, our transportation policies have, until recently, failed to recognize the extraordinary diversity of our cities, ranging from ancient, congested "European-type" cities such as Boston and San Francisco to decentralized "auto-age" cities like Miami and Houston. Our 1950's philosophy of total auto-mobility has proved disastrous for many if not most of our cities, and indeed impossible to achieve. It has also resulted in what is probably the worst public transport system in the Western world. This philosophy has also contributed to the continued deterioration of our cities and the growing plight of the central cities' residents. Most recent federal policies have alleviated these conditions but still don't effectively confront the total urban problem or recognize the diversity of our cities.

Both the European nations and the Canadian provinces have been far more innovative and sensitive in the development of urban policies and strategies. In both, it can be reasonably argued that the quality of urban life is better for the general population, rather than worse, than it had been in earlier decades. These nations do not harbor the same cultural negativism toward cities which seems to underlie much U.S. policy. Nor do they share the generally negative attitudes toward effective and viable government, peopled by professionally competent staffs at the local and regional levels. Further, there is an acceptance of planning at all levels in those nations, still largely absent here. In this writer's opinion, local government in the U.S., despite our vaunted "grass roots" traditions, is substantially less autonomous, responsive and effective than is the case in the other countries studied.

## III. Institutions for General Definition and Implementation of Goals

Goal definition is effective only when it is linked to policy implementation. Furthermore, in a democratic society, goals must be responsive to citizen input and comprehensive in scope, i.e., related policies must be related to each other.

In the U.S., metropolitan planning institutions and processes evolved before a satisfactory means of policy implementation developed. These institutions go back to the 1950's, and received major encouragement after 1962 from the Federal government in various legislative acts, many of which have been transportation acts. The characteristic institutional form to emerge has been the Council of Governments (COG), representing local governments, but rarely endowed by state or local units with the power to impose metropolitan objectives on the local jurisdictions. Such powers as these bodies have are largely products of Federal law and relate to Federal programs.

Of the six U.S. urban areas discussed in this study, only Seattle has this most typical form of institution. San Francisco has, in addition, a Metropolitan Transportation Commission, established by state statute, which has unusually strong powers over transportation agencies. In the Boston area, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has assumed much greater general transportation authority than is the usual case. In the Minneapolis-St. Paul "twin cities" area, an unusually strong Council, appointed by the governor, has been established with significant powers over local governments, the state highway agency, and metropolitan institutions. A somewhat similar but less powerful body has been established in Atlanta. The Miami-Dade area has a metropolitan government, with strong powers over all urban transportation programs and agencies.

Unlike the U.S. and the Continental European cities studied, both the English and Canadian cities have moved a long way toward effective metropolitan governments, with powerful elected or representative decision-making bodies. "Two-tier" governments (somewhat similar to Miami's) have been established in all, with most transportation responsibilities held by the metropolitan bodies. In all these metropolitan areas, also, the "parent" governments (nation, province) have become much more heavily involved in regional planning than is true in the U.S.

In Hamburg and Amsterdam, there has been little progress in this direction. However, transportation planning and land use planning and programming are highly integrated within single institutions of the city government, closely supervised by elected officials. Relations with suburbia are informal, or through the central or provincial governments. The Stockholm area is somewhat different in that mass transportation and regional planning have been delegated to the County, which is much larger than the urban area. Close working relationships exist between county and city, however, and the latter continues strongly to influence major planning decisions. As in England and Canada, central governments all play a major role in regional and interregional planning.

#### IV. Transportation Institutions

In the U.S., transport decisions, largely thanks to Federal requirements, have been brought formally more closely under the general planning bodies. However, there continues to be a high degree of autonomy of decision-making, particularly by state highway departments, city traffic and parking departments, and

to a lesser extent, public transit agencies. Historically, the trend has been toward greater public involvement, higher level government involvement, and greater comprehensiveness in planning, but there is still a great deal of functional, autonomous planning and decision-making. Among the cities studied, Miami, San Francisco, Boston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul have most nearly achieved a system of integrated planning and programming.

Comprehensiveness and integration of the several transportation programs and with land use planning have been more nearly achieved in Canada and England. On the Continent, despite the absence of metropolitan policy-making institutions, metropolitan transport planning and systems have been largely achieved through a variety of approaches. Hamburg has its HVV, a coordinating body for transit representing both transit providers and municipalities as well as the Federal railways. Since the city owns the largest transit unit, it has strong inputs into decisions of the HVV. The county of Stockholm operates the transit system, but the city's planners have largely determined its configuration. Amsterdam has not yet resolved this problem, an issue which will probably be settled when the necessary modal decisions are made.

At the "parent" government level, there is a universal trend toward comprehensive departments of transportation. In the American states studied, California and Florida have moved the farthest; Massachusetts has achieved considerable integration without a comprehensive agency; Georgia has such a department, but so far it is largely a "name-only" change. Minnesota and Washington (state) are still struggling with the issue.

Both Ontario and Quebec have increasingly strong comprehensive departments, although the latter's still struggles to improve its capability in non-highway programs. Of the European countries visited, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands have transportation departments, although Britain's is combined with housing, planning, and other concerns into a Ministry of the Environment. Sweden does not have such a department; national grants for transit are made by the National Roads Administration, but decisions regarding the distribution of total funding between roads and transit are essentially local.

It would be accurate to say that all of these national and (Canadian) provincial transportation departments have been substantially enlarging their role in urban transportation in recent years. The present intended direction of reform in England, however, is to move back toward greater local (metropolitan) autonomy in these respects.

#### V. Transportation Policy Outputs

Responsiveness and comprehensiveness are the two key measures of the effectiveness of our transportation programs. But, both need further definition. Programs must be responsive not only to the urban population served but also to the inter-city, regional, and national/provincial policies of the parent governments, thus it is not reasonable to argue that all such decisions should be decentralized. This means that to be "comprehensive" transport policies and

programs must not only be related to other metropolitan concerns, but also to other parent government concerns. Examples of the latter are environmental and social policies which may be of little interest locally.

The conventional decision-making structure, which has traditionally been too narrow functionally in the U.S. and Canada and too narrow geographically in Europe, plus the differences in the timing of pressures for changing policies, plus other cultural, social, and political differences, have coincided with rather different trends in policy since World War II. To seek to determine the relationship between organization and policy output, we have constructed three diagrams, V-1, V-2, and VI-1.

Figure V-1, the "Urban Transportation Policy Tree", shows the evolution of policy in the thirteen cities discussed in the report. As will be noted, Montreal, Hamburg, Stockholm, Toronto, Leeds, and Amsterdam all avoided the policy phase represented by Box B, i.e., giving highest priority to the motorists' needs. All the U.S. cities ventured into this policy, as did Manchester, England. No cities currently occupy that position, but all the U.S. cities remained there for a long time.


Deterioration of the transit system led most U.S. cities to move away from this policy to one of providing stop-gap support to transit, just to keep it alive (Box C). San Francisco, however, moved directly to a policy of favoring and providing major support to transit, while down-grading highways. The Canadian and European cities (except Manchester) moved directly from Box A to Box D, which represents a sincere attempt to provide real balance in transport programs. Boston, too, moved on to that policy, and along with the others (except Montreal) has since moved to a policy of down-grading highways (Box E). Atlanta, Seattle, Miami, and Amsterdam have also moved to Box E, meanwhile. This is currently the chief policy locale in both Europe and North America. It signifies major investments in transit, as the highest priority, and cutbacks in highway programs.

A number of cities (notably Stockholm, Hamburg, Amsterdam, Toronto, Atlanta, and Boston) have begun to show a recognition that this policy cannot be maintained; it provides no means of reducing the pressure for more space for automobiles. Thus, all of these are considering mechanisms for controlling automobile usage in the congested center area (Box F). Stockholm is actively effecting such programs, and thus we show that city in Box F, while the others are en route there. Leeds (and Gothenburg, which we visited briefly, but was not included in the chart) have both moved directly to Box G, which represents a policy of comprehensive restraints, restricted use of highways (and limited, specialized highway investments) and major emphasis on transit. It seems likely that Box F is merely transitional and that cities which arrive there will likely go on to Box G. Box H is a comprehensive, auto-oriented program; no cities have ventured in there, but it seems possible that some highly decentralized U.S. cities might go in that direction from Box D.

Figure V-2 indicates roughly the years that the policy changes described above took place in the cities studied.

Figure V-1

### THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION POLICY TREE



## TRENDS IN TRANSPORTATION POLICY

	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1974	
MIAMI	A	A B				B C C E		
MPLS	A	A B			B C		(D)(E)(F)	
SEATTLE	A	A B				B C C E		U S A
ATLANTA	A		A B		B C	C E	(F)	
SAN FRANCISCO	A	A B		B E				
BOSTON	A		A B	B C C D		D E	(F)	
TORONTO	A		A D			D E	(F)	CANADA
MONTREAL	A			A D			(E)	
STOCKHOLM	A		A D			D E E F	(H)	
AMSTERDAM	A			A C C D		D E	(F)	EUROPE
HAMBURG	A			A D		D E	(F)	
LEEDS	A			A C		C G		
MANCHESTER	A			A B		B C	(E)	

XI

\*NOTE: SHADED AREAS INDICATE A HIGHWAY-ORIENTED POLICY

FIGURE V-2

We are suggesting by these charts that there are strong patterns of policy evolution, that some of the directions taken, particularly the move by American cities into almost total auto-reliance, were illogical directions, the policy implications of which were not clear at the time and which needed to be reconsidered because they were unworkable. For the most part, it was popular opposition plus the severe deterioration of transit service (and its attendant financial crisis) that led to reconsideration.

Several transitional steps were taken along the way, which inevitably proved ineffective. Even substantial support for transit has proven ineffective if the motorist continued to be served (Box D). Even when highway funding was withdrawn and congestion worsened (Box E), the motorist continued to prefer his automobile and the freedom it offered. Only a gasoline shortage drove him to abandon his car.

The attraction of Americans (citizens and policy-makers) to the idea of freedom of movement is unquestionably strong, and thus policy-makers have considered the adoption of controls over use of the car only with the greatest of reluctance. No U.S. cities have seriously confronted this option.


Europeans too like the freedom of the car. The cities where major controls or restrictions have been adopted (Leeds and Gothenburg) have relatively small downtowns, and thus peripheral parking is relatively manageable without serious inconvenience. Elsewhere, consideration of the programs is coming about from the logic of the situation and the closing of other options. Stockholm, Hamburg, Boston, and Amsterdam cannot build any further access roads to their central business districts. Amsterdam cannot even build a subway. Thus the reduction or elimination of auto congestion seems feasible only through the prohibition of some automobiles, and the commuters' cars seem the best target. While such ideas are being promoted and contemplated, they have not been seriously considered and are vigorously opposed. Nonetheless, in this writer's opinion, they are very likely prospects for the future unless auto congestion declines for market reasons (steeply rising costs or fuel shortages).

## VI. Institutions and Policy Outputs

Along with policies, institutions have also been evolving, as suggested earlier. Broadly speaking, they have been moving from a situation of fragmentation (U.S. and Canada) or unification (Europe) toward one of four situations: (1) decentralization, (2) centralization, (3) dualization, (4) continued fragmentation. Chart VI-1 indicates the routes followed by the cities studied. Decentralization is a structure wherein the local or metropolitan government is delegated most decision-making authority, with the parent government playing only a limited (usually financial) role. Centralization is a structure in which decisions are largely made by the parent government. Dualization is a shared decision-making structure. The fourth resting place is one of continued fragmentation, with little effective metropolitanization or centralization. This is a fall-back position, "adopted" only because of an inability to achieve one of the other three.

Figure VI-1

# THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTIONAL POLICY TREE





At the present time, most U.S. cities are in transition to one of these resting places. Most are experimenting with both metropolitan institution-building and comprehensive state institution building. Where the former results in a strong, capable decision-maker and the latter becomes a true multi-modal agency, then dualization will be the result. If one or the other occurs, decentralization or centralization will result. If neither is effective, fragmentation will continue.

Manchester, Leeds, Stockholm, and Hamburg have achieved stable, decentralized systems. Toronto and Miami have strong dual systems. The others are all in transition. Figure VI-1 indicates our estimate of their final resting places.

In analyzing and speculating about the effectiveness of these several institutional models, we have concluded that the fragmented model (which remains the most common U.S. model) is the only one with seriously negative consequences for decision-making. It effectively prevents development of a unified policy; at best it allows for a policy by default.

The two single-node systems (centralization and decentralization) have certain internal problems for U.S. cities, although they may be workable. The former holds the danger of reducing local citizen input and failing to be sensitive to the special needs of subcommunities. The latter--decentralization--risks overlooking the needs of the larger polity, although this is a less serious concern because that polity can always intervene with its inherent powers. Dualization, while it is an inevitably competitive system, with built-in conflict, reduces the fundamental competing interests to a manageable two. These interests are not identical, and thus such a conflict situation is realistic and appropriate.

#### Conclusions and Recommendations

The U.S. model for urban transportation decision-making has not been conducive to the achievement of responsiveness and comprehensiveness. The dual trend toward more effective metropolitan institutions and stronger, more comprehensive state agencies are positive steps and should continue to be encouraged by the Federal government. In most but not all urban areas, our aim should be to develop and encourage a fine balance between these two levels of authority and program. Under some circumstances, especially when the metropolis constitutes the bulk of the state, this may be impractical, and a centralized system may be the only politically feasible approach. This prospect seems appropriate only in the smaller Eastern states. In both circumstances, states should seek to develop their capabilities in the area of land use planning in order that transport planning will not continue to occur in a vacuum. This is not likely to, nor should it, mean state planning in detail, but more an evolution toward state guidelines for and supervision and review of local planning, as is evolving rapidly in Canada, the Netherlands, Britain, and Sweden, by their respective "parent" governments. Municipal governments, here as elsewhere, should continue to be the prime planning units.

As the state assumes greater responsibilities in land use planning and transit planning and financing, it should move in the opposite direction for urban highway planning and transfer that responsibility largely down to the metropolitan institutions. Clearly, such devolution requires a prior decision by the state to give effective governmental powers to the metropolitan institutions.

Metropolitan bodies should encompass the whole urban region, but our study suggests this is not essential. If the bulk of it, certainly including the most urban core is included, it is likely to be able--with parent government help--to control the necessary planning, implementation, and political tools.

As for the needed powers of metropolitan bodies, they must gain control over the transportation programming, as well as the planning, process. Federal transportation legislation in 1973 aims at achieving this, and should be strongly implemented. Further steps must be taken to strengthen the powers of metropolitan bodies over land use planning. One possible means is to give them, and/or the state, (as in Toronto) review and approval powers over municipal planning. Such reviews by some higher level government, are standard practice everywhere but in the U.S., it seems.

Citizen participation in transportation decisions is most difficult in a fragmented system, although this type of organization has not prevented citizens' groups from stopping projects. Positive, creative participation, however, is nearly impossible. Citizens have been found to operate effectively at all levels. Where a unified decision-making process existed, they were able to effect positive changes and clear new policies. Elsewhere, as typical in the U.S., their efforts resulted for many years in confusion and "negative policy decisions" or non-decisions.

Citizens' participation works best through the normal political process, but this is only possible when that process is understandable. This means the politician receives the input and has the power to influence the decisions. Our suggested institutional changes would allow the normal process to work better.

Federal efforts to improve transportation decision-making have had important results, but have been resisted by both municipalities and state agencies. Future Federal efforts should be directed at strengthening and encouraging comprehensive state agencies and giving stronger powers to metropolitan institutions. The recent progress in de-functionalizing the funding process is important and should be further encouraged--also at the state level.

Requiring metropolitan review and approval of plans and positive metropolitan programming of funds will go a long way to enlarging the capabilities of metropolitan institutions in these policy areas.

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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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Transportation has been a primary force in shaping the development of the Twin Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis. The Mississippi River and the Falls of St. Anthony played an important role in the establishment of the cities: St. Paul in the 1830's along the east bank, at the head of steamboat navigation on the Mississippi River, and Minneapolis in the 1850's on the west bank, where the Falls of St. Anthony were harnessed to provide energy for the lumber industry. St. Paul was established in 1837 as a gin mill and trading post selling liquor to the Indians, and later developed into the territorial capital and principal railhead of lines to the East and West.<sup>1</sup> The city looked to the East for its economic development; the Chicago and Milwaukee urban areas afforded finance for development as well as a market for St. Paul's wares. Minneapolis, on the other hand, was oriented toward the distribution of products to the West. Distribution industries--first lumber, then milling and food processing--found Minneapolis a more convenient location than the more congested and limited area of St. Paul.<sup>2</sup> Population growth in the 1850's was encouraged by the speculative mania which engulfed the nation during that period, and by transportation development--canals and steamboats on the Great Lakes, roads and railroads, and fleets on the Mississippi. By 1854, it was possible for new immigrants coming into New York to travel by rail to Rock Island, Illinois, and by steamboat to Minnesota. With the rapid growth of the West in the late nineteenth century, Minneapolis came to surpass St. Paul in size and economic importance. Minneapolis became a world leader in flour milling, and the milling empire developed its necessary interrelations with finance, banking, and the general economy. The city's dominance was further encouraged by a more progressive and active political leadership than that which existed in the more eastern-oriented, and consequently more conservative, St. Paul. St. Paul was chartered as a city in 1854, and Minneapolis followed two years later.

Both cities grew rapidly between 1880 and 1910, Minneapolis reaching a population of 301,000 and St. Paul 214,744. The area was settled mainly by groups of northern and western European peoples--first the Swedes, then Norwegians and Germans. The physical growth of the urban areas was encouraged by the development of a horse-drawn streetcar system beginning in 1872, to be replaced by electric streetcars in 1889. The change to electric streetcars accelerated the trend in urban development outward along the transit lines. The cities, originally located about ten miles apart, were quickly growing into a physically, if not politically, unified metropolitan area.<sup>3</sup> St. Paul extended its city boundaries to meet those of Minneapolis in 1884.

Beginning about 1915, transit began to lose to the forces of the automobile<sup>4</sup> its influence in shaping continued development.

Increased flexibility and greater mobility allowed the filling of open areas between transit routes. Commercial activity also developed in the 1920's along the outlying arterial streets. Although the development of suburban communities is generally viewed as a post-World War II phenomenon, suburban sprawl in the Twin Cities actually became prevalent during the period between the wars.

Today the Twin Cities area has expanded into a metropolitan area of 3,000 square miles and almost two million people, over 60% of whom live outside the municipal boundaries of the two cities. The area enjoys a diversified and growing economy based on machinery, chemicals, plastics, electronics, and food products, financial and insurance services, managerial operations and headquarters for rail, air, water, and truck transportation, and it provides goods and services to a large portion of the upper Middle West.<sup>5</sup> The Twin Cities region is the principal industrial, financial, cultural, and service center for a vast area which stretches east to the dairy country of Wisconsin, north to Canada, and south and west to the grain-belt states of Iowa, Nebraska, and the Dakotas.

Although Minneapolis has clearly won the competition as the leading economic center of the region, there still exist elements of a one-time bitter rivalry between the cities, a rivalry that up to a decade ago prevented the area from functioning in a unified manner. The Twin Cities are one of only two metropolitan regions in the country with over one million population that has more than a single major central city. (San Francisco-Oakland is the other). The competing pressures for development, a heritage of different orientation, and populations of different social and cultural outlooks have led to what a recent observer calls a "palpable separation": "though the centers of the cities were only about 10 miles apart, in an important sense they lay back to back, a position not conducive to intercourse."<sup>6</sup>

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1. Stanley Baldinger, Planning and Governing the Metropolis: the Twin Cities Experience (New York: Prager, 1971), P. 37
  2. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 15, 1972 ed., p. 532, and Vol. 19, 1972 ed., p. 919
  3. Office of the City Coordinator, Rapid Transit for Minneapolis: An Interim Report, 1972, p. 13
  4. Ibid., p. 14
  5. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 15, 1972 ed., p. 533
  6. Charles Backstrom, "Minneapolis-St. Paul," in Politics of Mental Health, Robert Conway (ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 410-412

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CHAPTER II

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

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Minneapolis-St. Paul ranks fifteenth in population among the urban centers in the nation, with 1,813,423 residents. Its growth rate of over 60% during the past 20 years has been matched by only four other American urban areas among the top 20. As mentioned previously, the population is composed mostly of northern and western European peoples; the population base of the Twin Cities is essentially the same as that for the rest of the state.<sup>1</sup> Of the 15% foreign stock, approximately one fifth are Swedish and one fifth are German. Daniel Elazar notes that the population uniformity throughout the state contributes to a greater community of interest between city and out-state areas than that which might exist in other states.<sup>2</sup> The number of families statewide below the poverty level (8.2%) is actually greater than the number in the Twin Cities SMSA (4.6%), or in Minneapolis (7.2%) or St. Paul (6.4%). Among the 20 largest U.S. metropolitan areas, the Twin Cities area ranks lowest in minority-group population, with 2.8% Black and .5% Indian. This factor reinforces the number-three ranking of the area in home ownership (63%), and the number-seven ranking in family median income (\$11,682 in 1970). The median income in the city of Minneapolis is the lowest in the area at \$9,960, while St. Paul's is \$10,544. These city incomes are somewhat above those of other urban areas of comparable size. The Minneapolis suburbs of St. Louis Park, Brooklyn Center, Brooklyn Park, and Crystal are all near \$12,000 in family income, while Bloomington (\$13,433), Minnetonka (\$15,068), and Edina (\$19,494) are all a great deal higher. The St. Paul suburbs of Maplewood and Roseville are both in the \$12-13,000 range, while Anoka and Dakota counties, the other areas in the SMSA, are both a bit above the SMSA average.<sup>3</sup>

The area's population is also highly educated; in 1967, the Twin Cities ranked seventh in the nation in proportional number of high school and college graduates, and fourth in the nation in the number of persons with five or more years of college studies.<sup>4</sup>

James Q. Wilson's study of the "quality of life" in several states indicates several measures of "individual equality" for which Minnesota ranks near the highest nationally: first in "health and welfare," third in "economic growth," and tenth in "living conditions." These judgments, Wilson notes, were made primarily on the basis of urban considerations,<sup>5</sup> which include education, open housing laws, comparatively low unemployment, living conditions, antipoverty and welfare programs, health, police, and fire protection.

While the entire Twin Cities area has been growing at a rapid rate--22.4% between 1960 and 1970--the growth has all taken place in the suburban areas, while St. Paul has remained stagnant, and Minneapolis has actually lost 10% of its residents. In terms of density, the area ranks nineteenth among the 20 metropolitan areas, with 2,363 persons per square mile. The city of Minneapolis, with a population density of 7,049 persons per

square mile, is similarly placed among the lowest-density central cities in the country. An important implication of this recent suburban development has been the concurrent fragmentation taking place among newly created political jurisdictions. Municipal incorporations, which had been occurring at a fairly steady rate, suddenly jumped 50% in the decade of the 1950's, mounting to a total of more than 300 separate political units in the metropolitan area in 1960.

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1. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966), p. 119
  2. Ibid., pp. 181-182
  3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing: 1970, Census Tracts, Minneapolis-St. Paul SMSA, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1972
  4. Proposed Rosemount Site, Upper Midwest Research & Development Council, September 1968, p. 55
  5. James Q. Wilson, "Regional Differences in Social Welfare": Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, 1967

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CHAPTER III  
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

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The recent innovations in the political institutions concerned with planning in the Twin Cities, innovations which are certainly more far-reaching than any yet implemented in any other major American metropolitan area except Miami, are due in part to the unique political climate and culture which exist in the state and in the Twin Cities area. The political culture, or that "pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among members of a political system,"<sup>1</sup> is a key aspect of the political system that will fashion the political response to transportation needs in the area. An understanding of this element is crucial to any determination of which aspects of the Twin Cities' experience in institutional reform might be relevant elsewhere, and which are applicable only in the context of a unique Minnesota tradition.

In this regard, the state is well recognized as one of the best governed in the nation;<sup>2</sup> the heritage of the Yankee and Scandinavian settlers, coupled with the populist and progressive traditions, has combined to make the political system one of the nation's most capable, honest, and responsive.<sup>3</sup>

Emanating from the populist-agrarian reform movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a widespread distrust of professional politicians, who were often suspected of being partial to private interests. In the late nineteenth century, as wheat production became the dominant livelihood in the state, farmers became increasingly dependent upon the huge corporations that regulated the transportation and sale of their major crop. The established political parties were not responsive to the farmers' demands; the latter instead turned in the 1890's to the third-party movements of the Anti-Monopolists, Greenbackers, Farmers' Alliance, and Populists, organizations which best crystallized the farmers' demands.<sup>4</sup> From these movements came the sentiment and power to diminish the strength of the established parties and professional politicians. The nonpartisan local city councils, and a legislature that was nonpartisan until this year, are carry-overs from this tradition. The previously nonpartisan legislature had been organized into liberal and conservation caucuses, which were aligned with either the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL) or the Republican Party. The DFL is the product of a merger in the late 1940's between the Democrats and the original third-party movement, the Farmer-Labor Party, a union which was successful in electing its first governor in 1955, after 16 years of Republican administrations. The DFL's strength lies in the urban and rural areas, while the Republican strongholds are the suburban and upper-income urban areas. Even the state's Republican party, however, has attempted to associate itself with the progressive tradition.



Because the party caucuses within the nonpartisan legislature had increased in importance in recent years, especially for purposes of committee assignments, the legislature became officially partisan in 1973 for the first time.

The nonpartisanship of government, which was intended to move the political leaders closer to the people, is complemented by strong participation by citizens in state and local politics, heavy voter turn-outs, and a sense of public service in politics and other civic activities.<sup>5</sup> There exists a strong acceptance of the view that the private individual's participation in government is part of "the formal channels of political activity."<sup>6</sup> This was most clearly indicated to us by the degree of attention paid by elected officials to the reports of the Citizens' League, a private citizens' research group. The extent of such participation, as well as its effectiveness, is still limited by the resources of the group involved. The Citizens' League succeeds in part because its membership is mainly executives and professionals; a group representing a lower-income constituency may not find its participation as accepted or effective.

Daniel Elazar has written that the populist residue combined with the high moralistic attitudes of the state's original Yankee and Scandinavian settlers has contributed to the higher level of integrity in the Minnesota political system.<sup>7</sup> The results are manifest in a system which is long on individual independence and comparatively short on machine politics and patronage.<sup>8</sup>

It was indicated earlier that Minnesota provides a higher level of social services to its citizens than most other states. These services have traditionally been supplied at the state level, with minimal participation by towns, cities, or counties. The state programs are financed by a tax system which is considered to be one of the nation's most progressive, with the level of taxation consistently near the highest among the states.<sup>9</sup>

In a recent session, the legislature enacted a "Fiscal Disparities Bill" which provides that 40% of any increased tax revenue from development taking place in any one part of the seven-county area shall be redistributed to the total area. While the law is being challenged in the courts and has not yet taken effect, its passage is a continuing indication of the progressive attitude toward taxation which has characterized the state throughout its history.

Although both state and local governments have recently been moving toward stronger executive branches, the state has traditionally avoided concentration of power in governors, mayors, and similar officials. The office of the Mayor in Minneapolis is one of the weakest in the nation; St. Paul was the last major American city to abolish the commission form of government. The new Metro Council functions through legislative-type committees, and the chief officer of the Council is not a dominant force. The trust in legislative bodies and distaste for executive officials are yet another carry-over from the Populist-Progressive tradition.

The cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul have been more fortunate than many other major American urban areas in terms of the maintenance of fruitful relations with their state government. While there certainly

exists no consensus between urban and rural legislators, there are still factors which militate against the development of conflicts to the extent they have appeared elsewhere. Of great importance is the fact that the population of the Twin Cities is not greatly different in any major respect from the population statewide. Furthermore, the coalition molded in the late 1940's between the Farmer-Labor Parties and Democratic Party was dependent upon a reconciliation of urban and rural progressive views. Their united success in 1955 has encouraged the once-competing interests to continue to work cooperatively. Of final note in this regard is the location of the capital in St. Paul; this cannot help but familiarize the rural legislators with urban problems and needs.

A complicating political factor at the local level is the long-standing rivalry between the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, which results in competition for resources from both the public and private sectors. Any plan which is favored by one is looked upon warily by the other; state as well as metropolitan officials who must make decisions affecting the whole region remain acutely sensitive to this fact. The recent agreements by the two cities to participate in metropolitan organizations suggest some reduction in this traditional rivalry.

All of these factors indicate that the political systems relevant to the Twin Cities region have a higher capability of dealing with the problems of that area than is true in most other urban areas of the nation. There is a stronger consensus on the notion of a positive role for government (both state and local), and a much less negative attitude by state government toward its cities. There is a greater tendency toward issue-orientation as opposed to partisan political maneuvering. There is a greater responsiveness to citizens' groups than prevails generally. There is a higher degree of homogeneity in the political culture, with less divisiveness among disparate elements of the society. The achievements in institutional reform and in policy change already evident are indicative of future capacity for change.

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1. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 50
  2. Stanley Baldinger, Planning and Governing the Metropolis: The Twin Cities Experience (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 26-27
  3. Herbert Jacob, "State Political Systems," in Jacob and Vines, (eds.), Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965), p. 15
  4. G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960)

5. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966), pp. 120-123
6. Ibid, p. 122
7. Ibid. pp. 96-100
8. Mitau, op. cit., pp. 4, 18-19, 27, 29
9. Clara Penniman, "The Politics of Taxation" in Jacob and Vines, op. cit., pp. 305-312

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CHAPTER IV

TRANSPORTATION

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The present transportation situation in the Twin Cities is defined by two central business districts, a wide dispersal in trip origins and destinations, and few natural barriers to limit either future development or construction of transportation facilities.

Physical determinants played a major part in the development of St. Paul as the northern terminus of Mississippi River traffic and the growth of Minneapolis as a manufacturing and distribution center for the upper Northwest. The directions of their growth and the development of transport corridors have not been greatly influenced by physiographic determinants. The Twin Cities lie in the rolling prairie country of southeast Minnesota, 800 feet above sea level. Minneapolis is located on the western bank of the Mississippi; and St. Paul, with its CBD 10 miles to the west, is built on bluffs along the north bank of a large north-eastward bend in the same river. Glacial deposits have left hundreds of lakes in the area, including 22 within the city limits of Minneapolis.


A. Freeways

The major commercial and residential development of the area in recent years has been along highway routes, most notably the interstates which surround and enclose a major part of the metropolitan area. (See Figure IV-1). To the south is I-494, along which the airport is located, and also the largest share of recent commercial and residential development. I-494 extends northward at the western side of the metropolitan area, and upon completion it will meet I-94, which, together with I-694, encloses the northern portion. East-west I-694 eventually swings south to join the eastern extremity of I-494. Within this enclosed beltway is a major corridor, I-35W, running south of central Minneapolis to I-494 and the airport, and a portion of I-94 which is the major connection between the downtowns of Minneapolis and St. Paul. While the major portion of Minneapolis's development has been along its southern boundary, St. Paul has experienced recent commercial growth eastward where a major Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3-M) facility is located.

B. Public Transit

Public transportation in the Twin Cities consists of an extensive bus system, which was purchased with Federal aid by the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC) in 1970 from Twin City Lines. Its operations have been contracted to American Transit Enterprises Management Services Co. (ATE), a private managerial firm. Since it took over Twin City Lines, the MTC has

Figure IV-1



Grass L.

D A K O I T S A

Cotta Gro

increased bus route mileage by 50%, purchased several hundred new buses, undertaken a major advertising campaign, eliminated fares for senior citizens during off-peak hours, and started mini-bus services in the downtowns of St. Paul and Minneapolis. Ridership, which declined from 200 million in the late 1940's to 46 million in 1970, has now begun to rise. While 25% of all trips taken in the area are CBD oriented (14% Minneapolis, 11% St. Paul), the MTC share of total trips is only 3.2%.<sup>1</sup>

The population density in the metropolitan area ranks nineteenth among the 20 largest metropolitan areas. While the comparative aspect is not extremely significant, because of the manner in which SMSA's are defined, the low density of two central cities ten miles apart, each with its own suburban areas, helps to explain several other characteristics of the Twin Cities transportation situation: 1) The 1972 National Transportation Report prepared by the U.S. Department of Transportation revealed that the Twin Cities area has a smaller percentage of families without cars (12.9%) and a higher percentage of families with two cars (40.6%) than 11 other major metropolitan areas mentioned (including Los Angeles).<sup>2</sup> 2) A recent study by the Urban Institute placed the Twin Cities 7th highest in transportation cost for a moderate-income family of four among 18 large urban areas in the study.<sup>3</sup> 3) Trip distances have increased from an average of 2.2 miles in 1958 to a 1970 average of 4.9 miles,<sup>4</sup> and 2.7 daily trips are made per person, compared to 2.3 in 1958. 4) Trip destinations are widely dispersed. Less than one in six metropolitan workers is employed in the combined CBDs of Minneapolis and St. Paul. There have been no adequate studies of whether the work forces of the CBDs are actually growing.

The Twin Cities area cannot be seen yet as having an inefficient transportation system or facing a serious transportation crisis. Average travel time per trip actually decreased from 1958 to 1970; at the same time, trip length increased. A 1971 federally financed report on travel on I-35W south of downtown Minneapolis (the most heavily travelled corridor) stated:

In comparison to other major urban areas, congestion on the I-35W corridor is virtually non-existent. In the absence of accidents, rain storms, or snowy pavements, traffic seldom comes to a complete stop. Any stoppages are of a few seconds as compared to many minutes in Chicago, Los Angeles, or New York. Rather than peak periods of two or three hours, we have only 30 to 45 minutes of peak volumes.<sup>5</sup>

The optimistic evaluation of Twin City transportation is probably valid now, but most observers believe that, with the ending of the era of major freeway construction in the heavily urbanized region, the situation will become worse.<sup>6</sup> Future person trips (1990) in certain traffic corridors, as indicated in a consultant's memorandum to the Metropolitan Council, will exceed twice the design capacity of portions of the projected 1980 highway network.<sup>7</sup>

The present bus system, which is geared mainly to travel to and within the downtown areas, is not expected to cope adequately with prospective transport needs. In 1970, only 14% of all travel destinations were to the Minneapolis CBD areas, and projections indicate that this will be reduced to 5% by the year 2000. Although over 12% of the families in the region do not own automobiles, only 3.2% of all trips were made by bus.

Most observers, including those we interviewed in the transport planning agencies, citizens' groups, and political office, recognize that there already exists a class which is severely disadvantaged with respect to transportation, and that the Twin Cities must plan for future transportation investment, not only to meet the needs of those individuals, but also to avert major congestion on existing facilities for all users.

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1. Metropolitan Council, Metropolitan Development Guide, "Transportation Policy Plan, Program" (St. Paul: 1973), p. 8
  2. 1972 National Transportation Report, U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D.C., 1972
  3. A Study of Comparative Urban Indicators: Conditions in 18 Large Metropolitan Areas, Urban Institute. Washington, D.C., 1972
  4. Metropolitan Council, Travel Behavior Inventory, 1970
  5. I-35W Urban Corridor Demonstration Project: Bus Metered Freeway System, Final Report. Prepared for Metropolitan Council, St. Paul, 1971
  6. "Building Incentives for Drivers to Ride", Citizens' League Report, 1973, p. 7
  7. Office of the City Coordinator, Rapid Transit for Minneapolis: An Interim Report, 1972, p. 20

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CHAPTER V  
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTATION  
PLANNING

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Over the past ten years, there have been ongoing efforts toward planning a transportation system for the Twin Cities metropolitan area. During this period, new institutions have been created which are directly involved in the planning process; others have been revised and reorganized; still others have been disbanded.

The major institutions currently operating in transportation planning have evolved from a long history of regional concern. That concern was first evident in an 1888 "Combined Plan" for Minneapolis and St. Paul, which called for the development of the two cities as one metropolitan area.<sup>1</sup> In 1927, the Metropolitan Regional Planning Association of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Environs was formed to stimulate regional planning efforts; this private organization, however, could not be sustained because of a lack of public support and adequate financial resources.<sup>2</sup> In the 1930's, the legislature established the Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District (MSSD) to provide sewage collection and treatment for an area that included the Twin Cities and adjacent suburbs. The Metropolitan Airports Commission was formed in 1943 to provide improved air traffic facilities to serve the metropolitan area.

In 1957, an important step was taken through the legislative creation of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC), the first such area-wide organization in the country authorized to levy a tax for operating purposes. The legislation allowed the MPC to "make plans for the physical, social, and economic development of the metropolitan area with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing coordinated and harmonious development of the area."<sup>3</sup> While the MPC could conduct studies and assist localities in coordinating plans, it had no positive implementing or review powers.

In mid-1961, with the financial assistance of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) and the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HFFA), the MPC, jointly with the Minnesota State Highway Department and other area planning and governmental bodies, undertook one of the nation's major land-use transportation studies. In its five-year duration, the Joint Program, which became the main function of the MPC as the area's 3-C's agency,<sup>4</sup> published a series of four principal reports which collectively constituted a metropolitan development guide. In 1967, the Joint Program concluded that the unusual transit problems of the Twin City area--no geographical barriers, two downtowns, two full-circle corridors with 17 potential radials, and a wide dispersal in trip destinations--combined to make rapid rail transit infeasible for the area. The report was issued without the endorsement of the Metropolitan Council.

There are several aspects of the Joint Program which are of relevance to our consideration of present planning in the Twin Cities. While



the study originally was designed to evaluate transportation-land-use relationships, the planners gradually recognized the necessity of a thorough study of other factors that might influence land use. In 1964, for instance, statements began to appear to the effect that transportation systems alone may not fundamentally influence the form or shape of metropolitan areas.<sup>5</sup> "If highly articulated metropolitan forms are to emerge, other development controls must be employed such as the reservation of open space or the limiting of public services such as sewer, water, fire, police, etc."<sup>6</sup> Of equal importance was the Joint Program planners' recognition of the need to integrate sound planning with the physical planning tasks that had been delegated to them. It was felt to be especially important that these tasks be conducted in a coordinated manner, by one staff charged with comprehensive planning.

A comparative study, Metropolitan Plan Making, is critical of the Joint Program in two major respects: first, the reports are characterized by a general vagueness which failed to translate the state's values and goals, including its call for multicentered commercial development, into actual plans; and second, there is a lack of technical mathematical analysis to substantiate its conclusions. This analysis, the study comments, is especially valid in the transportation plan, or lack of one, on the part of the Joint Program.<sup>7</sup>

While the MPC and Joint Program were conducting these studies, there emerged major sentiment for a more powerful comprehensive approach to the area's service problems. The limitations set upon the Joint Program staff certainly contributed to that sentiment. It was most apparent, however, in the inability of the MSSD to cope with the demand for sewer service in new and expanding communities. The discussions between suburban, city, and county officials concerning the sewerage issue gradually focused on discussions of the need for a state-created metropolitan agency for planning and service needs. A consensus was built around such an issue, with support coming from both city and suburban leaders, the MPC, business associations, the Citizens' League, and city area newspapers. The major opposition came from county officials, outer-ring suburbs, and out-state legislators.<sup>8</sup>

Greater impetus was given for legislative action by support from Governor Levander; legislative redistricting in 1965, which gave the area more representation; and the need for an adequate mechanism for compliance with the A-95 review requirements of the Bureau of the Budget. (Section 204(a) of the Demonstration Cities Act requires that all applications for federal grants or loans be submitted for review to an agency which is designated to perform metropolitan or regional planning for the area within which the assistance is to be used. BOB circular A-95 specifies federal requirements for such an agency.) The widespread support from most metropolitan concerns, as well as that from the Governor, was successful in gaining passage of legislation creating the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in the 1967 legislative session. This body, the Metropolitan Transit Commission, the Minnesota Highway Department, and the region's cities and counties, are now the major institutions involved in the transportation planning process.

A. Metropolitan Council

The Metropolitan Council consists of 14 members appointed by the Governor to staggered six-year terms, each representing two state senatorial districts (250,000 pop.) from the seven area counties encompassed by the Council (Hennepin, Ramsey, Anoka, Washington, Dakota, Scott, and Carver). The fifteenth member of the Council, the chairman, serves as the chief executive officer of the Council, at the pleasure of the Governor with the Senate's advice and consent.

Service on the Council by local officials is legally prohibited. While the Twin City community had lobbied for locally elected representatives, the arrangement which now exists was formulated as a compromise with the state legislature, a majority of which originally wished to see the Council function as a state agency. The Governor, Wendell Anderson, stated he favored an elected Council, and the Minnesota House of Representatives had already given preliminary approval to such a measure in the 1973 session. The Council is financed by a property-tax levy of up to a half mill per dollar. This amounted to over a million and a half dollars in 1972.

The legislation that created the Council was and is unique in the nation, both as to the mechanism for appointments and by the fact that it coupled regional planning with regional planning coordination. To accomplish the Council's coordinating role, local communities were required by the legislation to transmit their long-range, comprehensive land-use plans to the Referral Committee of the Council for evaluation, review, and comment. In 1971, counties came under the same requirements. They are similarly required to submit for evaluation any proposed matters which the Council determines to have metropolitan significance.

At the regional level, the legislation requires that special-purpose districts transmit their plans to the Council for review before they are implemented. It also provides the Council with the authority to stop implementation of part or all of these plans if the Council determines they are not consistent with metropolitan-wide planning. If a satisfactory conclusion cannot be reached between the Metropolitan Council and a special district, and a hearing and review process has been exhausted, the dispute must be resolved by the state legislature.

In 1969, legislation was passed placing the Sewer Board (MSSD) under the Council. This model, which has been suggested by the Citizens' League as one which should be adopted to resolve the current controversy over planning powers between the Metropolitan Council and the Metropolitan Transit commission (see VI below), places clear responsibility within the Council for the regional sewer plans. The Council appoints Sewer Board members and approves the Board's annual budget, while the Board implements the Council's plan and maintains and operates the regional system.

The Council has been designated by the U.S. Bureau of the Budget as the regional clearinghouse for applications by local communities and single-purpose districts to the Federal government for funding assistance. The Council has taken a more active role in the use of the A-95 requirement than most other such agencies. For example, under Council Policy 31, it can eliminate all Federal assistance to any community which refuses to take its share of Section 236 (U.S. Housing Act) low-income housing funds. The Council has determined that three-quarters of public housing should be located in the suburbs, and this is their mechanism for achieving that goal.

As a basis for carrying out the above functions, the Council was directed to draw up a metropolitan development guide for the future growth of the area. The guide has been formulated by the Development Guide Committee. This, in effect, established a decision-making process for the area, as Council members judge local and regional plans in relation to the Development Guide, or what they sometimes refer to as "the Bible." The Council has interpreted the objectives of the legislation to create a regional capability to plan and see that regional programs are carried out in accordance with their guide, but not to create a general-purpose metropolitan government.

When the Council was initiated, it was required, as part of its development guide, to prepare and maintain a transportation chapter including policy statements, goals, standards, programs, and maps prescribing guides for an orderly economic development. In 1971, legislation was passed directing the Metropolitan Transit Commission to implement the transportation elements of the transportation-development program as adopted by the Metropolitan Council and requiring Council approval for the MTC's issuance of revenue bonds.<sup>9</sup> The Council also possesses a large degree of control over MTC actions: it has the power to review and coordinate plans, to approve capital-improvement programs, and to pass on applications for Federal funds.

Although the Metropolitan Council did not undertake a formulation of a transportation chapter until 1971, it did attempt to organize a structure to advise the Council for the facilitation of the coordinated, comprehensive, and continuous planning of transportation programs. The 3-C's process had previously been a function of the Joint Program, and was therefore transferred as a function to the Council.

The resulting advisory structure, which took effect in 1969, is called the Transportation Planning Program (TPP). The TPP is a complex organization in which the agencies with authority and responsibility for implementation of transportation improvements participate through interagency agreements with the Metropolitan Council to propose the transportation section of the Metropolitan Development Guide and coordinate development of transportation improvements. By participating in the TPP, operating agencies can theoretically assure that the elements for which they are individually responsible interface properly with other elements of the transportation system and are coordinated within a total regional development framework. The TPP is composed of three committees: 1) The Management Committee, consisting of the Metropolitan Council Chairman, Minnesota Highway Department Commissioner, MTC Chairman, and representatives of the counties and municipalities of the region; 2) The Policy Advisory Committee, composed of elected officials representing the jurisdictions of the seven-county area; and 3) The Technical Advisory Committee, consisting of the chief technical officers from participating agencies and jurisdictions.

The TPP is looked upon by all involved as an inadequate mechanism to achieve coordination among the planning and implementing agencies. The MTC asserts that the TPP has no power, and that the Council has rejected every TPP Development Guide recommendation.<sup>10</sup> The Council, on the other hand, charges that the inability of Policy and Management Committee representatives to overcome their parochial attitudes and modal biases makes effective regional plan-making hopeless within the present institutional structure. The Citizens' League, an independent public research group, has commented that the explicit representation of highway interests on the management committee "makes it extremely difficult to discuss such a policy [mass transit]

without determining the extent to which such a policy would jeopardize their plans and future programs. . . This greatly reduces the possibilities of achieving balanced transportation decisions." Council members, who refer to the TPP as the "jelly fish," will readily admit to ignoring it. The only area of accomplishment for the TPP is in the Technical Advisory Committee, which is said to provide a forum for staff contacts and coordination at the technical level. The failures of the TPP have been further compounded by the current controversy between the Council and MTC over planning powers and transit plans. What might have been a forum for the transit-interested agencies to unite against the Highway Department has turned into a battleground between proponents of different transit plans.

#### B. Metropolitan Transit Commission

In 1967 the Minnesota Legislature passed the Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission Act, which legally prescribed and structured an agency set up two years earlier under a joint-powers agreement.

Although the MTC and Metro Council legislation were enacted in the same legislative session, the MTC Act, which was not nearly as controversial, passed much earlier than the Metropolitan Council Act, passed in the final days. With no certainty that Council legislation would eventually pass, the MTC Act gave the commission "power to plan, engineer, construct, equip, and operate transit systems, transit projects, or any parts thereof (emphasis added)."<sup>12</sup> The Council legislation also granted that body the power to plan a regional transportation system. The development of the current struggle over planning power, which will be discussed in detail later, began at this point.

The area designated as the metropolitan transit area is the identical seven counties which are members of the Metro Council. Eight MTC commissioners are appointed by the city councils of Minneapolis and St. Paul and by the executives of the other municipalities of the region. The ninth commissioner, the chairman, is appointed by the Governor. Representation is divided as follows:

Minneapolis: 2 commissioners  
Suburban Hennepin County: 2 commissioners  
St. Paul and the remainder of Ramsey County: 2 commissioners  
Washington and Anoka Counties: 1 commissioner  
Dakota, Scott, and Carver Counties: 1 commissioner.

The MTC is unique in its structure with a one-man, one-vote principle: each commissioner receives one vote for every 1,000 persons in his district.

The transit area itself, with this commission as the governing body has the legal status and powers of a public corporation.<sup>13</sup> Originally, the Commission had the power to levy and collect a wheelage tax to finance operations. However, in 1971 that tax was held to be unconstitutional, and the provisions of Section 14 of the MTC Act became effective: "An amount equivalent to the amount that would have been produced by the wheelage tax" is now collected by a direct property tax.

The MTC consists of the Operations Division, which has been contracted to a private management firm, and the Government Division, which is composed of four committees:

- 1) The Regulation Committee controls changes in transit operation such as fares, charters, routes.
- 2) The Operations Committee directs the five-year capital improvement plans of the bus lines.
- 3) The Finance and Administration Committee oversees matters relating to budget and general administration.
- 4) The Transit Development Committee is in charge of long-range transit planning and development.

The Transit Development Committee is responsible for both the improvement of existing transit facilities and services and planning for long-range transit development. In 1970, the consulting firm of Simpson and Curtin, under contract with MTC, recommended the purchase of the Twin City Lines Bus Company; this was accomplished in September, 1970, with the approval of the Metro Council. (The long-range planning activities of the MTC will be discussed in section VII below.)

The MTC has forgone the conventional public hearing as a method of community participation and criticism. Instead, it has relied on the 41-member Advisory Committee on Transit (ACT), a body whose representatives are chosen by the commissioners themselves. One of the ACT members serves on the Project Management Board of all studies as the public representative. In addition, the group hears presentations on all projects. However, members of the MTC and of ACT admit that the body is an ineffective mechanism for citizen input and, as a result, has been largely ignored by the commissioners over the past year. Meetings are now held infrequently, and attendance never reaches 50%.

### C. State Highway Department

The Minnesota State Highway Department has constitutional and legislative authorization and responsibility to establish, locate, improve, maintain, and reconstruct a system of trunk highways in Minnesota, including the metropolitan areas. The Highway Department is administered by a single commissioner, who is appointed by the Governor subject to Senate approval.

Under local-consent legislation passed in 1969, the Highway Department must gain local approval before beginning any construction. On matters dealing with the interstate system, any local objection to highway plans must be arbitrated in the Metropolitan Council. State highway controversies are to be resolved before a panel of state judges. While the Metro Council has gained a handle over highway planning through the A-95 power, it has never been necessary to resort to a negative review of a highway funding application. Thus far, the Metro Council has been able to negotiate its differences with the Highway Department, with resulting revisions in highway plans, and has not been forced into a real test of its highway powers.

This seemingly uncommon interchange between the Metro Council and the Highway Department is due in part to the present Commissioner of Highways. He is Ray Lapagaard, a professional management specialist who has previously served as commissioner of three other state departments. Lapagaard's attitude is somewhat atypical for a highway commissioner; he is now allowing the Metro Council to plan both the highway and transit systems for the metropolitan area, with his department's role limited to the provision of technical assistance. Most recently, the Metro Council refused to approve the I-94 extension to the northwest of Minneapolis until such time as transit is planned for the corridor. Similarly the Council has cut back "system 14" of the old MAPC, a system of radials and diagonals, to a new "system 16," which eliminates the diagonals through and near the two downtowns. The Highway Department has not yet attempted to block this change.

Lapagaard's attitude has not necessarily permeated the bureaucracy over which he presides. A highway department official, who has been active in coordinating Twin City transportation planning, expressed his hesitancy in turning over planning power at a time when power relationships are so ill-defined. The TPP represents the Highway Department's participation in the transit planning process at the metropolitan level; from the previous discussion about the TPP one can correctly ascertain that the effect of this particular input channel is minimal.

There presently exists a proposal of Governor Anderson's Inter-departmental Transportation Task Force to create a Department of Transportation for Minnesota. The new agency would consolidate all transportation activities on a statewide level to a single department, with responsibility and authority to plan the overall transportation needs of the state. The Task Force indicated that a state department of transportation would be effective in coping with the need for comprehensive, multimodal planning at the state level. Chances for passage appear to be strong.

#### D. The State Legislature

The state legislature can, at least for the time being, exercise as much control as it wishes over the transportation plans for the metropolitan area. It can decide between the alternative plans presented by the Metro Council and MTC, or it could alternatively define the planning powers of each, an action which would in effect amount to the choice of a transit plan. At this time, however, the legislature is ill-prepared to make such a decision. Because the legislature, for the first time, is meeting on an annual basis, several senior members left office last year. The chairmen of the urban affairs committees in both houses are new, as are the chairmen of the transportation sub-committees. Because of this lack of experience most legislators are now hesitant to exercise the power they hold over choosing a transportation system. Another proposal before the legislature is one to make the Metro Council elective; it is supported by Council members, the Governor, and most city legislators. Out-state legislators and some local officials feel that an election of councilors will serve to increase the Council's power, and they fear the possibility of a strengthened rival political force.

### E. Municipalities

The tradition of Minnesota government is favorable to strong legislative bodies and weak executives. This is still most evident in the Minneapolis city government, which probably has the weakest mayor system in the country. St. Paul had a commission system--that is, no executive at all--until last year, when a new city charter which substituted a strong mayor system went into effect.

The development of the Metro Council can be seen in part as necessitated by the lack of concern for regional issues on the part of municipalities. The cities have been hesitant in extending services to the suburbs for fear of raising municipal debts. Similarly, the cities have never actively pursued the creation of alliances with each other, with surrounding communities, or in the state legislature. As a result they are now finding their political "clout" at a minimum when confronting long-neglected regional problems. The cities' representation on the Council is actually more than adequate--they have eight representatives among 15 members, when their population is a bit less than half that of the area embraced by the Council. The cities' complaints concerning the Council's actions can be more easily attributed to their failure to articulate their interests effectively through their representatives than to a lack of concern on the part of the Council. The localities' main concern is really a loss in their powers to govern their respective areas, and an inability to utilize any political tools to minimize that loss.

1. Minneapolis The city of Minneapolis has a strong council system of 13 nonpartisan aldermen elected by districts every two years. The city is administered by the City Coordinator, who serves at the pleasure of the Council, in turn appoints the Directors of Planning and Development, Public Works, Traffic Engineering, and Transportation Planning. The Council also chooses the City Attorney, City Clerk, Assessor, and Engineer. The mayor of Minneapolis possesses few formal powers; he can appoint only the Chief of Police, a Director of Civil Defense, and his own secretary. He or his representative sits on the Board of Estimates, the Park Board, and the Library Board. The former mayor, Charles Stenvig, had developed considerable influence through his position on the Board of Estimates, which has budgetary responsibilities. Through this position, he was recently able to block a proposal for a downtown domed stadium, a plan which was favored by the Council of Alderman and downtown businessmen.

The city is involved in transportation planning in a number of ways--through municipal roads; as a planner for its own downtown rapid-transit people-mover system and skywalks;<sup>14</sup> as a participant through its representatives on the MTC; and through subsidizing the operation of the MTC's downtown 10¢ "Q-T" service. The City Coordinator, Thomas Thompson, together with his staff, are strong advocates of the MTC's fixed-rail proposal. Their perspective is reported to have been considerably influenced by Wayne Thompson, a planner for BART in San Francisco, whom the Dayton Development Corporation of Minneapolis brought to that city in the early 1960's to lobby for mass transit. The City coordinator's office has produced a report, Rapid Transit for Minneapolis, which pleads

the case for rail rapid transit as the only transportation form capable of serving the needs of the downtown area. The Coordinator's staff refer to this report as a "lobbying document." The Coordinator's office has also been involved in planning for a "people-mover" system, a plan to link 40-60 downtown blocks with some form of rapid transit along a fixed guideway. The plan for this project was funded by the Federal Urban Mass Transportation Administration, with the local one-third share equally divided between the city and the Downtown Council, an organization which represents the major downtown business interests. The planning for this system assumes the existence of the MTC's rail terminals, a scheme which is not yet settled.

In any case, the city cannot apply for the necessary Federal funds for the people-mover project without Metro Council approval. That approval is unlikely until the major metropolitan transit decisions are made. The Planning and Development Department of the Coordinator's office has also been involved in the planning for an extensive network of skywalks. While the presently existing skywalks were all privately financed, the Planning Department is now programming public assistance through a "benefit assessment district," with a proposal that the properties benefiting from the publicly built skywalks should be assessed at a higher rate.

2. St. Paul The city of St. Paul was governed by a commission form of city government until 1972, at which time it was converted to a strong mayor-weak council system. Under its new charter, the seven-member nonpartisan Council is elected at large every two years. The transportation planning function is vested in the City Planner's office, whose chief official is appointed by the Mayor. As in Minneapolis, the city has taken an active role in the plans for a skywalk system in subsidizing a low-cost downtown bus system, and in supporting the MTC's fixed-rail plan. The city is now engaging in an attempt to locate an AMTRAK terminal on the same site as a proposed MTC station; Federal approval of such a project would strengthen the position of the MTC advocates.

The present mayor, Lawrence Cohen, has been a strong vocal opponent of the Metro Council and its proposals. He argues that the Council is not capable of making decisions for localities, that it has little knowledge of political and social realities within specific communities, and that it meets local community objections with great arrogance. He says the Council should spend its time preparing a more adequate development guide on the basis of which local decision-makers can evaluate local programs. He also argues against the Council's involvement in social planning. His view is that such programs as the housing policy have deflected the Council from its concern for shaping developmental growth. Specifically regarding the Council's transit plans, which call for bus ways, the mayor argues that such a proposal will induce sprawl and will detract from the development of the two downtown areas. With adequate rail transit, specifically the MTC rapid transit plan, Cohen foresees the development of a residential community in downtown St. Paul, though this is a region with no tradition of downtown living.



F. Counties

The seven counties of the legally defined metropolitan area, five of which are included in the SMSA, are administrative agencies of the state, responsible for providing a variety of services which vary from county to county. Common to all are provision of judicial services, supervision of elections, collection of taxes, construction and maintenance of county highways, and welfare services. When county or municipal highways have a metropolitan effect or are eligible for Federal assistance, the applications must be submitted to the Metro Council for approval.

Each county, with the exception of Ramsey, is governed by a nonpartisan, elected, five-member board of commissioners. Ramsey County, whose seat is St. Paul, elects a seven-member county board, whose chairman is the St. Paul mayor.

Minnesota counties are weaker than those of most states, and their limited interests have been directed more toward the provision of social services than toward transportation and related physical planning. Hennepin County, whose county seat is Minneapolis, has been more aggressive than most in assuming urban services, although its attention has not been directed toward transportation.

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1. Alan Altshuler, The City Planning Process (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 10
  2. Roscoe C. Martin, Metropolis in Transition: Local Government Adaptation to Metropolitan Crowding (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 52
  3. Chapter 468, 1957 Minnesota Session Laws
  4. The 1962 Federal Aid Highway Act requires that, in areas of more than 50 thousand population, "transportation projects are based on a continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively with states and local communities" (emphasis added). The agency designated to have responsibility for this function is called the 3-C's agency.
  5. David Boyce, Norman Day, Chris McDonald, Metropolitan Plan Making (Philadelphia: Regional Science Research Institute, 1970) p. 344
  6. Goals for the Development of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, Report No. 3, Joint Program, November, 1965
  7. Boyce et. al., op. cit., p. 369
  8. Baldinger, Planning and Governing the Metropolis: the Twin Cities Experience (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 90-124

9. Chapter 830, 1971 Minnesota Session Laws
10. Public statement by MTC Chairman Kelm on the "Role and Relationship of the Metropolitan Council and MTC," January 22, 1973
11. The Key Thing to Build is Usage, Citizens' League, 1971
12. Minnesota Session Act, 26A, 1971
13. Minnesota Statutes, 1967; 473, A. 05, Subd. 7
14. Skywalks are enclosed walkways extended over streets to connect buildings at a second-floor level.

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CHAPTER VI

TRANSPORTATION CONTROVERSIES

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The major controversy which now exists between the Metro Council and the Metropolitan Transit Commission has already been referred to several times in this report; this chapter will explore the generation of that controversy, the interests involved, and the implications for the institutions concerned in the planning process.

The legislation creating the MTC was passed in 1967 with no certain knowledge that a metropolitan council bill would be enacted; it therefore provided that:

the commission, with the cooperation of the Twin Cities metropolitan planning commission or its successor in authority and the Department of Highways, shall develop a plan for a complete, integrated mass transit system for the metropolitan area.<sup>1</sup>

The Metropolitan Council was likewise directed to develop a transportation chapter in its development guide. In its first two years, the Council was preoccupied with other matters and did not take great interest in transportation; it approved the 1971 MTC report entitled *Transit in Transportation*. The first of the major concepts introduced in this report called for a "family of vehicles," with rapid transit operating on its own exclusive right of way (fixed guideway or bus way) as the backbone of the system. The report also further defined the transit corridors between the "major diversified centers" identified by the Joint Program. The concepts of this report served as the transportation chapter of the Development Guide. In the same year, the legislature enacted a law which directed the MTC to implement the transportation plan of the Council. While this law was envisioned as a clarification of ambiguities in the planning powers of the two agencies, it only served to confuse them further.

After the council approval of *Transit in Transportation* in 1971, the MTC contracted with the consulting firm of Simpson and Curtin to determine the appropriate technological mode to serve as the system's backbone. In the same year, 1971, several new members of the Metro Council took office, including David Graven, a law professor and former candidate for governor. Under Graven's chairmanship, the Development Guide Committee attempted to write a new transportation chapter of greater specificity for the Development Guide.

Graven indicates that the earlier transportation guide shed little light by which the Council could evaluate any MTC plans. Furthermore, he argues that there existed within the MTC a rail-transit bias which might preclude serious consideration of other alternatives. This was particularly evident in the MTC's choice of consultant and in their failure originally to consider bus ways as an alternative, until pressured to do so by the renewed interest on the part of the Council.

The final study focused on five systems: reduced rail, transit expressway, activity-center transit, personal rapid transit (PRT), and bus ways. The first three systems are various forms of rapid-rail operations, differing primarily in vehicle size. PRT was given at least token consideration as a result of the continued efforts and pressure by J. Edward Anderson, a professor of mechanical engineering at the University of Minnesota and a leading proponent of PRT systems. The actual bias was also seen to be a product of both the organizational growth and personnel of MTC.<sup>2</sup> Since taking over the bus company, the MTC had contracted operations to a private management firm; their main preoccupation and chief concern was therefore their planning responsibilities. The planning efforts were largely controlled by John Jamieson, an engineer and former highway commissioner. Jamieson, long a rapid-rail travel advocate, had evidently been influenced by the BART example, as had the previously mentioned Minneapolis City Coordinator. The MTC chairman, Douglas Kelm, was similarly seen by those we interviewed as a rail advocate.

Meanwhile, during 1972, the Council conducted its own hearings on transportation. It utilized a series of open hearings, public hearings, and the limited use of a consulting group, Barton-Aschman, to answer specifically directed technical questions. Barton-Aschman had previously recommended a bus way system for the Milwaukee area. The now obvious divergence of the two agencies exposed the ineffectiveness of the Transportation Planning Program to coordinate policy; its uselessness was admitted by all. In September of 1972, the Metro Council made public its transportation plan, extending to the year 1990. It called for an extensive system of express buses or bus ways, a plan which, in effect, rejected the earlier "family of vehicles" concept that the Council and MTC had agreed upon. Graven calls the "family of vehicles" concept a euphemism for numerous transfers in a single trip. The Council plan also proposed the completion of the "System 16" highway plan. The bus way proponents stress the flexibility that the area will still possess in its capability to react to and integrate new technological concepts into a rapid transit system at a later date.

Two months later, in November, 1972, the MTC released its \$1.1 billion transit plan calling for 40-passenger automated vehicles as the backbone of the system. The vehicles would run on exclusive, but unspecified, guideways, presumably rail. (See Figure VI-1 for map of proposed system.) One commission member, Loring Staples of Plymouth, abstained on the vote, citing his disbelief in the consultants' patronage estimates.

The MTC proposed that the one-third local share for its system should be raised jointly by the MTC, representing the municipalities, and the state for the capitol and university stations. The MTC share would be raised in one of the following manners:

- 1) A .13 cents per kilowatt-hour electric utility tax
- 2) A .2 per cent income tax
- 3) A .3 per cent sales tax
- 3) A 2.5 mill property tax

The Metro Council has yet to determine financing mechanisms for its proposal.

In theory, the Council at this point (November, 1972) had the right and responsibility to review the MTC plan. However, the Council already had its own plan and rejected the notion that the MTC had any role in the system planning process. Had the Metro Council rejected the plan outright, the MTC could have taken the dispute before the state legislature, as re-

# SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 1972 - 1990 PLAN A

- FIXED GUIDEWAY STATIONS
- MAJOR BUS FACILITIES
- FIXED GUIDEWAY STAGE 1
- - - FIXED GUIDEWAY STAGE 2
- BUSWAY
- - - EXPRESS BUS WITH / PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
- EXPRESS BUS

Plan A maximizes the use of freeway rights-of-way and air rights over commercial streets for fixed guideway and busway locations.

Source: Metropolitan Transit Commission

Mission: Transit Development

Program: 1973-1990, 1973




FIGURE 7

Figure VI-1

quired by the legislation which created the Council. With the Council refusal to review, the MTC had no alternative but to attempt to go before the legislature. That the legislature will ultimately decide the question now seems to be accepted by both agencies. In the 1973 session, the MTC proposed legislation to: 1) allow it to begin to collect taxes to finance the proposed system; and 2) clarify the structural relationships between the two agencies allowing the MTC the right to plan, including the right of choice of mode. The Council in turn has proposed legislation bringing the MTC under the Council and strictly limiting its duties to those of an operating agency. The Metropolitan Council has traditionally taken a low profile before the legislature, for fear of being seen as a potential rival for power; it is therefore attempting to let its allies (interest groups, legislators) fight for this legislation.

The 1973 legislature adjourned without making a decision concerning these proposals; the committee chairmen involved recognized the complexity of the issues involved and felt that they would be capable of making a better-reasoned decision if the determination could be deferred until the next session.

The ensuing political controversy that now exists is being fought by some over the issue of choice of transit mode and by others on the structural questions. The Metro Council argues that only its plan has effectively integrated transportation planning with comprehensive physical and social planning; that the Twin Cities' low density could not support the kind of system the MTC proposes (less than five per cent of the residents and one per cent of the land will be within walking distance of the 44 proposed stations); that the MTC program represents an unwarranted major investment at a time when technology in the field is rapidly changing; and that a limited rail transit system will be unable to attract a significant number of vehicle trips in the area.

MTC figures indicate that three per cent, or 55 million, of all trips are now made on public transit in the seven-county area, and six per cent of all trips in the area are provided by bus service. A fixed guideway operating in 1985 would carry 110 million passengers annually, and if high-intensity development takes place in terminal locations, 166 million by the year 2000.

The MTC states that only its fixed guideway system is capable of encouraging the kind of regional diversified centers that previous Council policy had envisioned, thus generating high transit usage in these well-served areas. Only the guarantee of permanent guideway facilities in defined corridors will ensure the major development of terminal areas. Bus ways, the MTC charges, have few developmental implications. Another service problem which rail advocates envision is the inability of buses, even on bus ways, to operate under disadvantageous climatic conditions. "Fixed guideway systems allow for sophisticated control systems to insure train separation and, therefore, offer a distinct advantage in reliability of operation during unfavorable weather conditions."<sup>3</sup> The MTC also points out that a bus way proposal would encourage increased highway construction near or in downtown areas, as well as totally congesting the downtown streets with buses during the rush hour.

The first Council argument, regarding its concern for comprehensive planning, is really as much a question of the emphasis one wishes to place on social objectives in planning as a distinction between the two proposed systems. The Council has adopted a policy to encourage the dispersal of low-income people throughout the metropolitan area. Their trans-

portation plan is reflective of this policy, in that it provides the greatest service and flexibility to suburban areas and corridors which are not well serviced now. The MTC plan, without this policy as a major consideration, serves those demands which now exist and will tend toward concentrating or diminishing the dispersal rate of urban dwellers. Thus a body with control over only the physical transit planning has looked upon the planning problems in a different manner than one concerned with both social and physical policy.

Because the MTC plan is oriented around the core city, and apparently because of the perceived prestige associated with being a region with rail rapid transit, the city governments as well as the Downtown Council (a downtown businessmen's group) favor the MTC plan. We found the prestige of rail rapid transit, or subways, to be a very real and very important consideration to these city actors, so much so that it seemed to outweigh the issues of potential cost and likely service. The city officials also fear that the downtowns will be unable to handle the number of additional buses that the Council plan projects.

While the Downtown Council, which represents strictly downtown interests, supports the MTC plan, the Chamber of Commerce, whose membership is metropolitan in scope, favors the Council plan. This is the first time these groups have differed on an issue since their affiliation with each other in the 1950's. Donald Dayton, the owner of the largest department stores in both city and suburban areas and the man who brought the pro-rail lobbyists to the Twin Cities, voted in favor of the Council plan in his capacity as Council member. Similarly, Jack Dunne, vice-president of Northwest National Bank and former president of the Chamber of Commerce, voted for the Council plan. These two individuals are usually acknowledged as the most influential leaders of the business community, and their support is presumed to be indicative of a wider feeling in that community.

Another influential group within the Twin City community is the Citizens' League, an independent nonpartisan, educational organization of 3,600 members (mostly businessmen and professionals) which specializes in questions of government planning, finance, and organization. The degree of attention which seems to be directed toward this group by city and state officials is both a measure of the quality of the research it conducts and the openness of, and public interest in, the political process which seem to characterize the political culture in the state of Minnesota. The most recently issued Citizens' League report is Building Incentives for Drivers to Ride, a recommendation for a program of noncapital improvements to relieve present and projected transportation congestion. The thrust of the report is toward the encouragement of public policies which will influence transport demand, rather than simply responding to existing and projected demand. Such policies could include parking limitations, car pool incentives, and an automobile-user tax. The League suggests that overall transportation planning responsibility be vested in the Metro Council, and its primary work should be directed toward such noncapital, demand-influencing improvements. The work of the League is widely reported in the press and seems to be seriously respected in the legislature.

J. Edward Anderson, the professor at the University of Minnesota, and proponent of what is called personal rapid transit, which he defines as

". . .that class of fixed-guideway systems in which automated vehicles no larger than small automobiles which carry people and/or goods nonstop between any pair of stations in a network of slim guideways . . .PRT vehicles are occupied by a single individual or by people travelling together may be captive to the guideway or have the capability of operating on both the guideway and street systems, i.e. dual mode."<sup>4</sup>

Professor Anderson's residence and work in the area have not been without influence. He has many friends and associates on the Council and in the legislature, and by the constant exposure Anderson generates for his system through public relations and educational campaigns, many citizens have been converted to PRT advocacy and membership in a pro-PRT organization called the Citizens Transit Council. The Metro Council proposal is seen by Anderson as somewhat of a victory for PRT, insomuch as it does not commit the Twin Cities to a fixed system of multipassenger vehicles.

The controversy will be resolved in the state legislature, where its fate is uncertain. The inner-city representatives are likely to support the MTC plan because it clearly is more core-city oriented. The out-state, rural legislators are likely also to support the MTC, not because of any belief in that system's superiority, but because they wish to see the growing, and possibly competing, power of the Metro Council curbed. The suburban legislators, it appears, will support the Council and its plan, because it provides more adequate service to the outlying areas. The Governor is remaining neutral in the struggles. He apparently cannot afford to commit himself to either side at present, as both the Council members and the MTC's chairman were his own political appointees. Albert Hofstede, chairman of the Council, served as Governor Anderson's campaign manager, and Douglas Kelm, MTC's chairman, is the brother of the Governor's executive secretary and chief political adviser. The State Highway Department is committed to the Council's plan. This can be attributed, in part, to Commissioner Lapagaard's strong regional outlook, and also to the simple fact that the Council's plan ensures continued highway construction (bus ways) in the metropolitan area.

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1. 26A Minn. S. A. 473A. 06 Sub 1
  2. See The MTC Long Range Planning Process: We're not Getting There, Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 1972
  3. Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, Transit Development Program 1973-1990: p. 87
  4. Program, International Conference on Personal Rapid Transit, "Progress, Problems, and Potential," May 2-4, 1973, Minneapolis



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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

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The Federal government is strongly committed today to encouraging a strong and close relationship between the urban transportation planning process and comprehensive area-wide planning. While the evolution of planning structures in the Twin Cities demonstrates a clear movement toward this goal, it has not yet been reached, and there is some danger that an unfavorable legislative decision could undermine that evolutionary movement.

At the present time, the Metro Council has a two-pronged hold on transportation projects--the first through its own planning capabilities in its formulation of the Development Guide, the second through its mandate to review all applications for Federal funds under the "A-95" process. At least until now, the latter function has been more significant, for no part of the Development Guide's transportation chapter has yet been implemented. The control through review that the Council exercises, which is usually, but sometimes only peripherally, based on Development Guide priorities, is certainly its strongest present power in the transportation area.

It should be emphasized again here that the theoretical statutory powers of the Council are far greater than those prevailing in most U.S. metropolitan areas. Most, important, the Minnesota legislation establishing the Council provides a means by which disputes can be resolved. First, the Council review process gives it greater influence over the other metropolitan agencies and the municipalities and counties than that held by most councils of government. Second, when this review process fails to resolve a controversy, the statute provides that the legislature will settle the question.<sup>1</sup> While this may be an unwieldy process, it nonetheless is an arrangement which provides for ultimate authoritative decisions. The typical COG has only the review powers given it by the Federal A-95 process, which extends only to Federally aided projects, and there is no provision for settlement at the regional or state level when disagreements exist; the only settlement comes from the Federal decision. Unquestionably, this leads to a very cautious attitude on the part of the COG. Furthermore, given the fact that most COG governing boards are made up of representatives of the local governments encompassed by the COG, the professional staff is wary of seriously conflicting with municipal objectives. The fact that the

Metro Council's membership is appointed by the Governor further encourages an independent and objective outlook on the part of the staff and its governing body.

In the transportation area, however, there have been serious limits so far on the capacity of the Metro Council to assure comprehensive, consistent decisions. In addition to the problem of ambiguity in the powers of the Council vis-a-vis the MTC and the State Highway Department, the Council is seriously lacking in powers to control development, particularly at the fringe of the metropolitan area. Land-use controls continue to be a function of municipal and county government, and no adequate means has been devised to give the Council any more than a limited review and recommendation authority in this area. Thus, while transportation policies and plans theoretically can be made to conform to developmental objectives, the Council's capacity to assure that development itself conforms to those objectives is small.

In some limited ways, the Council has attacked the developmental problem. For example, its public housing policy, which is implemented as a part of its A-95 review powers, calls for distribution of public housing throughout the metropolitan area, not concentration within the inner cities. Such a policy, if it proves successful, will have an impact on transportation needs; and the Council is clearly moving toward relating these two policy areas. But this is a limited aspect of land use.

There is still no one agency responsible for all transportation planning in the metropolitan area. The State Highway Department plans highways; counties and municipalities plan local streets and pedestrian ways and handle traffic management; and it is still unclear who plans transit. Some functions, such as parking and the control of private demand on public transportation facilities, are not clear public responsibilities, but are largely the product of individual private decisions. The Council now has authority to review all transportation planning, if the Council itself deems such plans to have area-wide implications. Council supporters argue that planning activities would be more effective if they were integrated into a single agency. At present, the municipalities can utilize their planning authority as a political weapon against the Council, as is the case with Minneapolis's intention to build a downtown people-mover which will align with proposed MTC terminals, and St. Paul's consideration of an AMTRAK station along the same MTC lines. The Highway Department is cooperating because of the less narrowly functional attitudes of key personnel; such cooperation would not be automatic under other administrations or in other states. Attempts to bring the agencies together in a cooperative planning process, through the TPP, have been a failure; the evidence indicates that the planning process will be fragmented as long as no one agency has responsibility for all transportation planning. The TPP experience suggests that there is a possibility of agencies' working together at the technical level, but policy makers can use such a coordinating body only for the articulation of their agencies' views. This coordination problem is now further confused in the Twin Cities as a result of the uncertainty which surrounds the issue of transit planning and programming responsibility before any transportation program can move ahead.

The problem of definition of authority in the Twin Cities area is fully recognized by most participants and observers in the region. There seems to be general agreement that the Council should have review powers over broad plans of the operating agencies, and that these plans must conform to the broad planning objectives set forth in the Development Guide. The question that has not been resolved is the extent of the planning powers of the operating agencies, particularly the MTC. The desirability of an independent review power for the Council seems clear. The granting of detailed planning powers to the Council seems questionable, since the Council would then find itself reviewing its own work.

Assurances must be made that whatever governmental body or bodies are vested with overall comprehensive and transportation planning will be responsive to the citizens of the region governed. This is an especially difficult problem for the Federal government to take an interest in, for the responsiveness of a particular institution is not only dependent upon its structure and procedures, but upon the political culture in which it operates. It is not difficult for DOT to identify structural requirements; it is another matter to measure the effectiveness and responsiveness of these structures.

The Metro Council has operated for its five years as an appointed body, with its members chosen by the Governor representing senatorial districts which coincide with no other jurisdictional boundaries. This arrangement has resulted in what most people consider high-quality leadership in the Council, most, if not all, of whom have a strong regional perspective. Their independence has generated much hostility on the part of local officials and some state legislators, who see their own power slipping away to the Council. This, however, is probably inevitable if a metropolitan body is to have any decision-making capability.

The MTC, on the other hand, is composed of local elected officials or their direct appointees. Although they serve on a metropolitan body, they cannot realistically be expected to represent a regional interest, if their position is dependent upon loyalty to a particular political jurisdiction.

Metro Council members, as well as the Governor, now support substitution of an elected Metro Council. If such a measure is enacted, the Council members may well be forced to sacrifice some regional and independent outlook in response to local pressure. However, on the whole the Council will be a stronger body in the community, insomuch as its mandate comes directly from the people. In fact, most opposition to the direct proposal comes from out-state legislators who fear the emergence of a competing political force. Basing our judgment on the experience of the MTC and COG's in other areas, the parochialism which can result in direct elections might be minimized by restricting membership on the Council to persons who hold no other local office, and separating council district boundaries from other jurisdictional

lines.<sup>2</sup> Finally, we must point out that the Council has been able to operate effectively as an appointed body.

When such metropolitan bodies are structured along a "one man, one vote" principle, and they all can be legally required to do so, the central city--or cities, in this case--will almost always be outvoted by the heavier suburban representation. The central cities in the Twin Cities are now represented by eight of the 15 Council members, but this would be altered to a minority position if the Council becomes elective. It is therefore imperative that the structure's districts be apportioned in such a way as to minimize the accountability of representatives to already existing political jurisdictions.

Federal requirements indicate that transportation decisions must be viewed by the reviewing agency in their total metropolitan context. This has been interpreted to mean that the social and environmental impacts of transportation decisions must be considered, including their effects on those who are displaced by any transportation decision. At the present time, highway-project relocation assistance is provided through the State Highway Department, with the assistance of local housing authorities. It has not yet been resolved who will have these responsibilities when transit construction begins. The Metro Council has the capability of assuming leadership in this area through its housing policy plan and program, a Development Guide chapter for which is now being formulated.

The state of Minnesota and the Twin Cities have taken a fairly progressive view in relation to the distribution of benefits resulting from transport investment. The "Fiscal Disparities Act," which provides that a portion of any increased tax revenue resulting from development taking place in any one part of the seven-county area be redistributed to the total area, is indication of the state's concern in this matter. The law is now being challenged in the courts and has not yet taken effect. There are moves, however, to exempt special tax districts (such as transit) from fiscal disparities.

The Metro Council is still unclear in its plan for financing its proposed system. It does make clear in its policy statements, however, that "the cost of the system should be borne, where possible, in relation to the benefits of the system, but it should not rest heavily on low income groups."<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, it states as Council policy that "transportation planning, programming, and legislation should be directed toward reduction and possible eventual elimination of the use of the property tax as a source of transportation revenue."<sup>4</sup>

As mentioned previously, the MTC plan envisions that the local one-third share would be raised jointly by the MTC and benefiting municipalities, with contributions from the state for the capital and university stations. There are no specific plans for relating costs to benefits, unless it could be accomplished through the Fiscal Disparities Act.

On the whole, we can conclude that the two structures involved in the planning and programming process have a high degree of capability toward resolving the cost-benefit problem; it is another matter as to whether they will actually utilize those capabilities.

Those agencies involved in the planning process have not yet developed an adequate mechanism to ensure that the viewpoints of independent, concerned citizens are included in the planning process. The MCT's citizens' advisory group, ACT, was previously described as a body chosen by the MTC with little direction given to its activities. Under such an arrangement, it is quite possible to prevent an adequate representation of varying viewpoints. As a result of the group's total lack of professional support, it can be incapable of dealing with serious technical issues. These structural weaknesses are borne out by the almost total invisibility of the group in the current struggle.

The Metro Council utilizes an extensive public-hearing process both during the formulation state and the review process of Development Guide chapters. An advisory committee is formed from among those interested citizens attending the hearings; it, however, has no official status and is provided with no technical support. The TPP has no citizen participation, and does not actively solicit the views of individuals or groups other than those in agencies involved in planning or building portions of the system.

While the structural basis of participation is very weak, the nature of the Minnesota political process lessens the absolute necessity of such a defined structure as might be crucial in other parts of the country. The Citizens' League, the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, Professor Anderson, and various interested groups are all able to influence the decision-making process, because the system is receptive enough to listen seriously to their views. However, these participants all have the financial and professional resources; such is not the case within communities. In summary, such an informal process as exists in the Council, or in a defined but structurally dependent mechanism such as the MTC, cannot seriously consider the legitimate inputs and grievances of unorganized groups and independent, but not technically versed, individuals.

That the planning process in the Twin Cities is well advanced beyond that which exists in most other urban areas is quite clear. In moving ahead, however, the legislature has failed to coordinate the responsibilities of the various agencies in an effective and clear way, with resulting conflict and confusion. The coordination which exists in planning between the highway and transit modes is not legally mandated, and the present arrangement could collapse at any time. If the controversy is solved in a manner that does define, but does not diminish, the

power that the Council perceives itself as possessing, the Twin Cities will be able to continue to move ahead toward the implementation of a true metropolitan plan. It is quite another matter, and certainly not our role, to evaluate whether that plan can best serve the metropolitan area.

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1. It is interesting to note that in Minnesota, despite the fact that it has a "strong" governor in terms of formal powers compared to most other states, it seems to be generally accepted that the resolution of such conflicts is an appropriate job for the legislature, not the governor, as would be the case in some other states.
  2. Another protective device might be to have the Council members run from districts, but be elected at large, as is the case in Dade County, Florida.
  3. Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Development Guide (St. Paul: Metropolitan Council, 1973), p. 31.
  4. Ibid, p. 32.

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APPENDIX A

MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL INTERVIEWS

March 26-30, 1973

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J. Edward Anderson, Mechanical Engineering Department, University  
of Minnesota

Camille Andre, Metropolitan Transit Commission

Oliver Byrum, Metropolitan Council

Charles Burrill, Minnesota State Highway Department

Lawrence Cohen, Mayor, City of St. Paul

Thoms Duffey, Minneapolis Downtown Council

David Graven, Metro Council Member

James Hetland, Former Chairman of Metro Council

Ted Kolderie, Citizens' League

William Krog, Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce

Spenser Mack, Mayor's Office, City of Minneapolis

Robert Moffit, Minneapolis Director of Environmental Control,  
City of Minneapolis

Thomas Scott, Political Science Department, University of Minnesota

John Tomlinson, Minnesota State Representative

Dan Wascoe, Minneapolis Tribune

Betty Wilson, Minneapolis Star

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APPENDIX B

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